SuttaCentral
Hmmm. but the mind does know.
Unpleasant feeling is directly one of the 3 dukkhas.
Then we can eventually get to question are all mental objects concepts and thus can be eternal and not subject to dependent origination? Or some are actually subject to dependent origination and cessation?
Eg. self is a false concept not found in the world, but still a concept.
Feeling is a direct mind object, directly experienced all the time, except when there is no mind.
Dukkha is inherent in the grasping aggregates. The grasping aggregates are bound by dukkha. That is the actuality of suffering. We can penetrate this truth with the mind.
You would seem to imply that by merely removing the concept of dukkha, anicca, anatta we remove suffering?
If dukkha is inherent in form and form can be known by the eye, then can dukkha be known by the eye? Can you literally see dukkha with eye contact? How about impermanence and not-self? Are these also inherent in form? If so, can you see impermanence and not-self with the eye just like the eye can see form? If not, why not? Surely, something that is inherent should be visible in form since form itself can be known by the eye…
If form has the inherent nature of dukkha and the inherent nature of impermanence and the inherent nature of not-self, then does form have three different inherent natures? How can something have three different inherent natures?
If these three natures are different, does that mean that dukkha is not impermanent? Certainly, dukkha is impermanent, right? But if dukkha is impermanent, then surely not-self is impermanent too, right? Does that mean that self arises since it is the opposite of not-self when not-self (which is impermanence) ceases?
If form has only one inherent nature does that mean that dukkha, impermanence, and not-self are all the same thing? Is not-self dukkha? Does that mean that self is true happiness?
Why did the Teacher say that the aggregates had no core and that an essence could not be found if we are to understand that the aggregates like form have either three different cores/essences or one core/essence? Seems a thicket of conundrums arise when we view the aggregates as having some inherent nature…
Perception is a grasping aggregate. Dukkha is a mark of suffering. The aggregates are marked by dukkha, anicca, and anatta. What can be known as perception can be known by its marks. Penetrative wisdom reveals the marks. For example whatever form one perceives, that is known as marked by the three characteristics. Whatever perception of that form exists; that can be known as marked. Whatever feeling, intention, or manner of consciousness … they’re all marked by the three characteristics and can be understood as such via wisdom and penetrative knowledge.
Well. I don’t think it’s a problem for a thing to have three inherent natures. An electron has mass, spin, and charge - for example.
But, I would instead say anyway that if one penetrates into the three marks and he sees dukkha existing in the aggregates, then he sees all three characteristics.
And besides, I don’t see how a thing is limited to how many inherent properties it has. Shouldn’t things have multiple inherent properties?
Pretty much. Or at least they all follow from each other. We’ve all seen the dialogues where the Buddha asks:
Is form permanent or impermanent?
Is that which is impermanent happiness or suffering?
And can we call such a thing “self”?
Likely because that lack of a core is, in other words, a lack of self.
I’m kind of waxing philosophical, but I inherently agree with you. The aggregates do NOT have a core. It is exactly because they are marked by the three characteristics that they are deemed “hollow; cancerous; a barb; a disease”.
So you don’t think suffering is inherent to the aggregates? Wouldn’t a lack of inherent nature be inherently painful for us beings?
Agreed. Although it doesn’t have to be grasped at.
Dukkha is a mark and is widely translated as suffering although there is disagreement about that.
Agreed.
I do. It seems a non-sensical thing to say that some thing can have three different independent inherent natures. BTW, I don’t think it is correct to say that an electron has three different independent inherent natures of ‘mass’, ‘spin’, and ‘charge’, but then an electron is a gossamer/nebulous thing that disappears when confronted with penetrative analysis. No core or essence of ‘electron’ can be found.
It depends upon what you mean by ‘inherent’ I guess and what you mean by ‘properties?’ The way you’re talking leads me to believe that you think the three marks are things themselves? Do you see the three marks as dhammas? Is dukkha a thing? Is impermanence a thing? Is not-self a thing?
For sure consciousness lacks a self, an essence or a core just like a banana tree lacks heartwood. If you peel back the layers you arrive at voidness.
I see what you did there 
Agreed. I wonder if we also agree that the three characteristics also lack a core or an essence?
Definitely not because nothing is inherent to the aggregates. The aggregates themselves cannot be found under analysis so how could anything at all be inherent to them? Precisely because the aggregates cannot be found under analysis they are deemed impermanent, not-self and dukkha; they are utterly unworthy of any passion or craving after. At least, that’s what my feeble mind makes of things.
I mean, maybe no “core” or “essence”. But measurements assure us that electrons at least have these properties.
I don’t see them as existing independently of the aggregates, no.
Well. Sure. “Thing” is a broad category which I would say the three characteristics fall into. We’re able to talk about them in the sense that they are “things”.
Ha ha. That was semi-intentional. I noticed it after proof reading my post and decided it should stay. 
Upon final analysis, even the characteristics can be deconstructed, IMO. Ie. I think they can be reduced to nothing by intense penetrative wisdom and insight.
So, that would seem to evict them from the “thing and/or “property” and/or “inherent” categories. But, such an eviction, IMO, is inherent to realization. The default state of the aggregates (on a functional level) is to demonstrate the three marks.
Again, I think the inherent voidness of the aggregates on a micro level is what gives rise to the three characteristics on a macro level.
I agree, but only to the extent that realization is possible.
Well. Don’t sell yourself short. 
I would disagree in any event. Under formal analysis, I think the aggregates demonstrate the three characteristics as universal marks belonging to or, ie., inherent to their being (even if that is just a consequence of voidness).
Under intense analysis, attachment to those aggregates is separated by a type of discernment which eradicates sense-consciousness.
In the extreme (and this seems to be an unpopular opinion) when sense-consciousness is eradicated, I believe saññāvedayitanirodha arises in the “emptiness” which remains outside the scope of that very clinging (which is the essence of the marks).
And in another case, I believe Nibanna is a complete detachment from sense contact.
I differentiate between saññāvedayitanirodha and Nibanna on the basis of how contact exists in each state. In saññāvedayitanirodha contact has no basis. In Nibanna, on the other hand, the suffering of contact has no basis. So, IMO, one state simply doesn’t allow for contact and the other state simply doesn’t allow for suffering.
Without the labelling of the experience, you wouldn’t cognise pain at all. Since its dependent upon conceptualisation, how is it actual? As you say an atta is a concept, and ultimately an atta is neither eternal nor annihilated. Concepts aren’t eternal nor annihilated.
Since it depends on the mind, how is it actual? Awakening is seeing all dhammas for what they are. Concepts only. This is true of the atta, and its true of all else too.
I think this is where the fork between Mahayana and Theravada goes.
For those who really just drop all concepts, and able to just touch hot iron with bare hands and still not claim to suffer ultimately (please don’t do it, just an extreme vivid example), they are going to get their wish of not having cessation after their “attainment”. They get to be reborn to practise the bodhisattva path again and again.
From the perspective of Theravada, since these people are not even stream winners for having wrong view on the nature of parinibbāna, whatever they attained, even dropping of concepts, that is impermanent too, one day they might fall from it. And then they are not safe from suffering, no longer being protected by the perception of emptiness.
Whereas true liberation, refuge from all suffering is where all ends in parinibbāna. No more rebirth, no more 5 aggregates, no more arising, no more possibility of arising.
With all respect, what you are saying sounds like craving for non-existence. Perhaps, there is a reason the Buddha did not declare what happens to the Buddha after death and said that it was not necessary to live the spiritual life.
I’m not a Mahayanist. My background is in Theravada. If I were to ordain, it would be in a Theravadin monastery. Its not about dropping concepts. You have to use concepts in life. Its about understanding them. Not being deluded by them.
There needs to be desire to get to nibbāna to get to nibbāna. And near there too, one should even get rid of it.
It is craving which is the issue, not the non-existence part. Non existence notion doesn’t arise when one sees arising. When all conditions for arising are gone, this condition for non existence notion is gone too.
The Buddha refused to answer because the question is using the concept of self.
@Ceisiwr yet you adopted Nagarjuna, that’s basically mahayana influence.
“They neither make a choice nor form an intention to continue existence or to end existence. Because of this, they don’t grasp at anything in the world. Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished” (or personally attains Nibbana according Bodhi (MN140).
It was then that the Bhagavān addressed the monks, “There are two kinds of views. What are the two? They are the views of existence and the views of inexistence. Of those, which are the views of existence? They are the view of desire existence, view of form existence, and view of formless existence.
“What is the view of desire existence? This refers to the five desires. What are the five desires? They are forms seen by the eye that are extremely desirable, esteemed, and thought about. Having never abandoned forms, worldly people revere them. When the ear hears sounds … nose smells odors … tongue tastes flavors … body feels tender touches … mind cognizes notions … These are said to be the views of existence.
“What are the views of inexistence? They are the view of permanence, view of impermanence, view of something being destroyed, view of nothing being destroyed, view of being limited, view of being limitless, view of having a self, view of no self, view of having life, view of no life, view of other selves, view of other lives … These sixty-two views are called views of inexistence and unreal views. These are said to be the views of inexistence.
“Therefore, monks, you should abandon these two kinds of views. Thus, monks, you should train yourselves.”
Accepting Ven. Nagarjuna’s exegesis doesn’t make one a Mahayanika. For example, I don’t accept the Bodhisattva idea.
Where is this from? please cite. Sounds like an agama text.
It depends on conditions external to the mind.
If I get hit by a car that is a function of a car existing externally to me and me existing externally to the car. Ie. actual forms actually existing.
If a tree falls in a forest and there’s no one there to see it fall … it still falls.
It’s actual in the experience of it. How can this be denied, no matter what labels are applied or not?
It appears that you’re taking a position that denies the 1st Noble Truth. The Buddha asserts the truth, the experience, of dukkha. In that way, it’s “actual”.
The fact that nothing has any permanent or inherent essence doesn’t mean they aren’t experienced , and in that sense they’re real.
Consciousness cognizing essenceless processes doesn’t mean the processes aren’t experienced as dukkha.
Otherwise, why commit to the practice for liberation?
In the sutta it says
If you can find a sutta where it actually says otherwise, I would love to see it.
If these are of a dependent nature, how can they also have an independent nature?