Bhikkhu Bodhi is known for his Pali translations (perhaps the best available), his translator’s task is difficult, since in Pali the greatest knowledge of grammar, doesn’t guarantee the proper translation of certain words. Pali is perhaps the only language where someone without knowledge of it can understand (just based on the context, in which the word appears), much better how it should be translated, than the best Pali scholar, who doesn’t understand the Four Noble Truths. It is so because Pali language deals with Dhamma, and so with the Buddha who is dhamma-bhūta, ‘become Dhamma’, one who sees Dhamma while not yet dhamma-bhūta, sees the Buddha and so has at his disposal direct knowledge unavailable to the best Pali scholar but without such knowledge.
(The sekha—no longer a puthujjana but not yet an arahat—has a kind of ‘double vision’, one part unregenerate, the other regenerate.) As soon as one becomes a sotāpanna one is possessed of aparapaccayā ñannam, or ‘knowledge that does not depend upon anyone else’: this knowledge is also said to be ‘not shared by puthujjanas’, and the man who has it has (except for accelerating his progress) no further need to hear the Teaching—in a sense he is (in part) that Teaching.
Nanavira Thera
However in the preset article, certain mistaken ideas - promoted by Bhikkhu Bodhi - will be pointed out, which can be avoided even by one without direct knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. Perhaps when going into details of dependent arising, it is good always have the Four Noble Truths in the background. So before we determine for ourselves this or that specific aspect of Dhamma, we should be very clear about the most fundamental aspect of Buddha’s Teaching, namely suffering and its cessation. Our ideas on any particular aspect of Teaching cannot and should not contradict the fundamental meaning of suffering and its cessation. And suffering in its most profound sense isn’t understood by the puthujjana, so before one has not any direct knowledge about what constitutes suffering, the Suttas are his only trustworthy guide:
And how, then, does knowledge of dukkha come about? .. by their hearing (as puthujjanas) the Buddha’s Teaching, which goes against their whole way of thinking. They accept out of trust (saddhā) this teaching of anicca/dukkha/anattā; and it is this that, being accepted, becomes the criterion or norm with reference to which they eventually come to see for themselves that all things are dukkha—for the puthujjana. But in seeing this they cease to be puthujjanas and, to the extent that they cease to be puthujjanas, to that extent (sankhāra-)dukkha ceases, and to that extent also they have in all their experience a ‘‘built-in’ criterion or norm by reference to which they make further progress.
Nanavira Thera
So what Suttas say about suffering? Bhikkhu Bodhi beautifully translated the following passage:
“This world, Kaccāna, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence. But this one [with right view] does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about ‘my self.’ He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge about this is independent of others. It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view. SN 12: 15
Where puthujjana sees his self, or himself as a certain person (sakkaya) one with the right view sees suffering. In other words attavada = suffering. Of course, it isn’t all the truth about suffering, since even after abandoning of attavada in the most cases asmimana or conceit “I am” remains intact. But it is only after going beyond sakkayaditthi (inseparable from attavada) conceit “I am” is clearly seen as a core of suffering:
Pleasurable is dispassion in the world,
The getting beyond sensuality.
But the putting away of the conceit ‘I am’
—this is the highest pleasure.
Udāna 11
But what Bhikkhu Bodhi says about attavada in his article on Nanavira Thera?
An unbiased and complete survey of the Nikāyas, however, would reveal that the problem of dukkha to which the Buddha’ s Teaching is addressed is not primarily existential anxiety, nor even the distorted sense of self of which such anxiety may be symptomatic. The primary problem of dukkha with which the Buddha is concerned, in its most comprehensive and and fundamental dimensions, is the problem of our bondage to samsāra—the round of repeated birth, aging, and death.
But if phrase “distorted sens of self” means something it must mean attavada. And going beyond attavada practically solves the problem of our bondage to samsāra—the round of repeated birth, aging, and death. Of course, ultimately for the rebirth is responsible the attitude “I am”, but it can be removed from experience only after abandoning of attavada.
Sakkayaditthi can be seen as rationalization from the fundamental attitude “I am” (Nanamoli Thera), where asmimana provokes puthujjana to create more or less precise self-image of “what I am”. Together, both of these aspects of ignorance, on reflextive level (sakkayaditthi) and pre-reflexive level (asmimana) constitute suffering or person (sakkaya).
Person
“Friend Sāriputta, it is said, ‘person’, 'person.’ What now is person?”
“These five aggregates subject to clinging, friend, have been called person by the Blessed One; that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the determinations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. These five aggregates subject to clinging have been called person by the Blessed One.”
SN 38: 15
So it is not that puthujjana suffers from this or that unpleasant sensory experience or mental defilement (which of course is also included in suffering) but his very being is suffering. Buddha pointing out the fundamental existential contradiction: subjectivity, asmimana as well atta are associated with perception of permanence, while self-image created by the puthujjana is always derived from things which are impermanent, offers also the cure from suffering:
Now this has been said by the Blessed One: “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination.” And these five aggregates affected by clinging are dependently arisen. The desire, indulgence, inclination, and holding based on these five aggregates affected by clinging is the origin of suffering. The removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for these five aggregates affected by clinging is the cessation of suffering.’ MN 28
So we see that while it is praiseworthy to urge us to abandon the round of repeated birth, aging, and death, Bhikkhu Bodhi not only ignores more profound aspects of suffering, but in fact argues that attavada is not strictly related to liberation from samsāra. There may be many reasons for such mistake, but the main problem seems to be structural and it is based on his misunderstanding of the role of sankhārās in Dhamma. (Who sees Dhamma sees dependent arising).
Bhikkhu Bodhi argues that sankharas in the context of dependent arising in Suttas like MN 9 and SN 12:2 are:
In the context of the doctrine of dependent origination, formations (sankhārā) are wholesome and unwholesome volitions, or, in short, kamma. The bodily formation is volition that is expressed through the body, the verbal formation volition that is expressed by speech, and the mental formation volition that remains internal without coming to bodily or verbal expression.
(his commentary to MN 9)
This triad of saṅkhārā should not be confused with the triad discussed at 41:6 (IV 293,14-28, also at MN I 301,17-29). I have added “volitional” to the present set to distinguish them from the other, though the Pāli terms are identical. The latter triad is always introduced in relation to the cessation of perception and feeling and is never brought into connection with dependent origination. (his commentary to SN 12:2)
In his general introduction Bhikkhu Bodhi says:
In SN the word occurs in five major doctrinal contexts:
(1) As the second factor in the formula of dependent origination, saṅkhāras are the kammically active volitions responsible, in conjunction with ignorance and craving, for generating rebirth and sustaining the forward movement of saṃsāra from one life to the next. (…)
(3) In the widest sense, saṅkhārā comprises all conditioned things, everything arisen from a combination of conditions. In this sense all five aggregates, not just the fourth, are saṅkhāras (see III 132,22–27), as are all external objects and situations (II 191,11–17). The term here is taken to be of passive derivation—denoting what is conditioned, constructed, compounded—hence I render it simply “formations,” without the qualifying adjective. This notion of saṅkhārā serves as the cornerstone of a philosophical vision which sees the entire universe as constituted of conditioned phenomena. What is particularly emphasized about saṅkhāras in this sense is their impermanence. Recognition of their impermanence brings insight into the unreliable nature of all mundane felicity and inspires a sense of urgency directed towards liberation from saṃsāra (see 15:20; 22:96).
As we see, Bhikkhu Bodhi confirms here that he excludes fundamental message of the Buddha:
All sankharas are impermanent
All sankharas are suffering
All things are not-self
from the context of dependent arising. Perhaps it requires certain reflective effort to see that dependent arising is “merely” reformulation of the teaching just quoted, so: when there is this (sankhara), this is (sankhata dhamma) and sankhata dhamma as determined and dependently arisen cannot be seen as a self (so in fact, dependent arising is just chain of sankharas and dependently arisen things which by themselves are also sankharas for other things).
But for sure to determine properly the meanings of sankharas in MN 9 or SN 12:2 no need for any higher knowledge, it is enough to be faithful to definitions provided by the Suttas.
And based on Suttas one can gradually reduce his ignorance, since certain mistaken interpretations of Dhamma are automatically rejected despite our personal predilections.
And apart direct verbal contradiction where kayasȧkhāra, vacı̄saṅkhāra, cittasȧkhara are defined as kama, what should be more contradictory than decision to exclude the most fundamental teaching:
All sankharas are impermanent
All sankharas are suffering
All things are not-self
from the context of dependent arising?
Instead of coming to the right conclusion: kayasȧkhāra, vacı̄saṅkhāra, cittasȧkhara are found in the context of dependent arising as well in the context of the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling, so it must mean that there is a vital connection between the two subjects - and such conclusion is within the reflexive ability of averagely intelligent puthujjana - Bhikkhu Bodhi based on his (mis)understanding of Dhamma informs us that these two are quite seperate subjects:
This triad of saṅkhārā should not be confused with the triad discussed at 41:6 (IV 293,14-28, also at MN I 301,17-29). I have added “volitional” to the present set to distinguish them from the other, though the Pāli terms are identical. The latter triad is always introduced in relation to the cessation of perception and feeling and is never brought into connection with dependent origination.
But who is here “confused”? Because it looks like the Pāli terms are identical for the good reason, namely that cessation of all sankharas and dependently arising are strictly connected subjects, and distinction made by Venerable translator exist only in his mind. And as it was said before, it isn’t really any ariyan knowledge, after all it is stated verbatim:
It is hard for such a generation to see this truth, that is to say, specific conditionality, dependent arising. And it is hard to see this truth, that is to say, stilling of all saṅkhārās, relinquishing of the essentials of existence, exhaustion of craving, fading of lust, cessation, Nibbāna. MN 26
Or
I have also said: ‘Whatever is felt is included in suffering.’ That has been stated by me with reference to the impermanence of determinations. That has been stated by me with reference to determinations being subject to destruction … to determinations being subject to vanishing … to determinations being subject to fading away … to determinations being subject to cessation … to determinations being subject to change.
“Then, bhikkhu, I have also taught the successive cessation of determinations. For one who has attained the first jhāna, speech has ceased. For one who has attained the second jhāna, thought and examination have ceased. For one who has attained the third jhāna, rapture has ceased. For one who has attained the fourth jhāna, in-breathing and out-breathing have ceased. For one who has attained the base of the infinity of space, the perception of form has ceased. For one who has attained the base of the infinity of consciousness, the perception pertaining to the base of the infinity of space has ceased. For one who has attained the base of nothingness, the perception pertaining to the base of the infinity of consciousness has ceased. For one who has attained the base of neither-perception-nor-nonperception, the perception pertaining to the base of nothingness has ceased. For one who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling have ceased. For a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed, lust has ceased, hatred has ceased, delusion has ceased.
“Then, bhikkhu, I have also taught the successive subsiding of determinations. (…)
SN 36:11
As we have seen, mistakes done by Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi could be avoided by one who knows (have read) Suttas, regardless of whether he has any higher understanding of Dhamma or not. That’s true that Venerable translator spoke not merely for himself, but these who believe in traditional commentaries, but traditional commentaries and orthodoxy aren’t the same thing. After all, based on an orthodox approach to the Dhamma, any interpretation of dependent arising which involves past and future should be rejected as ayoniso manasikara.
“This is how he attends unwisely: ‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I become in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where will it go?’
MN 2
But when we have in mind the background of the Four Noble Truths, we cannot forget that puthujjana doesn’t understand his own experience as much as he doesn’t understand arahat. In terms just used he neither understand what it means “to be”, nor what the cessation of being is. One who sees the First Noble sees also the Third one. So dependent arising should be seen as description, or rather the set of interconnected descriptions which cover any kind of experience, where ignorance of the Four Noble Truths is present. It is kind of mirror in which puthujjana can see and understand what does it mean to be puthujjana, or “to exist”.
Suttas describe the very existence (bhava) as suffering, and explanations of dependent arising in the terms of three, two existences, one existence, momentary existence, all of them take existence for granted. But the task is to understand what does it mean “to be”, “to exist” or to understand that existence is painful, impermanent, determined and dependently risen on the present condition.
Puthujjana is certain that he exists in space and time, taking the attitude “I am” for granted and unquestionable. Well, one with avijja can put question mark here, but: any attempt I may make to abolish my existence tacitly confirms it; for it is my existence that I am seeking to abolish. (Nanavira Thera). Puthujjana is imprisoned in dialectic “to be or not to be” MN 11, and the reason he doesn’t see escape from these two views is lack of insight into dependently arisen nature of his existence, that is depends here and now on the present condition, namely ignorance. So delusional certainly of one who doesn’t see dependent arising, in the case of sekha is replaced by certainty:
And how do those with vision see? Here a bhikkhu sees whatever has come to being as come to being. By seeing it thus he has entered upon the way to dispassion for it, to the fading and ceasing of lust for it. That is how one with vision sees.” Itv 49
There is an existential paradox, that while the puthujjana’s questions about his own being are exercises in ayoniso manasikara
“'Was I in the past? … Shall I be in the future? .. What am ? How am ? Where has this creature come from? Where will it go?’
such inquiry may likely be a good sign, or at least we shouldn’t attribute any wisdom to one, just because he doesn’t ask such questions, for the same reason that we shouldn’t attribute any wisdom to water buffalo just because it’s very peaceful.
On certain level these questions are sign of intelligence. If one isn’t “sort of person who provides unquestionable answers to unanswerable questions” perhaps in his search one may find it worthwhile to consult the Dhamma and understand by direct knowledge why these questions shouldn’t be asked.
“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has clearly seen with correct wisdom as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen things, it is impossible that he will run back into the past, thinking: ‘Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past?’ Or that he will run forward into the future, thinking: ‘Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? What will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? Having been what, what will I become in the future?’ Or that he will now be inwardly confused about the present thus: ‘Do I exist? Do I not exist? What am I? How am I? This being—where has it come from, and where will it go?’
“For what reason [is this impossible]? Because, bhikkhus, the noble disciple has clearly seen with correct wisdom as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen things.” SN 12: 20
The states of being (bhava) are states of self-identification. Unlike later traditions, Buddha doesn’t undermine reality of things which have past, future, duration. The problem of suffering is the problem of self-identification, and unlike sekha who “merely” understands dependent arising, without full realisation, arahat totally replaced puthujjana’s certainty of being in space and time with certainty:
‘I was’ is not for me, not for me is ‘I shall be’;
Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs?
Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants –
For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear.
Theragāthā 715, 716
The Buddha Teaching: on suffering can be reformulated in many various ways, one of it is:
"Bhikkhus, both formerly and now what I teach is conceit "I am ", and the cessation of conceit "I am,
but in order to arrive at nibbana here and now one should follow advise:
The perception of impermanence should be developed to eradicate the conceit ‘I am.’ When one perceives impermanence, the perception of non-self is stabilized. One who perceives non-self eradicates the conceit ‘I am,’ [which is] nibbāna here and now.
But we have already seen that Venerable transtator insists (at least in his article on Nanavira), that attavada is not really related with “the problem of our bondage to samsāra—the round of repeated birth, aging, and death”.
In order to develop the perception of non-self one must understand impermanence of all sankaras, but we have already seen that Venerable transtator doesn’t perceive dependent arising as a chain of sankharas and things dependently arisen upon them (which of course by themselves are sankharas for other things).
Here we entered into really deep and profound Dhamma, not easy to comprehend, but one factor of misrepresentation of the Teaching found in "A Critical Examination of Nanavira Thera’s ‘A Note on Paticcasamuppāda’” can easily be corrected. It is enough to be faithful to definitions of sankharas as are found in Suttas, and from that point try to develop understanding that “to be is to suffer”. But while many pessimistic philosophers -on puthujjana’s level - would agree that “to be is to suffer”, the escape from suffering is seen only by insight: “with upadana as condition being”. In other words that being is impermanent, determined and dependently arisen on self-identification.
To summarise the truly orthodox understanding of dependent arising, with which Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi disagrees, it is the best to quote friend of Nanavira, Ven Nanamoli Thera:
But being is a member of the paṭicca-samuppāda as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.
The destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, then consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all; for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no more ignorance then it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in MN 22)*.
*(‘since here and now the Tathāgata actually and in truth is not to be found…’) Avyākata Samy. 2 <S.iv,384>). The reason why the Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra-, and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found.
Nanavira Thera
Here again we have the shortest illustration of what constitute suffering - the state of being - and cessation of suffering -bhava-nirodho nibbānaṃ.
Venerable transtator created in his mind his own representation of Nanavira and Nanamoli Theras ideas, and than dismissed it as mistaken.
Bhikkhu Bodhi: I will show presently , these terms are intended quite literally as signifying biological birth, aging, and death, not our anxiety over being born, growing old, and dying.
But neither Nanamoli Thera no his friend undermined the validity of Suttas descriptions. Objective descriptions of birth, aging, and death are quite valid, but taken separately they are incomplete, since biological death of the body is the same in the case of puthujjana and arahat. But when ignorance is present birth and death are always “mine”, which leads to anxiety. And as long as one believes that one was born, there is no escape from death, one will die in the future. One who sees dependent arising however sees death as impermanent, determined (sankhata) and dependently arisen on the present condition and so sees also unborn. And unborn isn’t some kind of poetical phrase, any more or less inteligent reader can come to the straightforward conclusion that one cannot die, when one wasn’t born at all. So while description of biological birth as it is found in the Suttas is quite valid, it in no way should prevent one to follow the Buddha’s advice and see the body as: “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”.
References for the beginners, rebirth depends on attavada and asmimana (conceit I am)
“Whenever any monks or brahmans see self in its various forms, they all of them see the five aggregates affected by clinging, or one or another of them. Here an untaught ordinary man who disregards noble ones … sees form as self, or self as possessed of form, or form as in self, or self as in form (or he does likewise with the other four aggregates). So he has this (rationalized) seeing, and he has also this (fundamental) attitude ‘I am’; but as long as there is the attitude ‘I am’ there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body.
SN 22:47
Attavada is the fundamental upadana (three others upadana can be found also in the outsider’s teaching.)
Just as a fire burns with fuel, but not without fuel, so, Vaccha, I declare rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel.”*
*Sa-upādānassa khvāhaṃ Vaccha upapattiṃ paññāpemi no anupādānassa. There is a double meaning here, with upādāna meaning both “fuel” and subjective “clinging,” but I have translated the sentence in consonance with the following simile. (Bhikkhu Bodhi)
Escape from anxiety
It is impossible and inconceivable, friend, that when [the notion] “I am” has been discarded, and one does not regard [anything as] “This I am,” the dart of doubt and bewilderment could still obsess one’s mind. There is no such possibility. For this, friend, is the escape from the dart of doubt and bewilderment, namely, the uprooting of the conceit “I am.”’
AN 6:13
Nanavira Thera on suffering and attavada
Query: If all things are adjudged as characterized by dukkha, who does the judging? And with reference to what criterion or norm? A subject (immortal soul) with reference to an objective sukha, no? Q.E.D.
(…) From a puthujjana’s point of view, it can be described as immediate contact between subject and object, between ‘self’ and the ‘world’ (for how this comes about, I must refer you to PHASSA). This, however, is not yet knowledge, for which a reflexive reduplication is needed; but when there is this reflexive reduplication we then have intuitive knowledge, which is (still for the puthujjana) immediate contact between knowing subject and known object. With the arahat, however, all question of subjectivity has subsided, and we are left simply with (the presence of) the known thing. (It is present, but no longer present ‘to somebody’.) So much for judgement in general.
But now you say, ‘If all things are characterized by dukkha…’ This needs careful qualification. In the first place, the universal dukkha you refer to here is obviously not the dukkha of rheumatism or a toothache, which is by no means universal. It is, rather, the sankhāra-dukkha (the unpleasure or suffering connected with determinations) of this Sutta passage:
There are, monk, three feelings stated by me: sukha feeling, dukkha feeling, neither-dukkha-nor-sukha feeling. These three feelings have been stated by me. But this, monk, has been stated by me: whatever is felt, that counts as dukkha. But that, monk, was said by me with reference just to the impermanence of determinations… (Vedanā Samy. 11: iv,216)
But what is this dukkha that is bound up with impermanence? It is the implicit taking as pleasantly-permanent (perhaps ‘eternal’ would be better) of what actually is impermanent. And things are implicitly taken as pleasantly-permanent (or eternal) when they are taken (in one way or another) as ‘I’ or ‘mine’ (since, as you rightly imply, ideas of subjectivity are associated with ideas of immortality). And the puthujjana takes all things in this way. So, for the puthujjana, all things are (sankhāra-)dukkha. How then—and this seems to be the crux of your argument—how then does the puthujjana see or know (or adjudge) that ‘all things are dukkha’ unless there is some background (or criterion or norm) of non-dukkha (i.e. of sukha) against which all things stand out as dukkha? The answer is quite simple: he does not see or know (or adjudge) that ‘all things are dukkha’. The puthujjana has no criterion or norm for making any such judgement, and so he does not make it.
The puthujjana’s experience is (sankhāra-)dukkha from top to bottom, and the consequence is that he has no way of knowing dukkha for himself; for however much he ‘steps back’ from himself in a reflexive effort he still takes dukkha with him. (I have discussed this question in terms of avijjā (‘nescience’) in A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §§23 & 25, where I show that avijjā, which is dukkhe aññānam (‘non-knowledge of dukkha’), has a hierarchical structure and breeds only itself.) The whole point is that the puthujjana’s non-knowledge of dukkha is the dukkha that he has non-knowledge of; and this dukkha that is at the same time non-knowledge of dukkha is the puthujjana’s (mistaken) acceptance of what seems to be a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ or ‘ego’ at its face value (as nicca/sukha/attā, ‘permanent/pleasant/self’).
*
What we call the ‘self’ is a certain characteristic of all experience, that seems to be eternal. It is quite obvious that for all men the reality and permanence of their selves, ‘I’, is taken absolutely for granted; and the discrepancy that K. speaks of is simply that between my ‘self’ (which I automatically presume to be permanent) and the only too manifestly impermanent ‘things’ in the world that ‘I’ strive to possess. The eternal ‘subject’ strives to possess the temporal ‘object’, and the situation is at once both comic and tragic—comic, because something temporal cannot be possessed eternally, and tragic, because the eternal cannot desist from making the futile attempt to possess the temporal eternally. This tragi-comedy is suffering (dukkha) in its profoundest sense. And it is release from this that the Buddha teaches. How? By pointing out that, contrary to our natural assumption (which supposes that the subject ‘I’ would still continue to exist even if there were no objects at all), the existence of the subject depends upon the existence of the object; and since the object is manifestly impermanent, the subject must be no less so. And once the presumed-eternal subject is seen to be no less temporal than the object, the discrepancy between the eternal and the temporal disappears (in four stages—sotāpatti, sakadāgāmitā, anāgā-mitā, and arahatta); and with the disappearance of the discrepancy the two categories of ‘tragic’ and ‘comic’ also disappear. The arahat neither laughs nor weeps; and that is the end of suffering (except, of course, for bodily pain, which only ceases when the body finally breaks up).In this way you may see the progressive advance from the thoughtlessness of immediacy (either childish amusement, which refuses to take the tragic seriously, or pompous earnestness, which refuses to take the comic humorously) to the awareness of reflexion (where the tragic and the comic are seen to be reciprocal, and each is given its due), and from the awareness of reflexion (which is the limit of the puthujjana’s philosophy) to full realization of the ariya dhamma (where both tragic and comic finally vanish, never again to return).