Sometimes people make an argument from what the Buddha didn’t say. This argument goes something like “If my idea about what the Buddha taught is wrong, then why didn’t the Buddha say [insert very specific thing that would disprove my idea]”
I feel like this is fallacious for two reasons. First, we generally cannot know why the Buddha didn’t speak in a certain way about a certain topic. We can only know things he did say, to the extent that has been preserved in the EBTs.
This seems related to the idea of falsifiability to me. We cannot ask the suttas “why didn’t the Buddha say X” [1] meaning we cannot even in principle use the suttas to determine whether the argument is false.
Second, it also seems related to the idea of “moving the goalpost”:
Moving the goalposts is an informal fallacy in which evidence presented in response to a specific claim is dismissed and some other (often greater) evidence is demanded. (Wikipedia)
Normally, the evidence for what the Buddha said comes from plausible interpretations of the words recorded in the EBTs, i.e. plausible interpretations of what he did actually say. So the argument that the Buddha “should have spoken in a certain way if I were wrong” suddenly brings in an impossibly high standard of evidence.
I wonder if there are any other arguments for the “Argument from what the Buddha didn’t say” is fallacious, or are there times when it is appropriate?
I would appreciate any help in thinking about this
The exceptions would be suttas like SN 19.1 where the Buddha explicitly explains why he didn’t say something (because the audience would not have believed the Buddha) ↩︎
I think an example I can think of, and that is valid, is that of how Nibbāna is not a type of consciousness.
If that was his view, we’d have repeated formulas to the point of brainwash that it is the case. There’s plenty of formulas that point the other direction. People still argue that Nibbāna is a type of consciousness according to Pāli sources.
Oke, but there is the problem: What is plausible for one is not plausible for another.
I do not think there is a way that we can level this. I do not believe that more study of texts can help. I think we just have to accept it.
It easy to become judgemental and blame others being hindus instead of buddhist, being biases in stead of being open, being intellectual dishonest and that kind of loaded judgements. The underlying sentiment seems to be that one feels that ones own understanding is superior, and ‘only this is true’.
It is amazing, i feel, how strong this is among buddhist. There are many that claim to know the one and only pure Dhamma, is my experience. And if they do not do this openly then they surely secretly and it will show.
I think it is very well possible that the Buddha did not share what is not welcome. What someone cannot accept or digest at that moment. In later buddhism this argument is often made. They often teach that certain teachings people were not able to understand and digest. Like teaching complex math to people who have never learned to add up. I think such is possible. I feel, that later buddhist teachings are not really different but they resonate on a different level. Their entrence is different. They go more directly to the heart i feel. By the way i also feel that can also be a pitfal. Because it gives rise to the impression that one already knows and understands but that is not really yet a personal or embodies knowing.
Perhaps differentiating between inference and metaphysical leaps is applicable here.
On the one hand, we have hundreds of suttas in which the Buddha teaches the impermanence of all processes labeled as consciousness, (SN22.9, SN22.10).
In none of these teachings does the Buddha follow-up with a disclaimer such as, “But this doesn’t apply to unconditional consciousness or timeless awareness”, for example.
So we might reasonably infer, before our actual insight into this conditionality, that the Buddha not directly and clearly mentioning an “unconditional consciousness” indicates that it’s not an aspect of his teachings.
I mean, if “unconditional consciousnes/awareness” is so important and fundamental, can’t we infer that it would have been clearly and directly stated hundreds of times, (like teachings on anicca)?
This doesn’t prove the point about “unconditional consciousness” but it seems a valid and strong inference can be made via the absence of this teaching.
On the other hand, using what the Buddha didn’t say as a kind of “space” into which we project our personal views and metaphysical beliefs and then claim that “the Buddha never said otherwise, so I have a valid point” is different.
Here, absence is used a a kind of empty screen on which to project our views. A problem with this is that arguing in this way from what the Buddha didn’t say allows one a kind of “immunity” from having their views challenged.
The Buddha said that inference (anumāna, naya), is a legitimate aspect of Dhamma practice until there is direct knowledge and certainty, (SN47.12 and DN16).
Basing this inference on hundreds of suttas in which a critically important point is not made seems reasonable.
Asserting the “presence” of something because it wasn’t specifically denied or the Buddha “didn’t say it” and filling that “gap” with our particular viewpoint is something else, imo.
It may be valid to point out how the Buddha didn’t say something, I’m not claiming it never is, I guess I’m trying to get a clearer idea of some common patterns of reasoning that seem to pop up.
Here’s an example I just made up:
the Buddha taught a true self, and we can know that because the Buddha only denies the self, not the true self.
In fact, when he says the khandas are not self, that’s because they’re actually the true self.
This is a pretty silly argument, but exactly why is it silly?
Replace ‘true’ with ‘unicorn’ if the argument doesn’t feel silly enough
Thanks for pointing this out. The reasoning is something like by parallel or by a pattern? I.e. we observe the Buddha repeat some teachings very often. It makes sense that important teachings were repeated often by the Buddha.
Therefore, if an idea was very important we should expect it to be prominent in the suttas also. So with these assumptions the absence of something can point to the Buddha not teaching certain ideas.
What would you say is the most important type of prominence though? One is numerical repetition, but there’s also a more qualitative type of prominence?
E.g. the analysis of dependent origination in DN 15 is not repeated often (if at all?) but there’s still something weighty about the narrative that the Buddha is going into the details and really spelling things out.
Or the Mahāparinibbānasutta (DN 16) – e.g. where the Buddha is laying down his legacy that includes Bhikkhunis – seems more weighty than a sutta in the AN where the Buddha seems ambivalent about Bhikkhunis, even though strictly numerically in their “weight” might be similar.
Green, darling, you’re really chronically derailing threads. I wish you would exercise some discipline, out of compassion for the hard working OPs of this forum.
If someone tells you that your argument is false, because if it were true, the Buddha would have said such and such is not fallacious, but recognizing the dhamma as well spoken. This is why, sticking to what the Buddha said is a safe bet.
Moving the goal post is not uncommon amongst sects that utilizes via negativa as a way to teach. You can compare it with the Nirvana Fallacy:
Good points regarding repetition and prominence.
FWIW, I think DO is in fact repeated in many suttas, not only as the 12 nidāna formula, but with 10 and sometimes 5 factors. This teaching also occurs indirectly in MN38, for example.
Also, it falls squarely into the Buddha’s oft repeated and fundamental teachings on idappaccayatā and the 4NTs.
Yeah, from what I’ve read and imo the more ambivalent, as you wrote, materials on Bhikkunis is thought to be late and possibly added, very likely, by men who were influenced by certain cultural conditionings.
For this aspect, I think we can’t know exactly what happened historically, but for me the beautiful and main takeaway was the Buddha’s acknowledgment that anyone can become fully awakened. And this is supported by the foundational teachings in the Nikāyas.
In a time and culture in which women were not seen as equals, this was no small thing!
So, less frequent but what I think also counts is how a given view fits into the overall context of the Teachings. In this sense, it’s the qualitative kind of prominence you wrote about, assuming I understood you correctly.
For me it is sure that Buddha constant points to a bare awareness as the one and only undistorted knowing, as the nature of a pure mind. Purified mind is a bare awareness. A mind without lobha, dosa, moha. Dispassionate, empty, without signs of me, mine, my self, without conceit and other inclinations. Peaceful. Not getting habitually involved in feelings and perceptions (vinnanas), detached.
The Buddha may not use a wording as…nature of mind…i am sure he constant talks about it. And it is also possible that people become to fixed on wordings and not to where they point to.
I feel it is not oke at all to become so rigid in using words, as if Buddha would not be able to use others words or use another angle to introduce his teachings to people.
How would Buddha introduce his teachings in christian cultures? Would he immediately tell that God as Creator is all fake news?
There is no reason at all, i believe, that when certain wordings are not used this means they cannot be used or would never be used by the Buddha.
People also can really be triggered by words and that is their personal issue.
If christian mystics speak about the soul…one can as buddhist have an allergic reaction but that is only ones own passion and fire. One can better see and investigate how this word is used and where it refers to. Then you see that is not about atta but aligns to Buddha’s teaching about the supramundane.
The soul is used to refer to that part that already is not of this world, and is already pure. So, Buddha can even, if he would wish to, use the word soul to share his teachings. He did not talk about it, still it perfectly aligns with what mystics share.
At least i tried to be on topic, have merci, or not…
What i was trying to say is that in discussions between Buddhists practitioners, it is good to take what he said as authoritative. To make inferences based on what he said is not fallacious. To make inferences based on what he did not say would be fallacious, or speculative.
The example provided by the OP does not appear to present a case where an inference was made based on what the Buddha did not say. It rather appears as: i make the following inference based on what the Buddha said, because otherwise, the Buddha would have said such and such. This is simply via negativa rather than “moving the goalpost”.
If i misunderstood the OP, then i hope s/he clarifies. For the record, i am not a professor of EBT arguments - or something!
You mean like the fact that some people say Buddha never taught not self ( anattā) on the basis of a few well known suttas in which he refused to respond to certain questions? And then, from there and on the basis of that, some people say that Buddha never directly taught not-self (anattā), because they aren’t familiar enough with the suttas to know that he did? But rather, have been lured into a false belief on the basis of incomplete knowledge and “doubt.”
That is one example, but I’m trying to get to maybe some underlying principles of reasoning well or poorly about the suttas.
I also hope to benefit. I engage with the suttas all the time, but I want to do so in as principled a way as possible.
I don’t want to bring up old debates – I want to think clearly about the suttas, and probably others want that too, so I thought it was worth making a thread about it
