Bhikkhu Bodhi on Nibbāna

Again, this doesn’t invalidate the experiential truth of dukkha, just because there’s no permanent being or self in the processes.
My reply was based on your statement questioning how dukkha could “be actual.”

In SN35.28 the Buddha doesn’t qualify the dukkha of the senses by saying they’re void or selfless or can’t be labeled:
“The mind is burning. Thoughts are burning. Mind consciousness is burning. Mind contact is burning. The painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by mind contact is also burning.
Burning with what?
Burning with the fires of greed, hate, and delusion. Burning with rebirth, old age, and death, with sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress, I say.”

Nothing here about experiences being real or not in a philosophical sense.

The Buddha wasn’t concerned with these abstract issues and debates about whether things are really-real or not.
Rather, experiences through the senses is the All of experience, SN35.23. Real in that way.
And these senses are burning/dukkha in direct experience, as in SN35.28. Real in that way.

These conditions practice to end the defilements → awakening → final cessation of all experiences, complete end of dukkha.

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The very first fetter is about thinking in terms of actual existence, and that’s given up. I mean, even from your point of view he was concerned with if the atta exists or not wasn’t he.

And these senses are burning/dukkha in direct experience , as in SN35.28. Real in that way.

Direct experience is of “hot, cold, sweet, red” etc. So, once again you never directly experience “impermanence”. It’s a creation of the mind. It’s not a concrete noun. It’s an abstract noun. Furthermore in order to say “red” is real (the direct experience) you have to say there is a substance which is red. That’s atta based thinking. Substance based thinking. Thinking in terms of independently existing things. It’s Sakkaya ditthi, but concrete nouns are also mind made. The “red ball” is a mental construction.

Hello Dhamma friends! :pray:

I haven’t posted in a while but would like to chime in with some final thoughts from all these Nibbāna discussions I’ve partaken in. Nibbāna has probably been discussed in multiple other threads for ages here on Sutta Central. :wink:

But here are some of the things I’ve noticed:

  1. Cessationists automatically assumes one is an eternalist if one rejects the cessationist view. But SN 22.81 (and plenty of other suttas) paint a different story, one can and should rejects both views - rejecting both views will initially lead to doubt - but that doubt is only a conditioned phenomenon. Both the eternalists and cessationists mentioned in SN 22.81 adhere to the khandas being not-self: ”Perhaps they don’t regard form, or feeling, or perception, or choices, or consciousness as self.” Therefore there is actually no distinction at all between ”annihilationists” and ”cessationists” despite cessationists trying to make a distinction, that isn’t even there, regarding the ”selfless khandhas”. The annihilationists & cessationists are 100% the same, as we clearly see in the sutta SN 22.81.

——

    1. According to MN 1 even puthujjanas can delight in Nibbāna. At some point a Paccekabuddha must have been a puthujjana. If Nibbāna is total annihilation and nothing else, puthujjanas would obviously not delight in Nibbāna since there is nothing to delight in to begin with. We are told by the Buddha that his disciples in higher training should not delight and not identify with Nibbāna as ”me” or ”mine”.
  1. Anidassana (invisible) is a synonym for Nibbāna (and the entire path), so in reality both DN 11 and MN 49 make perfect sense (I’ll post the whole Anidassana translation below).
    1. When Ananda asks both The Buddha (AN 10.6) and Sāriputta (AN 10.7): if a mendicant might gain a state of immersion beyond all planes of existence where they can still perceive? Both The Buddha and Sāriputta affirm that this is possible. One is still able to perceive. :+1:
  1. I have no clue what ”classic” or ”orthodox” Theravada, that some cessationists say they adhere to, really entails. But one thing is certain, the 5 senses do not cease in jhana/rupa loka. There is also light in rupa loka, one could argue that intense light is actually the main characteristic of the rupa loka realms - even puthujjanas know this. Does ”orthodox Theravada” also say that the 5 senses cease in jhana and that there is no light in jhana/rupa loka or do only certain cessationist buddhist teachers claim this? The light in rupa loka is intense, just like the sun. In arupa loka, like the moon glowing - way more subtle. That is why the following said by The Buddha in Ud 1.10 is so beautiful:

Where water and earth,
fire and air find no footing:
there no star does shine,
nor does the sun shed its light;
there the moon glows not,
yet no darkness is found. <——————
And when a sage, a brahmin, finds understanding
through their own sagacity,
then from forms and formless,
from pleasure and pain they are released.”

No elements, no sun shining and no moon glowing - no form & no formlessness - ”yet no darkness is found.” :+1:

And since ”no darkness is found”; “viññāṇāṁ anidassanaṁ anantaṁ sabbato pabhaṁ.” = “Consciousness invisible, endless, radiant all around.” makes perfect sense as a description of Nibbāna (contrary to the second arupa loka plane) and the entire path to the invisible.

Please read SN 43.22 translated below - ”that in which nothing appears” in its entire context and it makes even more sense. :+1:

Anidassanañca vo, bhikkhave, desessāmi anidassanagāmiñca maggaṁ.
Taṁ suṇātha. Katamañca, bhikkhave, anidassanaṁ …pe….

“Mendicants, I will teach you the invisible and the path that leads to the invisible. Listen … And what is the invisible? The ending of greed, hate, and delusion. This is called the invisible. And what is the path that leads to the invisible? Serenity. This is called the path that leads to the invisible. … And what is the path that leads to the invisible? Immersion with placing the mind and keeping it connected. … Immersion without placing the mind, but just keeping it connected. … Immersion without placing the mind or keeping it connected. … Emptiness immersion. … Signless immersion. … Undirected immersion. … A mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of the body—keen, aware, and mindful, rid of covetousness and displeasure for the world. … A mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of feelings … A mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of the mind … A mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of principles … A mendicant generates enthusiasm, tries, makes an effort, exerts the mind, and strives so that bad, unskillful qualities don’t arise. … A mendicant generates enthusiasm, tries, makes an effort, exerts the mind, and strives so that bad, unskillful qualities are given up. … A mendicant generates enthusiasm, tries, makes an effort, exerts the mind, and strives so that skillful qualities arise. … A mendicant generates enthusiasm, tries, makes an effort, exerts the mind, and strives so that skillful qualities that have arisen remain, are not lost, but increase, mature, and are fulfilled by development. … A mendicant develops the basis of psychic power that has immersion due to enthusiasm, and active effort. … A mendicant develops the basis of psychic power that has immersion due to energy … immersion due to mental development … immersion due to inquiry, and active effort. … A mendicant develops the faculty of faith, which relies on seclusion, fading away, and cessation, and ripens as letting go. … A mendicant develops the faculty of energy … mindfulness … immersion … wisdom, which relies on seclusion, fading away, and cessation, and ripens as letting go. … A mendicant develops the power of faith … energy … mindfulness … immersion … wisdom, which relies on seclusion, fading away, and cessation, and ripens as letting go. … A mendicant develops the awakening factor of mindfulness … investigation of principles … energy … rapture … tranquility … immersion … equanimity, which relies on seclusion, fading away, and cessation, and ripens as letting go. … A mendicant develops right view … right thought … right speech … right action … right livelihood … right effort … right mindfulness … right immersion, which relies on seclusion, fading away, and cessation, and ripens as letting go. This is called the path that leads to the invisible. So, mendicants, I’ve taught you the invisible and the path that leads to the invisible. Out of compassion, I’ve done what a teacher should do who wants what’s best for their disciples. Here are these roots of trees, and here are these empty huts. Practice absorption, mendicants! Don’t be negligent! Don’t regret it later! This is my instruction to you.”

:pray:

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Nibbana isn’t consciousness. It’s the emptiness of all consciousness.

We can agree on this assertion – but the whole point of the Path is not about philosophical speculations on “real” and “unreal”. It’s about the experience of dukkha and its ending. And that experience is real as experience.
Otherwise, you haven’t replied to whether you see the 1st NT as valid or not. If it’s valid, the dukkha as experienced is real, and the other NTs reveal what can be done about it.

It’s not about the “direct experience of impermanence” – it’s about the reality of experiencing change and instability in all experiences → letting go of ignorance and craving that perpetuates experiences → liberation.

Right. And a real experience that is fundamentally dukkha. As are all experiences in and through the six senses.

Have you read:

Except for the ending in DN11:
"And that is where long and short,
fine and coarse, beautiful and ugly;
that’s where name and form
cease with nothing left over—
with the cessation of consciousness,
that’s where they cease.”’

This expression on nibbāna could be useful:
“the calming of all activities, renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, the fading away of desire, cessation, nirvana" (sabbasaṅkhārasamathe, sabbūpadhipaṭinissagge, taṇhakkhaye, virāge, nirodhe, nibbāne) (SN 22.90 = SA 262).

The Buddha’s words, not mine. :wink:
However we look at it the reality from the suttas is that,

  1. Both The Buddha and Sāriputta confirm that one can still perceive beyond all the planes of existence.
  2. Puthujjanas can delight in Nibbāna.
  3. No darkness is found there.
  4. Anidassanaṁ is a synonym for Nibbāna and the path to Nibbāna.

I’m just pointing out how all the things I’ve mentioned in my post relate to eachother.

Hello Jasudho! :slight_smile:
Yes, I have - read my post in the very end of it. :+1:

Hi Dhabba, :slightly_smiling_face:

Read your post, and saw the sutta, but not anything about the essay (link) offered by Ven. Sunyo.
If you did read it, what did you think of his points?

I mean, DN11 does end with the cessation of consciousness.

All best

I meant my post in the very end of that thread/essay you linked to. :slight_smile:

I will reply to what Ven. Sujato wrote to me later on (his reply is currently the last post in the thread just after mine), and also write more about DN 11, like you mentioned, and not only MN 49 like I did in the thread. :+1:

(still having problems with my ipad and a glitching charger, on 3% now :sweat_smile: see you sooner or later! :pray: )

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I don’t assert that they exist independently. I assert that they can exist independently of the mind.

I also recognize, on the other hand, that in terms of perception, there is a dependence on the mind as well. This does not, however, negate the actuality of forms (for example) and the physical eye (in relation to forms). It only points to eye-consciousness as a purely subjective experience.

As to other conditions which give rise to things (like forms, for example) there can be a variety of causes and conditions involved. The fact that dependent causation implies the reality of sunyata at its heart (as its essence) implies a further actuality to sunyata. Ie. that suyata is the actual nature of dependently arisen “things”.

Sunyata may neither exist nor not-exist. That doesn’t negate the actuality of it. Consider the word itself. “Act” - to cause something. “Ality” - the essence of. “Actuality” - the essence of that which is caused.

sunyata is the essence of that which causes things to arise dependently. What is “conceptual” here is only a person’s ability to put these actualities into a framework of understanding. Being able to conceptualize reality doesn’t, in and of itself, take anything away from the actuality of reality. In fact, it’s a necessary requisite of an “concept” that it have some kind of basis in reality.

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We’re still talking past one another. I never said there are really existing things. I just think your language about “existence” is overly strict, and also alien to the early texts, where temporary phenomena do “exist” in a non-“real”, non-inherent way.

All that exists (in experience) are dependently originated processes, not independently, truly existing things. And when these processes cease, it is not annihilation because no thing was destroyed. Your logical step from nothingness to annihilation is incorrect.

In my view, according to the Buddha the result of parinibbāna is no type of experience or awareness, i.e. there is nothing left. If you don’t agree with that, then it seems there are two options. Either you think the Buddha didn’t know/care/explain what happens after parinibbāna, or you think there is still something remaining afterwards. In the latter case it is that which holds that there is a truly, inherently existing thing—namely something that remains.

In other words, it is exactly because there are no truly existing things that parinibbāna can end in nothingness. If there were such things, then this wouldn’t be the case, because inherently existing things can’t cease (otherwise they wouldn’t truly exist). And also, if parinibbāna ended in some kind of mind or experience, then that itself would be the truly existing thing.

That’s why cessation of empty processes is the middle teaching.

I think this is exactly what Nāgārjuna teaches, although with a different use of words, which is why I don’t have fundamental objections to these teachings. The wrong views of atthitā and natthitā in the suttas are synonyms for eternalism and annihilationism. Both entail a self—or in Nāgārjuna’s language, truly existing entities. My view, like yours, is that such selves/things don’t exist. But neither of the two views is that mere dependently originated processes cease without any truly existent thing remaining. That is not what natthitā is about.

I would ask, how could there be no truly existent things yet nibbāna still be something? If you agree that nibbāna is not something, then it is nothing. Those are the only logical possibilities in ordinary (i.e. non-Nāgārjuna) language. That’s why earlier I tried to press you on this point, to take a stand on the matter. You acknowledged that it is possible to talk in, let’s say, “non-ultimate” way, yet didn’t say what your position is on this.

I don’t really mind either way, but I think it will be generally useful for any discussion if we don’t assume the other has said things they didn’t.

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Namo Buddhaya!

In regards to what Ven. Bodhi says regarding the argument against parinibbana being like the atheist’s conception of a destruction of a living being.

Have you heard this argument before?

  • the aggregates are extinguished in the world like a fire. The absence of fire is not something that there is but is only a description of what is not there.

One way this should be established as false is thus

The state of there being a burning can be described as the absence of everything being cool & wet and the extinguishment of the fire can be described as the absence of burning.

Alternatively both can be described in positive terms

The state of there being a burning can be described as the presence of a fire and the extinguishment of the fire can be described as the presence of everything being cooled.

I’ve said this before
To assert that the aggregates are extinguished in a world like a fire, this is a very bad idea.

It divorces aggregates from the world, essentially asserting that the world which having been with the aggregates becomes without the aggregates, changing as it persists.

The annihilationist proposition is based on a very simple line of reasoning

  • there is a world
  • this world was with buddha’s feelings
  • now the teacher is gone, world is without buddha’s feelings

Now let’s do thought experiment removing beings from this world as if bursting soap bubbles in a room.

It begets the questions

  • Can you extinguish all beings?
  • Can you describe a world where all beings are extinguished? How or why not?

Again this type of reasoning rests on the metaphysical idea that there is some field wherein the aggregates of beings are like candles burning in a room.

This conception is structurally analogical to ideas of there being a multiverse where the universes like ours are closed off from one another, just here one has universes of percipience closed of from eachother in some ‘world’.

Nevermind the ayatana/dhatu argument, i think there is no need to appeal to the text because these ideas are just obviously flawed.

Why flawed?

Because you can’t pin a world down. People talk about the world only in as far as there are aggregates present. Extinguishment of the aggregates is the end of the world. The extinguishment of the aggregates is not the end of the world in some everchanging world where the impermanent worlds end.

The parinibbaba is an end of the constructed, end of what was changing as it persisted, and it is possible because there is the unconstructed, discerned as not changing as it persists.

When a person talks about a world before and after parinibbana, then they are describing the constructed changing as it persists, do you see the trap in describing the end of the constructed as a change in the constructed?

What they are then talking about is their own or someone elses percipience of the world before & after what they call buddha’s parinibbana and this context cannot be used to explain ‘the end of the constructed as the unconstructed’ as it merely describes a change in the constructed as it persists.

Buddha’s parinibbana does not occur in the percipience of another person. Therefore whatever you make out of your experience/existence, narrating about it in terms of being with & without the arahant, this has nothing to do with explaining asankhata.

I hope we never hear of this stuff again.

Your position is not clear.

Can you state your thesis on where do you stand? Something or nothing after parinibbāna?

The first sentence is supporting nothing after parinibbāna.

The second sentence still doesn’t make sense even after many readings.

This is a false dichotomy and it is inherently flawed. I’ll show you

Something or nothing after parinibbāna?

This question divorces asankhata from parinibbaba.

Here are two common permutation of answers

  1. asankhata after parinibbana
  2. nothing after parinibbana

#1 divorces asankhata from cessation. In the sense that one comes first and next comes another.
#2 divorces asankhata from parinibbana because this parinibbana is apprehended as something constructed just like the atheist apprehends death, as a running out of life rather than something which is not life coming into play. Thus here one asserts that the asankhata is just a running out of the constructed rather than the coming into play of something else.

I make a point of not divorcing cessation from that in dependence on which it is discerned, this whilst delineating that which ceases from that in dependence on what cessation occurs, but i do not divorce the two having delineated this difference.

Therefore i take asankhata as tied to parinibbana and therefore it’s not something that comes after the parinibbana.

Nor do i conceive of asankhata/parinibbana as the atheists do of death thinking that the same world goes on after someone therein attains parinibbana with there being nothing further to what ceased.

In other words i say there are two elements, equally real but categorically different

  • the made is changing as it persists
  • the unmade not changing as it persists

The unmade is also apprehended as the altogether cessation of the made. And one can’t say that one comes after another or that one is nothing where another is something.

In certain context, one can’t speak of a world after parinibbana because all constructed ceased. So there is then no basis to speak of something constructed after the cessation of the constructed.

  • That which ends is something
  • The end is something
  • That in dependence on what the end occurs is something
  • The end is not a sequel of what ends
  • That which ends is neither the end nor that in dependence on what the end occurs

There are two contexts to wit

One can essentially speak of parinibbana as an occurence/attainment, as something occuring in the constructed world, and one should take note when doing so for one describes a change in the constructed.

On the other hand one can speak of reaching the end of the world, as the asankhata, then there is nothing further to the world.

For clarity i can offer a thought experiment/analogy

Suppose you are dreaming for very long time, so long that you now only know the dream world, can’t remember anything before.
Suppose everybody in the dream are the same but there is a doctrine of awakening that can be trained. And people meditate as to gain samadhi based on awakening-principle as to see a different reality for themselves.

Suppose the course of training goes like this.

  1. You develope dispassion towards the dream
  2. You gain temporary awakening as samadhi release and by this seeing with discernment you become completely disenchanted with the dream.
  3. When your lifespan runs out in the dream, the dream will end.

Now think about this.

From your point of reference, Is that dream world something that goes on after your pariawakening?

It is only from the point of reference pertaining to the beings that you saw in the dream that you can conceive of a context where they speak about you after your pariswakening. But how foolish is that? Because it was but a dream, those beings can’t be pinned down as a truth & reality and in as far as you are concerned there is nothing further to that world and a release was discerned based on an equally real albeit categorically different reality.

Of course in this analogy i speak of one subset of the constructed reality ceasing in dependence on another constructed reality but the structure of reasoning is exactly the same describing the constructed ceasing in dependence on the unconstructed.

Imagine now if someone you met in a dream was teaching ‘pariawakening is like the atheist’s idea of death and this world will persist without aggregates’. Wouldn’t that be entirely foolish?

It looks to me like the sutta method of expression is basically based on these analogies hence words like awakening are used but it’s not made explicit.

I can add one more point

You know howvin some sense humans tend to divorce themselves from nature? Eg distinctions between what is man-made & what is natural, notions of man vs environment, things like this.

On the other people also realize that they are it, maybe not all of it, but they are part of a whole and having delineated a difference one can’t separate one from another.

The unmade reality is otherwise, it’s not whole for it has no parts and when one thinks of the cessation of aggregates one should think of the cessation of both man & nature, hence end of the world as if waking up from a dream, but one does not wake up to another first-person-perspective, as a part of a whole, but one awakens to something better for lack of a better word.

Maybe those with little dust in their eye can see if i explain it like this.

On a general note i’ll add that i am not impressed with Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s explaining things. It’s only clear that he doesn’t think of parinibbana like the atheist’s idea of death. But does he think it’s like some kind of first person experience, not 6 senses but maybe a 7th sense you know, like crabs have senses humans don’t have so maybe these venerables conceive of some extraordinarily pleasant & stable first person experience without body or normal perception. I don’t know.

Did you notice that he asserted that the stilling of all fabrications is apprehended as signless? This stands out to me, because i assume this is based on the commentary take on what makes contact as one emerges from cessation of perception & feeling but afaik comy doesn’t draw parallel to the stilling of all sankhara as directing the mind to deathless for the removal of fetters.

It’s noteworthy because if it is laid out like this then he suggests that commentary teaches that cessation of perception & feeling is required for the removal of fetters but afaik this is not alluded to in the comy nor is it stated explicitly and the vsm asserted that only anagami with all formless jhana can attain cessation samadhi.

I am curious as to how he would address this.

So this is something like partial eternalism?

If the unmade is leftover and that unmade is not nothing, then the position seems to be inline with something after parinibbāna.

Of course, as usual, the unmade is already in the samsaric world as well, because it cannot change, it is not produced etc. Basically what the Mahayana call dhammakāya? Or Buddha nature?

If you want to use that designation i don’t mind as long as you get the meaning correctly but i wouldn’t use those terms other than in a reference to there being two elements wherein one is described as dhuva.
So if you take the constructed and the unconstructed together as a whole then one part of that is dhuva stable and appavatta non-evolving/continuing.

However the unconstructed is not part of the constructed.

Now if the asankhata was part of the sankhata then one would say that the asankhata is then leftover, a residue purified of the stain of sankhata, but i do not say that asankhata is part of the sankhata nor that sankhata becomes asankhata.