for example i do not know what you mean with direct insight is. But i leave it at rest. I am going to sleep, and gonna take some time of. Now i really do 
You seem to view death as the true exit for painful feelings; death as the true exit for feeling in any form. In many ways, this debate seems all about death and the fate of the aggregates to my mind. As I tried to say above, I don’t think death is any kind of special moment to fixate on and the fate of the aggregates after they’ve been laid down is just not an appropriate concern. In fact, I fear being concerned with the fate of the aggregates after death hinders the shucking off of this burden.
Some of those who take issue with Bhikkhu Bodhi in this thread I surmise are not talking about nibbana as such, but rather death. It is death and the fate of the aggregates that they seem focused on. Which aggregates? Those they believe to comprise the self of an awakened one. They seem to maintain that although the self never existed, the parts of this self that never existed are of concern for a noble disciple.
Are all forms of dukkha of concern or extinguished following death? No. Why? Because obviously the phenomenal world still exists, right? No, it is the fate of the parts that compose the non-existent self of an awakened one and what happens to these parts after death that seems to be the concern.
To my mind, nibbana is not death. To my mind, the fate of the aggregates after death are not an appropriate concern. This is all just my hypothesis and I could be wrong and readily admit as such. I don’t truly know much of anything at all.
Only if it isn’t followed by rebirth. As in Iti44.
It’s not about fixating on it – it’s about when the aggregates and senses cease at death without rebirth → no further dukkha. Death for the arahant is the ending of saṁsāra. That’s the point.
Might be harder to let them go if we don’t see them as dukkha.
Not necessarily. Just the senses and aggegates as they are with adding anything about them being a self, etc.
This is again conflating what we assume about external reality with where the “being” and dukkha are known in experience to exist: in the six sense fields.
When they cease without rebirth, there’s nothing to even know about whatever may or may not be going on in external reality.
No one is saying that. Death with rebirth is saṁsāra.
Death without rebirth, with the final extinguishment of the senses and aggregates, is cessation of all dukkha. Could dukkha continue with full cessation of all conditions?
AN10.107: “I will teach a noble washing that leads solely to disillusionment, dispassion, cessation, peace, insight, awakening, and extinguishment. Relying on that washing, sentient beings who are liable to rebirth, old age, and death, to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress are freed from all these things.”
All best
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It seems we just have a disagreement that I don’t see any way around except through continued practice.
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Your quote say “Freed from Death.” Not dying first then freed.
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AN 11.7 seems to the same thing described in Ud 8.1. I want to bring up the description of Nibbana as having no support, coming or going, remaining etc. I believe in the book of threes it’s always described as having no arising, change while persisting, or vanishing. Would you be able to explain how a bare knowing would fit in with this?
For clarification, I don’t know that I have a hat in either ring on this debate. Both sides constantly convince me.
Freed from death means no further rebirth after an arahant passes away, and free from death in the last life with respect to not clinging or identifying with any experiences, including the deterioration of the body.
AN6.14:
“A mendicant who lives life like this has a good death. This is called a mendicant who delights in extinguishment, who has given up substantial reality to rightly make an end of suffering.”
This AN 6.41 is just an analogy, nothing to do with the supramundane state or Nibbana state.
What that got to do with rebirth or future birth. Those are just papanca. Mind and body have cooled here and now. No more death by An Arahant.
I guess that’s your interpretation.
This just gets mired in words; of course there’s no defining an arahant. And yet: a being whose old kamma and aggegates remain until they cease at death.
AN4.184:
““Furthermore, there is the case of the person who has no doubt or perplexity, who has arrived at certainty with regard to the True Dhamma. Then he comes down with a serious disease. As he comes down with a serious disease, the thought occurs to him, ‘I have no doubt or perplexity. I have arrived at certainty with regard to the True Dhamma.’ He does not grieve, is not tormented; does not weep, beat his breast, or grow delirious. This, too, is a person who, subject to death, is not afraid or in terror of death.”
Check out DN16.
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This Sutta is for those who is still liable to DEATH. Arahant is Free of DEATH as your above Sutta said.
‘All those liable to death are frightened and terrified of death.’” …
…
These are the four people liable to death who are not frightened and terrified of death.”
I used 6 sense contacts because that cannot be denied to exist.
When we say things are empty of self, it means the self doesn’t exist and it’s a figure of imagination. We cannot find it if we searched.
When you say apply this to the 6 sense contacts, and say they are inherently empty, I don’t think you mean the same thing.
If eye contact doesn’t exist, then there’s no possiblity of sight. It can be directly verified that sight appears, and logically deduced that even to arahants, sight appears as they clearly see things. So it’s not the same emptiness as empty of existence. It’s the same emptiness as in empty of self.
Since eye contact comes to be, there must be conditions for it. And therefore it is impermanent, and thus suffering. Same for all sense contacts. And there’s a way to cease what is conditioned. That’s what you have been denying. That what is conditioned can cease, not just in the mind as a concept when emptiness is seen, but actually not present, not vividly appearing.
I dunno how you can get the stamina to debate with basically the whole site about this and still go on. I am getting tired again. I don’t think anything will change your mind anyway, unless you meet with a Buddha in the future and ask him these.
Can you define an arahant and death?
If we take arahant to be the conventional 5 aggregates, and death to be the breaking up of the aggregates, by the death of the Buddha and so many arahants recorded in the suttas, arahants do die.
So your definition must be something special and unusual.
What I see that the Buddha meant is that the 5 aggregates unclung to, will not be subjected to rebirth anymore, hence freed from future deaths, only that this final death is inevitable as it’s conditioned by being reborn in the first place.
If you posit an arahant as a soul or dhammakaya or some other eternal mind, separated from the 5 aggregates, anything which survives the physical body breaking up (for the arahant), then you might be in danger of introducing soul to the arahant, falling into eternalism.
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I took this to refer to an arahant, but admit it may not and your point may be valid. Thanks.
Meanwhile, you chose not to respond about DN16.
When using abstract words and designations like “arahant” people apply different views and definitions, so it’s difficult to discuss.
Maybe it’s a bit more clear if we use the word “experiences.” Were the Buddha’s experiences of old kamma and life conditions the same as yours? If not, it’s those particular-to-each-life-experiences that will cease for an arahant – that is, death.
In this sense arahants die – of course without rebirth, so dukkha ceases without remainder at the final death of all experience.
Welcome to the world of paradoxes.
But your definition of terms in this context doesn’t apply.
Effort to end dukkha by practicing the N8FP is not craving and the cessation of dukkha via the cessation of experience at final nibbāna is not non-existence as it is used in the suttas, although some people accused the Buddha of teaching annihilation, which he denied – though he did say those who held to the wrong view of annihilation were closer than those who held to eternalistc views.
See SN 12.15, Iti49, and from MN60:
“If those ascetics and brahmins who say that there is no such thing as the total cessation of continued existence are correct, it is possible that I will be unfailingly reborn among the gods who are formless and made of perception. If those ascetics and brahmins who say that there is such a thing as the total cessation of continued existence are correct, it is possible that I will be fully extinguished in the present life. The view of those ascetics and brahmins who say that there is no such thing as the total cessation of continued existence is close to greed, yoking, relishing, attachment, and grasping. The view of those ascetics and brahmins who say that there is such a thing as the total cessation of continued existence is close to non-greed, non-yoking, non-relishing, non-attachment, and non-grasping.’ Reflecting like this, they simply practice for disillusionment, dispassion, and cessation regarding future lives.”
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Everything that is felt would include the formless realms, and mind.
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Hi Jasudho,
I believe we already had a long discussion about this on this very thread! So to reply to you now would just be to start a circle. I know that your most recent post is introducing a new sutta to consider, but notice how you state your view about the debated premise as if it were true at the beginning of your reply 
– I know what your position is!
For what it is worth, I don’t personally care if paranibbana is existence, non-existence, both, neither, beyond language, cessation, or whatever. I trust the Buddha that it is worth it to make the effort to sever the fetters, and so (for now) I just focus on that.
And yet the Buddha said Nibbāna is beyond language, reasoning and logic (Atakkāvacara)
Reading suttas and applying logic to what one is reading will lead one astray.
One will only imagine that they understand something prior to the actual experience, based only on applying a certain logic from reading the suttas.
This was quite evident regarding things stated in posts in other threads on this forum (and even liked by monastics) about the formless. From insects ending up there after the destruction of Kama Loka, to even suicide victims ending up in the formless.
These wrong statements comes solely from reading the suttas and getting an idea of what the formless
realms ”ought to be like”, based on a certain logic.
Actual meditation and insights has nothing to do with the logic.
Meditation and insight goes against the very things most say is impossible in the first place.
So why apply a rigid and narrow view of how things
”must” be regarding Nibbāna, based on logic?
(while also rejecting suttas that don’t fit the cessationist view)
As an example:
There is the law of gravity, but there is also levitation.
The fact that the Buddha had no praise for such supernatural abilities actually proves that one can develop these and they truly exist.
(Why would the Buddha dismiss something non-existent?)
But more importantly where is the logic in that a meditator all of a sudden can walk through walls, become invisible and on top of that defy the law of gravity by levitating?
There might be logical explanations on how matter, motion and conscioussness operate that most agree on - but all those logical (restricted) explanations turn out to be wrong in the light of meditation.
This view of Nibbāna is only a logical conclusion based on the Buddha saying that one can’t describe anything beyond ’The All’. Which goes hand in hand with the Buddha saying Nibbāna is beyond language:
And what is the all?
It’s just the eye and sights, the ear and sounds, the nose and smells, the tongue and tastes, the body and touches, and the mind and ideas.
This is called the all.
Mendicants, suppose someone was to say:
‘I’ll reject this all and describe another all.’ They’d have no grounds for that.
I’m glad that in the Bikkhu Bodhi interview, Nibbāna was mentioned as an element (Dhātu) just like how MN1 starts with the element Earth, goes through all the elements and all the planes of existence and ends with Nibbāna as an element that even putthujhanas can delight in…
But not Asaññasattāvāso… 
(I’ll reply to you in that thread some other day )
I mainly pointed out how how iti44 Nibbānadhātusutta is translated incorrectly by both John D Ireland and Bhikkhu Sujato. Since the term “pañcindriyāni” refers to the five faculties or spiritual faculties, which are faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom.
Not the 5 senses…
As to your view on ’when nothing is felt’ and what that ”must” imply, is once again an interpretation based on a certain form of logic.
Which leads me back to MN 49, where the Buddha mentions something that is truly Atakkāvacara - beyond logic, namely: Viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ
Once again:
Anidassanaṁ is a synonym for Nibbāna (obviously not the second formless realm) from SN 43.14
The invisible (Anidassanañca) …
that in which nothing appears …
Anidassanañca vo, bhikkhave, desessāmi anidassanagāmiñca maggaṁ.
Taṁ suṇātha. Katamañca, bhikkhave, anidassanaṁ …pe….
From MN 49:
Since directly knowing all as all, and since directly knowing that which does not fall within the scope of experience characterized by all, I have not become all, I have not become in all, I have not become as all, I have not become one who thinks ‘all is mine’, I have not affirmed all.
Consciousness where nothing appears, infinite, luminous all-round—that is what does not fall within the scope of experience characterized by earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Progenitor, Brahmā, the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory, the gods of abundant fruit, the Vanquisher, and the all.
‘Seeing the danger in continued existence—
that life in any existence will cease to be—
I didn’t affirm any kind of existence,
and didn’t grasp at relishing.’
The Buddha is saying all of the above because first Brahma says this:
So, mendicant, I tell you this:
you will never find another escape beyond this, and you will eventually get weary and frustrated.
If you attach to earth, you will lie close to me, in my domain, subject to my will, and expendable.
If you attach to water …
fire …
air …
creatures …
gods …
the Progenitor …
Brahmā, you will lie close to me, in my domain, subject to my will, and expendable.’
Then the Buddha explains that there are higher Rupa Loka realms that Brahma does not know and see:
But there are three other realms that you don’t know or see, but which I know and see. There is the realm named after the gods of streaming radiance, There is the realm named after the gods replete with glory … There is the realm named after the gods of abundant fruit, which you don’t know or see.
So Baka is obviously not saying anything at all about the formless realms later on, because he doesn’t even know and see the higher Rupa Loka realms(!)
Baka also imagined his dwelling as: ‘This is permanent, this is everlasting, this is eternal, this is whole, this is imperishable yet that dwelling happens to be below the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory & the gods of abundant fruit…not the second formless realm.
- For the Buddha to become invisible but with his voice still heard he didn’t have to enter a distinctly different world of existence like arupa loka, a higher rupa loka plane is sufficient for the task.
Also let us not forget the fact one can’t teach dhamma to any of the beings in arupa loka:
Furthermore, a Realized One has arisen in the world.
But person has been reborn in one of the long-lived orders of gods.
This is the fourth lost opportunity for spiritual practice.
Which means that if one can’t teach dhamma while in the formless, how could the Buddha ”teach Baka a lesson” FROM the second formless realm(!?).
The mistake cessationists make is to instantly, thanks to their logic, equate ”Viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ anantaṁ sabbato pabhaṁ” with something other than Nibbāna so it ”must” refer to the second formless realm…
But I hope it is clear it has nothing to do with the second formless realm and that the essays with theories regarding Viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ have grave mistakes in them.
Anidassanaṁ is a reference to Nibbāna found in SN 43.14 and it also has nothing to do with doctrines of Eternalism since it has to do with Nibbāna:
Otherwise why are we asked to give up every notion of me and mine regarding Nibbāna in MN 1?
And Viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ anantaṁ sabbato pabhaṁ ”Consciousness where nothing appears, infinite, luminous all-round” - outside ’the all’, does not sound that different from this in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma:
The seventh liberation is transcending all aspects of neither perception nor non-perception and abiding in a state beyond thought and non-thought.
The eighth liberation is transcending all aspects of thought and non-thought, illuminating all worlds equally, and remaining motionless.
- Who knows, maybe this element of illuminating ALL worlds equally while remaining motionless, where nothing appears, infinite, luminous all-round is something a putthujhana would actually delight in, as mentioned in MN1? Even buddhist disciples in higher training?
the undefiled …the truth …the far shore …the subtle …the very hard to see …the freedom from old age …the constant …the not falling apart …that in which nothing appears …the unproliferated …the peaceful …the freedom from death …the sublime …the state of grace …the sanctuary …the ending of craving …the incredible …the amazing …the untroubled …the not liable to trouble …extinguishment …the unafflicted …dispassion …purity …freedom …not clinging …the island …the protection …the shelter …the refuge …
Hi Soren,
Apologies. There was no intention to go in circles and we’ll respectfully disengage from this topic. 
BTW, my last post wasn’t about the cessation vs eternalism debate. Rather it was in response to the post you offered that equated those who incline to understand final nibbāna as cessation of craving for non-existence.
All best
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Hi Bhante 
It was not my intention to accuse you of deliberately misrepresenting anyone’s views or arguments. I take this exchange as a good-faith discussion. The definition of the fallacy I posted, and had in mind, doesn’t include intentional misrepresentation. I’m sorry if my comment made the wrong impression!
I will mark that in my previous comment.
Such conversation helps me to see my and other assumptions and ways of thinking. So for that, thank you!
But what “does not fit the assumption that Nirvana is a mere nothingness”? It is not that The Teacher doesn’t mention there is no self, instead it is the limits of language.
But that (cesationism -added by @pyjter) is also not beyond the reach of language, as the teachings on the characteristic of not self, found among the early discourses, show. Thus, the reply to Upasīva does not fit the assumption that Nirvana is a mere nothingness but much rather conveys an utter transcendence that is completely beyond the reach of language and measurements.
Yes, “the same reasoning would also be relevant”, but I don’t see it as the same argument (see above). Again, his argumentation is cumulative.
In the case of the analysis of MN22, I agree with you. Ven Analāyo comes closer to an argument from “a lack of contrary evidence” (Wikipedia). But I would not agree with you that, in that case, it is a fallacy.
We are discussing what Buddha says, so it is important what he says. It’s also significant what he doesn’t say. Otherwise, anything can pass as his teaching.
If he doesn’t say something, what does it mean? Is it true, false „unknowable, only knowable in the future, or neither completely true nor completely false"? (Wikipedia)
I would say, that for a text interpretation, the argument “that something is false because it isn’t said to be true” is not always true, but has very heavy weight. What is explicit is more significant.
It looks like your definition of reification is too broad; in your case, it includes all that is “something more than just a nothing.” But usually reification means “The treatment of a relatively abstract signified (e.g. technology, mind, or self) as if it were a single, bounded, undifferentiated, fixed, and unchanging thing, the essential nature of which could be taken for granted”.
Additionally, the word “something” can indicate not only reified things but abstract numbers, not existing unicorns, and logically impossible things like a round square.
In Analāyo case, nibbana as “something more than just a nothing” doesn’t reify it.
Yes! To avoid reification.
I agree with that, but is it only possible interpretation?
If you allow, I will not respond to argument from “emotional response” because I’m not going to engage in psychoanalysis of anyone. It is an uncertain thing if they don’t disclose their emotions.
To the language!
He also argues that for Buddha to express the cessationist position is not beyond language or logic “… as the teachings on the characteristic of not self, found among the early discourses, show”.
There is nothing beyond language and logic in cessation. Ask any materialist or physicalist, they are also cessationists. Why? Because language is made for that, it is in the realm of common experience. This is why I wouldn’t call language subjective because if it is private, it can’t serve as a means of communication. It’s intersubjective. As I wrote before, it is a social construct and the usefulness of it outside the social dimension is limited.
There is no problem as long as we know that language is not a prefect tool and never mistake the proverbial finger for the moon.
That’s a good argument! I imagine that Ven Analāyo would argue that the imagery of Nibbana found in suttas implies that. Like this:
Nirvana is an island, yet that island is having nothing and taking up nothing. There is that where there is no birth, although to reify it as an unborn would be going too far. Light and darkness are both absent, all five aggregates cease, including consciousness, yet the destiny of those who have attained that much is beyond being designated.
I doubt that this is the Ven Analāyo position. He doesn’t argue that anything individual exists. “all five aggregates cease, including consciousness, yet the destiny of those who have attained that much is beyond being designated.”
He simply disagrees that nibbana is “a kind of death followed by mere nothingness”.
For those with a substantial view of the aggregates as dukkha incarnate that only ends with death I wonder what you make of this sutta:
“In that case, Bāhiya, you should train like this: ‘In the seen will be merely the seen; in the heard will be merely the heard; in the thought will be merely the thought; in the known will be merely the known.’ That’s how you should train. When you have trained in this way, you won’t be ‘by that’. When you’re not ‘by that’, you won’t be ‘in that’. When you’re not ‘in that’, you won’t be in this world or the world beyond or between the two. Just this is the end of suffering.”
Ud 1.10
Here the Teacher is referencing the end of suffering while the six sense contacts remain intact. How? By not taking up and identifying a self “in that” or “by that.” Not being “in that” or “by that” the Teacher says, “you won’t be.” How is it possible for suffering to have ended with the six sense contacts intact if dukkha incarnate only ends with death of a physical body?