Yes! I would go even further and suggest that this is one of those suttas that validates a teaching by putting it into the mouth of the Buddha in it’s “second act”.
You see the same thing with MN35, a teaching, sabbe dhammā anattā never seen before in the previous 68 suttas of the canon, is given by a monk, Assaji, and then in the second half of the sutta, confirmed by the Buddha, word for word, “deep in the woods”. (this sutta also involves the family aggivessana, conincidentally?)
Now, the novice Aciravata doesn’t show up again after MN125, but the prince, Jayasena, shows up again in the very next sutta, MN126, which is also interesting !
In it, the monk Venerable Bhūmija tells the prince;
“Prince, I haven’t heard and learned this in the presence of the Buddha.
“Na kho metaṁ, rājakumāra, bhagavato sammukhā sutaṁ, sammukhā paṭiggahitaṁ.
But it’s possible that he might explain it like this:
Ṭhānañca kho etaṁ vijjati yaṁ bhagavā evaṁ byākareyya:
Now, it may of course just be a coincidence, but here we have, in the very next sutta to one where a unique formulation of hinderences-mindfullness-jhana occurs, the same interlocutor being told, “i didn’t hear the buddha put it like this, but…”
Fascinating! (also it’s an abyakata sutta so I am giddy with excitement).
The Budhha then, once again, appears to confirm, word for word, that this new variant on standard tropes is in fact fine and jim dandy like sour candy.
So it appears to me that this is a fairly standard way the canon has of inducting new contributions from lesser known personages.
In fact, it is the contention of my aforementioned essay in production that this is precicely what happenswith the four foundations of mindfullness itself, which, when you actually drill down and look at how it appears to be introduced into the canon, is a “sariputta teaching” first, and only then a “buddha teaching” later.
Just before we leave Venerable Bhūmija though, he appears in one more sutta, SN12.25 where he asks sariputta a question about the abyakata and recieves, you guessed it, yet another innovative combination of previously canonical tropes in explanation. (this is also an example of the “sariputta reversal” that appears to happen in Pali suttas, making sariputta the teacher where often it is the oter monk who is teac hing in the sanskrit, again, the innovation here is probably Bhūmija’s, validated in the Pali by making it Sariputtas)
And guess what happens then?
You guessed it, Ananda “overhears” the discussion, and the Buddha, of course, confirms verbatim what the previous speakers have said.
TLDR
If these where teachings original to the Buddha the canon would preserve them being given by the Buddha, front and centre, from paragraph one, which is not what happens, instead, what is preserved is evidence of doctrinal innovation, and even of the innovators, like Bhūmija, who managed to sneak in to the suttas by way of the Buddha in the deep deep woods" 
Anyway! Back to the original issue, that is this innovative trope from MN125. First, here are the notes refered to by Sujato above:
24.2
‘Come, mendicant, meditate observing an aspect of the body, but don’t think thoughts connected with sensual pleasures.
Editions vary and it is not easy to decide between them. MS and BJT editions have kāmūpasaṁhita (“connected with sensual pleasures”), while PTS has kāyūpasaṁhita (“connected with the body”), followed by “connected with feelings, mind, and principles” respectively. The Chinese parallel has “sensuality” in first place, abbreviates the next two, then “against the dhamma” for the final satipaṭṭhāna (MA 198 at T i 758b15). Sanskrit texts Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and Pratyutpannabuddhasaṁmukhāvasthitasamādhi-sūtra have kāya. So the balance of the non-Pali texts supports the reading kāyūpasaṁhita. On the other hand, kāmūpasaṁhita is a common term, while kāyūpasaṁhita (etc.) appear only here; but the passage is passed over in the commentary and subcommentary, which suggests that they thought it was self-evident, making it unlikely that unique terms were used. Finally, the overall topic of the discourse is overcoming sensuality through meditation, and it would seem odd for the Buddha to be teaching specialized meditation instructions, found nowhere else, to a novice. Overall, then, I accept the reading kāmūpasaṁhita; see too the next note.
The Pali version, in a unique presentation, has the four satipaṭṭhānas in place of the first absorption, which offers further light on the problem discussed in the previous note. The first absorption is characterized by seclusion from sensual pleasures, while vitakka is still present. Clearly one is not “thinking of sensual pleasures” at this point, so the reading kāmūpasaṁhita is unproblematic. But it is not clear that one is not having vitakka for the body (and feeling, mind, and principles). For example, in mindfulness of breathing one is applying the mind or “thinking of” the breath, in other words “thinking of the body”. Thus the reading kāyūpasaṁhita would be difficult to fully explain. Any conclusions on this passage, however, are tenuous, and it seems likely there has been some textual corruption. Indeed, the Chinese parallel here has all four absorptions as usual.
And Analayo;
Another implicit reference could be seen in the relationship established in a Pāli discourse between cultivation of the establishments of mindfulness and the first absorption. The passage in question depicts a progression from an establishment of mindfulness cultivated in the absence of thought directly to the second absorption (MN 125). This could convey the impression that at
least the first absorption is implicitly included once the four establishments of mindfulness are mentioned. Consultation of the Chinese parallel, however, makes it fairly probable that the presentation in this Pāli discourse is the result of an error in textual transmission (Anālayo 2006a). It follows that a reference to the four establishments of mindfulness would also not imply absorption.
(Analaya 2006a is here btw:
https://journal.equinoxpub.com/BSR/article/view/8819/10271
)
Now, all that the above really shows is that there is some doubt about the the semantic range of “thoughts about sensuality” and “thoughts about the body”, and that the text is, indeed, innovative, in combining two well established tropes in a way not seen elsewhere.
In terms of the first issue, well, thouhts “of the body” can certainly mean “saucy” thoughts in idiomatic english, and I see no reason why the two possible terms can’t be seen as near synonyms anyway.
As for the second issue, as per above, there are reasons to suspect that this is not textual corruption in the sense of copyists simply garbling the two well know tropes, rather the mention of the novice in question, and the connection of the prince with another known “innovator” in Bhūmija, is suggestive of this text actually being an intentional inclusion of a teaching by a monastic after the dispensation of the buddha had ended, but retrospectively validated by having the buddha repeat the teaching in the second half of the sutta.
Analayo in his 2006a says;
While the Madhyama Āgama discourse proceeds from a basis in moral con-duct directly to the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas, the Pāli discourse follows moral conduct with sense restraint, contentment, wakefulness, the practice of mindful-ness together with clear comprehension, and the removal of the fi ve hindrances, after which only it turns to the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas. The Pāli version’s presentation in this way corresponds to the standard descriptions of the gradual path in other discourses. Due to giving such a full account of the gradual path, the Pāli version of the DantabhūmiSutta takes up satipaṭṭhāna only subsequent to the removal of the fi ve hindrances, at a stage of the gradual path where normally the development of the jhānas has its place.
But this makes it soundlike the Agama version doesn’t precede the Jhanas with Satipathanna, but it does, exactly like the Pali, it simply skips the steps before that.
Analayo then goes on to say;
This positioning of satipaṭṭhāna is unexpected, since according to the Pāli and Chinese versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, awareness of the presence of the fi ve hindrances is an integral part of satipaṭṭhāna practice.42 A discourse in the Aṅguttara Nikāya even recommends the practice of satipaṭṭhāna in order to over-come the fi ve hindrances.43 Thus one would not expect satipaṭṭhāna practice to be appropriately placed only after a removal of the fi ve hindrances
But this seems not at all right, after all,
‘All the perfected ones, fully awakened Buddhas—whether past, future, or present—give up the five hindrances, corruptions of the heart that weaken wisdom. Their mind is firmly established in the four kinds of mindfulness meditation. They correctly develop the seven awakening factors. And they wake up to the supreme perfect awakening.’”
‘ye te, bhante, ahesuṁ atītamaddhānaṁ arahanto sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te bhagavanto pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe catūsu satipaṭṭhānesu supatiṭṭhitacittā sattabojjhaṅge yathābhūtaṁ bhāvetvā anuttaraṁ sammāsambodhiṁ abhisambujjhiṁsu.
Yepi te, bhante, bhavissanti anāgatamaddhānaṁ arahanto sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te bhagavanto pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe catūsu satipaṭṭhānesu supatiṭṭhitacittā satta bojjhaṅge yathābhūtaṁ bhāvetvā anuttaraṁ sammāsambodhiṁ abhisambujjhissanti.
Bhagavāpi, bhante, etarahi arahaṁ sammāsambuddho pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe catūsu satipaṭṭhānesu supatiṭṭhitacitto satta bojjhaṅge yathābhūtaṁ bhāvetvā anuttaraṁ sammāsambodhiṁ abhisambuddho’”ti.
DN16
So there is at least one major trope, occuring prior to DN22, and certainly, if are talking about suttas with Agama parallels in the parallel collection, prior to MN10, that explicitly asserts that the hinderences are first removed, then the foundations established, then the seven enlightenment factors, culminating, as they do, in samadhi (jhana) and upekkha (4th jhana).
they then go on:
According to the Pāli and Chinese versions of the Dantabhūmi Sutta, the func-tion of satipaṭṭhāna at this point is to overcome thoughts related to the household life.44 From the perspective of the Pāli discourse, this specifi cation is puzzling, since if the practice of satipaṭṭhāna were to take place after the fi ve hindrances have already been removed, there would be little need for it to perform the func-tion of overcoming thoughts related to the household life.
This seems a little simplistic to me, surely monks where wrestling with their demons and purifying their minds in a more complex and human way than the checklist tickbox presentation of the tropes, why should we think that there is some definitive order to these parts of the picture, we have just seen how such orders can be called into question by picking and choosing the tropes or suttas we like to highlight what we prefer.
Analayo goes on;
an expansion of the original account could have taken place along the lines of a full treatment of the gradual path of training. That is, the long account of the disciple’s practice of sense restraint, contentment, wakefulness, practice of mindfulness and clear comprehension, and removal of the fi ve hindrances, found in the Pāli version, could be such an expansion. It may not be too far-fetched to assume that during oral transmission, a reference to the arising of a Tathāgata could have caused the reciter(s) to continue reciting a full account of the gradual path, as such a full account would normally be required when a refer-ence to the arising of a Tathāgata comes up during the recitation of a discourse.If this section in the Pāli version should have been accidentally expanded during oral transmission, the treatment of satipaṭṭhāna, which usually is not explicitly mentioned in accounts of the gradual path, would thereby have been displaced to a later section of the discourse. Such a displacement would explain why satipaṭṭhāna stands in a place where usually one fi nds the jhānas, a placing that does not fi t the purpose satipaṭṭhāna should perform at this junction accord-ing to both versions of the Dantabhūmi Sutta, namely to overcome thoughts related to the household life.
But all this is given to explain why the sekkha appears in the Pali version, and therefore why the foundations occur after the hindreances, as we have already pointed out, the foundations already occur after the hinderences, in a widely distributed trope, first given at DN16, so there seems no need to look for a “deeper” explination, a similar agrgument is given about the three knowledges, again, that the Chinese and the Pali differ in thier tendancy to expand certain tropes seems to carry very little argument here, which seems more motivated by a desire to see doctrinal consistancy form Analayos perspective.
This is even more evident in the case of the next point:
Another signifi cant diff erence is that from satipaṭṭhāna practice without thoughts, the Pāli version continues with the attainment of the second jhāna, whereas its Madhyama Āgama counterpart also takes the fi rst jhāna into account. The presentation in the Pāli version is surprising, since it seems to imply that the practice of thought-free satipaṭṭhāna corresponds to the attainment of the fi rst jhāna. Though satipaṭṭhāna meditation can function as an important foundation for the development of the jhānas, satipaṭṭhāna in itself does not constitute a form of jhāna.
This is just manifest wishful thinking on Analayo’s part, the Agama parallel does not “take into account” anything at all, merely giving the standard MA trope;
In the same way, Aciravata, when the noble disciple contemplates the internal body as body and does not think a thought related to sensual pleas-ures (and so on up to) contemplates feelings, mental states and dhammasas dhammas and does not think a thought related to what is not rightful, then in this way the noble disciple follows the instructions of the Tathāgata. 25. When the noble disciple follows the instructions of the Tathāgata, the Tathāgata further tames the monk: “you should dwell secluded from sen-sual pleasures, secluded from evil and unwholesome states (and so on up to) attaining and dwelling by having accomplished the fourth jhāna!”
This makes the same step from “desensualised” body contemplation (or “disembodied” body contemplation) to jhana as the MN sutta does,
The Realized One guides them further:
Tamenaṁ tathāgato uttariṁ vineti:
‘Come, mendicant, meditate observing an aspect of the body, but don’t think thoughts connected with sensual pleasures.
‘ehi tvaṁ, bhikkhu, kāye kāyānupassī viharāhi, mā ca kāmūpasaṁhitaṁ vitakkaṁ vitakkesi.
Meditate observing an aspect of feelings …
Vedanāsu …
mind …
citte …
principles, but don’t think thoughts connected with sensual pleasures.’
dhammesu dhammānupassī viharāhi, mā ca kāmūpasaṁhitaṁ vitakkaṁ vitakkesī’ti.
As the placing of the mind and keeping it connected are stilled, they enter and remain in the second absorption …
So vitakkavicārānaṁ vūpasamā ajjhattaṁ sampasādanaṁ cetaso ekodibhāvaṁ avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhijaṁ pītisukhaṁ dutiyaṁ jhānaṁ …
third absorption …
tatiyaṁ jhānaṁ …
fourth absorption.
catutthaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati.
Basing the thought that some technical distinction is being drawn in the Chinese because of the insertion of one more “guides them further”, is, as I say, wishful thinking. Both suttas draw the connection between the four foundations, the stilling of sensual/bodily thoughts, and the jhana sequence. the Agamas don’t mention the first jhana, just the begining of the trope and the fourth.
Anyway, this is more or less the entire argument given by Analayo in support of the idea of textual corruption; that the text can’t be right becasue the foundations come before the hinderences, and becaus the foundations without vitakkavicārānaṁ still don’t constitute jhana.
I submit that rather than compelling evidence for textual corruption this is just as persuasivly read as evidence of doctrinal evoution, capturing a moment in the history of early Buddhism when Jhana was beginning to fade and Satipathanna was beginning to assend in prominence.
Regardless, it is a fascinating and provocative Sutta, and one that can be pondered and interrogated to great profit, IMO.
Metta.
