I just don’t think this is possible. How would you say “oneself” using a word that involves “soul”? Personally I am satisfied the two contexts are so different that nothing much is lost if we translate them differently.
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Yes, that must be part of the problem. Also, some people who are victims of abuse or have a lot of guilt and all embracing self-loathing might think of the not-self teachings as a kind of invitation to practice a kind of mental suicide. So rather than learning to see and accept the things that arise and pass away in their minds with a kindly and detached attitude, they practice strong aversion toward the thoughts they loath and detest, and push them all away in an impossible attempt not to think anything at all.
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This would apply only to new Buddhists, obviously, not traditional Buddhists. For the population at large, I couldn’t say.
But for those who come to stay at monasteries and do retreats, I would say it is significantly greater. My guess would be maybe a quarter or a half might have a clinical-level psychological disorder.
To be clear, many of these people have been diagnosed and are under treatment, but many more are not, and as someone who is not qualified to make a diagnosis, this is just an impression.
In my time as a monk I’ve seen everything from mild depression to someone having to be strapped down in a lockup ward to stop them from throwing themselves off a ledge. As a teacher, I developed a close relationship with several Buddhist psychologists and psychiatrists, and would refer students to them on a regular basis.
Everyone who comes to a monastery does so because they’re suffering, so this correlation should come as no surprise. The question is, to what extent is being in a monastery actually helpful? I think this varies a lot. Sometimes it can be just the right thing.
But it should not be seen that being in a monastery or on retreat or doing Buddhist practice in general is some universal panacea for mental illness. Staying in a monastery even for many years is no guarantee of mental health. Indeed, certain kinds of disorders—for example, narcissistic personality disorder, OCD, various eating disorders—are likely to be aggravated by a monastic or spiritual setting. Being ordained doesn’t help, either.
However, if someone is aware of their issue and taking steps to address it, a monastery or other spiritual environment can be very supportive and helpful.
But there’s no way I would teach anattā to anyone with a mental illness. That’s not what it’s for.
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Ahh, exactly. There are some people who are really attracted to the whole idea of not-self. It’s especially popular among—how to put this?—rebellious young males. Death metal, reject society, oh yeah, not-self! It feeds into a strand of nihilism, providing an elevated, prestigious spiritual justification for deep-rooted cynicism and negativity.
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Very good question, I don’t about any study but what I was alluding to is the clear unhealthy mindset of people one usually finds within contemporary non-traditional Buddhist communities.
Just hangout after a Dhamma talk or retreat and notice the sort of people these things attract.
Even here in this forum, you can notice frequent waves of conflict in the name of Dhamma by people clearly smart but at the same time clearly not balanced in their minds and totally blind to that probably by an inner denialist narrative based on this misunderstanding of anatta.
Of course, if you don’t specify the population and take Buddhists as the widest possible sample, including 90% of the population of countries like Thailand and Sri Lanka, your findings would converge to what is normal in terms of abnormality! 
All that said, may someone one day investigate this!
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Very interesting topic.
Hi Bhante, I’m a little confused by this. SN 22.59 discusses anattā in terms of a lack of control, rather than in a metaphysical way. It seems to be, in part, about seeing through the illusion that there is something in control.
I think you said this yourself very well here:
This “natural laws” seems to be the reason for this lack of control:
“Bhikkhus, form is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’ But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’
https://suttacentral.net/en/sn22.59/3
I think that the modern materialistic rejection of a soul doesn’t have much to do with insight into anattā. Otherwise stream entry would be very common. Materialists still think they are in control…
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You can’t necessarily derive the metaphysical nature of the attā from any particular discussion. Compare such statements as:
- Does God exist?
- Does the Tasmanian tiger exist?
- We will all be together again in heaven
- We will all be together again in the coffee shop
- My god, my god, why have you forsaken me?
- OMG, why have you unfriended me?
They all depend on the metaphysical nature of the topic, but this is already assumed, and can’t be inferred from the mere structure of the statement. And so it is with attā. In philosophical contexts, it is taken for granted that it is a metaphysical entity: that’s what the word means.
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OK, fair enough. Perhaps my question should be whether the metaphysical aspect or the lack of control aspect is most important for us to grasp, and how they are related.
Consider a modern materialist (Richard Dawkins for the sake of argument who actually mentions lack of a controller/soul in The God Delusion, but apparently has no clue about Buddhist ideas, otherwise he’d presumably have mentioned it…). They would be quite happy with the metaphysics, but don’t have the experiential knowledge that it presumably takes to let go the the attachment to the sense of self, which I think you described very well in the passage I quoted from you above, which doesn’t seem to be about metaphysics.
Indeed. I think the main point is that it does require some interpretation to see how it would apply in a different context. The job of a translator is to transmit what it meant for those people in that context, not to interpret it for the reader. Having said which, it is important to be sensitive to various modern responses, and to try to translate in such a way as to minimize misconstrual.
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[quote=“sujato, post:43, topic:4926”]
But for those who come to stay at monasteries and do retreats, I would say it is significantly greater. My guess would be maybe a quarter or a half might have a clinical-level psychological disorder.
[/quote]This is analogous to my own (and I assume others’) experiences interacting with certain (many? hopefully not the majority) constituents that comprise the “Internet demographics” of Buddhism, i.e. varieties of people one only ever meets online on Buddhist forums.
Never met one in person, at an actually Buddhist establishment doing actual Buddhism, yet they seem so prevalent sometimes online. Specifically Buddhist forums, as orthodoxchristianity.net does not have the problems Dharma/DhammaWheel have with profoundly mentally ill people in need of treatment. I have a latent suspicion that it has something to do with “convert demographics”, concerning who “seeks out” a different path than their peers.
There are all sorts of reasons that are wonderful as to why one might come to the Dhamma and leave a different tradition, however there are also reasons to be attracted to the Dhamma that are rather “unDhammic”, if one will excuse me to horrendous practice of calling things “Dhammic” and “unDhammic”.
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I confess I have not given this issue enough thought, and I may even have misrepresented the Buddha in the process. From now on, I will avoid speculating on these deep Dhamma issues.
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Let’s not forget that the Self is supposed to be the ultimate bliss in Vedic litterature. Whatever this Atman takes as a form. Either as an “outsider” Atman, in the late Vedic texts - or as an integral “insider” Atman/atman, as in the later Upanishads.
Note that both the latter views, have this Self/self as continuous and pervasive.
SN 55.3 below, might therefore resume and settle the conundrum of Self (in Buddhism).
Note also that, in SN 44.10, Buddha does not deny a “Self”; but implicitly a “self”.
Talking about a “Self”, outside paṭiccasamuppāda, would be confusing and useless, as far as the Teaching and its goal are concerned.
That is to say again, that Buddha wanted to prove that there is no “self” within the demesne* of paṭiccasamuppāda; and that there is, on the other side, no use to tackle the issue of a “Self”; as far as getting to nibbana is involved.
In other words, “getting to nibbana” means (among other things,) to realize that the “self” is a false concept. However, getting to realize that there is (or not) a “Self” is absolutely irrelevant with that goal.
If there is a “Self”, it is just “cherry on the cake”. But the Teaching is primarily and merely, about making the cake right.
Our grammar pundits might, for our benefit, turn to the pericope api nu me taṃ, ānanda, anulomaṃ abhavissa ñāṇassa uppādāya: ‘sabbe dhammā anattā’ti? and serve us with a good literal translation. That would be swell.
I again insist on the AN 11.9 (SA 926, SA2 151,) that seems to engage with something out of paṭiccasamuppāda.
* Another daily word 
Related suttas on anattā.
These suttas all have parallels in the Agamas.
SN 12.66
Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics and brahmins in the past regarded that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as secure: they nurtured craving. In nurturing craving they nurtured acquisition. In nurturing acquisition they nurtured suffering. In nurturing suffering they were not freed from birth, aging, and death; they were not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; they were not freed from suffering, I say.
Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, atītamaddhānaṃ samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā yaṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ taṃ niccato addakkhuṃ sukhato addakkhuṃ attato addakkhuṃ ārogyato addakkhuṃ khemato addakkhuṃ. Te taṇhaṃ vaḍḍhesuṃ. Ye taṇhaṃ vaḍḍhesuṃ te upadhiṃ vaḍḍhesuṃ. Ye upadhiṃ vaḍḍhesuṃ te dukkhaṃ vaḍḍhesuṃ. Ye dukkhaṃ vaḍḍhesuṃ te na parimucciṃsu jātiyā jarāya maraṇena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi domanassehi upāyāsehi, na parimucciṃsu dukkhasmāti vadāmi.
SN 22.20
“Bhikkhus, form is nonself. The cause and condition for the arising of form is also nonself. As form has originated from what is nonself, how could it be self? (feeling, etc… - khandhas).
“Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, anattā. Yopi hetu yopi paccayo rūpassa uppādāya, sopi anattā. Anattasambhūtaṃ, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ kuto attā bhavissati.
SN 22.45
“Bhikkhus, form (feeling, etc…) is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, the mind becomes dispassionate and is liberated from the taints by nonclinging.
“Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ. Yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ; yaṃ dukkhaṃ tadanattā; yadanattā taṃ ‘netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā’ti evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ. Evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato cittaṃ virajjati vimuccati anupādāya āsavehi.
“If, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu’s mind has become dispassionate towards the form element (feeling element, etc…), it is liberated from the taints by nonclinging.
Rūpadhātuyā ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi.
SN 22.46
Same as first paragraph above.
When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, one holds no more views concerning the past. When one holds no more views concerning the past, one holds no more views concerning the future. When one holds no more views concerning the future, one has no more obstinate grasping. When one has no more obstinate grasping, the mind becomes dispassionate towards form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness, and is liberated from the taints by nonclinging.
Evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato pubbantānudiṭṭhiyo na honti. Pubbantānudiṭṭhīnaṃ asati, aparantānudiṭṭhiyo na honti. Aparantānudiṭṭhīnaṃ asati, thāmaso parāmāso na hoti. Thāmase parāmāse asati rūpasmiṃ … vedanāya … saññāya … saṅkhāresu … viññāṇasmiṃ cittaṃ virajjati vimuccati anupādāya āsavehi.
SN 22.55
“He does not understand as it has come to be selfless form as ‘selfless form’ … selfless feeling as ‘selfless feeling’ … selfless perception …
Anattaṃ rūpaṃ ‘anattā rūpan’ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti, anattaṃ vedanaṃ ‘anattā vedanā’ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti, anattaṃ saññaṃ…
Note:
Also
- He does not understand as it has come to be > impermanent.
- He does not understand as it has come to be > painful.
- He does not understand as it has come to be > conditioned (saṅkhata).
- He does not understand as it has come to be > to be eliminated (vibhavissatīti).
Note 2: In SN 22.85,there is an additionnal
- He does not understand as it has come to be > murderous (vadhaka).
SN 22.59
Bhikkhus, form (feeling, etc…) is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’ But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible
Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, anattā. Rūpañca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca rūpe: ‘evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī’ti.
SN 22.68
Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever is nonself.”
“Yo kho, bhikkhu, anattā; tatra te chando pahātabbo”ti.
Note: Because form, (etc…) are impermanent.
SN 22.69
“Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever does not belong to self.
Yaṃ kho, bhikkhu, anattaniyaṃ; tatra te chando pahātabbo”ti.
SN 22.82
Now on that occasion the following reflection arose in the mind of a certain bhikkhu: “So it seems that form is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself. What self, then, will deeds done by what is nonself affect?”
Tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno evaṃ cetaso parivitakko udapādi: “iti kira bho rūpaṃ anattā, vedanā … saññā … saṅkhārā … viññāṇaṃanattā; anattakatāni kammāni kathamattānaṃ phusissantī”ti. Atha kho bhagavā tassa bhikkhuno cetasā ceto parivitakkamaññāya bhikkhū āmantesi:
“What do you think, bhikkhu, is form permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”…
—“Is feeling permanent or impermanent?… Is perception permanent or impermanent? … Are volitional formations permanent or impermanent?… Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir.”
Taṃ kiṃ maññatha, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā”ti? “Aniccaṃ, bhante”. “Vedanā …
saññā … saṅkhārā … viññāṇaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā”ti? “Aniccaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā”ti? “Dukkhaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ: ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”
“Therefore … Seeing thus … He understands: ‘… there is no more for this state of being.’”
Tasmātiha … pe … evaṃ passaṃ … pe … nāparaṃ itthattāyāti pajānātī”ti.
SN 22.122
Friend Koṭṭhita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself.
Sīlavatāvuso, koṭṭhika, bhikkhunā pañcupādānakkhandhā aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato yoniso manasi kātabbā.
SN 35.3
Bhikkhus, the eye (nose, etc. - ajjhatikāni āyatanāni) is nonself. What is nonself should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’
Cakkhuṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ. Yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ; yaṃ dukkhaṃ tadanattā. Yadanattā taṃ ‘netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā’ti evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.
SN 35.1 >> the eye is impermanent.
SN 35.2 >> the eye is suffering…
SN 35.9
Bhikkhus, the eye is nonself, both of the past and the future, not to speak of the present. Seeing thus … … The mind is nonself … for its fading away and cessation.”
Cakkhuṃ, bhikkhave, anattā atītānāgataṃ; ko pana vādo paccuppannassa. Evaṃ passaṃ, … manassa nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hotī’ti.
SN 35.167
Bhikkhu, when one knows and sees the eye as impermanent, the view of self is abandoned.”
When one knows and sees forms as impermanent … eye-consciousness as impermanent … eye-contact as impermanent … whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition … as impermanent, wrong view is abandoned. It is when one knows and sees thus that the view of self is abandoned.”
Cakkhuṃ kho, bhikkhu, anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati. Rūpe anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati. Cakkhuviññāṇaṃ anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati. Cakkhusamphassaṃ anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati. Yampidaṃ cakkhusamphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā tampi anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati … pe … jivhaṃ anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati … pe … manaṃ anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyati. Dhamme … manoviññāṇaṃ … manosamphassaṃ … yampidaṃ manosamphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā tampi anattato jānato passato attānudiṭṭhi pahīyatī”ti.
SN 44.10
If, Ānanda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, ‘Is there a self?’ I had answered, ‘There is a self,’ would this have been consistent on my part with the arising of the knowledge that ‘all phenomena are nonself’?
Ahañcānanda, vacchagottassa paribbājakassa ‘atthattā’ti puṭṭho samāno ‘atthattā’ti byākareyyaṃ, api nu me taṃ, ānanda, anulomaṃ abhavissa ñāṇassa uppādāya: ‘sabbe dhammā anattā’ti?
And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now.
Ahañcānanda, vacchagottassa paribbājakassa ‘natthattā’ti puṭṭho samāno ‘natthattā’ti byākareyyaṃ, sammūḷhassa, ānanda, vacchagottassa paribbājakassa bhiyyo sammohāya abhavissa: ‘ahuvā me nūna pubbe attā, so etarahi natthī’ti.
SN 55.3
Venerable sir, as to these six things that partake of true knowledge that have been taught by the Blessed One, these things exist in me, and I live in conformity with those things. For, venerable sir, I dwell contemplating impermanence in all formations, perceiving suffering in what is impermanent, perceiving nonself in what is suffering, perceiving abandonment, perceiving fading away, perceiving cessation.
Yeme, bhante, bhagavatā cha vijjābhāgiyā dhammā desitā, saṃvijjante dhammā mayi, ahañca tesu dhammesu sandissāmi. Ahañhi, bhante, sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī viharāmi, anicce dukkhasaññī, dukkhe anattasaññī pahānasaññī virāgasaññī nirodhasaññī.
Buddha as a conservative radical?
If there was a ‘Self’ it would have to take its place next to the ‘Flying Spaghetti Monster’. 
Yes I have seen this, without any meditation, in an unwell patient. [quote=“DKervick, post:30, topic:4926”]
projecting metta or transferring their merit outward from their cushions, etc.
[/quote]
Believing the ability to do this is a cultural belief in traditional Buddhist countries like Sri Lanka and not a sign of mental illness.
With metta
The Satipatthana says to be free from mental pain (domanassa) before practice. I suppose therapy and lots of metta practice has an important role to play, in this Westernised generation (worldwide).
I remember in one retreat I conducted for a Sri Lankan (traditional) group (living in U.K.), I carried out a diagnostic questionnaire and there was only one person who was depressed in a group of 20 or so. Shorter retreats are the way forward for them I think as longer the days and ‘Noble Silence’ isolates and takes away a coping mechanism of depression- company and having someone to talk with (discussions with the instructor doesn’t count). I think if they were depressed to begin with they probably shouldn’t be doing a proper Samatha Vipassana retreat (IMO). If they were prone to depression then a maximum of 10 days is probably adequate unless it is a full Divine abodes retreat!
If “pasta + rastafari” is the ultimate bliss, why not!?.
But this ironic trope cannot just wipe the fact of an AN 19.11.
Nor does it explain that anything that is painful (dukkha) cannot be equated with “self”.
So what is that “self”, that can be equated to the “not painful”, then?
This kind of wit is often used by people with a very basic, or no knowledge at all, of the brahminic philosophy - or by the adepts of the “new” saṅgha. Or one could even go as far as saying, by Mara’s people (why not - if you are a genuine Buddhist).
Sometimes they even equate the possibility of a “Self” with sheer crazyness. Like communists in the USSR, used to qualify the non-communists as sheer nuts (and lock them up).
The new “delusion” is to refuse to wipe out hard facts from the Nikayas with hard parallels. That’s the new insanity.
I will refer to @DKervick remark:
I would be much more worried about the fact that people can develop psychotic delusions and disordered thinking around such notions as hearing or seeing devas and yakkhas, etc.
and quote the following:
It is just the same with any recluses and brahmins who are wrong about this world and the hereafter,wrong about what is and what is not the realm of Māra, wrong about what is and what is not the realm of Death; - all who imagine they ought to hearken to, and trust in, such recluses and brahmins, will long suffer and smart for it.
MN 34
In genuine Buddhism, it is clear, that there is another world. (MN 34 has a parallel in SA).
Some people are just rewriting the Nikayas to their suitable wishes - wiping out Buddha’s (most important) sayings here and there - and they decide that what they keep is sanity, and the rest is not.
The only insanity is not to follow the Path; and then fantasize things. Or else, not to listen to the right ascetics like Buddha (MN34). That is the real delusion.
And ignorance is to wipe out most of the Teaching and practice. That is what Mara & friends are delighted with. A “worldly buddhism”, unaware of the other world.
One thing for sure though, is that Buddha never denied categorically a “Self” (whatever that might be). But He surely did established what a “self” was not.
Neither did he deny the other world.
I think this is a good idea Ajahn. It certainly makes sense in terms of being clear about what the term means.
However, I wonder though if those new to Buddhism, coming with strong theistic conditioning or similar, would find the whole notion of being without a soul too awful.
Another consideration is that perhaps “soul” is a rather loaded word. For instance, sometimes, “soulful” can mean that someone is deeply present, connected with what and how they are, able to relate to themselves, others and the world skillfully. It is connected with the notion of being connected to one’s centre, the heart, the innermost of one’s being.
I can see how anyone without the anatta conditioning would view this as atta.
But to me, in a meaningful, perhaps you could even say, on an emotional level, it links in some what with the ongoing journey that is the Practice, Bhavana and links in on a broader, and perhaps in a more external way, with the whole notion of yoniso manasikara…
Which of course then must go from the external and seems to me, must naturally propel inwards, looking for the Truth within. I can imagine how this would lead to deeper and deeper connection within, more presence, more letting go and perhaps the path to the deep meditations would open up. Now, I’ve often heard it said that people who achieve 1st Jhana without the anatta teaching, generally view this state as union with The divine power…basically, what they would perhaps equate with the deepest connection with their own “soul”.
So, it’s possible the use of the word “soul” could be too overwhelming, too confusing and in the most unfortuante instance, may even cause some to resist any deep connections with their own hearts. What I mean by this last comment is that, often in Buddhist circles, one finds that people are trying to act as if they understand anatta and end up not wanting to really look at what they are; they just blithely dismiss “themselves” and their ways of being as anatta and simply don’t go anywhere near really looking into what their “self” really is. It’s an unintentional confusion, and one that perhaps we’ve all fallen into. What I’m trying to say is that, in trying to, with good intentions perhaps, act as if they’ve already realised anatta, they might inadvertently go off on the path that has no real presence or connection. I’ve benefitted on reflecting on anatta and using this concept as a skillful means; but I guess, in my own life, I’m noticing it helps to set it aside as a Truth to be realised later, and become present to the reality of my mind, which very much continues to behave as if there is an atta. I do feel a sense of trust at the moment, that this is the way to go…diving as deeply and as easily as possible into my “self”, however it presents…will hopefully lead all the way, one day, way, way, into the future, to going right to the very centre and seeing, as Ajahn Brahm says, that there’s nothing there. Well, that’s the dream, the imagining that I use anyway…I guess it’s just a skillful means. 
Just a few ruminations Bhante…I’m not entirely certain on any of them really …
… offered with much respect and metta 
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Reminds me of when one of my teachers led us through a discussion that was basically SN 22.59. After working through it, and having general agreement about the not-self nature of the body, etc, one of the participants sat there looking rather puzzled. “But where is the soul then?” she finally asked…
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Well, it probably would have been pretty radical at the time of the Buddha, too. On several occasions the Buddha was denounced as an “annihilationist.” The idea of a soul, a permanent essence, seems to have been the establishment outlook also back then.
I tend to be wary of diluting the message of the suttas to avoid scaring or offending people. The Buddha’s message really is radical, and we risk losing sight of this if we cushion everything in non-confrontational language. It would be a rather terrible consequence if our translations become a serious hindrance to comprehension.
An instance of this can be seen in Ven. Bodhi’s translation of nibbidā. In the Connected Discourses he translated this as “revulsion,” which I think is quite an accurate translation. After getting complaints, however, he changed this to “disenchantment” in the Numerical Discourses. But if “revulsion,” or something similar, is correct, should one really change the translation because some people find it off-putting? We are dealing with the heritage of the Buddha and it seems crucial to me that we conserve it to the very best of our abilities.
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Hi suci1,
See AN 4.174 for clarification. It talks of objectification of that which should not be objectified. It’s possible to come up with anything lying ‘beyond Nibbana’ but there is nothing existing which can be objectified.
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