An interpretation of Anatta

Discussion
4

“Sabbe dhamma anatta” seems unambiguous to me, given that Nibbana is also a dhamma.

5

Nibbana is the cessation of dhamma ‘dhammaana.m nirodha.m’ according to SN/SA suttas (SN ii, pp. 14-16, 129-130: SN 12.13-14, SN 12. 71-81 = SA 352-354). See p. 180, note 129, in Choong Mun-keat’s Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism.

6

MN 115 refers to the “asankhata dhatu” (“uncondtioned element”). Iti 44 refers to the Nibbana-Dhatu.

It seems SN 12.13-14 simply refers to “these dhammas”, namely , the twelve unwholesome dhammas of dependent origination.

They understand these things, their origin, their cessation, and the practice that leads to their cessation.

Ime dhamme pajānanti, imesaáč dhammānaáč samudayaáč pajānanti, imesaáč dhammānaáč nirodhaáč pajānanti, imesaáč dhammānaáč nirodhagāminiáč paáč­ipadaáč pajānanti.

SuttaCentral

7

That is, the four noble truths. The cessation of dhamma is nibbana.

8

I belief it is easy to get lost in philosophy about self and not self, but what does it all mean in a normal psychological human sense?

I tend to see it this way that when anatta is completely understood, we do not take up things personally anymore. Not exited when things go well, nor depressed when things not go well. Not offended by harsh words, nor cheerful by nice words. Not longing for compliments. Not longing to be seen as wise, loving, a great person. Not holding on to any status. Without any ideas of being less, more or equal to others. Not anxious and dark when we meet suffering. Not seeing suffering as punishment nor happiness as a reward. Not fearing death, not fearing birth. Such things.

The more we take up things personally the more we lack real understanding of anatta. I think that’s where it come down to in a practical psychological sense.

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9

I feel that any discussion of Anatta is premature until we first have a firm grasp on the meaning of Atta. :grin:

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10

@Mike_0123 I summarize here the points you mentioned. I also put comments whether that I agree or disagree. For the points that I disagree, I will also tell you the reasons and my suggested explanations.

Category 1: What anattā is not

  • You disagree that “anatta is the rejection only of a permanent self, but it still defends that there is an impermanent self, which is our stream of consciousness.”:

I agree with you because I also disagree with above statement “anatta is the rejection only 
 our stream of consciousness.”. Your logical arguments in this category are mostly okay.

Category 2: What anattā is

I disagree with you about the above part.

It appears to me that: you still consider “being” or “the Tathāgata” or “self” as something that exists in absolute sense.

  • This leads to doubt and worry as “if there is no self, then my happiness is actually no one’s happiness, and what is the purpose of pursuing it if I’m disconnected from it?”.

  • This also leads to your speculated theories such as “being is not annihilated” or “being becomes undefined, beyond description/determined”.

The Yamakasutta SN 22.85 that you mentioned in your own post should help you in this situation. You should instead focus on this part:

What do you think, Reverend Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as form?”
“No, reverend.”
“Do you regard the Realized One AS feeling 
 perception 
 choices 
 consciousness?”
“No, reverend.”

“What do you think, Reverend Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as in form?”
“No, reverend.”
“Or do you regard the Realized One as distinct from form?”
“No, reverend.”
“Do you regard the Realized One AS IN feeling 
 or distinct from feeling 
 as in perception 
 or distinct from perception 
 as in choices 
 or distinct from choices 
 as in consciousness?”
“No, reverend.”
“Or do you regard the Realized One as DISTINCT FROM consciousness?”
“No, reverend.”

“What do you think, Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as POSSESSING form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness?”
“No, reverend.”

“What do you think, Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as one who is WITHOUT form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness?”
“No, reverend.”

Pay attention to the parts: “as”, “as in”, “distinct from”, “possessing”, “without”. You should realize that, not only “the Tathāgata” but any other being such as Mr. Biden, Mr. Putin and Mr. Zelenskyy, a dog, a cat, a mouse, etc. :sweat_smile: also can’t be found “as”, “as in”, “distinct from”, “possessing”, “without” the 5 aggregates.

In conclusion, my suggested explanation is, you should see that: Those words “being” or “the Tathāgata” or “self” are nothing more than words, used in conventional language to ease the communication process. Seeing that way, the above mentioned doubt and worry will not arise, the above mentioned speculated theories will not arise either.

If you (or anyone else here) think that such a view presented above will bring suffering, please reply and explain in details. Thank you. :pray:

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11

Hi, Bhante Paññādhammika! Thank you for your reply.

I see that most of your reply is based on the notion of two truths. I had thought a lot of whether or not I should comment on that in my original post, but ended up deciding not to. Basically, I don’t believe it to solve anything honestly. It used to sound like a wonderful solution, until the moment I realized that two contradictory truths can’t be both true at the same time: they are either both consistent (and therefore aren’t really two truths, but rather one single bigger one) or at least one is wrong.

On the suttas that you quotes, like AN2.25, they might not refer to the doctrine of the two truths. Actually, they might simply mean that there are suttas that need deeper interpretation to be grasped correctly and others, if you dive too deeply, seeing connections and stuff, will be grasped wrongly.

Self and being seem different both in usage and meaning. For example, I may say, “my self,” but “my being” sounds weird. Both are also different in meaning in so far as there is nothing that we can see as our self, but there are still beings around, who, according to the SN 23:2, are defined as desire and passion for the aggregates. In conclusion, there is no self, but there are beings (not as some sort of essence though).

Indeed this might sounds as an eternalist view, but the same can be found in the suttas as well. Things like, “the Tathāgata is not found in the aggregates. With the cessation of the aggregates, only dukkha ceases. The Tathāgata is not annihilated. He can’t be said to exist, not to, both, or neither in parinibbana.” By person, I meant an awakened being, but by “being” I mean only conventionally, just for the sake of being understood, for a being can’t be said to exist when there is no desire and passion.

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12

Thank you for your reply!

I believe that there is no self (in the sense of something that we can identify ourselves with), but I take “being,” at least when said in the context of SN 23:2, as something referring to our sense of personhood in the world, which doesn’t necessarily involve identifying oneself with the aggregates. In reality, conceit and mine-making can make us have this sense even after overcoming identity-view. However, when “being” is used to refer to an awakened being, then it’s said in a completely conventional sense, since they have no delight and passion, as it’s said in the SN 5.10:

What? Do you assume a ‘living being,’ Mara?
Do you take a position?
This is purely a pile of fabrications.
Here no living being
can be pinned down.

Just as when, with an assemblage of parts,
there’s the word,
chariot,
even so when aggregates are present,
there’s the convention of
living being.

For only stress is what comes to be;
stress, what remains & falls away.
Nothing but stress comes to be.
Nothing ceases but stress.

Instead of defining “being” as something related to desire and passion, the nun says that a being exists only conventionally in relation to the aggregates, which might sound contradictory with SN 23:2. Given the context of the nun’s answer, namely that Mara was “wanting to arouse fear, horripilation, & terror in her, wanting to make her fall away from concentration,” the whole sutta seems to be connected with fear of annihilation in parinibbana. In this case, it indeed sounds reasonable that a being would be just conventional. This mere convention, however, is not enough to justify kamma, but since an arahant doesn’t need to worry about it, it’s not much of a problem.

I agree that the same reasoning can be applied to all these living beings. What I don’t hold is that “being” can be taken as wholly conventional. Any being indeed won’t be identical to any aggregate, and the sutta’s questions are intended to approach precisely identity-view. Nonetheless, SN 23:2 gives a way more precise definition of what “being” means.

The fact that we don’t exist as, as in, distinct from, possessing, or without form, feeling, perception, volitions, or consciousness means just that the cessation of the aggregates won’t consist of our annihilation. This doesn’t solve the fact that not seeing certain things as you and yours makes rational decision making impossible. This doesn’t mean that a being exists in an absolute sense either. We could say that anatta would be a sort of an strategy to deal with our sense of being, and the straightaway denial of any possession (including one’s own happiness) is, not only detrimental, but also incorrect.

In summary, the ultimate goal is to free ourselves from this sense of personhood, selfhood, and being something. The first step must be at the level of our views, for if I believe to be identical to something, I won’t give up my sense of self. After giving up identity-view, I still have to cling to my actions and see my kamma as mine in order to free myself from the remnant forms of this sense of self (I- and mine-making). I can’t just deny the existence of anything that is mine, like my own happiness, because I actually still take things to be mine, and so they are “mine.” If I stubbornly repeat to myself, “there is no self in absolutely anything,” thinking to have fully comprehended anatta, then I might be unable to notice this subtle sense of being in my mind, which will ultimately make me unable to progress.

Maybe this way of rephrasing my views show it better that I don’t take beings in a somewhat absolute sense, which indeed seemed to be the case in my original post.

13

Are you saying that anatta doesn’t apply to Nibbana? I don’t think the suttas support the idea of Nibbana being a self.

14

Nibbana is referred to as both a dhamma and a dhatu in the suttas. But I don’t think Nibbana is described as a self, and I don’t think it is exempt from “sabbe dhamma anatta”.

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15

The Third Noble Truth describes the cessation of craving, not the cessation of dhammas generally.
The cessation of dhammas (phenomena) generally would amount to the cessation of all experience.

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16

I think the most important thing is to do a reality check all the time. We can be able to explain things in a apparantly very coherent clever way, consistent, clear, logical, supported by texts, thinking we catch the real meaning of the teachings and feel Dhamma-experts, but still emotionally and psychologically function like we have no real understanding of these topics at all. Right?

We must not delude ourselves and others. All that mental cleverness does it really uproot the asava, tanha and anusaya’s or does it even makes it worse?

I often feel it is the last because one tends to develop the idea one understands Dhamma while if one sees truly, one is just a very ordinairy person with identity view, strong cravings, anxiety, a lot of mana, and a very big ego.

17

Not ‘can’ but ‘will’! Though identity view is the first fetter, the subtle sense of Self is the final fetter to be overcome (SN22.89).

AFAIK, the nun in question was an Arahant and is responding on the basis of the ultimate truth ‘there is Nothing’. Mara on the other hand, has posed the question of a ‘living being’ which is a conventional truth - true only within the framework of the aggregates to the extent that craving produces the illusion of a living being (which would be compatible with SN23.2). The moment this illusion is clung to, there is becoming
 Birth, old age, Death, suffering and also kamma all come to be (DO).

AFAIK, for an Arahant, there is nothing in the ultimate sense- its all an empty shell. The aggregates are simply natural processes, all experience and consequent responses are arising and ceasing on the basis of natural law (the Dhamma of Idapaccayata). There are no defilements present to cause idiosyncratic ‘Self’ based responses to occur. That is why there can be no kamma.

A very good insight indeed!

MN 106
“Sir, take a mendicant who practices like this: ‘It might not be, and it might not be mine. It will not be, and it will not be mine. I am giving up what exists, what has come to be.’ In this way they gain equanimity. Would that mendicant become extinguished or not?”

“One such mendicant might become extinguished, Ānanda, while another might not.”

:grin:

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18

Incorrect, according to the mentioned SA/SN suttas. The dhammas are the factors themselves of the ‘conditioned arising’ (paticcasamppada).

19

I don’t agree. In the context of “sabbe dhamma anatta”, dhamma refers to phenomena generally. The nidanas of DO are a category of dhamma (phenomena), but dhammas are not limited to DO.

One category of dhammas are sense-objects like sights and sounds, and presumably sense-objects do not cease for the Arahant.

20

The sense spheres are simply empty. See SN 35.197 = SA 1172; SN 22.95 = SA 265 (see also pp. 92-93, 54 in Choong Mun-keat’s Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism).

21

So the sense-spheres are empty, lacking in substance, and not fit to be regarded as self
 ie anatta. OK.

But how does this relate to our discussion about “sabbe dhamma anatta”, and the scope of “dhamma”?

22

The dhamma (such as the sense-spheres) are both anatta and ‘just empty’ (su~n~naka), according to the mentioned SA/SN suttas.

23

And so? How does this relate to our earlier discussion?