@Mat
AN 4.173 & 74 are just exposing the incoherence of a continuation of the proliferation of the mind (mano); when there is no more mano. Which is totally illogical.
In all cases:
- With the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact, there is something else,’ one proliferates that which is not to be proliferated..
- ‘with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact, there is nothing else’, one proliferates that which is not to be proliferated.
- with both…
what is said in “appapañcaṃ papañceti” is that you cannot create proliferation [or speculations] with something that does not exist anymore (mano).
Note: I have already mentioned the fact that Buddhism is the only early Indian school/doctrine (mata), that puts Mana at satta’s level. Not even Saṃkhya does it. Something worth noticing, I suppose.
So again, we are diverging to something that has nothing to do with the self; with that ludicrous and ill-interpreted “reification” construct.
To resume these suttas: “As soon as you get out the world of senses (viz. contact w/ the sense bases - of which mano is a part), there is no more papañca possible”.
Simple!
No self involved there, since there is no self, or what pertains to a self in the ajjhatikāni āyatanāni.
Buddha will also show that in the rupa and arupa loke, there is no self.
See why below.
However, positing a Self as the “ultimate Bliss” in Indian philosophy at large, is just plain evident; whatever that Self takes as a form in the pre-Buddhist Vedic litterature.
SN 55.3 & SN 22.59 consolidate that evidence.
Venerable sir, as to these six things that partake of true knowledge that have been taught by the Blessed One, these things exist in me, and I live in conformity with those things. For, venerable sir, I dwell contemplating impermanence in all formations, perceiving suffering in what is impermanent, perceiving nonself in what is suffering, perceiving abandonment, perceiving fading away, perceiving cessation.
Yeme, bhante, bhagavatā cha vijjābhāgiyā dhammā desitā, saṃvijjante dhammā mayi, ahañca tesu dhammesu sandissāmi. Ahañhi, bhante, sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī viharāmi, anicce dukkhasaññī, dukkhe anattasaññī pahānasaññī virāgasaññī nirodhasaññī.
Bhikkhus, form (feeling, etc…) is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’ But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible
Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, anattā. Rūpañca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca rūpe: ‘evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī’ti.
Does putting an abstract concept on “non-affliction” (viz. bliss,) makes a “reification” of some sort out of it?
Do you mean that “Bliss” is not real? - Are you infering that Bliss is just an abstract concept with no essence? - Just a word with no counterpart? - a vitakka with no vicāra? - A papañca determined to disappear?
Note:
As far as a “self” being in “control” in SN 22.59 is concerned, it would be good to look closer at the parallels.
SN 22.59 & its parallels:
“Bhikkhus, form is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’ But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’
SN 22.59
“Form is not self. If form were self, then sickness and suffering ought not arise regarding form and it ought not happen that one would want form to be like this and it not be like that. Form is not self because, regarding form there is sickness and there is suffering arising and it is the case that, regarding form, one wants it to be like this and it is not like that.
SA 33
“Form does not exist as a self. If form existed as a self, then form would not be associated with the arising of illness and suffering. Regarding form, it is also not possible to cause it to be like this, or not like this, because form is not oneself. From form and the arising of illness and suffering, one also grasps the desire to make form like this, or not like this. For sensation, conception, synthesis, and discrimination, it is also such as this.
SA 34
SN 22.59 > “Bhikkhus, form is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction
SA 33 > “Form is not self. If form were self, then sickness and suffering ought not arise regarding form
SA 34 > “Form does not exist as a self. If form existed as a self, then form would not be associated with the arising of illness and suffering.
SN 22.59 > and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’
SA 33 > and it ought not happen that one would want form to be like this and it not be like that.
SA 34 > Regarding form, it is also not possible to cause it to be like this, or not like this, because form is not oneself.
SN 22.59 > But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’
SA 33 > Form is not self because, regarding form there is sickness and there is suffering arising and it is the case that, regarding form, one wants it to be like this and it is not like that.
SA 34 > From form and the arising of illness and suffering, one also grasps the desire to make form like this, or not like this.
The control is impossible over the impermanent nature of the external stimulus - That is a hard fact of Buddhism.
The last sentence of SA 34 demonstrates also, that there is a desire to change that; and seems to imply that the endeavor is pathetically useless.
However, there is a line of thoughts in western “buddhism”, (particularly in the satipatthana MN 10 movement,) that we should accept this ineluctable fate. That we should live these external stimulus plainly, with no restraint - because there is no “control” possible.
But this is a perversion of Buddhism.
The reading of the EBTs substantiates the contrary. The all Nikayas are laden with Buddha’s guidance to restrain from these external khandhas (becoming internal > clinging khandhas); not to live them plainly.
So there is “control”; and that takes place in mano.
And that is the will to abandon the external influences, that might or not become internal.
The escape (nissāraṇa) is the subduing (vinayo) and abandoning (pahāna) of desire (chando) & and affection (rāgo) towards the khandhas - SN 22.82.
In other words: No control over the nature of the stimulus - but control over acquiring it or not.
P.S
Not to mention the fact that the khandhas are “not yours” (e.g. SN 22.33).
So not only the nature of these khandhas are impermanent; but the content with which your empty sense bases (ajjhatikāni āyatanāni) are going to be filled with, are “not yours”.
So we have a “mine”, that is defined as making the khandhas as clinging-khandhas - an “I”, that is defined as making the external khandhas (nāmarūpa nidana,) “ours” - and finally, a “self” that is defined as making what is impermanent, and therefore full of dukkha, something that is blissful (as per pre-Buddhist Vedic philosophy’s definition of “Self/self” - particularly the Upanishadic view of a Self/self).
