Thanks a lot for that! I remember there was at least one or two who expressed some difficulty with that article. I know I had to read it twice, with your previous explanation sandwiched between the two before I got it. And, then, you’re just on a roll with article and dissertation reviews recently, aren’t you?
Unfortunately, I think you missed my question. Like I said, I had a feeling I wasn’t explaining myself clearly–mostly because, as I was composing the post, I started realizing I didn’t have the grasp I thought I had when I first tagged you on the other thread. However, I figured something out that may have solved my puzzlement. (I think it did, anyway.) This time should be a bit clearer.
For context, let me say that this line of thought was sparked by Alexander Wynne’s 2019 article, Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation I agree with his premise in theory, I guess: I agree that the the suttas don’t speak with one voice. And, though those voices are usually in harmony, there are times when they are not. And, it stands to reason that differing theories of mind might require different soteriologies: not necessarily so, but possibly.
However, irrespective of whether or not I feel his premise is theoretically possible, I do not agree with his conclusion–that a philosophy of mind such as that which he ascribes to Mahā Kaccāna is wholly incompatible with a calm-insight practice–at all.
I endorse his depiction of Mahā Kaccāna as espousing a philosophy of mind wherein viññāṇa represents something “pre-noetic” as well as his recognizing that, papañca being the crux of the problem, more papañca as the proposed solution is, well, problematic. However, I see DN 15’s paṭiccasamuppāda as a perfect example of the same type of mind model he ascribes to Mahā Kaccāna. Nevertheless, DN 15 clearly prescribes a calm-insight path.
I don’t want to get into why this should be; if anyone’s interested, that should probably be a separate thread. But my question concerned the cognitive functions of the mind in the DN 15 model. From nāmarūpa, through viññāṇa, and on to phassa–where I consider the mind model to be centered–there was no implication of any form of mentation on the part of the subject pertaining to intellection: that is, nothing beyond bare sense perception. There was the transmission of sense data back and forth between the nāmakāya and the rūpakāya in the form of adhivacana and paṭighasamphassa, but the locus for that as per Olalde’s article was within the sense object and not in the head of the subject. Assuming nothing, but simply taking this one, very unique sutta at it’s word, mano should be understood as simply another faculty of very basic sense perception like the others, and nothing else. That is, it simply registers the names associated with the attributes of forms, it does not “papañc-ize” about them.
“So where is the thinking?” That was my question. Between the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, for definitions of nāma we have “phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā, and manasikāra” and “vedanā, saññā, and saṅkhārā.” I don’t think DN 15’s nāma admits of anything like either of those. It seems like a really bare-bones schema: like Wynne posits for the Kaccāna model–perhaps even more so. So, again, I wondered, where’s the intellection, the discursion–where’s the thinking?!
Then I found it. It comes after vedanā and tañhā in the secondary chain: pursuit, gain (and loss), decision-making, attachment, etc. It’s all there. It’s not as categorically neutral as, say, a five aggregates model of mind: it is colored with Buddhist ethical sensibilities. But it is a model of mind all the same: not unlike that found in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta which Wynne holds up as Kaccāna’s philosophy of mind.
That was my question (and answer to it). Please, don’t be afraid to tear it to shreds. I should be most grateful if you do.