About Attā and The Root of All Things

Discussion
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In my understanding even in Pali there is no distinction between the reflexive-self (oneself) and Self (eternal soul/spirit), it means the same as in the upaniṣads and other early Indic/Sanskrit sources.

So anattā (anātman) is associated with dukkha (duḥkha) and anicca (anitya) but one who has realized oneself (i.e. one’s self-identity, which is not any physical or psychological ‘thing’) is said to have attained freedom from all that is conditioned (anattā). But the attā is not spoken about directly and it is not considered as phenomenally existing reality, as everything that is phenomenal is anicca. What is not anicca, not anattā and not dukkha is the state of abiding in nibbāna, the attā.

The reason why I understand it this way is because other explanations make no logical sense, i.e. they turn out to be circular argumentations or other kinds of logical absurdities.

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It’s interesting, The Self part of DHP. I think Attā / Anatta has always been contentious, and suttas reflect a pluralist understanding, a lot of passages can be made to read in both ways. I do find it curious how Advaita Vedanta was necessary, in the way that why did they, so inspired by Buddhism (obviously) felt the need to build their own path? Was it just about the authorities of the Vedas? Perhaps so.

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Yes because Advaita-Vedanta is based principally on the Upanishads (a.k.a. Vedānta, the final/ultimate “anta” part of the “Vedas”) and Brahma-sūtras, it takes the Vedic corpus as authoritative to reach similar conclusions as early-Buddhism.

Early Buddhism (in my understanding) was not known as Buddhism in Vedantic and Hindu texts, it was called Sāṅkhya, and the founder of Sāṅkhya is a Muni (sage) called Kapila, who I think was the proper name of our Gautama, the Buddha. Kapila’s father is (Ārāḍa) Kardama muni (perhaps identical to Āḷāra Kalāma in Pali). Kapila-vāstu (Kapila-vatthu) simply means Kapila’s home.

The Upanishads dont mention Sāṅkhya but the Brahma-sūtras make much effort to distinguish Vedanta from Sāṅkhya, and to oppose aspects of Sāṅkhya (as Sāṅkhya is considered very close to Vedānta in most respects).

However Kapila is accorded great respect as the Muni par-excellence in Hinduism. In the Bhagavadgītā, Krishna identifies himself as the best Muni, Kapila (Jātaka-esque self-identification) - “siddhānāṃ kapilo muniḥ”

Sāṅkhya literally means the philosophy that “enumerates”, and we know how many enumerations there are in the EBTs. However paradoxically no text of the greatly-eulogized early-Sāṅkhya survives today (if we dont consider early-Buddhism to be the original Sāṅkhya, that is).

Sorry for the detour, moderators may please split this into a new thread if appropriate.

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How does this square with SN5.10?
“When the parts are assembled
we use the word ‘chariot’.
So too, when the aggregates are present
‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.”

And Snp3.9:
" For name and clan are formulated as mere convention in the world.
Produced by mutual agreement, they’re formulated for each individual."

“Attā” is not used here, but the context points to labels and conventions for reflexive selves rather than an eternal soul/spirit.

When does the Buddha ever use attā in relation to liberation, nibbāna?

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The word used in the orignal is satta/sattva (a sentient being) - which is never found equated to attā anywhere that I know in any EBT (Pali, Gandhari or Sanskrit)? So if you want to take satta as identical to attā, do you prefer to apply the same equivalence wherever the words satta and attā are found, including anattā?

I dont support such an equivalence.

He doesnt, and that is because the attā is what is not anattā. It is the self-essence that remains once all that is anattā/anicca/dukkha has been put an end to. Anattā by its very definition means “something other than attā”. In Sanskrit grammar this is called paryudāsa.

You may ask how do we know that attā is to be taken as mutually-exclusive to anattā. To know that you either need to understand how Pali and Sanskrit grammar work (like a native speaker), or trust someone who knows the grammar of those languages well enough.

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Thanks.

My points are less about grammar per se and more about what the statements/grammar mean in the context of the teachings.

Of course satta is not identical to attā. The point was in response to your statement that

If you’re speaking only in terms of Pāli grammar, fine. But the meanings derived from the contexts of the teachings show a difference in terms of conventional conditional selves, i.e. beings, and Attā as understood in terms of an everlasting, even ineffable, Self/soul.

Won’t derail the thread here, but this points to the ongoing debate between those who understand final nibbāna to be something that “remains” after the final death and those who understand it as cessation – which appears to be why the Buddha never uses attā with nibbāna in the suttas or Āgamas.

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No - you are positing two attās, one conditional and one absolute - there are no two attās mentioned, nor is such a distinction between two attās explained in any EBT.

The satta / sattva is described as constituting the aggregates in the text you have yourself quoted above (and the satta is therefore anattā, as the aggregates are explicitly described as anattā) - how do you take the diametrically opposite view and describe the satta as attā? That is the polar opposite of what the EBTs say.

The attā is never described as a ‘conditioned’ or ‘conditional’ anywhere in the EBTs.
Whatever is conditioned is called anattā, anicca and dukkha. So if something is conditioned, it cannot be called attā (according to the EBTs, as it is explicitly described as anattā)

Cessation of dukkha - not the cessation of attā.

Whether the attā ‘remains’ after ‘final-death’ cannot be ascertained by another person in any case - so I wonder why we should make much ado of it. A ‘final-death’ is an equally unascertainable concept. How does anyone else verify or know if a death of another person is a ‘final’ death?

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Hi,

I see your point, but that’s not what I’m trying to express.
Agree – there are not two attās.
The point is that the suttas point to conventional selves in the sense of mere designations via the aggregates and sattas, being conditional and not awakened, by definition, have a self-sense.
This ceases upon full awakening, so no sense of attā remains. That doesn’t mean there’s a second attā.

The second part is speculative, even by your own definition:

I agree with you that discussions around the final death can become quite abstract and circular.
But the Buddha also taught about inference as an aspect of the practice and the stock phrases, as you well know, all express the ending of dukkha and rebirth and stop there. So some infer: cessation.

Agree. Good point.
At the same time, as we also agreed, attā is never used in the suttas for the unconstructed.

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I think MN2 is interesting on this:

When they apply the mind irrationally in this way, one of the following six views arises in them and is taken as a genuine fact.
Tassa evaṁ ayoniso manasikaroto channaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati.
The view: ‘My self exists.’
‘Atthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘My self doesn’t exist.’
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive the self with the self.’
‘attanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive what is not-self with the self.’
‘attanāva anattānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive the self with what is not-self.’
‘anattanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
Or they have such a view:
atha vā panassa evaṁ diṭṭhi hoti:
‘This self of mine is he, the speaker, the knower who experiences the results of good and bad deeds in all the different realms. This self is permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable, and will last forever and ever.’
‘yo me ayaṁ attā vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ vipākaṁ paṭisaṁvedeti so kho pana me ayaṁ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassatī’ti.

As for the MA10 parallel:

“Thus, they incorrectly contemplate. As a result of those six views, this view arises: ‘There really is a soul.’ That view gives rise to [this view]: ‘There really is no soul.’ That view gives rise to [this view]: ‘The soul sees the soul.’ That views gives rise to [this view]: ‘The soul sees what’s not the soul.’ That view gives rise to [this view]: ‘What’s not the soul sees the soul.’ That view gives rise to [these views]: ‘The soul speaks, knows, acts, teaches, initiates actions, and initiates teachings. It’s born in one place or another and receives the results of good and bad [actions],’ ‘It certainly comes from nowhere … certainly doesn’t exist … certainly won’t exist.’

Using constructive logic, it implies that it can’t be established that self exists or doesn’t exist. Whatever is the concept of self, it is beyond such deliberations.

I think it can be argued that, Buddha specifically refrained from mentioning atta = nibbāna because it would lead people to think their conceptual identity is nibbāna.

However, in many indian schools, the transcendental, non-conceptual is referred to as atta, which is what I think @srkris is aiming at.

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That is the opposite of what the EBTs say. The EBTs say that whatever is conditional is anattā, and anattā is mutually exclusive with attā. You are naming what is described as anattā in the suttas to be a conventional-attā. There is no such ‘conventional-attā’ mentioned. What is conditioned cannot be taken to be the attā (as it is explicitly called anattā). Why do you have to invent a term called ‘conditioned/conventional attā’ - to then deny what the suttas say about all conditioned things being anattā?

That is your definition. The EBTs do not call nibbāna as a cessation of attā. Nibbāna is rather a cessation of one’s dukkha, not a cessation/extermination of oneself (as per the EBTs). You may have a different view but that is at odds with early-Buddhism.

Yes but I am stating what the EBTs say (not whether I consider that verifiable) - nibbāna is the cessation of dukkha, nibbāna is never described as a cessation of attā.
I agree persoanlly that the attā is unverifiable but the EBTs speak of conditioned things being anattā (so it is their view that I am trying to explain).

Birth and death apply to the body and its aggregates (which are anattā), not to the attā. When there is no rebirth, it means this is one’s final/last embodiment. It does not however mean that an attā which formerly existed has been extinguished completely. Cessation or extinguishment are terms applied to dukkha upon nibbāna. Whatever leads to dukkha is anattā/conditioned. End of dukkha is not end of attā because attā is never described as conditioned, it is anattā that is described as conditioned.

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RIght, the attā is not described - for describing or understanding (conceptually/intellectually grasping) it is not the same as realization / awakening, nor does such an intellectual grasp even lead to awakening. Awakening comes from letting-go, not from grasping something (even conceptually/intellectually).

Also, when the topic is about such an abstract thing as the attā, the less said, the better. The least said, the best.

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I think we’re talking past each other. I’m not disputing the definitions or grammar, but relating more to the meaning of what the texts are pointing to.

For example, in AN 5.57:
“‘I am liable to grow old, I am not exempt from old age.’ A woman or a man, a layperson or a renunciate should often review this.
‘Jarādhammomhi, jaraṁ anatīto’ti abhiṇhaṁ paccavekkhitabbaṁ itthiyā vā purisena vā gahaṭṭhena vā pabbajitena vā.”
“‘Jarādhammomhi,” is first person singular, yes? So, constructed/conventional “self.”

So, of course whatever is constructed is anattā. At the same time, as the Buddha said, there is differentiation in conditional beings which can be conventionally labeled with names like Sariputta. It’s not ontological, it’s conventional.

Disagree. But to get into this will derail the thread.

You can’t prove something through absence.

Ok, that’s your interpretation. Sounds very Advaita and related to some of the Upanishads.

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Actually, if you replace “Atta” with “Tathagata”, a lot of this stuff would make sense, I would think.

Arahants, tathagatas are immesurables, their parinibbāna is beyond deliberations (as per snp5.7 and many other places). What’s arahant or tathagata but a roundabout way of saying “true self”?

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Consider this. The three characteristics of all that is conditioned are - dukkha, anicca & anatta.
For nibbāna to be a cessation of dukkha, it has to apply to conditioned things that are also anicca and anatta.

You take the polar opposite view - and consider a cessation of dukkha not to be a cessation of anattā but rather a cessation of attā (i.e. a self-extermination or something of that sort). That may be your view, but that is the opposite of what the EBTs say.

You say you are talking about a conventional-self (and not about the attā), but then have no qualms treating the conventional-self as the attā (when you claim it is the attā that gets extinguished at nibbāna) - when the EBTs make it clear that it is dukkha (and the other 2 characteristics of conditioned existence - i.e. anicca & anatta, that are associated with dukkha) that gets extinguished.

One’s extinguishment of dukkha is not objectively verifiable by another person, so another person cannot know objectively if you achieved nibbāna or not.

Why do you even need to imagine that your body and its aggregates are your ‘conventional’ self - that itself is the wrong view. They are anattā - they are not your self - and this is what Buddhism teaches you, isn’t it?

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I’d say there’s are great deal of difference and “true self” is never used in the suttas.

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And however it is known among those various populations, you speak accordingly, thinking: ‘It seems that the venerables are referring to this.’

I’m saying in a mechanical equivalence across traditions. But if you want to stay true to canon vocabulary and not explore other constructions, hat’s fine. :slight_smile:

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How about “truly selfless” - implying generosity.

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Sorry, but this is not what I’m meaning at all.
I’m not saying there is a “conditional self” anymore than someone calling you “srkris” implies there’s a real attā present.

By conventional, I’m pointing to what the suttas I quoted (and one by the Buddha which I can’t recall right now) says are just labels for what are falsely understood to be selves or things with an enduring essence/soul/Self.

For sure, there is no such thing as a real constructed/conditional attā.
But because unawakened beings are deluded, they mistake themselves as such and this was what I’ve been expressing since my first reply.

At the same, there’s a difference between ontological teachings and what unawakened beings experience – such as sakāyaditthi.

Agree. But that’s not the point here. Also, where do you put the Buddha’s teachings on rebirth?
One can know the cessation of rebirth and whatever others don’t see or don’t understand about this is irrelevant.
As in AN10.95:
“In the same way, it’s not the Realized One’s concern whether the whole world is saved by this, or half, or a third.
Evamevaṁ kho, āvuso uttiya, na tathāgatassa evaṁ ussukkaṁ hoti: ‘sabbo vā tena loko nīyati, upaḍḍho vā, tibhāgo vā’ti.”

Again, here we see the conventional use of loko without in any way implying a self, true self, or inherent reality to it. Same as my point above regarding :“conventional self/beings.”

But, as stated above, I’m not. I’m pointing to conventional labels as used in the teachings.
Again, not ontology but context.

Why do you need to imagine this? :slightly_smiling_face:

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Yes, figuratively. As you wrote: “implying.”
I’d say the context of the thread is different but I appreciate your point.

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Hello @Jasudho, :slight_smile: hope you’re doing well! :pray:

But this understanding of Attā is based on actual experiences by meditators:

It’s when some ascetic or brahmin—by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind—experiences an immersion of the heart of such a kind that they recollect their many kinds of past lives. That is: ten eons of the cosmos contracting and expanding; twenty, thirty, or forty eons of the cosmos contracting and expanding. They remember: ‘There, I was named this, my clan was that, I looked like this, and that was my food. This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended. When I passed away from that place I was reborn somewhere else. There, too, I was named this, my clan was that, I looked like this, and that was my food. This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended. When I passed away from that place I was reborn here.’ And so they recollect their many kinds of past lives, with features and details.

They say: ‘The self and the cosmos are eternal, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They remain the same for all eternity, while these sentient beings wander and transmigrate and pass away and rearise. Why is that? Because by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind I experience an immersion of the heart of such a kind that I recollect my many kinds of past lives, with features and details.

So this understanding of an eternal soul/self didn’t just pop up out of the blue or happen to be some form of speculation. Rather, the eternalists misapprehend their experiences from immersion and their standpoints are rooted in feelings.

This is how The Buddha refutes eternalism:

“This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands. And he understands: ‘These standpoints, thus assumed and thus misapprehended, lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond.’ He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not misapprehend. And because he is free from misapprehension, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of FEELINGS, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.

Also regarding feelings and ”This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended.”

They say:

  • And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.

So eternalists also happen to have neutral feelings regarding the suffering/pain involved in death and rebirth:

If they feel a neutral feeling, they feel it attached.

They’re called an unlearned ordinary person who is attached to rebirth, old age, and death, to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress; who is attached to suffering, I say.

  • So the perception of a permanent self/soul that wanders from one existence to another is something plenty of meditators can experience as an actual reality and from that draw conclusions.

To uproot craving, feelings have to be uprooted:

When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for craving?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a condition for craving?’ you should answer, ‘Feeling is a condition for craving.’

‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’” - MN 136

“Reverends, extinguishment is bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!”
When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?”
“The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.

‘Reverends, when the Buddha describes what’s included in happiness,
he’s not just referring to pleasant feeling. <——

The Realized One describes pleasure as included in happiness wherever it is found, and in whatever context.’”

Of the seven types of annihilationists, six of them believe in rebirth.

Only the materialist-annihilationist who denies rebirth imagines a total annihilation at death.

That being said the semi-eternalists and the six types of annihilationists who believe in rebirth, have a lot in common.
:pray:

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