Well, even when we don’t personally experience Nibbāna, we still can get the definition of Nibbāna. Can you still not even start your kind of analysis on the definition of Nibbāna given by the Buddha in the suttas?
‘This is peaceful; this is sublime—that is, the stilling of all activities, the letting go of all attachments, the ending of craving, fading away, cessation, extinguishment.’
‘etaṁ santaṁ etaṁ paṇītaṁ yadidaṁ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan’ti.
What is the result that your kind of analysis gives you when applying on such definition?
I notice a few additional interesting points:
For such kind of “analysis”, is it by itself also not having “essence, inherently exists, or is really real”?
For statements such as “Sabbe saṅkhārā anicca”, “Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkha”, “Sabbe dhammā anatta”, are they also not having “essence, inherently exists, or is really real”?
For the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, are they also not having “essence, inherently exists, or is really real”?
For certain ABC dhamma, you need to have a process to analysis it, now it is the process - not the analysis in its abstract form. So, I guess, such process should be not having “essence, inherently exists, or is really real”, right? But then, the result of such process, which tells you such certain ABC dhamma does not having “essence, inherently exists, or is really real”, such result also does not having “essence, inherently exists, or is really real”, won’t it be problematic to trust such result?
Nibbana is said to be the unconditioned in sutta. Certainly, we can contemplate carefully and examine closely what this might mean. It is good to do so! Here is an attempt.
There is a crucial difference between how I use the word dependent versus the word conditioned. It is prudent to state this at the outset so as to avoid confusion later. Before proceeding I’ll try and give a description of these two terms and how they differ with the usage I intend.
To be conditioned is to be caused to arise due to causes and conditions. All conditioned things are subject to arising and ceasing due to causes and conditions.
To be dependent means something does not exist in and of itself. The notion “small” depends upon the notion “large” to be understood. The notion of “darkness” depends upon the notion “light” to be understood.
Crucially, not all that is dependent is necessarily conditioned.
Which brings me to my main point: Nibbana being unconditioned does not necessarily mean that it is independent. Nibbana being unconditioned means it does not arise and it does not cease and is not caused due causes and conditions. This is not the same as saying that it is not dependent.
Which sets me up to hopefully try and answer your questions:
Correct. I would NOT say that Nibbana being unconditioned necessarily means that it ,“has essence, inherently exists, or is really real.” Something that has essence or inherently exists or is really real would not be dependent upon anything at all and it would not be caused or conditioned. It would be both independent AND unconditioned.
These most definitely do not have essence in my estimation. “Lack of essence,” itself also does not have essence because it is dependent. Lack of essence is also unconditioned: it does not arise due to causes and conditions and it does not cease, but it can be known.
Correct. None of these has essence or is really real in my estimation. The Teacher said so himself in regards to the Tathagata
Correct. The process of analyzing a banana tree to find it lacks a core is a conditioned process that also lacks essence in my estimation.
No! I don’t believe it is problematic at all. Logic operates just fine to arrive at this conclusion. No laws of logic were broken and no contradiction necessarily entails. It might seem so, but this is due to assuming LEM which thankfully does not need to be assumed.
I keep harping on LEM on this forum, because it really is crucial for understanding why a non-affirming negation is not a problem. LEM does not allow for a non-affirming negation, but thankfully we don’t need LEM!
This is something that’s bugging me philologically for a while. Asankhata also means conditionless, as in absence of conditions.
Nibbāna as a metaphor of an event and not a state is evident in Agama/Nikayas, though even there there’s sometimes traces of it being something like a dimension.
But let’s take a closer look at the metaphor of fire extinguishing - fire doesn’t abide in extinguishment; extinguishment is not a state, it’s a one-shot event that symbolizes eradication of something, rather than being something in-itself.
There’s also the very obvious dilemma of treating Nibbāna as the unconditioned which makes the path to it, a condition, a problem. The traditional analogy, that is, path being conditioned doesn’t make the mountain conditioned, also doesn’t satisfy me for the following reason:
Nibbāna is often explained as the ending of three poisons (whether of greed, aversion and delusion; or desire, existence and ignorance). Leaving aside all the metaphors and all the flowery imagery, eradication of these things is conditioned. Nirvana is eradication of these things. Therefore, Nirvana is conditioned.
I’m aware that even in Nikayas and certainly in later texts, Nirvana is treated as something different. But therein I find a pattern of reification of a metaphor through a gradual idolisation - Nirvana no longer being what’s like the event of pouring water on fire, but more about the state that ensues. I don’t think that perspective aligns with the metaphor at all.
I think even Bhante Sujato translates asankhata as unconditioned. But I don’t quite understand what such a translation would entail. All the traditional accounts I’ve read seem like patchwork explanations for the shift in understanding of nirvana as an event to a state.
This might be of interest to Bhante @Sunyo as he’s working on his book on the topic at the moment. Perhaps you could shed some light on this.
You may have seen this thread, but this is a response from @Sunyo in case you haven’t:
" In my opinion the problem is the translation ‘unconditioned’. Asankhata literally means “without (what is) created”. The word sankhata is used with reference to a raft that is put together, for example, and we don’t say a raft is “conditioned”. (Snp1.2) So Thanissaro for example translates sankhata as ‘fabricated’, which I think is better than ‘conditioned’. The prefix a- in asankhatafunctions as a prefix of absence, not of opposite. As the Critical Pali Dictionary says for the prefix: “In adj.comp. with subst. = ‘without that’,” (Other dictionaries say similar things, but this is the one I could find quickest.) So asankhata refers to the absence of anything created.
Nibbana can refer either to the cessation of the defilements or the cessation of existence at death of an enlightened being. I would say both are conditioned, in the English sense of the word, because they depend on the eightfold path. So they aren’t unconditioned in the sense that we normally understand this term.
Nibbana is a metaphor for cessation (the metaphor of a fire going out), and cessation is not a thing that exists forever and we just reach it, as some people argue in favor of ‘unconditioned’. The cessation of suffering, just as the extinguishment of a fire, is something that has a clear cause."
You might want to have a look at the entirety of SN 36.31
And what is liberation of the flesh? Katamo ca, bhikkhave, sāmiso vimokkho?
Liberation connected with form is liberation of the flesh. Rūpappaṭisaṁyutto vimokkho sāmiso vimokkho.
And what is liberation not of the flesh? Katamo ca, bhikkhave, nirāmiso vimokkho?
Liberation connected with the formless is liberation not of the flesh. Arūpappaṭisaṁyutto vimokkho nirāmiso vimokkho.
And what is liberation even more spiritual than that not of the flesh? Katamo ca, bhikkhave, nirāmisā nirāmisataro vimokkho?
When a mendicant who has ended the defilements reviews their mind free from greed, hate, and delusion, liberation arises. This is called liberation even more spiritual than that not of the flesh.” Yo kho, bhikkhave, khīṇāsavassa bhikkhuno rāgā cittaṁ vimuttaṁ paccavekkhato, dosā cittaṁ vimuttaṁ paccavekkhato, mohā cittaṁ vimuttaṁ paccavekkhato uppajjati vimokkho, ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, nirāmisā nirāmisataro vimokkho”ti.
Here again we see that liberation (free of conditions/unconditional), is described as an absence and not as any “thing”.
And liberation “arises” from the absence of the defilements – again, as freedom from them and not as a “something.”
For now, I don’t have much to add to what I wrote before, which Jasudho quoted. I’m still unsatisfied with the translation ‘unconditioned’, because in normal English it means something has no cause or condition, while nibbāna does have a cause: the practice of the path. Many translators have suggested what I think are more satisfying translations for asaṅkhata, along the lines of ‘without anything formed/constructed/fabricated’.
I also disagree with the idea that nibbāna is something that, like a mountain, always exists. Some have argued for this idea directly based on the translation ‘unconditioned’ for asaṅkhata. But this idea doesn’t even work in direct definitions of the word. For example, in SN43.1 the Buddha says:
And what is the asaṅkhata? The ending of greed, hate, and delusion.
The ending of greed, hatred, and delusion clearly isn’t there before enlightenment is reached, and so it is not some ever-existent, “Unconditioned” thing. It is actually something that is brought about through practicing the path.
Since this ending (or “extinguishing”) of the defilements is what nibbāna is, nibbāna is also something not something that is ever-existing. (The same goes for parinibbāna as the ending of the aggregates.)
If we were to redefine “unconditioned” to mean, as I think Yeshe does, “not arisen by a cause”, then, sure, in a way that works, because nibbana is not an arising of the defilements (or anything) but their cessation. However, that would be an artificial definition. In normal English an ending of things can also be conditioned by causes.
But there are many more epithets besides Asaṅkhata & Nibbāna:
And what is the Dhuvañca (the constant/permanent/stable)?
The ending of greed, hate, and delusion.
And what is the Apalokitañca (the not falling apart)?
The ending of greed, hate, and delusion.
And what is the Anidassanañca (that in which nothing appears)?
The ending of greed, hate, and delusion.
And for instance Virāgañca (dispassion) is said to be the best of all things whether conditioned or unconditioned.
There are these two elements: the conditioned element and the unconditioned element. When once he knows and sees these two elements, in that way he is worthy to be called skilled in elements.” - MN 115
Also, if we take the following epithets regarding the goal of the path:
the peaceful …
Santañca
the freedom from old age …
Ajajjarañca
the freedom from death …
Amatañca
Together with some other epithets, they fit perfectly with MN 140:
The sage at peace (Santañca) is not reborn, does not grow old (Ajajjarañca), and does not die (Amatañca). They are not shaken (Anītikañca, Anītikadhammañca), and do not yearn (Taṇhākkhayañca, Anālayañca).
For they have nothing which would cause them to be reborn. Not being reborn, how could they grow old? Not growing old, how could they die? Not dying, how could they be shaken? Not shaking, for what could they yearn?
So there is clearly freedom from both rebirth and death, and there is no ”final death” since the sage at peace does not die.
Just from a ‘standard use’ point of view, ‘on fire’ is usually a state of other things rather than fire itself. Like we might say that a stick is on fire. So you can certainly have a stick that isn’t on fire and that is the state of the stick. I’d prefer to be in a state where my head wasn’t on fire rather than having to put it out, but we get what we deserve I guess
But this doesn’t necessarily imply, let alone prove, that cessation/nibbāna is a “something.”
Rather, once the defilements are eradicated it’s known that their cessation is constant/permanent.
The awakened know that this awakening/elimination of greed, anger, ignorance will not fall apart during life. The freedom from the defilements is irreversible.
There’s an understanding that after all the senses and aggregates cease after the final death nothing will appear – including an ineffable “something.”
Of all the early buddhist schools only the Sautrāntika claimed a final death since to them Nibbāna was not a state/immersion/dimension (āyatana).
But no other buddhist school agrees with the views held by the Sautrāntika.
The view of the other schools like Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, Mahīśāsakas, Pudgalavādins & some Mahāsāṃghikas is that there is no “final death”.
This is because the suttas repeatedly say the goal involves freedom from both rebirth & death.
That is exactly why I pointed out the following from MN 140 in my previous post where plenty of the epithets for Nibbăna are found:
”The sage at peace (Santañca) is not reborn, does not grow old (Ajajjarañca), and does not die (Amatañca). They are not shaken (Anītikañca, Anītikadhammañca), and do not yearn (Taṇhākkhayañca, Anālayañca).
For they have nothing which would cause them to be reborn. Not being reborn, how could they grow old? Not growing old, how could they die? Not dying, how could they be shaken? Not shaking, for what could they yearn?”
How could there be a final death when the sage at peace (with greed, anger & ignorance eliminated) is not reborn, does not grow old and does not die?
As to Nibbāna being an immersion beyond the all it clearly says:
There exists (atthi) that dimension (āyatana) Ud 8.1:
There, mendicants, I say there is no coming or going or remaining or passing away or reappearing.
It is not established, does not proceed, and has no support.
Just this is the end of suffering.”
Together with AN 11.7 and all those similar suttas.
Yet I don’t think we can ever actually agree on this.
So we should rather say that some of us are more inclined towards the Sautrāntika understanding while others align more with the understanding held by Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, Mahīśāsakas, Pudgalavādins & Mahāsāṃghikas.
This may or may not be true, but even if it is, how does that prove the point?
There were many schools of thought that did not agree with Copernicus regarding the earth being at the center of the universe. And yet…
Right. A final death with nothing left over.
Right. As has been posted on SC in other threads, the Pāli present tense can point to the future.
Also, when there’s no self-identity while alive, there is the knowing that even now there is no death – of a self. Just the cessation of conditions.
Same with āyatana not necessarily pointing to a “place/sphere” or “realm” of any sort. It can also mean opportunity.
As usual, it comes down to varying understandings and interpretations of the teachings.
imo, what you and I have posted here are not proofs, but different understandings within the context of the Teachings, (rather than identifying with particular schools that developed around 200 years after the Buddha).
Despite the complete elimination of greed, anger & ignorance and the complete uprooting if the conceit “I am” a fully awakened can still recollect their past lives, right?
First some rhetorical questions about rebirth and recollecting past lives in general:
Why is it that past lives even remain accessible?
Where and how are these memories stored up in the first place?
How, and why exactly do these memories remain through all lives?
Since the memories even remain after extinguishment and there is also no more dark or light kamma for a fully awakened one it obviously has nothing to do with kamma.
So just like you would say that a fully awakened only conventionally says:
“In that previous life of ”mine”, ”I” had such and such experiences”
That such a self mentioned is only conventional, which is I totally agree with given that the conceit ”I am” has been uprooted completely, exactly in the same what you call death or a final death is likewise also only a convention.
But I guess you disagree with this?
There is only the conventional death of the arahant’s physical body.
The arahant at peace with all defilements uprooted does not die, as MN 140 points out.
And the only difference between the arahants in iti 44 is the physical body, nothing else.
So when you write:
The “with nothing left over” part is from iti 44 and regarding the physical body.
Exactly, the conceit “I am” has been completely uprooted and yet despite this all the memories from past lives somehow still remain and were never extinguished.
So maybe what you call death or a final death is nothing more than the death of the physical body? (a very insignificant thing in the grand scheme)
I mean all experiences from past lives always remain, they do not ”die” or get terminated, unlike the physical body.
You don’t think an arahant who has already recollected hundreds of thousands previous deaths and rebirths understands that death of the physical body always resulted in rebirth?
But since the defilements has now been eliminated one will not take rebirth ever again nor will one die.
Beyond both existence and non-existence - the middle.
But the four āyatanas are actual places and dimensions (the four formless realms) so why would this āyatana mentioned in Ud 8.1 be any different in terms of being a realm/dimension that exists (atthi) compared to the formless realms which are very real actual places?
I’m just pointing out that if there is no such immersion as mentioned in Ud 8.1 and AN 11.7 then the Sautrāntika understanding of a final death does make sense.
On the other hand if there is an immersion beyond the all (the unconditioned element) as MN 115 states:
There are these two elements: the conditioned element and the unconditioned element. When a mendicant knows and sees these two elements, they’re qualified to be called ‘skilled in the elements’.”
Then it would make more sense that the unconditioned āyatana Ud 8.1 is where arahants end up after the conventional death of the body.
Hence not being reborn nor dying as MN 140 points out.
Just like Ven. @Sunyo already pointed out in this thread:
Likewise the complete uprooting of the conceit “I am” isn’t there before enlightenment either, but brought about through practicing the path:
“the perception of impermanence should be developed for the complete uprooting of the conceit ‘I am’. To one who has the perception of impermanence, Meghiya, the perception of non-self is established, one who perceives non-self reaches the complete uprooting of the conceit ‘I am’, in this very life reaches Emancipation.” - Ud 4.10
Which reveals a major contradiction in the Sautrāntika view if one reads iti 49 which states the following:
“How, bhikkhus, do some overreach? Now some are troubled, ashamed, and disgusted by this very same being and they rejoice in (the idea of) non-being, asserting: ‘In as much as this self, good sirs, when the body perishes at death, is annihilated and destroyed and does not exist after death—this is peaceful, this is excellent, this is reality!’ Thus, bhikkhus, do some overreach.
Sure, one can still claim “there is no self at all” and point out the sentence “In as much as this self” in the sutta.
But first one has to reach enlightenment to get rid of the conceit ”I am”, right?
So if the conceit “I am” remains until the goal of the practice is reached how can then the Sautrāntika view be said to be correct?
In iti 49 when Dhamma is being taught for the cessation of becoming (bhavanirodhāya), prior to having reached the goal some think cessation must be non-existence and how peaceful and sublime that would be, but the Buddha says in iti 49 they overreach and are wrong regarding bhavanirodhāya.
Is it really only based on still having a notion of ”I am” that those in iti 49 are incorrect and is that the only reason why the Buddha says they overreach?
The Sautrāntika would say this is the case.
But why would non-existence be considered peaceful and sublime without the conceit ”I am” but not peaceful and not sublime if one still has a notion of ”I am”?
Especially since the complete uprooting of the conceit ”I am” can only be realised thanks to bhavanirodhāya in the first place, and bhavanirodhāya is not what those in iti 49 imagine it to be.
Remember that it is the Buddha himself who has already eliminated all defilements and completely uprooted the conceit ”I am” who is saying that non-existence is not peaceful nor sublime.
It becomes a major contradiction summarized like this:
The Sautrāntika view = it is the notion of ”I am” that makes the goal of the practice (Bhavanirodhāya) not peaceful and not sublime. But once the conceit ”I am” is uprooted and there is no self, then Bhavanirodhāya (non-existence) is indeed peaceful and sublime.
Other buddhist schools view = the complete uprooting of the conceit ”I am” is only thanks to Bhavanirodhāya. So only after the goal (Bhavanirodhāya) is reached has the conceit ”I am” been fully uprooted. Now if Bhavanirodhāya is not non-existence and non-existence is not considered peaceful nor sublime, as pointed out by the Buddha in iti 49. Then likewise the complete uprooting of the defilements and the conceit ”I am” (which is peaceful, sublime and the highest bliss) can’t be said to be existence, since existence is suffering according to the Buddha.
You offered a long post and I won’t respond to each point.
No, we agree on this.
The memories, just like the senses and aggregates that are still present, are old kamma and conditions that arise and cease. Perceptions and sensations still occur after awakening. Yes?
The Buddha described backpain and the arahants did not walk into trees. Conditions we label as memories are clearly, according to the suttas, still experienced.
Just not by a someone with a self sense.
Right. But see the prior posts. They will have no further rebirth and there is no one and no self to die – just conditions will end.
So in that sense they do not die.
And, because it can also refer to the future in terms of no rebirth and subsequent death.
That’s one interpretation. Another is that it means with nothing left over at all. Like the sutta says.
I believe nibanna is a dynamic equilibrium. Changes that occur cancel each other out maintaining an optimal experience, locally at a minimum. “Leaf” nodes are tautologies. And the moral of this story is be helpful, not condescending, and never make things worse. A new golden rule.
