Perhaps, as long as the word or phrase used, clearly points to the notion of something being absent or “empty of”, perhaps that is enough of a sign post to anyone seeking they way to what might be Truth.
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Hi Bhante
Doesn’t ownership include the idea of an identity/owner? “Form is identified with, as me /mine”.
Dear Bhante, might I suggest that instead of discussing a particular word, what about a particular rule/standard/principle for choosing translations?
For example, “The Dhamma is well-expounded by the Blessed One, visible in the here-&-now, timeless, inviting verification, pertinent, to be realized by the wise for themselves.” is often found in the suttas.
A rule could be which way of translating conveys the most timelessness, is the most inviting to verification, etc.
Or for example from AN 8.52 (in this case dhammas is translated as qualities):
“As for the qualities of which you may know, ‘These qualities lead to dispassion, not to passion; to being unfettered, not to being fettered; to shedding, not to accumulating; to modesty, not to self-aggrandizement; to contentment, not to discontent; to seclusion, not to entanglement; to aroused persistence, not to laziness; to being unburdensome, not to being burdensome’: You may categorically hold, ‘This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher’s instruction.’”
One rule might be to choose the translation which is in most in line with this.
Or another rule might be to choose the translation which is most true to the cultural context of the time of the Buddha.
It’s easier to agree and disagree on a principle and whether a translation is in line with that principle or not; I think framing the discussion in this way could help pull the conversation away from the domain of personal opinion.
It could also be interesting to see if different principles suggest different translations, there might be some good learning outcomes in that.
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Hello folks,
I am new here. I followed a link from another site to this discussion.
This subject is already covered over there in this thread. -> Dhamma Wheel Disussion
I would invite Lal from puredhamma.net to explain the revised meaning in detail.
"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self… or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self… or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self… or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress. MN2
MN2 seems to use ‘atta’ to mean the ‘autobiographical’ self and the metaphysical self. It might suggest that ‘atta’ had a broad meaning in Pali which makes sense in a way because the soul would be the very essence of self while the aggregates take on the material/mental form of it. The inability to fully control the aggregates suggests the aggregates are not worthy of being called the Self as if they were we would be able to wield them they way we want to (this being the aggregates being the self, view, not the Self is outside the aggregates view).
With metta
Puredhamma? Is that this group who interprets the old Pali words with the semantics of the modern Sinhalese words and ignores linguistics? I would suggest they do it in a separate post, aklong with providing a sound and scientifically valid (as in ‘linguistically sound’) explanation of how they arrived to their revised meaning. The reason for his suggestion is that it could be a rather long discussion 
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Well, I just quickly went through your posting history. You seem to admit not having a clue of either Pali or Sinhala.
I am just wondering how you come to a conclusion Pali or Sinhala word is ‘linguistically sound’ or not.
Because I have linguistic education, language resources and Pali texts in quite many wrting systems are readily available even here on SC, and, finally, a linguistically sound explanation would account for the semantics, etymology, as well as phonology and grammar of a discussed language both synchronically and diachronically and would be convincing even for people not speaking Sinhala or Pali but capable of using publicly available data. In a similar vein, I could give to you a linguistically sound explanation of language phenomena even in the languages you personally possibly don’t speak: Russian, German, Latin, Spanish, Ancient Greek, Sanskrit, Vedic, Proto-Indo-European (and I have a somewhat higher than average knowledge of the Indo/European linguistics) etc. We can even ignore the semantics for the time being and focus on the historical phonology, but again I would advise you to do it in a seperate thread.
Two examples of what I would consider a linguistically sound explanation (sorry, no sources there, but I can look them up if I were asked to do it):
One
Two
You can try and refute my arguments even if you don’t speak Latin, for example, by sources on the historical phonology and etymology of Latin, Vedic and Proto-Indo-European languages. They are all out there and can be checked against - or contested, provided you have enough solid evidence.
The source of this information is none other than Ven. Wataraka Thero. An eminent monk whom many believe is an Ariya-puggala even achieved the ultimate goal available to a human being.
Following his revised meanings of the Tripitaka, many are in the process of achieving identical results.
Just to give an example, many people are following the Anapanasatti Bhavana the wrong way the world over. The venerable was able to explain the correct meditation. This is just one example.
More here ->
https://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=29288
I like to think we are in the business of ending suffering. So linguistics should take a back seat even if things are academically sound yet does not really solve our ultimate problem.
So given all above, do you think it is worthwhile to consider the revised meaning?
No, unless you prove it is worth considering. i do not know whether Ven. Wataraka Thero was an arahant or not, and I do not know whether his teachings are leading people to the Enlightenment. It is impossible both to prove or disprove it. So, I have to take into account other evidence.
The crux of the argument for the revised meaning is linguistic (because comparing pali words to modern Sinhala ones is a linguistic argument), so you should provide linguistic evidence for its validity. If you are not ready to provide it, then please don’t use linguistical comparisons in your argumentation (like ‘in Modern Sinhala this word means this and this, so this is what it should mean in Pali because teh sounds are kind of similar’), because it would be plainly dishonest to use scholarly looking arguments if you cannot back them with scientific data. Just postulate the revised meaning and ask us to accept it on faith: this is pretty much what you did here in this thread, so it is okay, I have nothing against it. Still, I know that you are using linguistically looking arguments elsewhere, so why not do it here?
Could we please discuss the matter further in a separate topic please?
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Well, the word in question here is “Anartha”. I have lived with Sinhala for decades and the etymology of this word is certainly not modern. Although it is something I myself need to confirm.
In due course you will need to bring the linguistics that suggest this word is modern. I look forward to engage you on this later.
Per my understanding, self hits the meaning better than soul because it is a more comprehensive term. Though obviously unacceptable from a readability pov, a conglomeration like not-self/soul/I/me/mine/myself would make things most clear.
I voted for Neither of the above. I translate the meaning of Anatta as “futile”.
In order to demonstrate the revised translation and the prevailing meaning, I will list 2 examples. See which ones make sense.
The present understanding.
Sabbe dhammā anattā
Things do not have a soul
Sabbesu dhammesu anattānupassī viharati
One meditates observing no self in all things
Ven. Waharaka revision (new)
Sabbe dhammā anattā
Everything is futile
Sabbesu dhammesu anattānupassī viharati
One meditates observing the futility of things
Maybe spirit instead of soul:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit
It’s still mostly immaterial, but seems better to me.
Anyway - do you have to translate it consistently as one word? I know this is the best, and would be great to do - but if the semantic content of (an)atta doesn’t fit any one English word, split it into two / more words, it would preserve the meaning better.
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We should give up the “without”?
But we should also give up “soul” and “self”.
There is not/no “soul”/“self” in attā.
optional details
In pre-Upaniṣadic litterature, the subjective & objective (Ātman & Brāhman) are already appearing as being identical. Mental & cosmic are one.
“That one who is Brāhman in man, and that one who is in the sun, is one”. (TBr. 1.5)
This is what “soul”/“self” means in Vedic term. Might it be transcendent, like in the Ṛg Veda (“soul”); or immanent, like in the Upaniṣads (“self”).
The “Ceaseless” (Āt-man), and the “Expander” (Bṛh-man) are also both continuous & ubiquitous (pervasive).
But not attā.
Attā is compared (in Buddhism,) with this subjective, ceaseless, ubiquitous, and pervasive, but not transcendent Ātman - for transcendence does not belong to the realm of paṭiccasamuppāda (and therefore a speculative waste of time).
Also, this attā is compared with the subjective/objective, ceaseless, ubiquitous, and pervasive, and immanent Brāhman.
But because of impermanence, attā can’t be ceaseless and continuous; as per Buddha’s doctrine (in other words, impermanence = no bliss = no self).
It is definitely not “soul”, because it is not transcendent; as per paṭiccasamuppāda range.
It is not “self” either, because there is no ubiquitous immanence, [immanence in Buddhism has its locus in satta - mano is located in satta and is not ubiquitous]; but also because there is no continuity (for the reason that there is an impermanence of all the dhammas).
About “Identity”.
It is not really the identity between the object and the subject that is at stake here, (as it is in the close-set pre-Upaniṣadic and Upaniṣadic litterature); but about the continuity (and subsidiarily the ubiquity and identity) that is both common to the transcendent “Soul” that is ātman, in the Ṛg Veda for instance; and the immanent “Self/self” of the TBr., or the Upaniṣads. Continuity that does not take place in Buddhism.
Because everything is impermanent within paṭiccasamuppāda; ∴ there is no continuity.
Identity is a purely mano’s (satta’s) process, and adds a lot of unecessary confusion to the concept of self (see below).
First, there is the inherent impermanent nature (non continuity) of the phenomena (dhammas) in nāmarūpa. - (up to now it is easy - no continuity => no “self” - We could stop here - but why make things easy, when we can make them more complicated - so let’s continue towards the obscure).
Then identity appears as the “I” in saḷāyatana; when one considers the khandhas SN 22.33, the internal ayatanas SN 35.138, or the dhammas in general, as being “theirs”. [what is “not yours”, says Buddha, in these suttas].
Impermanence & identity are not really the same thing. Yet there must be a common point between “mine”, “I” and “self”; in the famous pericope: this is “mine”, this “I am”, this is “my self”. - etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’ti
How “continuous” (“permanent”) is that? - (and that is when things become a little bit more confused, with this unecessary additional “identity” shebang.)
Well, let’s see the process in this reverse (patilomam) order; viz. Mine >> I >> self.
What “I” make “mine”, is done by “I” becoming fettered to the craving procured by the dhamma. “I am” making the craving for the feeling (in vedanā nidāna) - procured by the dhamma - “mine”. [Remember?: feeling (vedanā nidāna) >> craving (taṇhā nidāna) >> clinging (upādāna)].
In the forward order (anulomam,) first, there is the making of the dhamma as an “I” (with the help of mano) - that is to say, to identify with the dhamma; then and only then, making the feeling born of this identification “Mine”, through craving & clinging to it.
To illustrate that anulomam order’s process, lets take the example of a nice sight that you identify with. This creates a good feeling in you. But the sight finally vanishes. The feeling remains - you crave for it - you bind yourself to that craving.
This is the usual process of the “I” >> “Mine”.
“I” makes first an identification with the dhamma in namārūpa, or wherever - (with the help of his mano). And this is where the continuity lies. “I” considers, like a late Vedic , or Upaniṣadic philosopher would do, that there is continuity in the flow; that his subjective Ātman (or in our case ātta,) is ubiquitous to the point that it can be considered as the same thing than the object. Continuity and ubiquitousness are melted in one sole process.
“I” considers himself as “self”; as continuous and ubiquitous in nature.
It is because people think that dhammas are continuous and ubiquitous, that there is identity.
Identity is making this nice sight, an “I” - “I am” this, says satta - and although the sight has disappeared, it still makes it “mine”, by craving for, and clinging to it.
The same holds for your satta, that is made of nāmarūpa constituents. Components that are empty by nature. They are impermanent like the rest, yet we make them an “I” - and a “mine” when we fill them up with experiences and feelings; which feelings we crave for and cling to.
So the object is non continuous (impermanent), and can’t be identified with the subject.
So continuity is the primary concern here. And identity just a secondary aftermath.
As said before, atta could just be conceptualized as a “continuous” satta, as long as he lives - but we could additionally say that the dhammas that are experienced, can’t be identified with atta, just because there is no adequation between the duration of an atta, and the duration of a dhamma.
"There is the case where someone doesn’t have this view: ‘This cosmos is the self. After death this I will be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change. I will stay just like that for an eternity.’
He hears a Tathagata or a Tathagata’s disciple teaching the Dhamma for the elimination of all view-positions, determinations, biases, inclinations, & obsessions; for the stilling of all fabrications; for the relinquishing of all acquisitions; the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; Unbinding. The thought doesn’t occur to him, ‘So it might be that I will be annihilated! So it might be that I will perish! So it might be that I will not exist!’ He doesn’t grieve, isn’t tormented, doesn’t weep, beat his breast, or grow delirious. It’s thus that there is non-agitation over what is internally not present."
So I guess that some people will continue to argue endlessly on “identity”, instead of “continuity” - on the effects, instead of the cause.
Obscurantism is often the attribute of those who praise the light (and it’s goddamn heavy).
Suci (the thrice born Aharant).
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I have read this thread carefully. I am still confused. Thus, on matters of metaphysical or semantic soul, I’m just going to go to the highest source: https://youtu.be/U5TqIdff_DQ
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Because you think there is “Ï” to be confused!
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I first learned the subject (Me) and object (my brother) from my aunt when I was about ten years old. Until such time I did not know the difference! For me, I and my brother were the same.
When I was about fifteen I told my mother I do not want to study because it is no use as I am going to die one day. She said that I will be re-born and will carry my knowledge to the next life. It was good enough reason for me to continue my education. I thought that I will go for ever in to the future.
I think that self identification and self view is an innate (Anusaya) and the concept of soul is a learned thing.
Any way I voted "without soul"
I did not vote “without self” because I have a self( ignorance) so I (ignorance) will continue until I realise Nibbana.
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I lurked on Dhammawheel a bit and came across this amazing post by @sylvester suggesting that we could translate Rūpaṃ anattā and Sabbe dhammā anattā differently, perhaps (and this is my five cents) so the former is rendered as ‘the form is not soul/self’ and the latter ‘all dhammas are without soul/self’ or ‘all dhammas do not have the quality of soul/self’. I posted too much on this thread so it would be a good idea to show some restraint, but I couldn’t help sharing this with you, Bhante 
On a side note, cakkhu atta from MN148 mentioned in the same thread makes the English renderings ‘the eye has soul’, or even more so ‘the eye is soul’ sound very weird to me. On the other hand, I am not entirely sold now on the idea that Rūpā anattā is not an adjectival proposition because the adjectival form anattā could sound identical both in singular and plural. The absence of grammatical evidence in the text doesn’t mean that it is a nominal proposition, it baiscally means - I think - that we can’t decide whether it is nominal or adjectival.
The problem I see is: when ‘form is not the Self’ is used, what is being denied ? The Vedic conception of an eternal, unchanging principle ?
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