§17 Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for.
This explanation by Leibniz challenges the possibility of a machine manifesting consciousness but, at the same time, contradicts many aspects of Buddhist doctrine.
Leibniz argues that perception/consciousness is a phenomenon that resides in a simple substance (a monad), something indivisible and immaterial—a concept that, in Buddhist terms, would be considered a Theory of Self. In this particular statement, he seems to dismiss the role of physical components in the formation of experience. I am not certain how Leibnizian philosophy describes the role of sense organs (“six sense bases”) in the formation of experience, but he appears to assume that monads are capable of processing such experiences without the mediation of sense organs.
It’s a profound theme, and probably I don’t have the knowledge of Leibnizian philosophy, let alone the Abhidhamma, that you may have. But The Monadology is a short text and I made a skimming to it. It seems to me that its similarities with the Abhidhamma comes from trying to explain reality from an atomistic perspective. But its theories are very far from the abhidhammic (and the EBTs) perspective. Here are some excerpts.
4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by natural means.
18. All simple substances or created Monads might be called Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (ἔχουσι τὸ ἐντελές); they have a certain self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) which makes them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.) 19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory. 20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. 21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time put animals into this condition.
Comparing the Monadology with the Abhidhamma would deserve a new topic. Maybe, to keep this discussion on topic, it would be interesting to look into the Abhidhamma and the EBTs for arguments against the possibility of AI manifesting consciousness. I guess there are already some topics and posts on Discourse about this theme.
When posting the Leibniz quote I didn’t mean to propose any similarity with Buddhist epistemology. But I found it highly interesting that already in the late 17th/early 18th century he suggested this possible eternal difference between mechanical and biological intelligence that I am sure many of us share intuitively.
Should at one time even the most advanced KI humanoids fail to completely mirror human understanding, thinking and behaviour and humans be empirically proven to be more than just highly efficient biological computers in this way, Leibniz’s hypothesis could be confirmed and dealing a major blow to positivism. Or the opposite.
As the monadology was a dialectic attempt at uniting the contradicting metaphysical/epistemological systems of the time, any metaphysics will find itself partly represented in it.
