Buddhism and anarchism: surprising convergences

Perhaps we just don’t understand each other position, assuming arrogantly that I understand my own position :grinning:

There is certain authority - Vinaya - which has to be obeyed. But in Catholic church they have also some kind of dogma, and it is precisely the reason that more conservative Catholics stoped to recognise the presen Pope, as the Pope.

So decentralisation in Dhamma works on lower level, but on higher level Dhamma is based not on values which can be described as libertarian anarchy but rather it is based on authority and is hierarchical. Hierarchical order isn’t very compatible with anarchy, or so it seems to me.

It was apparently Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation, but the website automatically links to Bhikkhu Sujato. SC search being broken, Google sometimes gives links to BB editions. There’s the big conspiracy. :slight_smile:

Cheers.

Just to be clear. You pasted from SC? Meaning: it was Bodhi’s translation at the time you copied it from SC, but by the time I got to SC, it was back to Sujato’s translation? (I’ve consulted Bodhi’s translation and notes and gained some insights but am undecided on sharing them till I get a better grasp of their relevance for our exchange and its connection to the OP).

This is the first I’ve heard of any conspiracy, let alone a big one. What do you mean?

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Nevertheless, the first and fourth truths are qualified by, depending on the rendering, “is to be” (Bodhi) or “should be” (Sujato) for all Four Truths (the Pāli in SN 56.29 is the optative form), implying that both the First and Fourth Truths fall on the side of the fact (is) rather than the value (must-be) side of the dichotomy. However, they also align with Leibniz’ absolute truths, rather than his factual truths. So, all Four Truths are, if I may coin a term, factual absolutes. (The questions, though, remain: [1] Does this qualify them as a Kantian synthetic a priori? [2] Is the categorical imperative even relevant? I intuit that the answer to both is yes, but will have to contemplate further to get my thoughts into written form.)

So the distinction you and @Alain maintain cannot be upheld. If you are still sceptical, consider that @Alain brought up the fact/value dichotomy to weaken the argument of @Dhammanando that Hobbesian/Darwinian state of nature does not preclude Kropotkin’s argument of mutual aid and solidarity. However, both Hobbes’ and Kropotin’s views are a part of saṃsāra and therefore subject to the absolutely factual ramifications of all the Noble Truths.

This reader suspects that is only some humour added to the mix.

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Please try and be aware that not everyone, certainly not me, can or do understand what all of that means. You may want to explain each term you use, how and why you want to connect it to Kant and Leibnitz etc. (probably in a separate thread). Please don’t assume everyone knows or understands technical philosophical language.
:pray:t5:

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I mean, you could say they’re both “fact” and “value”. Depending on your perspective, I guess: They both suggest a principle to be understood, and an action to take. For example, Fourth Noble Truth could be expanded to describe: “Go sit beneath a tree and meditate”. Would you consider such a straightforward directive as “Fact”?

But I suppose you’re digging deeper into these words beyond their superficial everyday usage and into Hume’s Is-Ought distinction, in which case please do carry on:

For first question, I’d say: Perhaps, but there’s a key difference. Kantian a priori knowledge is universal and independent of experience, one achieves it by reason alone. While the Four Truths are (supposed to be) experientially verifiable and beyond the scope of logic (atakkāvacaro). Would this not align more with a pragmatist epistemology (like Peirce or James) than with Kant’s transcendental idealism?

As for the categorical imperative, it operates on a deontological basis (that is, one should uphold them regardless of their consequences), whereas the Buddhist path is consequentialist in the sense that it leads to cessation of suffering - one acts with sīla not regardess of its consequences, but because it leads directly to less suffering.

I think my previous point answers this question, but just to iterate - it’s not the categorical imperative that dictates the value of mutual aid and solidarity, but the assumption that such behaviours will inevitably lead the practitioner to less suffering and more joy.

Now, whether you agree that they do (bring joy and reduce suffering), is a different matter of course. :slight_smile: But I believe Buddha keeps saying “These actions are for your benefit” and never once “Do this even if it makes you unhappy”.

But perhaps your point is that because of this, all of Buddhadhamma is a statement of fact (and not a statement of value), since it doesn’t have a deontological basis. Is this what you’re trying to highlight?

In lay terms - Buddhadhamma describes what actions lead to what consequences. If someone is interested in reducing suffering and increasing joy, such and such actions should be taken. But this should is different from Hume’s critique of “Ought”, since he criticizes moral systems with a distinction of vice/virtue not founded on relations of objects or perceived by reason.

Would Hume have considered Buddhadhamma in his “Is” rather than “Ought”?

Sīla is entirely based on relations of objects. I would also say it’s perceived by reason, but again, we can’t disregard Buddha’s own words that Dhamma is beyond the scope of logic (atakkāvacaro).

So, either? Neither? I don’t know. Perhaps it depends on how you read into atakkāvacaro. :slight_smile:

I wouldn’t say Buddhadhamma is irrational - but reason alone is not enough, and this is how I read atakkāvacaro (In which case, it’s Hume’s “Is”). However, this word might be enough to annoy Hume I suspect!

Quite so. :sweat_smile:

I’ve tried to include explanations for some of the more arcane terms in my post, I hope it was clear. :pray:

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Thank you for the advice. I appreciate it and will do my best to follow suit.

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Greetings again @Dogen. The combination of the lack of response from @Alain and the advice in the in the intervention from @trusolo makes me think I should only respond to your reply, if I respond at all, as new topics. My initial insertion into this topic, like I said, was to give @Alain some notes on improving his convergence thesis. I chose to do so where he called the fact/value distinction fundamental to philosophy because from my perspective it was the sorest of all his sore thumbs. For now I will move on to some of the lesser sore thumbs. If you’d like to start a new topic using anything in your latest reply, I’ll join you there.

I would still like an explanation about what happened with your copy/paste job. If you have one. If you don’t, I’ll leave it at that.

Respectfully
~l

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Greetings (again) @Alain,

@trusolo has recently (above), advised that I not assume that everyone knows or understands technical philosophical language and to explain my terms when using such language. In that spirit, would you mind supplying us with explanations and/or meanings for:

  1. “Libertarian communism”
  2. “Libertarian municipalism”

I know you conjoined these with an"or", but it’s not clear to me whether or not you mean they’re synonymous or whether or not they’re similar but not quite the same thing.

Would you also provide an explanation/meaning for

  1. “Libertarian federalism”?

And please expand on:

  1. “Libertarian socialism” beyond your explanation/meaning of it as “a critique of capitalism…oppos[ed] to institutionalised greed [that] seeks to establish a mode of production and distribution based on need rather than accumulation… [and which] emphasises autonomy and decentralisation, rejecting externally imposed control.” In particular, how is it similar to and/or different from the first three libertarianisms you cite?

In point 1 of your OP, you characterize "the Buddhist monastic community (saṅgha) as “neither coercive nor hierarchical.” I agree that it’s not coercive, but it’s seniority structure is hierarchical, is it not?

Furthermore, as a moral-political philosophy, anarchism opposes the manifestations of force at a state or societal level, but the Buddha structured the saṅgha to be dependent on the members of society, did he not?

And while it is accurate to call the Buddhist critique of oppressive economic systems implicit (your point 2), the dependence of the saṅgha on society is quite explicit every time one of its members feeds a bhikkhu or donates land and building materials to the saṅgha, etc…

I’ll save my issues over points 3-5 and your conclusion for after your response.

Respectfully,
~l

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How do you square your insights with the Buddha’s view of an ideal system being Monarchy?