Came across some talks of his, really enjoyed them but is it true he taught a no rebirth teaching?
Yes. But donāt let that put you off. 
If I remember some of his teachings, he concentrates on what is arising right now and cutting the link between what is happening right now and the craving that arises. In doing so, he rejects (traditional) rebirth, but you donāt have to. The principal of staying right here, right now with contentment is a pretty useful skill and leads in a useful direction imo.
Again, if I remember correctly, he talks about rebirth (in dependant origination) as the birth of an ego based on greed, hate and delusion in any moment (rather than physical birth that we normally associate with the term - see sn12.2). This way there is rebirth many hundreds of times a day in his understanding of the term.
3 Likes
Buddhadasa doesnāt deny rebirth, but he also doesnāt accept it either. Thereās interviews where he explicitly states that he doesnāt deny it, and that there could be rebirth. In short, his view of physical rebirth is agnostic.
However, his teaching proposes that belief in rebirth is not required, because of the way he interprets the core teaching of Dependent Origination.
Traditional Theravada interprets Dependent Origination as occuring over 3 lives, called the 3 life model. Buddhadasaās interpretation is mental aka ego rebirth, which arises and ceases instanteously when the conditions are right.
There are many interpretations of Dependent Origination, for example another early buddhist monk Ven. Dhammavuddho has his own interpretation which includes physical rebirth. Ven Nanavira and other monks like Bodhesako have a more existentialist interpretation of Dependent Origination.
There are several suttas that show that dependent orgination doesnāt require belief in rebirth. For example, the dhamma is visible here and now, not āthere and laterā as in suffering arising in future lives per 3-life-model.
Here and now is defined as seeing the 3 poisons manifesting within oneself here and now as per AN 6.47.
The suttas do talk about supernatural elements like devas and rebirth, but itās quite clear that the teaching of the dhamma does not require belief in those elements. When the Buddha tells monks to reflect on devas, itās to reflect on their good behaviour, which means someone with Supermundane view sees conditonal processes and actions, not beings whether human or supernatural.
We know the supernatural belief isnāt required because the Buddha tells the Kalamas to only go by what they know for themselves, he then tells the Kalamas that the 3 poisons are knowable for oneself. Furthermore, out of the 6 Abhinnas (higher knowledges) only one is Supermundane, and therefore Ariyan, and is not supernatural because itās the destruction of the asavas. The other abhinnas are supernatural but not Supermundane so they have nothing to do with the path.
Sariputta, an Arahant, for example has no supernatural powers, and when he gets smacked on the head by Yakkhas he only feels a pain, but doesnāt seem to care that itās caused by a Yakkha, even when Anuruddha tells him.
2 Likes
Buddhadasaās long-time disciple Santikaro once had the same doubt:
I heard him say, sometimes w/ me translating for him, that thereās no rebirth; however, his meaning was that thereās no rebirth of a being or atta . In private conversation when I tried, somewhat rigidly and dogmatically, to pin him down about what happens at death, he responded that it depends on idappaccayata . Of course, to assume that there was an atta or somebody to end at death is also refuted by the Buddha. In this, where is the Middle Way?
Can you clarify what you mean by a āmore existentialist interpretationā of DO?
Those relevant translated passages of the suttas generally say there are ābeingsā (āsattaā) subject to ārebirthā.
When my mind had become immersed in samÄdhi like thisāpurified, bright, flawless, rid of corruptions, pliable, workable, steady, and imperturbableāI extended it toward knowledge of the death and rebirth of sentient beings.
So evaį¹ samÄhite citte parisuddhe pariyodÄte anaį¹ gaį¹e vigatÅ«pakkilese mudubhÅ«te kammaniye į¹hite ÄneƱjappatte sattÄnaį¹ cutÅ«papÄtaƱÄį¹Äya cittaį¹ abhininnÄmesiį¹.
With clairvoyance that is purified and superhuman, I saw sentient beings passing away and being rebornāinferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, in a good place or a bad place. I understood how sentient beings are reborn according to their deeds: āThese dear beings did bad things by way of body, speech, and mind. They spoke ill of the noble ones; they had wrong view; and they chose to act out of that wrong view. When their body breaks up, after death, theyāre reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. These dear beings, however, did good things by way of body, speech, and mind. They never spoke ill of the noble ones; they had right view; and they chose to act out of that right view. When their body breaks up, after death, theyāre reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm.ā And so, with clairvoyance that is purified and superhuman, I saw sentient beings passing away and being rebornāinferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, in a good place or a bad place. I understood how sentient beings are reborn according to their deeds.
So dibbena cakkhunÄ visuddhena atikkantamÄnusakena satte passÄmi cavamÄne upapajjamÄne hÄ«ne paį¹Ä«te suvaį¹į¹e dubbaį¹į¹e sugate duggate yathÄkammÅ«page satte pajÄnÄmi: āime vata bhonto sattÄ kÄyaduccaritena samannÄgatÄ vacÄ«duccaritena samannÄgatÄ manoduccaritena samannÄgatÄ ariyÄnaį¹ upavÄdakÄ micchÄdiį¹į¹hikÄ micchÄdiį¹į¹hikammasamÄdÄnÄ; te kÄyassa bhedÄ paraį¹ maraį¹Ä apÄyaį¹ duggatiį¹ vinipÄtaį¹ nirayaį¹ upapannÄ. Ime vÄ pana bhonto sattÄ kÄyasucaritena samannÄgatÄ vacÄ«sucaritena samannÄgatÄ manosucaritena samannÄgatÄ ariyÄnaį¹ anupavÄdakÄ sammÄdiį¹į¹hikÄ sammÄdiį¹į¹hikammasamÄdÄnÄ; te kÄyassa bhedÄ paraį¹ maraį¹Ä sugatiį¹ saggaį¹ lokaį¹ upapannÄāti. Iti dibbena cakkhunÄ visuddhena atikkantamÄnusakena satte passÄmi cavamÄne upapajjamÄne hÄ«ne paį¹Ä«te suvaį¹į¹e dubbaį¹į¹e sugate duggate yathÄkammÅ«page satte pajÄnÄmi.
MN 4
Honestly, itās complex, Nanavira is a fan of Kierkegaard and takes Kierkegaardās existentialism to a new level.
If you want to understand it youāre better off reading Ven. Ninoslav Nanamoliās or Ven Bodehsakoās work first because they water it down, and they both follow Nanavira.
Hereās two articles that summarizes it,
Following the teachings of the Buddha, Nanavira asserts that, through the continued practice of this approach to their experiences, the person will begin to appreciate one of the cornerstones of the Buddhaās Teaching ā the notion of Dependent Arising. Contrary to the long-standing traditional explanation of Dependent Arising (Paticcasamuppada), this is not a thesis that asserts how actions (good or bad) in this life will lead to consequences in the next life. Rather it is a structural principle at the core of the life that each of us is creating (and living) at every moment. Dependent Arising is confirmed with absolute certainty in direct reflexion ā one sees how all aspects of our experience and understanding are connected with all other aspects, and of how each of these depends upon and is influenced by the others. This throws light on core teachings of the Buddha ā especially on concepts such as āintentionsā (cetana),ā determinationsā (sankhara) and āactionā (kamma). (Once again, the reader is referred to Notes on Dhamma if they want to get more information on what these concepts mean and of how Nanavira describes the process working).
Nanavira quotes the Buddha as saying that āHe who sees the Dhamma [the nature of things], sees dependent arisingā. Nanavira adds that āTo be determined and to be dependently arisen are one and the same thingā. As the person progresses in their practice, they will start to appreciate teachings that the Buddha gives about how all experience consists of the contact between consciousness ā which is a negative; and āname & matterā (nama-rupa) ā which is a positive. The former is simply the presence of a phenomenon of any kind in awareness; while the latter is the appearance and behaviour of the phenomenon in experience. Although this is only observed in reflexive practice, what the Buddha describes is actually occurring all the time ā that is, āname & matterā is constantly coming into contact with consciousness in the creation of the myriad experiences in our lives. With practice and guidance from the Buddha, the practitioner will notice that enmeshed in all these experiences is the sense of āIā, āmeā, āmineā etc. Nanavira describes how each of us thinks that things are āhappening to meā, and that āthese are my thoughts, feelings, and sensationsā etc.
- https://pathpress.org/introduction-to-nanavira-thera-and-his-approach-to-buddhist-practice/
- Appearance and Existence ā Path Press
You can also read Bodhesakoās articles āChangeā and āBeing and Cravingā
Your answer was not clear to me also. How did the Nanavira approach differ from the Buddhadasa approach? Thanks 
Buddhadasa doesnāt touch existentialist philosophy, whereas Nanaviraās method and teaching is full on existentialism.
Buddhadasaās teaching is very simple and straight forward, one just needs to have Mindfulness at the point of contact or around it to break the chain of dependent origination and preventing it from developing further. With time and practice, one gets better at this and eventually it becomes second nature.
Nanaviraās teaching is way more complex and not at all simple, itās hard to summarize thatās why I provided the links, but the gist of it is re-ordering how you value phenomena that you experience. Itās only through āreflexionā (Nanaviraās interpretation of sati-sampajanna) that a Puthujjana starts to realize his ordering of phenomena is incorrect and allows him to develop the right ordering of experiencing reality, thus resulting in Supermundane right view.
The details are explained here Appearance and Existence ā Path Press
Btw, Iām not saying either are correct/incorrect, just how I understand it.
I find it interesting how this approach, similar to Nanananda, mixes & matches DN 15 with SN 12.2, as though both suttas are saying the same. The Nanavira approach seems to be a DN 15 approach:
Itās been a long time since I read Nanananda, and donāt remember much. The past year Iāve been juggling materials between Buddhadasa (just started reading the newest book that recently came out āSeeing with the eye of the dhammaā), and Nanavirian buddhism that is taught by Hillside Hermitage (Ven Ninoslav Nanamoli).
If you want you can share your opinion of Nananandaās teachings or Hillside privately in DM as to not derail the thread. I am interested in your opinion.
1 Like
Well, he is identifying ābeingā with atta (self), and then Santikaro equates conditionality (idappaccayatÄ) with the āMiddle Wayā, all of which reminds me of later Buddhism, with special mention to NÄgÄrjuna.
1 Like
There are indeed two interpretations of Dependent Origination - the traditional three lifetimes approach and the minority one lifetime approach.
The one lifetime approach has support both in the EBT (in suttas which explain how experience arises) as well as in the commentary (no references available with me at the moment though).
The best explanation I have heard was given by Ajahn Amaro - the core principle of idapaccayata is a fractal principle, true at any scale.
Buddhadasa Bhikkhu has explained his stand in his book on Paticcasamuppada (pg 83 onwards), where he clearly says that earlier he used to teach 3 lifetimes approach but had decided that that was wrong and that henceforth he will teach it as a one lifetime approach.
3 Likes
On the YouTube channel it say Ven Santikaro literally translated his talks live in English. Not sure if it was during the actual talks or not but he does a wonderful and inspiring job.
1 Like
Hi Joel. It was during the actual talks. At times the talks went for 2.5 hours, even 3 hours, starting at 4.30am. Ajahn Buddhadasa was very old but (unlike today) he never even took a drink of water. He just sat for the whole time. The original live Thai-English talks can be found on the internet plus if you listen carefully to the English-only translations you can occasionally hear Ajahn Buddhadasa interjecting & also correcting Santikaroās live translation. For example, below is a Thai-English talk:
Or here with the monks from Wat Pa Nanachat: Stream Buddhadasa Bhikkhu Dhamma Talks | Listen to 'Wat Pah Nanachat' Talks playlist online for free on SoundCloud
Buddhadasa was very clear to distinguish idappaccayatÄ (conditionality) from paticcasamuppada (dependent origination), therefore Buddhadasa did not align with NÄgÄrjunaās generalisations. Buddhadasa was very clear & overt in explaining idappaccayatÄ is the fundamental broad principle that includes all examples of conditionality (cause & effect); while paticcasamuppada is a sub-category of idappaccayatÄ & only applies to the 12 conditions that result to the arising of suffering. For example, unlike NÄgÄrjuna, to Buddhadasa, the causes & conditions that result in the growth of a tree or flower are not paticcasamuppada. Buddhadasaās view correlates with the Commentary view about the Five Niyama, namely, Utu Niyama, Bija Niyama, Kamma Niyama, Citta Niyama and Dhamma Niyama. SN 12.20 is a sutta that includes both terms paticcasamuppada & idappaccayatÄ. Regards 
Now, idappaccayatÄ is, as mentioned, the law behind
all things, behind everything, but where it concerns people,
and especially when itās a matter of the dukkha of human
beings, we change the name and call it paį¹iccasamuppÄda,
or, to give its full title, idappaccayatÄ-paį¹iccasamuppÄdo. If
we just say āidappaccayatÄ,ā it applies to everything without
exception that either has or doesnāt have life, to everything
that is concocted, conditioned, but if weāre only concerned
with people, and particularly with the arising and
quenching of their dukkha, then we change the title and call
it āpaį¹iccasamuppÄda.ā The Buddha often used the longer
version, but we wonāt, weāll stick with paį¹iccasamuppÄda.So, we know that idappaccayatÄ is the general Law
of Nature, covering everything that happens, while
paį¹iccasamuppÄda is the Law of Nature where it concerns
humans and their dukkha.The essential import of paį¹iccasamuppÄda is: in
dependence on this, this arises, thus ādependent arising,ā
or ādependent co-arisingā; paį¹iccasamuppÄda means
ādependent co-arising,ā or ādependent co-origination.ā
Paį¹icca means ādependent,ā samuppÄda means āarisingā
or āorigination,ā thus ādependent arisingā or ādependent
co-arising.ā IdappaccayatÄ means because this is a
condition, this arises. Paį¹iccasamuppÄda means in
dependence on this, this arises. The meaning is much the
same, but thereās a difference in the breadth of meaning.Page 10 Idappaccayata: The Buddhist Law of Nature by Buddhadasa Bhikkhu - Suan Mokkh
5 Likes
Iām no expert on NÄgÄrjuna; my sense is that Buddhadasaās concept of idappaccayatÄ may be closer to NÄgÄrjunaās (MMK) pratÄ«tyasamutpÄda than both are to the (many versions of) paį¹iccasamuppÄda found in the EBTs. I would not lose sight of Buddhadasaās Mahayanic readings; after all, he reputedly was the first person to make Huineng and portions of the Laį¹ kÄvatÄra widely available in Thailand, translated from the English.
Buddhadasa uses idappaccayatÄ as an argument against rebirth, framing it as a āmiddle wayā between the extremes of a literal process of rebirth and a disordered cosmos. The pervasive impression, here and elsewhere, is that conditionality leads to conceptual aporias when applied to āliteralā rebirth and other traditional Buddhist tenets. There is at least one common reading of NÄgÄrjuna that draws a similar conclusion.
Yes, this seems so. This said, it seems NÄgÄrjunaās view about the 12 conditions was the same as the Theravadva ārebirthā view and thus different to Buddhadasa.
True but, for me, they are a departure from the Pali Suttas and caused confusion. Buddhadasa often taught Non-Duality, which seems not an EBT teaching, for obvious reasons. Also, Buddhadasa seemed to express certain idiosyncratic ideas about different types of non-perceptual sense contact not found in the EBTs and probably influenced by ānon-conceptualityā Mahayana.
Your terminology above is too complex for me. Could you offer an example of where Buddhadasa expresses the above? Thank you
Mmmā¦ as I posted, my impression is NÄgÄrjuna literally believed in ārebirthā; particularly in his explanation of the 12 links/conditions. My impression is NÄgÄrjuna did not apply his linguistic MMK gymnastics to refuting ārebirthā.
As for Buddhadasa, yes, he taught due to idappaccayatÄ-paticcasamuppada there is no āsame thingā can be ārebornā. Buddhadasa taught there is ābirthā (ājatiā) but no āre-birthā (āre-jatiā).
plural noun: aporias
- an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument, or theory.
What I find āNagarjunicā about Buddhadasa is not the rebuttal of rebirth itself, but the strategy āconditionality trumps your belief in X or Yā.
Buddhadasa considers many traditional Buddhist teachings (including rebirth or even morality) as eternalistic, and his remedy for that distorted view is conditionality. What he usually says is that conditionality is a middle way between eternalism and annihilationism, but I wanted to stress that, for him, conditionality takes the distinctive form of a cosmic order, Law of Nature, etc.
To return to the OP: this cosmic causality leaves the door open for some form of post-mortem continuity (as Buddhadasa acknowledges in Santikaroās quote above): just not the physical rebirth of one and the same being. But do Theravadins claim that it is the same being that gets reborn?
What was quoted above, from the Buddhadasa book link, refers to āattachment to moralityā rather than mere morality. For example, one term from the Suttas that includes attachment to morality is āsÄ«labbata-parÄmÄsaā. Buddhadasaās view here that attachment to morality can be eternalism seems consistent with the suttas, such as MN 60 & MN 117; particularly MN 117 which says the right view that sides with merit (morality) partakes in upadhi (attachment; acquisitions).
Again, Buddhadasaās idea above seems consistent with the suttas, such as SN 12.17, SN 44.10 & Iti 49.
Again, the above seems from the suttas, namely, SN 12.20 & AN 3.136, where Bhikkhu Sujato has also used the translation āLaw of Natureā.
But it seems not. Whether there is rebirth after death or whether there is nothing after death, Buddhadasa merely said it will following idappaccayata. Buddhadasa did not ever say here he personally believes there is rebirth after death. The impression is Buddhadasa generally said what happens after death is being placed in a coffin; as follows:
A person is born physically only once. Having been born, one lives in the world until one dies and enters the coffin. Physical birth happens to each of us only once.
What Theravadins claim I guess is not particularly relevant. The Theravadin Doctrine seems to be largely based in Commentaries. What seems relevant to me is the Suttas seem to clearly say the same being is ārebornā. In summary, the doctrine of Buddhaghosa that ātwelve-fold empty dhammasā are reborn seems to have no basis in the Suttas. To me, it seems both Buddhaghosa & Buddhadasa taught in a manner inconsistent with the Suttas. The suttas say, for example:
Take some [certain] woman or man who kills living creatures. Theyāre violent, bloody-handed, a hardened killer, merciless to living beings. Because of undertaking such deeds, when their body breaks up, after death, theyāre reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell.
MN 135
To end, I am happy to critique Buddhadasa, as I have already done, criticizing his Mahayana teachings of Non-Duality & Non-Perceiving Sense Contact plus saying, similar to Buddhaghosa, his ideas about there is no ābeingā that is ārebornā seems inconsistent with the Suttas. The kamma teachings of the Suttas seem to consistently say it is the same ābeingā that is ārebornā. But I donāt wish to spend my time continuously replying to unsubstantiated conjecture & misrepresentations about Buddhadasa or anybody else. Thanks. 
It seems obvious Buddhadasa did not believe in rebirth therefore I think its best to not grasp at a vague & confused statement by his translator and suggest Buddhadasa believed otherwise. My impression is the translator was confused about the Middle-Way, possibly due to Buddhadasaās own unusual teachings, such as referring to ānihilismā (ānatthikaā) as the extreme of eternalism (sassata-diį¹į¹hi) instead of āannihilationismā (āucchedavÄdaā) and also choosing the word ānirattÄā that also seems irrelevant:
So we can see that one of these positions or teachings is to take the positive extreme, take the positive towards extreme. The other is to take the negative extreme, and then there is one which is in the middle which doesnāt go to either extreme. The positive extreme is to take existence and say that there is just complete thing exists, completely, fully. And this is called sassata-diį¹į¹hi often translated the ābelief or view of eternalism.ā And then the other extreme or be in the middle is thing that everybody is calling it āselfā or ego or āsoul.ā Thereās something there but itās not-self. This is the middle position. This is the correct understanding. Itās called sammÄ-diį¹į¹hi (right understanding or right view). And then the third is to take the negative extreme, take negativism to its extreme. This is called natthika-diį¹į¹hi or that nothing exists whatsoever, to say there is no existing, nothing existing anywhere at all. So thereās the positive extreme (sassata-diį¹į¹hi), the negative extreme (natthika-diį¹į¹hi), and then sammÄ-diį¹į¹hi (the right understanding) in the middle ā that things exist, there is existence but itās not-self, so not to go all the way into affirmation or all the way into denial.
And then the other extreme ā the one extreme is the teaching that thereās a āself,ā there really is a āselfā ā and the other extreme is nirattÄ which is thereās nothing at all, that the thing called the āselfā thereās nothing even there that can be mislabeled as a āself.ā
In summary, its obvious the Suttas report the Buddha taught something the translators translate as ārebirthā. If Buddhadasa never explained this clearly then his opinions about this would logically have no basis in the Suttas. 
It does refer to āmoralityā. Earlier in the book, Buddhadasa considers traditional Buddhist teachings on morality to assume eternalism, and considers dependent origination to be āthe complete opposite of moralityā (see pages 6-8).
It seems obvious Buddhadasa did not believe in rebirth therefore I think its best to not grasp at a vague & confused statement by his translator and suggest Buddhadasa believed otherwise.
I wonāt go into what Buddhadasa did or did not believe, but brought forth an impression from a longtime studentāperhaps the only one who confronted him over the issueāwho was a lot less certain. The import of the coffin passage (translated and edited by Santikaro) depends on what you take āa personā to mean.