Best Namarupa translation

[freedom]

@Sunyo

whether nāmarūpa refers to the being, to certain external objects, or even to processes of cognition, the book clearly supports the first interpretation (with one exceptoin for SN12.61). For this it brings up many arguments which I won’t repeat here

As I understand 3 life model for DO, the current consciousness and namarupa are the results of the past life’s ignorance and volitional formations; therefore, the ending of current ignorance does not affect the current consciousness and namarupa (they will not cease). Since current consciousness and namarupa (the being) do not cease when current ignorance ceased, current sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, becoming also do not cease. Therefore, even if current ignorance ceased, current craving and clinging do not cease. The current being does not cease and still has sense bases, craving and clinging even if current ignorance ceased without remaining.

If current craving, clinging, becoming do not cease when current ignorance ceased, we must have birth and aging-and-death for the future, then how can we end future birth and suffering?

Do I understand 3 life model correctly?

[Sunyo]

@knotty36

could I get a page number for that passage?

103

@knotty36

I see, perhaps, an evolution of the definition bridging the pre-Buddhist

In the Upaniṣads nāma and rūpa are also commonly used to refer to beings. Olalde says this is actually the older use. (p. 104)

@knotty36

I would have to say that the “external name and form” passage is difficult for me to interpret any other way. But I’d like to hear your (and Olalde’s) thoughts on that passage.

As a unique instance of nāmarūpa referring to external objects. (Or perhaps almost unique, since there are a few other possible candidate passages, but Olalde thinks these are uncertain and can all be interpreted as referring to the being.) The way nāmarūpa is used in this sutta is not how it is ordinarily used in Dependent Arising. It doesn’t depend on consciousness and doesn’t result in the six senses. It is also specifically called “external” nāmarūpa, which must be for a reason. The ordinary nāmarūpa is the condition for the “internal” six senses (which are defined as the eye, ear, etc; not forms, sounds, etc), so it is not external.

@freedom

Do I understand 3 life model correctly?

In a sense, but you’re over applying it.

The three life model is a commentarial explanation of one way DO can work out in it’s origination mode. Afaik it doesn’t intent to explain the cessation sequence with the three lifetime model.

But that’s a commentarial example anyway. The process is more general in the suttas (and other places in the commentaries), with ignorance and craving together creating the next life.

Putting the factors strictly in three subsequent lives is somewhat of an oversimplification. You rightly point out some problems that arise from doing so.

[Vaddha]

@Sunyo

Or perhaps almost unique, since there are a few other possible candidate passages

I think things like

When a person sees, they see name and form,
and having seen, they will know just these things.
Snp 4.13

Pretty unambiguously refer to ‘external’ nāmarūpa or just in general. Other passages like the one in Snp 4.15 also seem to be best understood this way.

One who has no sense of ownership
in the whole realm of name and form,
does not grieve for that which is not,
they suffer no loss in the world.
Snp 4.15

The next verse continues the same idea and talks explicitly of general things.

So personally I think that it is somewhat detrimental to try and oversimplify things for the sake of ease. It’s easier to say “this is kind of complicated, so let’s just say it always means X.” But that doesn’t mean it is reflective of the reality of the situation of course.

That said, the above examples are not in the same general context of dependent arising; they refer to nāmarūpa in different contexts. I agree that nāmarūpa in dependent arising is meant to be the abode or apparatus that consciousness inhabits and co-develops within a particular station. Consciousness ‘descends’ into nāmarūpa in order to continue making contact (phassa) with the world because of craving, grasping, etc. This is also what the Ātman of reality or Brahman does in Brahmanical texts: it descends into nāmarūpa to experience the world it created. So nāmarūpapaccayā phasso.

At SN 12.63 we read:

When consciousness as fuel is completely understood, name and form is completely understood. When name and form are completely understood, a noble disciple has nothing further to do, I say.

I think this relates to the end of DN 15 where the Buddha describes the paññāvimutta arahant as understanding the stations/bases of consciousness and the different types of body/perception that exists there. By understanding the stations of consciousness into which it will descend and co-exist with nāmarūpa, one comes to understand all possible nāmarūpa and the impermanence of viññāna. I’m not sure if you had any thoughts on this passage in SN 12.63, venerable, or a different way to relating to it?

Mettā

[Sunyo]

@Vaddha

Pretty unambiguously refer to ‘external’ nāmarūpa or just in general.

I actually agree with that, but I if i recall correctly Olalde thought it ambiguous.

Nobody is trying to oversimplify or say “it always means X”. (Except for the commentaries, actually, who don’t understand the concept of external nāmarūpa.) I was just referring people to the book, where it is all explained in more detail than I can do justice to here. Nor do I necessarily agree with every little detail.

For example Snp3.6 I think is another reference to external nāmarūpa:

Having studied proliferation and name & form inside and out [or internal and external]—the root of disease;

Olalde thought internal and external didn’t refer to name & form here.

[Vaddha]

@Sunyo

Nobody is trying to oversimplify or say “it always means X”.

Yeah, I just understood the main message as “Olalde did an extensive study of nāmarūpa in the canon, and it always refers just to the ‘being’ with one exception.” It seemed it would be helpful to be clear that, as you say, there are other examples that I find rather clearly refer to more than the individual being.

Still, these examples are not in the context of what viññānapaccayā nāmarūpam (and vice versa), and they are marginal The primary sense is certainly the internal one. I think that the other cases/usages just contribute to the connotation or context of the word that can otherwise be missed. Consciousness is trapped ‘living’ inside of nāmarūpa experiencing the manifest, conditioned world; the escape from this is the cessation of both, rather than the everlasting escape. So to me phrases like ‘realm of nāmarūpa’ and so on contribute to my practice and contemplation of rebirth, existence, samsāra, etc.

@Sunyo

Except for the commentaries, actually, who don’t understand the concept of external nāmarūpa

Venerable, I recall in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s book on the Mahānidāna Sutta with the commentaries, he talked about how the aggregates include both internal and external domains, and how nāmarūpa would include these external ones as well. I don’t know if this was his opinion, or quoting a commentarial passage.

In the actual commentary on nāmarūpa and contact though, they talk about nāmarūpa including the internal and external bases as sense doors and their objects. The ‘rūpa’ of nāmarūpa they include for both, and the ‘nāma’ part is the supporting aggregates associated with contact/recognition/etc. with each door or object. So it seems they may have understood it as sometimes including external things, but I’m not very knowledgable of the commentary or how they express their philosophical ideas, so I could be mistaken. Then there is the Dharmaguptaka Abhidhamma which @cdpatton generously shared where they understand the term as having an external meaning as well. So maybe there is commentarial basis for this reading, even if they seem to overlook it most of the time?

Mettā

[OtE]

In The Word of the Buddha (1927) pg. 56 Nyanatiloka Maháthera translates (although I prefer to describe it as explains) it as

On consciousness depends the mental and physical existence (náma-rúpa)

I prefer this simpler translation. It seems better at conveying the idea of Thanissaro’s Name & Form, but in a more digestible context. Bodhi’s translation Mentality, Materiality, along with that of other translators, seems a bit vague to me.

[freedom]

@Sunyo

Putting the factors strictly in three subsequent lives is somewhat of an oversimplification. You rightly point out some problems that arise from doing so.

It seems to me that 3 life model has this problem because of misunderstanding of namarupa as a being. If the model only works in one way and not the other way then it is not the correct model for DO. The correct model should work for both.

If we think namarupa is a being then we should have a model that can satisfy DO in both way with namarupa as a being. If we cannot find any model that can do so because it will lead to conflict with the current definition of namarupa then we should re-examine the current definition of namarupa. That is what I see.

[Sunyo]

@Vaddha

Yeah, I just understood the main message as …

Sorry, I realize by trying to be succinct I didn’t explain things very well. Olalde concludes there is only one clear reference to external namarupa, being SN12.19. Some others they think are candidates, but they’re never definitive.

But I do think some others are pretty much definitive. (But notably they are pretty much all verse, and not very explanatory.)

@Vaddha

Venerable, I recall in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s book on the Mahānidāna Sutta with the commentaries, he talked about how the aggregates include both internal and external domains, and how nāmarūpa would include these external ones as well. I don’t know if this was his opinion, or quoting a commentarial passage.

Same problem with me trying to be succinct, I suppose. I havent read the entire commentaries, of course, but in SN12.19 the commentaries think external namarupa means other beings, not things. So you’re right the commentary refers to external namarupa but it the still takes namarupa to refer to beings. (Or the five khandhas of others.)

And since it doesn’t recognize external objects here I was assuming it doesn’t do so anywhere else either.

@freedom

It seems to me that 3 life model has this problem because of misunderstanding of namarupa as a being. If the model only works in one way and not the other way then it is not the correct model for DO. The correct model should work for both.

It is indeed a model, in the meaning ‘model’ being an example of how to think about DO. It is not the full picture, and thinking that it is, is not understanding its purpose. Again, the problem is not with the model but with over applying it.

@freedom

If we think namarupa is a being then we should have a model that can satisfy DO in both way with namarupa as a being.

We do have that, which is that of the suttas, where ignorance and craving cease together. There is no problem with this as long as we don’t insist the 12 factors are purely sequential. Which would cause a lot of other problems as well, also in other interpretations. For example, then craving would only cease after feeling ceases.

How do you interpret this link between feeling and craving? If ignorance is not somehow also a direct condition for craving, it makes little sense whatever way we interpret namarupa.

[CurlyCarl]

@Sunyo

but in SN12.19 the commentaries think external namarupa means other beings, not things. So you’re right the commentary refers to external namarupa but it the still takes namarupa to refer to beings. (Or the five khandhas of others.)

In SN 12.19, it seems the term “kaya” (“group”; “collection”) refers to the internal five aggregates because the dyad of internal “kaya” and “external namarupa” result in sense contact. External namarupa here seems to refer to external bodies & mental inclinations of others.

@Sunyo

It is indeed a model, in the meaning ‘model’ being an example of how to think about DO. It is not the full picture, and thinking that it is, is not understanding its purpose. Again, the problem is not with the model but with over applying it.

The idea above sounds like a Commentary idea rather than an EBT idea. The EBTs literally say nama is feeling, perception, intention, contact & attention. which seems to obviously refer to the culmination of inappropriate attention towards the previously arisen sankharas. I suggest MN 19 as explaining this reality.

@Sunyo

We do have that, which is that of the suttas, where ignorance and cessation cease together…

For example, then craving would only cease after craving ceases…

Is there typing errors above?

@Sunyo

There is no problem with this as long as we don’t insist the 12 factors are purely sequential.

The above seems to depart from the principle of “pariyāya” (“order of sequence”) found in AN 5.159; thus also possibly departing from the Dhamma Refuge principle of “svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo”. To me, this would lead to utter chaos in relation to Refuge.

@Sunyo

How do you interpret this link between feeling and craving? If ignorance is not somehow also a direct condition for craving, it makes little sense whatever way we interpret namarupa.

Ignorance is obviously a condition for craving however it seems DO is emphasizing craving arising from sense contact. In other words, SN 22.81 explains how ignorance first taints sense contact, using the term “avijjāsamphassajena”. If ignorance was a “direct condition”, I think the Buddha would have used the word “hetu” rather than “paccaya”.

[Sunyo]

@CurlyCarl

Namarupa seems to refer to external bodies & mental inclinations of others.

Read some of the literature quoted in the thread. It pretty obviously means external objects more broadly. It’s the same teaching as those on phassa, where the sense and external object result in feelings. But here it’s worded differently with the “body [with the mind]” and “external nāmarūpa”.

@CurlyCarl

The idea above sounds like a Commentary idea rather than an EBT idea.

Exactly.

@CurlyCarl

Is there are typing error above?

Yes. Will edit it, thanks.

@CurlyCarl

The above seems to depart from the principle of “pariyāya” (“order of sequence”) found in AN 5.159;

This principle means you teach sequentially. In other words, you don’t start with the deep ideas that people aren’t ready for. It has nothing to do with how the factors in DO are related.

@CurlyCarl

If ignorance was a “direct condition”, I think the Buddha would have used the word “hetu” rather than “paccaya”.

Bhikkhus, it is said: ‘A first point of craving for existence, bhikkhus, is not seen such that before this there was no craving for existence and afterward it came into being.’ Still, craving for existence is seen to have a specific condition. “I say, bhikkhus, that craving for existence has a nutriment; it is not without nutriment. And what is the nutriment for craving for existence? It should be said: ignorance. (AN10.62)

[CurlyCarl]

@Sunyo

Read some of the literature quoted in the thread.

Why would I read a commentary? This would mean the Buddha was a sloppy teacher.

@Sunyo

But here it’s worded differently with the “body [with the mind]” and “external nāmarūpa”.

I don’t read any “with the mind” in the Pali. Again, these ideas are not EBT; again suggesting the Buddha was sloppy/careless with words. The easy way is to simply give up attachment to the word “kaya” meaning “physical body”.

@Sunyo

Bhikkhus, it is said: ‘A first point of craving for existence, bhikkhus, is not seen such that before this there was no craving for existence and afterward it came into being.’ Still, craving for existence is seen to have a specific condition. “I say, bhikkhus, that craving for existence has a nutriment; it is not without nutriment. And what is the nutriment for craving for existence? It should be said: ignorance. (AN10.62)

Yes, as i suggested, the words “paccaya” & “ahara” are used above rather than “hetu”. Regardless, AN 10.62 seems to have no relevance whatsoever in explaining the twelve conditions of dependent origination.

[Sunyo]

@CurlyCarl

Why would I read a commentary? This would mean the Buddha was a sloppy teacher.

What is your point? I’m not saying you should. Nor am I the defending the commentaries here. In fact I was saying this three lifetime model is very limited.

@CurlyCarl

I don’t read any “with the mind” in the Pali. Again, these ideas are not EBT

That’s why I bracketed it. But all the Chinese parallels have it, so it is EBT. It’s rather probably dropped from the Pali. I do agree kāya doesn’t mean physical body, though, which is perhaps why “with consciousness” was dropped. We find this phrase “kāya with viññāṇa” in various other places in the Pali anyway.

@CurlyCarl

Yes, as i suggested, the word “paccaya” is used above rather than “hetu”.

I dont understand your point here. The two are basically synonyms and used like synonyms throughout the canon. Regardless, isn’t it obvious ignorance underlies craving?

[CurlyCarl]

@Sunyo

I dont understand your point here. The two are basically synonyms and used like synonyms throughout the canon. Regardless, isn’t it obvious ignorance underlies craving?

Again the above seems to be an Abhidhamma & Commentary idea rather than an EBT principle. AN 10.61 should make it perfectly clear the five hindrances & the nutriment (ahara) of the five hindrances, namely, the three unskilful actions, are not the direct cause (hetu) of ignorance because ignorance has no direct cause (hetu). This would explain the obvious for why the five hindrances are called the “ahara” (“nutriment”) of ignorance rather than the “direct cause” (“hetu”) of ignorance. The Pali words “paccaya”, “hetu” & “ahara” seem certainly not synonyms; just as the words “vinnana”, “mano” & “citta” are certainly not synonyms. These “synonym” ideas seem from the long held Theravada Commentary hubris.

@Sunyo

Regardless, isn’t it obvious ignorance underlies craving?

Yes. Underlies but not the direct cause per Dependent Origination, which seems was taught to highlight how ignorance underlies consciousness, namarupa, contact, etc, prior to craving.

If ignorance was the direct cause (hetu) of craving then craving would arise each time ignorance arises. It would be very difficult to stop/suspend craving, in the short term, in order to enter the stream.

[Sunyo]

Just to clarify for others reading later, we’re talking past each other a bit because you are editing your post constantly (and as a result I have to do so to). It would be more helpful if we finished our replies before posting. Anyway, I’m leaving for today anyway, so you can have time to edit your next reply as much as you like.

@CurlyCarl

just as the words “vinnana”, “mano” & “citta” are certainly not synonyms.

Sometimes they clearly are.

That’s why, when it comes to this body, an unlearned ordinary person might become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed.
But when it comes to that which is called ‘mind’ or ‘sentience’ or ‘consciousness’, an unlearned ordinary person is unable to become disillusioned, dispassionate, or freed. SN12.61

@CurlyCarl

Yes. Underlies but not the direct cause per Dependent Origination, which seems was taught to highlight how ignorance underlies consciousness, namarupa, contact, etc, prior to craving.

Contact, feeling, consciousness, etc are all explained simply as the three types of feelings, the six types of contact and consciousness. Not as being tainted by ignorance. Enlightened beings are still said to have all these things.

And why do you constantly bring up the commentaries in your replies? That isn’t helpful at all. If you want to discuss me, then discuss me. I am not the commentaries. If you have a problem with them, bring it up with their authors or people who are actually coming from the commentaries.

[CurlyCarl]

@Sunyo

It would be more helpful if we finished our replies before posting.

Yes. Since it is very difficult to cut & paste quote after quote using this format, it does take some time for me to complete a post. I wait patiently for your replies to appear complete.

@Sunyo

But when it comes to that which is called ‘mind’ or ‘sentience’ or ‘consciousness’, an unlearned ordinary person is unable to become disillusioned, dispassionate, or freed. SN12.61

Again the above sounds like a Commentary idea. I first heard this idea decades ago in Thailand and it seems to constantly be regurgitated. SN 12.61 seems to never say mano, vinnana & citta are synonymous. Instead, SN 12.61 seems to simply say mano, vinnana & citta are equally impermanent, that is all.

@Sunyo

Not as being tainted by ignorance.

I already quoted SN 22.81, which says:

When an unlearned ordinary person is struck by feelings born of contact with ignorance, craving arises.

Avijjāsamphassajena, bhikkhave, vedayitena phuṭṭhassa assutavato puthujjanassa uppannā taṇhā;

SN 22.81

@Sunyo

Enlightened beings are still said to have all these things.

Enlightened beings may have consciousness, namarupa, sense bases, contact & feelings but its unlikely these are tainted by ignorance that gives rises to craving. When the suttas such as MN 9 refer to “vinnana-nirodha”, it seems this only refers to the cessation of a consciousness that was conditioned by ignorance (rather than the cessation of all types of consciousness).

@Sunyo

I am not the commentaries… If you have a problem with them, bring it up with their authors

Possibly but being culturally conditioned by “tradition” or “old wives’ tales” can run deep. I suppose I am merely posting my impression the content of replies seem very similar to the Commentaries or Mahavihara Theravada. If you are citing authors, then, OK. I apologise for my confusion about who wrote & said what.

[freedom]

@Sunyo

It is not the full picture, and thinking that it is, is not understanding its purpose. Again, the problem is not with the model but with over applying it.

When we give an explanation or a solution to a problem, it should work for all possible cases of the problem. If it only works for one case and not the other cases of the problem then it is not the correct solution. We cannot say that the solution is just for one case of the problem.

DO has the arising and cessation mode. If a model cannot work for both of them then it is not the correct solution.

@Sunyo

How do you interpret this link between feeling and craving? If ignorance is not somehow also a direct condition for craving, it makes little sense whatever way we interpret namarupa.

Feeling is the necessary condition for craving to arise. You do not crave for something that you have no feeling. Without feeling, there is no craving.

Ignorance is not the direct condition for craving. Feeling is. According to DO, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving. DO does not say that with ignorance as condition, craving. That’s why it is called the nototherwiseness, specific conditionality.

It makes little sense for namarupa in DO when we take it as a physical being or a person because it must cease when ignorance ceased. Moreover, if we think the being (namarupa) only cease when death come then we say that death is the necessary condition for the cessation of namarupa, and the cessation of ignorance has nothing to do with namarupa. This is not found in DO.

[Lajji]

Few thoughts regarding SN12.19. In my opinion. The pali should be separated like this(sorry, don’t know the technical terms)

Avijjānīvaraṇassa, bhikkhave, bālassa taṇhāya sampayuttassa evamayaṁ kāyo samudāgato. Iti ayañceva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṁ.

Itthetaṁ dvayaṁ. dvayaṁ paṭicca phasso saḷevāyatanāni, yehi phuṭṭho bālo sukhadukkhaṁ paṭisaṁvedayati etesaṁ vā
aññatarena

Where it says “Itthetaṁ dvayaṁ” , (((THERE IS THIS DYAD))). anyone familiar with this Dhammavinaya would understand what dyad this is referring.

“And what, bhikkhus, is the dyad? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the dyad.

“If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this dyad, I shall make known another dyad’—that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he was questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.”

SN35.92

What then is referred by “ayañceva kāyo” and “bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṁ”. That which comes to be, due to avijja and tanha. Namely ones own savinnana kaya and the savinnana kaya of others. This I think is an instance where ‘nama’ is used to include vinnana as well.

[Sunyo]

Hi again

@CurlyCarl

SN 12.61 seems to never say mano, vinnana & citta are synonymous.

Apart from a literal “these things are synonyms” which afaik is never said about anything in the suttas, it’s as close as we can get. Because it uses three terms to refer to the singular yaṃ etaṃ. I.e. they refer to “that which is called”, not “those things which are called”. For your interpretation to work it has to be in the plural. There is rarely a clearer synonymity in the suttas than this, I would say.

@CurlyCarl

When an unlearned ordinary person is struck by feelings born of contact with ignorance,

Yes, exactly. There are feelings with ignorance and feelings without ignorance. The contact in DO includes both. See SN12.19 which we discussed before. It has the links six senses > contact > feelings explicitly for “the wise”, i.e. the enlightened.

@CurlyCarl

When the suttas such as MN 9 refer to “vinnana-nirodha”, it seems this only refers to the cessation of a consciousness that was conditioned by ignorance (rather than the cessation of all types of consciousness).

But in DO the fact of consciousness is defined exactly as all types of consciousness, see SN12.2 for example.

@CurlyCarl

Possibly but being culturally conditioned by “tradition” or “old wives’ tales” can run deep.

That’s not very respectful to imply I’m being conditioned by old wives’ tales, though honestly I find it funny that you would think so. Anyway, apologies accepted.

@freedom

When we give an explanation or a solution to a problem, it should work for all possible cases of the problem. […] If a model cannot work for both of them then it is not the correct solution.

You said that before, but the problem is, you set up a straw man. Because the commentaries don’t present DO in such a simple way, nor does anybody else who thinks nāmarūpa refers to the being. The Visuddhimagga for example very explicitly says that ignorance and saṅkhāras exist in this life as well, not just the past—which should be so obvious it shouldn’t need to be pointed out, yet it does. Still, you seem to think that, if nāmarūpa is taken to refer to the being, it limits these factors to the past life. But literally nobody who interprets nāmarūpa as the being thinks about it like that, the commentaries included.

Again, the three-lifetime model is not “THE solution”. It just an illustration of how you can interpret the factors, and the commentaries are well-aware of its limitations. It is not the complete picture of DO. To think that it is, is like believing that Pythagoras’ theorem about triangles is meant to apply to all shapes. You find that for squares it doesn’t work, then insist the whole theorem must be wrong. But the problem is not with the theorem, it is overapplying it.

I mean, I’m not the biggest fan of the three-lifetime depiction either, nor of some other commentarial ideas about DO. But before I criticize such ideas (as I’ve done here in the past), I do try to understand what they’re actually saying, so I don’t misrepresent them. It leads to more interesting and involved discussions also, because people take it more seriously.

@freedom

It makes little sense for namarupa in DO when we take it as a physical being or a person because it must cease when ignorance ceased.

This is only a problem if you think all factors cease simultaneously, but they don’t. Death for example doesn’t cease the moment ignorance ceases, because the enlightened one still has to die. Similarly, consciousness, feeling, and nāmarūpa also, do not cease when ignorance ceases. Nāma is defined as attention, feeling, perception; and rūpa as the four elements and what is taken from it (i.e. the body and the elements it is made of). These do not cease when ignorance ceases, otherwise the arahant has no feeling, perception, etc.

[CurlyCarl]

@Sunyo

Apart from a literal “these things are synonyms” which afaik is never said about anything in the suttas, it’s as close as we can get. Because it uses three terms to refer to the singular yaṃ etaṃ. I.e. they refer to “that which is called”, not “those things which are called”. For your interpretation to work it has to be in the plural. There is rarely a clearer synonymity in the suttas than this.

Thank you Sunyo. I suggested their “synonymity” is only in respect to their mutual impermanence. However, if SN 12.61 is as you say then the term “that thing” may not explicitly refer to either of the three dhammas but may simply refer to a generalization about mentality, such as when only ‘vinnana’ is included in the teaching of the six elements.

These words are obviously not synonyms, regardless of any linguistic analysis performed.

For example, the term ‘mano-vinnana’ does not mean ‘intellect-intellect’ or ‘consciousness-consciousness’ or ‘heart-intellect’ etc.

These three words cannot be substituted for eachother. ‘Mano’ is used in Dhp 1, for example, because Dhp 1 is about intention.

‘Citta’ is used in MN 10, for example, because this context is about defilements and freedom from defilements.

Even if SN 12.61 literally says these words are synonyms then SN 12.61, alone, cannot override the other Suttas.

@Sunyo

But in DO the fact of consciousness is defined exactly as all types of consciousness, see SN12.2 for example.

SN 12.2 only literally refers to consciousness arising from sankhara as its condition, which arises with ignorance as its condition.

@Sunyo

Yes, exactly. There are feelings with ignorance and feelings without ignorance. The contact in DO includes both. See SN12.19 which we discussed before. It has the links six senses > contact > feelings explicitly for “the wise”, i.e. the enlightened.

If there are feelings without ignorance then there must also be consciousness without ignorance.

@Sunyo

That’s not very respectful to imply I’m being conditioned by old wives’ tales, though honestly I find it funny that you would think so. Anyway, apologies accepted.

Thank you. I never implied anything about any self (atta). I merely posted Sutta interpretation can be influenced by old wives tales. Thank you for accepting my apology, where I confused whose view was what.

@Sunyo

the enlightened one still has to die.

Venerable. What is your view about those many suttas that seem to say an Arahant does not ‘marana’ (e.g, Dhp 21; MN 140; SN 22.85)?

Also, as a Pali scholar, is it true the word ‘marana’ is related to the word ‘Mara’? If so, would you regard the word ‘marana’ as synonymous with the term ‘kālaṅkato’? Thank you

In other words, when it was posted: “*the enlightened one still has to die”, is the Pali word “marana” found in Dependent Origination the appropriate word to use here, in relation to the passing of a Buddha? I ask this because my impression from reading the suttas is the term ‘kālaṅkato’ is used in relation to Noble Ones.

@Sunyo

nāmarūpa refers to the being. The Visuddhimagga

Venerable. What is your opinion about The Visuddhimagga relating the word ‘nama’ to ‘namati’ &, it seems by default, ‘nati’ (which are found in MN 19 and SN 12.40)? Thank you

[Sunyo]

@CurlyCarl

cannot override the other Suttas.

Yup!

That’s why I said from the start that vinnana has different meanings in different context. I’m not even sure why we’re arguing about it, to be frank. The Digital Pali Dictionary for example lists ‘consciousness’ but also ‘mind’. Also ‘knowing’ and ‘understanding’, because it does sometimes mean wisdom instead of just awareness. The PTS dictionary starts off saying: “a mental quality as a constituent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life-force (as extending also over rebirths), principle of conscious life, general consciousness (as function of mind and matter), regenerative force animation, mind as transmigrant, as transforming (according to individual kamma) one individual life (after death) into the next. (See also below, c & d). In this (fundamental) application it may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by “mind.” It is difficult to give any one word for v., because there is much difference between the old Buddhist and our modern points of view, and there is a varying use of the term in the Canon itself.”

@CurlyCarl

literally refers to consciousness arising from sankhara as its condition, which arises with ignorance as its condition.

No, it’s defined as the six types of consciousness, which is exactly how the aggregate of consciousness is defined as well. Elsewhere it is also said that sankharas create the aggregate of consciousness. (Sorry for not having the references handy.) They don’t just create a specific kind of consciousness; they created all consciousness through rebirth.

@CurlyCarl

If there are feelings without ignorance then there must also be consciousness without ignorance.

Indeed.

@CurlyCarl

Venerable. What is your view about those many suttas that seem to say an Arahant does not ‘marana’ (e.g, Dhp 21; MN 140; SN 22.85)?

MN140 itself explains it: “The sage at peace is not reborn, does not grow old, and does not die. […] For they have nothing which would cause them to be reborn. Not being reborn, how could they grow old? Not growing old, how could they die?” In other words, they won’t die again because they aren’t reborn again. But they’ll still have to die one last time. To say that they won’t die is an evocative way of speech, clearly not meant to be taken literal. Even the Buddha said about himself that he still had to die. And so he did. But after that he didn’t die again.

@CurlyCarl

Also, as a Pali scholar, is it true the word ‘marana’ is related to the word ‘Mara’? If so, would you regard the word ‘marana’ as synonymous with the term ‘kālaṅkato’? Thank you

They are related indeed. And they are synonymous.

@CurlyCarl

What is your opinion about The Visuddhimagga relating the word ‘nama’ to ‘namati’ &, it seems by default, ‘nati’ (which are found in MN 19 and SN 12.40)? Thank you

I haven’t particularly looked at this case, but the Visuddhimagga (and commentaries in general) are full of wrong etymologies, and I wouldn’t be surprised if this was one. They often are not meant to be taken seriously but make a point of dhamma instead. For example, the Visuddhimagga suggets bhikkhu comes from bhayam ikkhati (he sees fear) instead of just the verb bhikkhati (he begs). This is clearly not right but it does teach us something.