It seems that Ven Bhikkhu Analāyo isn’t cessationist as well. In his last book „The Signless and The Dethless” in the chapter „Annihilation and Happines” he discuses the SNP5.7:
“One who has come to an end—do they not exist?
Or are they free from disease for eternity?
Please, sage, answer me clearly,
for truly you understand this matter.”
“One who has come to an end cannot be defined,” replied the Buddha.
“They have nothing
by which one might describe them.
When all things have been eradicated,
eradicated, too, are all ways of speech.”
According to his interpretation, this passage express apophatic nature of Nibbana. Nibbana is not a thing graspable by language, but it is not simple nothing. He also tackles the cessationist position:
Since Upasīva’s query concerned either annihilation or an eternal condition, it seems that he should be envisaged as operating under the assumption that there is a self. Hence, there may have been an additional need to clarify that there is no self in the first place to be extinguished or perpetuated. But that is also not beyond the reach of language, as the teachings on the characteristic of not self, found among the early discourses, show.* Thus, the reply to Upasīva does not fit the assumption that Nirvana is a mere nothingness but much rather conveys an utter transcendence that is completely beyond the reach of language and measurements.
*An instance where the Buddha reportedly remained silent on the topic of the self, found in SN 44.10 at SN IV 400,17 and its parallels SĀ 961 at T 2.99.245b12, SĀ2 195 at T 2.100.444c4, and Up 9031 at D 4094 nyu 88b6 or P 5595 thu 136a3, appears to be due to pedagogical reasons rather than the limitations of language; see in more detail Anālayo 2023.
There is much more to say about this book. It deserve separate discussion.
Threads like this I think should make it very clear that differences in such topics have very little to do with distinguishing between extant Buddhist traditions at the granularity of Theravada and Mahayana. It seems there is widespread disagreement inside of Theravada with many different viewpoints and similarly for Mahayana regarding issues such as this. One can find Mahayana and Theravada practitioners advocating all the different viewpoints presented in this and other threads of a similar nature.
Yes. The sutta pointed out that the craving/desire to practice the Path is itself a craving/desire, yet on the whole one can still reach a state free from desire. How is this relevant to my original point?
Yes, but still, how is what you were saying directly relevant to what I said? I think I may know what point you want to make, but I think you need to be more explicit.
Either Ananda said it or the translators mistook a tense, but the sutta in question seems to say that once one arrives at and presumably enters the park then (past tense after arriving/entering) one gives up the desire to arrive/enter? Maybe that is true of parks, but I don’t think it is true if the park is “no-desires allowed” park.
My hypothesis is that the gradual giving up of desire happens long long before arrival and it is momentum that actually carries you in. It is kinda more like you start walking and then at some point well before you arrive you hop in a wheel barrow that carries along your previous momentum and then when you arrive at “no walking park” that momentum carries you in
Maybe.
The use of desire here is virtually a synonym for motivation in this context. And, of course, this is not the only sutta to shed light on this.
Even non-returners need to continue to practice the Dhamma so as to fully let go of self-view. So there has to be some intention/motivation to do this.
indicated that the motivation and desire for nibbāna as cessation was equivalent to the craving for annihilation/non-existence. My replies and sutta citations were addressed to that.
Hmm, but your response seems to indicate or affirm that they are equivalent. You seem to be saying something akin to:
Well, sure it is desire for nibbana as cessation that leads to nibbana as cessation; I acknowledge that this desire has to be given up eventually but it can only be given up at the last second before actually achieving nibbana as cessation because otherwise how would one arrive at nibbana as cessation?
Forgive me if this is not an adequate paraphrase, but I’ve tried to capture what it is I think you are implying. Please let me know if I have it wrong.
One problem here is the assumption that one couldn’t arrive at nibbana or really any place at all without desire. That desire and motivation or intention are synonymous. However, the Teacher did perform actions of body, speech, and mind even after his attainment of nibbana. Do you think that subsequent to nibbana (here with remainder for your understanding) he had desire? If not, then how did he perform actions of body, speech and mind?
The argument still seems to cut both ways. I am going to paraphrase the exchange so far:
NgXinZhao: Making sense of Nibbāna as something sounds like craving for existence
Soren: But this argument goes both ways. Trying to make sense of Nibbāna as the absence of anything sounds like craving for non-existence.
Jasudho: The motivation and desire for Nibbāna as cessation is not equivalent to the craving for annihilation/non-existence.
Now let’s flip it:
NgXinZhao2.0: Making sense of Nibbāna as the absence of anything sounds like craving for non-existence
Soren2.0: But this argument goes both ways. Trying to make sense of Nibbāna as something sounds like craving for existence.
Jasudho2.0: The motivation and desire for Nibbāna as something transcendent is not equivalent to the craving for eternalism/existence.
Note that, so far, I am not making any claims about whether or not Nibbāna is or isn’t cessationism. I am pointing out that, taken alone, this argument applies to either position. If you want to provide other references to show that cessationism is the correct interpretation of Nibbāna then you are free to do so. But I am not disputing the conclusion of NgXinZhao’s original argument, I am disputing the validity of the argument.
It seems to me like you are arguing as follows:
After death, Nibbana is purely cessation (of things which do not have a self).
The craving for cessation/Nibbana is the same as craving to reach the end of desire via the N8FP. Or, at least, if they are different, having one implies the other.
The Buddha encourages one to have craving for the end of desire as in SN51.15.
Therefore, by (2) and (3), the Buddha encourages one to have craving for cessation.
The Buddha also encourages us not to have craving for non-existence.
Therefore, by (4) and (5), the craving for cessation and craving for non-existence are different.
After awakening there is, of course, no desire. So the Buddha and arahants walk and talk and have intentions but they are all free of attachment and identification.
I think the Teacher would agree with anyone anywhere who said, “there is no true Scotsman!” Maybe we should call it the No True Scotsman Truth instead of fallacy
Thanks for offering a summary.
To try to clarify further –
They are not equal as the desire for eternal existence or eternal anything is different than desiring to practice for the cessation, i.e. absence of, all dukkha. I think this is an important distinction.
Desire here is a synonym for motivation/effort, which I think we all agree is needed to practice the Way.
Regarding the list you posted:
Rather, of everything, since the aggregates and the All (the six senses fields (SN35.23), end with nothing left over, (in this view of final nibbāna without rebirth).
Except craving is AFAIK in the suttas is always unskillful and associated with ignorance, while desire, chanda, in some contexts is depicted as skillful for practicing the Dhamma. My point.
In this context, that is so. And, of course, in the end any and all desires have to finally cease.
See above.
Non-existence in the suttas refers to the craving for annihilation and involves ignorance and self-view. This differs from the dissolution of the senses and aggregates without rebirth at the death of an arahant → cessation, nibbāna without residue, Iti44.
Except: craving…always associated with ignorance and self-view.
I agree that they are not the same. What is being disputed is whether or not the following two activities share the following property:
First activity: trying to make sense of Nibbana as not just being complete cessation.
Second activity: trying to make sense of Nibbana as being complete cessation.
Property X: Does the activity involve craving for existence or non-existence?
(I phrase it like this to stick to NgXinZhao’s original statement.)
Okay.
Okay.
So is the following summary accurate?
After death, Nibbana is cessation of “The All” and nothing else, that is, with nothing left over. “The All” is defined in SN 35.23.
The desire for Nibbana/cessation is the same as desire to reach the end of desire via the N8FP. Or, at least, if they are different, having one implies the other.
Craving is always considered negatively in the Suttas. However, desire is sometimes good. The Buddha encourages one to have desire for the end of desire as in SN51.15.
Therefore, by (2) and (3), the Buddha encourages one to have desire for cessation (which is the dissolution of the senses and aggregates without rebirth at the death of an arahant), that is, nibbāna without residue, Iti44.
The Buddha also encourages us not to have craving for non-existence.
Regarding (4) and (5), they do not contradict each other. Craving for non-existence refers to craving for annihilation and involves ignorance and self-view.
This leaves open the different views of final nibbāna as cessation vs an ineffable “something” , or "knowing’, or “timeless citta”, etc.
But that’s not what we’re directly into with these posts.
