Bless us with your sparkling love 💖 let us know any mistakes and typos

Sunyo · August 2, 2025, 6:50am

From previous feedback topic:

Hi Bhante, I hope it’s annoying because it happens in many places you have to edit, not because my comment itself is annoying!

Anyway, thanks again for your translations, Bhante. They are always very helpful. Here’s some more comments, whether you find them annoying or not. I collected them over time since my last comments, but I checked them against the latest public offline edition a few weeks ago before the rains. Sorry if some comments are still superfluous because of later edits. Also sorry if some are perhaps a bit pedantic.

Inconsistencies, which may be on purpose, but I mention them just in case:

DN2: “This body of mine is physical. It’s made up of the four primary elements”. Versus MN77: “This body of mine is formed. It’s made up of the four principal states”. Versus SN55.21: “Their body consists of form, made up of the four principal states”. (There will be other instances than these suttas.)
Thag2.38/Thag16.9: “sensual titillation” for kāmaguṇa instead of “sensual stimulation” elsewhere (consider also “five sense stimuli”?)
MN26: “a sensible person can soon realize their own tradition with their own insight” and “I realize this teaching with my own insight”.
Throughout: “Seeing a sight with the eyes” and “Seeing a sight with the eye” (plural versus singular “eye(s)”). Sometimes also “ears” is in plural but not “eye”, e.g. AN4.195. (Sorry, this may be one of those annoying comments!)

Translation suggestions:

SN22.96: taṃ bhikkhuṃ etadavoca, “said to the mendicants” → “said to the mendicant” (singular)
SN22.53–54: Rūpupayaṁ vā, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṁ tiṭṭhamānaṁ tiṭṭheyya, “As long as consciousness remains, it would remain involved with form.” I think the idea is the other way around: as long as consciousness remains involved with form, it will remain [in samsara]. I also think tiṭṭheyya does not refer back to rūpupayaṁ (i.e. “remains involved”), since the latter is a bahubbihi of viññāṇaṃ. So more literally the sentence is: “Existing consciousness which has an involvement with (or ‘attraction to’) form will remain.” I have: “Consciousness would continue to exist if it is attracted to form.” (Dropping the present participle which I think primarily just emphasizes tiṭṭheyya; compare cittaṃ bahulaṃ gacchamānaṃ gaccheyya of SN35.117.)
SN35.235 also has viññāṇaṁ tiṭṭhamānaṁ tiṭṭheyya, but the idea of “consciousness continues/remains” seems lost in translation. See my translation here.
SN22.85: So rūpaṃ na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhāti: 'attā me’ti. “Not being attracted to form, they don’t grasp it, and commit to the thought, ‘my self’.” This reads like they do commit to the thought ‘my self’. → “don’t commit”. Also, consider whether all three verbs refer to attā me, just like you take it in the similar phrase of SN12.15. → Something like: “They are not attracted to, don’t grasp, and don’t commit to the thought that form is ‘my self’.” (Note: here you also translate upeti as ‘attracted’, like I did in a previous comment.)
SN22.94: lokadhamma, “temporal phenomenon”. I assume this is based on the commentary’s unetymological interpretation of lokadhamma as lujjanasabhāvattā. But I don’t think this is right. The word elsewhere refers to worldly things, as in AN8.5.
SN45.7: “Mendicant, the removal of greed, hate, and delusion is a term for the element of extinguishment.” Nibbānadhātuyā kho etaṁ, bhikkhu, adhivacanaṁ: ‘rāgavinayo dosavinayo mohavinayo’ti. Since there are specifically two nibbāna-dhātus (Iti44) I think what is meant is → “an ‘element’ (or ‘stage’) of extinguishment”.
AN9.35: “When a mendicant enters and emerges from all these (taṃ tadeva) attainments”. Since the statement on the pliable mind usually occurs after the fourth jhana instead of saññavedayitanirodha, I think this means any of these attainments, not “all”, which implies you have to attain all the nine preceding states, including saññavedayitanirodha. Compare also MN32: “Suppose that a ruler or their minister had a chest full of garments of different colors. In the morning, they’d don whatever (taṃ tadeva) pair of garments they wanted. […] In the same way, a mendicant masters their mind and is not mastered by it. In the morning, they abide in whatever meditation or attainment they want.” This doesn’t mean they abide in all these attainments, just like the ruler doesn’t wear all clothes at once. → “When a mendicant enters and emerges from any of these attainments”
Iti49: Bhavārāmā, bhikkhave, devamanussā bhavaratā bhavasammuditā, tesaṃ bhavanirodhāya, “Because of love, delight, and enjoyment of existence, when the Dhamma is being taught for the cessation of existence, the minds of some gods and humans …” Consider the similar AN4.128, where there clearly is no such ablative of cause but two separate sentences. → “Gods and humans love, delight in, and enjoy existence. When the Dhamma is being taught …”
Ud3.10: Tassa nibbutassa bhikkhuno, Anupādā punabbhavo na hoti, “There is no further existence for that mendicant extinguished without grasping.” Anupādā could be a contracted dative (“for”), but it seems to me it functions as an ablative of cause, semantically meaning the same as anupādāya in standard anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucciṁsu. → “Because they don’t grasp, there is no further existence for that extinguished mendicant.” A solution sort of covering both options could be: “Without grasping, there is no further …”
Ud3.10: puthū avijjāya paretā bhūtā, “Mired in all sorts of ignorance, beings …” Perhaps puthū, either an adjective or indeclinable, describes paretā, not avijāya. → “Mired in various ways by ignorance, beings …” The sutta describes how beings can be stuck in eternalism or annihilationism through a similar ignorance of a sense of self. I also think I haven’t encountered the idea of multiple types (“all sorts of”) of ignorance elsewhere.
Ud6.8: “Those who realize these things, who were not found there, who did not conceive by that, there is no cycle of rebirths to be found.” Sentence seems ungrammatical. → “For those …” (tesaṃ)
Ud8.1 & SN35.117: āyatana as ‘dimension’. Many people use this to argue that nibbāna is some ontologically existent thing. I know we can see this as an idiomatic use of ‘dimension’, but consider something more abstract like the Critical Pali Dictionary’s gloss ‘case’ (or perhaps CPD’s and PEDs ‘occasion’). → “There is, mendicants, a case when where there is no earth …” and “you should understand the case when the eye ceases”. The commentary glosses kāraṇa, which usually means ‘cause’ but can also mean ‘case/instance’ and ‘matter’ according to Digital Pali Dictionary and Cone, respectively. See also here.
Ud8.10: Paññāpetuṁ gati natthi, “their destiny cannot be found”. This sounds like there is a destination, but it just cannot be found. But natthi applies to nominative gati, not to the infinitive paññāpetuṃ, which also doesn’t mean ‘to be found’ but ‘to declare’ → “there is no destination to declare”, meaning there is no destination at all.
SN1.20, Iti63 and maybe some others: akkheyya, “the communicable”. Not exactly sure what you mean by this. The commentary takes akkheyya to refer to the aggregates, but that seems wrong to me. Literally akkheyya ofc. means ‘can be spoken’ but such particles are often used as nouns. I suggest it means ‘words’ or ‘expressions’, which are actually the only things that truly can be spoken. Compare Snp4.6, where akkheyya refers to a person’s name (i.e. an expression), not to the person themselves: Diṭṭhāpi sutāpi te janā, Yesaṃ nāmamidaṃ pavuccati; Nāmaṃyeva avasissati, Akkheyyaṃ petassa jantuno. “You used to see and hear those folk, and call them by their name. Yet the name is all that’s left to tell of a person when they’re gone.”
(To aid understanding, in these verses I also translate akkheyyasaññino as ‘misperceive expressions’, since here saññā has the sense of a distorted perception.)
Iti63: Saṅkhāyasevī, “makes use after reflection”. I fail to see what “reflection” is based on. → “makes use of labels/names/designations”. The idea I believe is that they make use of conventional words like “I” but in reality no such thing can be identified/reckoned.
Snp4.15 and Thag16.1: Mamattaṁ so asaṁvindaṁ, “not finding anything to be ‘mine’”. What isn’t “found” seems to be the mamattaṃ itself, being the acc. object of nom. asaṃvindaṃ. → “In whom no ownership is found.”
Thag16.1: Na me hoti ‘ahosin’ti, ‘bhavissan’ti na hoti me. “It doesn’t occur to me, ‘I existed in the past’; nor, ‘I will exist in the future’.” This suggestion might require a longer explanation, but in short, the whole discourse is about Adhimutta’s attitude towards his imminent death. Knowing there is no self, the first reflection probably means that it doesn’t occur to him that “I existed [before death but not after]”. This reflects the view of annihilationism, whereas “I will exist” is of course eternalism. If so, the idea is something like: → “It doesn’t occur to me, ‘I will have existed [before death]’; nor, ‘I will still exist [after]’.” This uses the aorist ahosiṃ as a future perfect, but according to Magadhabhasa p.96 the aorist can for metrical reasons be used to indicate a future. On the latter point, see also Norman’s Elders’ Verses I p141 n78.
Likewise, in the same Thag16.1, ‘natthi me’ti na socati, “you won’t grieve, thinking ‘I don’t have it’.” Here I take atthi as a future, again referring to Adhimutta’s death. → “you won’t grieve, thinking ‘I won’t have anything’.” Compare maraṇasmiṃ na socati earlier in the discourse.
Kāya as ‘body’ in the jhāna similes. I’ve long disagreed with this translation, but only point it out now I’ve studied it further. As you point out in History of Mindfulness, kāya refers to the being or its experience more generally. I recently noticed that translations of DA20 by both BDK and Patton translate the equivalent 身 (which like kāya can mean both ‘body’ and ‘person’) as “being” or “himself”. The sūtra also clarifies that this is what is meant when it describes all the four jhanas as personal attainments in this life (lit. “present body”, 現身.) Patton translates: “A monk thus enters the third dhyāna. Free of joy and abiding in happiness, they soak themselves with it. No part of them isn’t covered by it. This is the third direct attainment of personal happiness.” I’d follow this example in some way in the Pali too, avoiding ‘body’, which just isn’t felt in jhanas and also makes one miss the entire point of the similes, like that of the lake which is not filled by rain or water from the four directions (i.e. pitisukha from the five senses) but only from within (the mind). See my translation and further footnote on the matter at AN 5.28. Five-factored Unification. (Also this post on 身: https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/on-sakkaya-identity-and-substantial-reality/31048/116.)
MN38: “Haven’t I said in many ways that consciousness is dependently originated, since consciousness does not arise without a cause?” anekapariyāyena paṭiccasamuppannaṁ viññāṇaṁ vuttaṁ, aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavoti. “Since” is not in the Pali, so there isn’t such a causal connection. The Buddha quotes himself in direct speech, but in indirect speech we’d have → “Haven’t I said in many ways that consciousness is dependently originated, that consciousness does not arise without a cause?” (Occurs multiple times in same sutta.)

On footnotes:

DN2: “To “establish mindfulness” (satiṁ upaṭṭhapetvā) is literally to “do satipaṭṭhāna”.” This general idea has been useful to my understanding of this phrase, but this does not seem a very good use of the word ‘literally’. Literally it actually is establish, but figuratively this means “to do”.
DN15: On “name and form are conditions for contact” you note, “Nowhere else is this condition expressed in this way”. But it’s also mentioned in passing in Snp4.11. Not anywhere else, though, afaik.
(Bit more technical one.) At MN 137: “That “dimension” (āyatana) is Nibbana (Ud 8.1:3.1, SN 35.117:8.2).” The quoted thought of longing an āyatana is in the singular (I think because the person only desires one āyatana at a time), but it concerns multiple liberations (vimokkhesu). This seems to me to refer to states of samādhi, called āyatanas e.g. in AN9.43. In MN44 the same longing indeed occurs in the middle of an exposition of the jhanas, placed where we usually find the second and third. Consider also the closeness (in position and words) of paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati to tadāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharissāmi. Also, the liberations are described as something noble ones (and apparently all noble ones!) “currently dwell in”, yet the āyatana of Ud8.1 and SN35.117 refers to parinibbāna, which all noble ones don’t dwell in, let alone currently. Perhaps the nibbāna of the defilements (which arguably some noble ones “dwell in”) is implied alongside states of samādhi in the āyatanas, but that seems unlikely to me.