Thanks for the clarification of the Chinese, Charles. 
From my limited knowledge, your translation makes more sense. To be honest, I don’t know what Ven. Anālayo’s even means.
Just to clarify the anatta thing. Indeed, anatta doesn’t deny that beings exist. But how the word ‘being’ is understood differs from person to person. When the annihilationists speak about a truly existent being, it doesn’t refer to a collection of empty aggregates but to something more substantial, to some non-existent entity that is thought to be the being. Someone who owns the aggregates, for example—that is: for all purposes, a soul.
In SN5.10 it is said to Māra: “Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’?” This seems a silly reply if we define ‘the being’ as just the collection of aggregates/six senses (which is sometimes done in the discourses). But it’s so not silly if we realize that Māra was assuming some entity behind the aggregates. Here ‘being’ effectively stands for a imagined ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘self’ on account of Māra.
It’s about psychology as much as it is about ontology, about how certain terms get misunderstood on a subtle level. If people hear “the sage, he no longer exists”, then, like Upasīva, they take this to be the eradication of some entity. That’s just the natural, initial reaction of the unenlightened mind. It’s a conceit, although in terms of he rather than I.
Likewise, it’s not that the arahant doesn’t exist at all. The point is, people take ‘arahant’ (or ‘sage’) to be more than a label for empty processes. See also Siderits explanation of the fire metaphor in this topic.
You can disagree with this of course, but just making sure you didn’t misunderstand my post. 
PS. Nāgārjuna doesn’t represent all Indians, certainly not of the time of the Buddha. His work was a response to a specific philosophy (Abhidhammic) in a specific point in time. This kind of language (or concerns) about existence and nonexistence isn’t found in the Pali canon.