To avoid misunderstanding. Sometimes name of Nanamoli Thera, friend of Nanavira Thera is mentioned. Ajhan Nyanamoli from HH is a quite different monk.
The list of course isn’t complete, but what is mentioned here should be enough to help “avarage” Buddhist or anyone who is interested in Dhamma to see that these monks have totally different understanding of Dhamma.
1 “There is no self”
Ajhan Buddhadasa takes for granted that Buddha teaches “There is no self”:
Buddhism teaches that there is no ‘self.’ If you hold that paṭiccasamuppāda leaves no room for a ‘self,’ your understanding is correct. But if you hold that there is a ‘self’ that spans three births, your understanding is incorrect.
Well, as a matter of fact Suttas teach us that “there is no self” is a wrong view known as ucchedavada and neither assertion of self, no negation of self are in confirmity with the right view, since the self in the form of attavad’upadana actually exist. So in his letter Nanavira Thera says:
The impossibility of making a definite assertion about an electron has nothing to do with the impossibility of making a definite assertion about ‘self’. The electron, in quantum theory, is defined in terms of probabilities, and a definite assertion about what is essentially indefinite (or rather, about an ‘indefiniteness’) cannot be made. But attā is not an indefiniteness; it is a deception, and a deception (a mirage, for example) can be as definite as you please—the only thing is, that it is not what one takes it for. To make any assertion, positive or negative, about attā is to accept the false coin at its face value. If you will re-read the Vacchagotta Sutta (Avyàkata Saüy . 8: iv,395-7), you will see that the Buddha refrains both from asserting and from denying the existence of attā for this very reason. (In this connection, your implication that the Buddha asserted that there is no self requires modification. What the Buddha said was ‘sabbe dhammà anattà’—no thing is self—, which is not quite the same. ‘Sabbe dhammā anattā’ means ‘if you look for a self you will not find one’, which means ‘self is a mirage, a deception’. It does not mean that the mirage, as such, does not exist.)
2 Dependent arising and time
According to Ajhan Buddhadasa dependent arising has to be seen as momentary process. Again and again he uses such phrases:
Paṭiccasamuppāda is a momentary and sudden; which is not the language of paṭiccasamuppāda which reflects the momentary. ; For people who clearly understand the principle of dependent origination in a momentary sense, ; Furthermore, this interdependent arising and ceasing is explosive like a bolt of lightning – it is exceedingly fast.; It is violently swift like lightning, and it exists in our daily lives.
According to Nanamoli & Nanavira Theras dependent arising isn’t process at all. That’s to say, of course there is samsara which most evidently is a process, but it is so because puthujjana does not understand his own experience, so Ven Nanamoli says:
Now let us consider the structure of the D/O for a moment.
Firstly, it is not a logical proposition, nor is it a temporal cause-result chain. Such an approach makes an understanding of it impossible.
Or:
To the question: “What are these sets of terms intended to describe?” we may answer tentatively that they are intended to describe experience of any possible kind where ignorance (that is lack of personal realization of the Truths) is present.
Nanavira Thera:
(Past and future only make their appearance with anvaye ñānam, not with dhamme ñānam ‘As it is, so it was, so it will be.’ Paticcasamuppāda is just ‘As it is’—i.e. the present structure of dependence.)
Or
The problem lies in the present, which is always with us; and any attempt to consider past or future without first settling the present problem can only beg the question—‘self’ is either asserted or denied, or both, or both assertion and denial are denied, all of which take it for granted. Any interpretation of paticcasamuppāda that involves time is an attempt to resolve the present problem by referring to past or future, and is therefore necessarily mistaken. (…)
In shortest way: in the past puthujjana was a victim of attavad’upadana and for sure he will be a victim of it in the future, tomorrow or next life and so on, unless he is able to see, now and here what it means to be a victim of upādāna. Dependent arising provides him kind of mirror where he is able to see his own upādāna. One can say: one moment ago I was puthujjana but now I understand the Four Noble Truths. But such moment happens only one time.
Teaching Dhamma as if one could be for some time puthujjana, then for few moments ariya and next again ignorant of the Four Noble Truths, to put it mildly, has no any support in Suttas, but this is exactly what Venerable Buddhadasa teaches:
If you cannot understand this point, please attend carefully. In any given day, it is the normal thing for most of us that sometimes we have craving, attachment, and clinging to an ‘I’ concept. ‘I am this’ or ‘this is mine.’ Most of the time, however, it is not like that. There is a passive, non-grasping state. For example, as you sit and read this, you have no ‘I’ concept because you have no craving or attachment.
You are empty of the ‘I’ delusion; you are just sitting and reading.
So peacefully reading puthujjana, is without upādāna? It is difficult to describe quality of such teaching using polite words, so I will provide kind of polite psychological justification. I believe Venerable Buddhadasa himself would agree that this is not so, but his mind was so strongly attached to idea of momentariness, that ceased to be able to reflect properly and everything what supported his view was accepted as true and valid. But for the case of transparency we can make separate point here.
3 Ignorance and time
Nanamoli & Nanavira see ignorance in quite orthodox way. It’s impermant, but impermanence of ignorance means that it can be removed from experience and impermanence is compatible with stability of it. Describing in short, Ajhan Buddhadasa confuses impermanence with momentariness and unfortunately for Ajhan Buddhadasa as a teacher, and for us all as samsaric beings there is nothing momentary in ignorance. Here the reaction of Venerable Sariputta who finely understood his own ignorance:
The venerable Assaji told the wanderer Sāriputta this sketch of the Dhamma:
The Perfect One has told the cause
Of causally arisen things;
And what brings their cessation, too:
Such is the doctrine preached by the Great Monk.Now when the wanderer Sāriputta heard this statement of the Dhamma, the spotless, immaculate vision of the Dhamma arose in him: All that is subject to arising is subject to cessation.
This is the truth: even if that were all,
You have attained the state where is no sorrow
That we for many times ten thousand ages
Have let pass by unseen.
Vin. Mv.1:23-24
So regarding the present experience of puthujjana Ven Nanavira says:
A man with avijjā, practising reflexion, may identify ‘self’ with both reflexive and immediate experience, or with reflexive experience alone, or with immediate experience alone. He does not conclude that neither is ‘self’, and the reason is clear: it is not possible to get outside avijjā by means of reflexion alone; for however much a man may ‘step back’ from himself to observe himself he cannot help taking avijjā with him. There is just as much avijjā in the self-observer as there is in the self-observed. And this is the very reason why avijjā is so stable in spite of its being sankhata. Simply by reflexion the puthujjana can never observe avijjā and at the same time recognize it as avijjā; for in reflexion avijjā is the Judge as well as the Accused, and the verdict is always ‘Not Guilty’. In order to put an end to avijjā, which is a matter of recognizing avijjā as avijjā, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the puthujjana’s reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is patisotagāmī (Majjhima iii,6 <M.i,168>), or ‘going against the stream’. The Dhamma gives the puthujjana the outside view of avijjā, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the ariyasàvaka this view has, as it were, ‘taken’ like a graft, and is perpetually available).
4 The relative and the absolute Truth and the language of dependent arising
In order to justify his explanations Venerable Buddhadasa introduces idea of the Absolute Truth in opposition to relative truth.
One profound fact concerning this matter is that, in the difficult task of making his teaching known, the Buddha had to use two languages at the same time. He spoke in the language of relative truth in order to teach morals to people still befuddled with the idea of eternalism – those who feel that they are selves, that they possess things. Such people feel this way to the point that they habitually cling to these ideas and become attached to them. The Buddha, however, also spoke in the language of ultimate truth in order to teach those who had only a little dust in their eyes so that they could come to an understanding of absolute reality (paramattha-dhamma).
No more quotes are needed, anyone who is interested can see for himself that Ajhan Buddhadasa in his booklet on dependent arising uses this concept frequently, it is his kay to understanding of Dhamma.
Venerble Nanavira points quite rightly that no such concept exist in Suttas. Venerble Buddhadasa teaches Absolute Truth perhaps not exactly in the same way as it is found in the commentarial tradition, the fact remains the same: such concept is not only absolutely unnecessary for understanding of Dhamma but more, it is an obstacle to understanding.
Why has this notion of ‘truth in the highest sense’ been invented? We find the clue in the Visuddhimagga. This work (Ch. XVIII) quotes the last four lines (5, 6, 7, & 8) and then repeats in essence the argument of the Milinda-pañha, using the word satta as well as puggala. It goes on, however, to make clear what was only implicit in the Milindapañha, namely that the purpose of the argument is to remove the conceit ‘(I) am’ (asmimàna): if it is seen that ‘in the highest sense’, paramatthato, no creature exists, there will be no ground for conceiving that I exist. This allows us to understand why the argument was felt to be necessary . The assutavā puthujjana identifies himself with the individual or the creature, which he proceeds to regard as ‘self’. He learns, however, that the Buddha has said that ‘actually and in truth neither self nor what belongs to self are to be found’. Since he cannot conceive of the individual except in terms of ‘self’, he finds that in order to abolish ‘self’ he must abolish the individual; and he does it by this device. But the device, as we have seen, abolishes nothing. It is noteworthy that the passage in the Milindapañha makes no mention at all of ‘self’: the identification of ‘self’ with the individual is so much taken for granted that once it is established that ‘in the highest sense there is no individual’ no further discussion is thought to be necessary . Not the least of the dangers of the facile and fallacious notion ‘truth in the highest sense’ is its power to lull the unreflecting mind into a false sense of security . The unwary thinker comes to believe that he understands what, in fact, he does not understand, and thereby effectively blocks his own progress.
So regarding the terms in dependent arising Venerable Buddhadasa insist that for example birth doesn’t refer to phenomenal descriptions of birth as it is understood by anyone and as it is understood in Suttas - for example see MN 9 but:
The words bhava and jāti, which mean ‘becoming’ and ‘birth,’ in the case of dependent origination do not mean ‘birth from a mother’s womb.’
Therefore, the word jāti (to be born) must refer to the birth in the moment of one revolution of dependent origination in the daily life of ordinary people (…) it is more useful than talking in terms of the language of relative truth (i.e., each birth means issuing forth from the mother’s womb) which is not the language of paṭiccasamuppāda which reflects the momentary. The word ‘birth’ as used in the language of relative truth will be an obstacle to understanding.
Of course it is quite contrary to what we can find in Suttas, but neither we can find it in Nanamoli’s and Nanavira’s writings:
It (the P/S) is not a temporal cause/effect chain: It is not symbolic since, if we look, we can find each member in ourselves by introspection. Nanamoli Thera
The misunderstanding that Ven Nanavira undermines validity of description of the term “birth” as it is found in Suttas- even Bhikkhu Bodhi whose views on Dhamma are more realistic than that of Ajhan Buddhadasa’s, thought that he does so - can be easily clarified:
Venerble Nanavira puts emphasis that birth as a member of dependent arising is impermant, determined and dependently arisen on the present condition. And when that present condition is removed, as it is in the case of arahat, there is cessation of birth here and now. In order words, puthujjana thinks “I was born” but he does so since he is a victim of attavada and asmimana and identifies himself with the body - but when asmimana is eradicated from experience, ideas “I was born” and “I will die” are also removed. So phenomenal descriptions of birth are quite valid, but no need to see the body which was born as: “this is mine, this I am, this is my self”. Not only it isn’t compulsory, this is precisely how the body should be seen.
In othe words “With ignorance as condition” is a description or rather set of descriptions of puthujjana experience, “with cessation of ignorance” refers to an arahat, so difference lies in the presence and absence of upādāna. It is worth to notice, in the entire Ajhan Buddhadasa booklet attavad’upadana is mentioned only one time with following commentary:
What is attachment? The Buddha said that there are four kinds of attachment: … and attachment to the ‘I’ concept (attavādupādāna), which are well known to all of us.
So we have it. Attavād’upādāna is not taught as: “All puthujjanas are victims of attavādupādāna” but attavādupādāna is well known to all of us. Unfortunately between to know and to understand there is difference which sometimes is not understood by one who knows. Apart that, in the case of Ajhan Buddhadasa he is mistaken even in knowing definition “I-making and mine-making” is an ignorance on pre-reflexive level while attāvada is abandoned by the arising of the right view.
5 Rebirth / Morality/ Nihilism
Some say that Ajhan Buddhadasa actually believed in rebirth. It may be so, but I am not at all certain. And it is certain that he is quite popular between Buddhists who actually don’t believe in rebirth.
Regarding rebirth Ven Nanavira is the hardcore of orthodoxy, he merely insist that direct knowledge of the Four Noble Truths, which is private, immediate and certain, as for mathematician is certain that 2+2=4. It can be stated as follows:
1 Asmimana is suffering
2 Arising of asmimana is arising of suffering
3 Cessation of asmimana is the cessation of suffering
4 There is the way leading to the cessation of asmimana
Such is the direct knowledge of sotapanna.
But when Sutta says:
but as long as there is the attitude ‘I am’ there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. SN 22:47
sotāpanna may have unshakable faith in such Sutta, but has no direct knowledge that it is so, since rebirth is in the future. So it is very praiseworthy that good Buddhists believe in rebirth in the future, but it is much better to know how to abandon future rebirth. Most certainly it cannot be done adopting Buddhadasa’s nihilism:
When teaching the ultimate truth, however, the Buddha spoke as if sentient beings, persons, even the Tathāgata himself, did not exist. There are only those interdependent events which arise for a moment and then pass away.
This is pure, condensed 100% nihilism. And quite often, at least in the booklet on dependent arising, Ajham Buddhadasa dismiss morality as relative practice, really unimportant and not related to dependent arising. In no place Ven Nanavira undermined importance of morality. That’s true that in the case of arahat we can speak about cessation of morality, but it is so because possibility of immoral actions was totally eradicated.
So what Nanamoli and Nanavira Theras say on the cessation of bhava here and now, and what Ajhan Buddhadasa transformed into wrong view: “Tathagata doesn’t exist” is as follows:
"The reason why actually and in truth Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra-, and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness.
But this applies only to one free from sakkayaditthi with eradicated asmimana. And so:
This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found".
Puthujjana is imprisoned In Brahmajala, and his state is that of being. And as long as ignorance is not removed from experience whatever action one does, it will have corresponding results, accordingly to the quality of action.
There are two kinds of righ view and mundane right view as far as responsibility for ones own actions is as much valid for puthujjana as for sekha. Regarding respect for mother and father the same, but with certain adjustments. Arahat as a puggala has parents, but as unborn obviously has non. Sekha should be grateful for what parents done for him, but ability to question fundamental assumption that one was born, should also put role of parents in proper perspective. Respect, yes, any emotional attachment, that’s different story.
Doctrine of anattā is the most profound aspect of Dhamma, it is clearly understood only by ariyas. So one first has to established himself in the fundamental aspects of Dhamma such as total responsibility for actions, which obviously includes rebirth. We see that many people are quite immoral individuals who break basic precepts, and yet they are very successful in wordly sense. As psychopaths, they even don’t suffer from remorse. And one who insists that after the death - since there is no rebirth - they will not suffer unpleasant consequences of their actions, not only has a wrong view mundane or not, but has no slightest idea what actually ariyan right view is.
So if our present understanding of anattā is incompatible with rebirth, it means that there is something wrong with our understanding. Unfortunately, in one thing Venerable Nanavira most certainly was mistaken:
(A curious view, that the Buddha was an agnostic on the question of re-birth and refused to pronounce on it, seems to be gaining currency. Even a very slight acquaintance with the Suttas will correct this idea. See e.g. Majjhima ii,2 <M.i,73-7>.)
In some cases it will not correct it. More, it is possible, knowing the context of Sutttas insist that one who believes in rebirth has a wrong view and so cannot be ariya. There is of course comical aspect here, but if we look more closely, it is very frightening how attachment to views can influenced the mind of the victim of diṭṭhupādāna.
This is of course an extreme example, but perhaps on lower level we are as much blind regarding our distorted ideas on Dhamma, just because “my view is …” and we don’t care that there are Suttas which contradic it. Or we care, but since Sutta contradicts our view, it must be later addition, corruption in text, or just in this particular case the meaning of the term has to be understood otherwise than usually is understood. And strange thing, the meaning is always in agreement with our present understanding.
