Buddhism at the beginning of the prose suttas

Essays
41

I agree with most of what you are saying re the Pali, it’s just the English side of the argument that irritates me. (not just your example, I mean Thanissaro, Bhante Sujato et all here also.)

In so far as the

I am not so sure. It seems to me that we start to get epigraphic evidence and even some “historical” evidence around 250bce.

It seems to me that we have a limit on the other side of approximately circa 500bce.

So we are looking at a period approximately between 500bce and 250bce, or about 250 years (which is a long time).

We have some pretty good evidence IMO, for poetry at around the beginning period in the material that is shared between the Jains, Early Upanishadic Texts and Buddhism, and after 250bce we have a growing body of evidence for what the literature of the Buddhists became.

So making a reasonable and systematic analysis of both the prose and the poetry that takes into account what poetry looked like before 500bce and what it looked like after 250bce seems like a reasonable exercise.

I assume this work is being done.

I am more or less wholly ignorant of it.

One day I will devour https://ancient-buddhist-texts.net/

And then I will feel more knowlegable.

But until then I will focus on the prose.

Where fixed technical vocabulary serves as a good analogy to fixed rhyme.

And allows a person of sufficient wit and dedication.

To uncover truths above thier station.

:stuck_out_tongue:

42

One can compare Pali and Chinese versions of EBTs, practically SN and SA:

The Samyutta Nikaya as the earliest of the EBTs - Discussion - Discuss & Discover (suttacentral.net)

43

Couldn’t agree more, but:

When looking eg. at the first book of SN, where the Suttas are arranged around verse that sometimes seem to have very little in common with the prose content, isn’t it reasonable to assume that these poems represent an older tradition that the Suttas were then entirely composed around? (Sorry, the language barrier is catching up with me here.)

44

That seems a perfectly reasonable thing to speculate about, but how could one know?

And how would knowing then affect our reading?
And how does not knowing affect our practice?

45

Speculation, yes, admittedly. But if we have

a) Historical scholarship showing that it is likely that the teaching of the historical Buddha and Sangha was very simple
b) Various doctrines that each by itself could very well have evolved from the theorized content of this teaching, as in a continouus scholastic elaboration
c) Textual criticism that suggests exactly this process of evolution,

then I believe that this hypothesis becomes more credible.

I guess it depends from where you start. There seem to be two kinds of people: Those who believe something because it is written, and those who believe what is written because they find it to be true. The second would probably not be affected at all.

But these are very valid questions, and why should I care for the teaching of the historical Buddha if I don’t believe that he was supernatural? Arguably to be right :sweat_smile:

46

So, having made a start on defining what i take to be the major technical tropes in the first post, that is the standard pieces of prose that aggregate around the terms abyākata and hoti na na hoti, nissaraṇa, and paṭipada and jhāna, let us now turn our attention to some of the standard terms in the suttas that are proposed as an alternative foundation to the canon, by the Sarvastivada Vinaya in the period of the early schools, and by the likes of Yin Shun, Choong Mun Keat, and our own @sujato today.

The first two suttas are suttas that themselves explicitly claim to be the earliest teachings of the Buddha; SN56.11 and SN22.59. To this we will add the seminal mediation sutta in SN, SN47.1, and examine how the technical doctrinal terms in these three suttas are distributed across the rest of the four principle prose collections.

There the Buddha addressed the group of five mendicants:
Tatra kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi:

“Mendicants, these two extremes should not be cultivated by one who has gone forth.
“Dveme, bhikkhave, antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā.

What two?
Katame dve?

Indulgence in sensual pleasures, which is low, crude, ordinary, ignoble, and pointless. And indulgence in self-mortification, which is painful, ignoble, and pointless.
Yo cāyaṁ kāmesu kāmasukhallikānuyogo hīno gammo pothujjaniko anariyo anatthasaṁhito, yo cāyaṁ attakilamathānuyogo dukkho anariyo anatthasaṁhito.

So first up, the Buddha says there are two things that are the problem, kāmasukhallikānuyogo and attakilamathānuyogo.

kāmasukhallikānuyogo occurs in the same story given more or less word for word as here in the Mahākhandhaka of the Vinaya, this is the only time it occurs in the Vinaya.

It occurs in DN28, a Sariputta sutta, it is not mentioned one single time in the long collection by the Buddha.

It does not occur in the middle or numerical collecitons.

Outside of 56.11 it occurs only once in SN, at SN42.12.

Moving on to attakilamathānuyogo we can add MN139 a vibhaṅgasutta that qoutes SN56.11
(the reason this sutta didn’t already show up is because it uses kāmasukhamanuyuñjeyya for sensual pleasures, a term occurring nowhere else in the entire canon.)

So the total teaching around the technical terms for the two fundamental errors the Buddha identifies in the entirety of the four principle prose collecitons are DN28 MN129 SN42.12 and SN56.11.

Let us continue;

Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One understood the middle way of practice, which gives vision and knowledge, and leads to peace, direct knowledge, awakening, and extinguishment.

Ete kho, bhikkhave, ubho ante anupagamma majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṁvattati.

The middle way of practice, which is the Buddhas solution for the two errors, is spoken of in the above and searching for the technical term majjhimā paṭipadā, allows us to add MN3 and AN3.157 to our list.

The List: SN56.11 SN42.12 DN28 MN3 MN139 AN3.157

Moving on.

And what is that middle way of practice?
Katamā ca sā, bhikkhave, majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṁvattati?

It is simply this noble eightfold path, that is:
Ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṁ—

right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right immersion.
sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṅkappo sammāvācā sammākammanto sammāājīvo sammāvāyāmo sammāsati sammāsamādhi.
This is that middle way of practice, which gives vision and knowledge, and leads to peace, direct knowledge, awakening, and extinguishment.
Ayaṁ kho sā, bhikkhave, majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṁvattati.

We will put aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo aside for a moment and move on;

Now this is the noble truth of suffering.
Idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhaṁ ariyasaccaṁ—

Rebirth is suffering; old age is suffering; illness is suffering; death is suffering; association with the disliked is suffering; separation from the liked is suffering; not getting what you wish for is suffering. In brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering.
jātipi dukkhā, jarāpi dukkhā, byādhipi dukkho, maraṇampi dukkhaṁ, appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi vippayogo dukkho, yampicchaṁ na labhati tampi dukkhaṁ—saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā.

Now this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering.
Idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhasamudayaṁ ariyasaccaṁ—

It’s the craving that leads to future lives, mixed up with relishing and greed, taking pleasure wherever it lands. That is,
yāyaṁ taṇhā ponobbhavikā nandirāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī, seyyathidaṁ—

craving for sensual pleasures, craving to continue existence, and craving to end existence.
kāmataṇhā, bhavataṇhā, vibhavataṇhā.

Now this is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering.
Idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhaṁ ariyasaccaṁ—

It’s the fading away and cessation of that very same craving with nothing left over; giving it away, letting it go, releasing it, and not clinging to it.
yo tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo.

Now this is the noble truth of the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering.
Idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṁ—

It is simply this noble eightfold path, that is:
ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṁ—

right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right immersion.
sammādiṭṭhi …pe… sammāsamādhi.

We will also put aside the ariyasaccaṁ for the moment and return to both it and the eightfold path later.

We will pass over the next bit to but reproduce:

As long as my true knowledge and vision about these four noble truths was not fully purified in these three rounds and twelve aspects, I didn’t announce my supreme perfect awakening in this world with its gods, Māras, and Divinities, this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its gods and humans.
Yāvakīvañca me, bhikkhave, imesu catūsu ariyasaccesu evaṁ tiparivaṭṭaṁ dvādasākāraṁ yathābhūtaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ na suvisuddhaṁ ahosi, neva tāvāhaṁ, bhikkhave, sadevake loke samārake sabrahmake sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya ‘anuttaraṁ sammāsambodhiṁ abhisambuddho’ti paccaññāsiṁ.

So the Buddha says that as long as they had not fully purified the four truths in the “three rounds and twelve aspects” they did not claim awakening. So let us turn to these technical terms:

tiparivaṭṭaṁ occurs nowhere else except this sutta and the identical prose part of the VInaya.
dvādasākāraṁ occurs nowhere else except this sutta and the identical prose part of the VInaya.

So to summarise:

The technical religious terms for the two extremes, and the middle way of practice, that is the fundamental teaching of SN56.11, occurs nowhere else in the prose collections except SN42.12 DN28 MN3 MN139 AN3.157, and nowhere by the Buddha in the entirety of the long collection. MN3 is also a Sariputta sutta so there is no teaching by the Buddha about the two extremes or the middle path of practice until MN139, a vibhaṅgasutta, or commentary sutta, presumably on SN56.11 itself, so aside form a commentary on the text in question MN says nothing at all about either the fundamental extremes or the middle way between them, as far as the technical language of SN56.11 is concerned. the sequence at AN3.157 variously identifies the middle path of practice as the four foundations of mindfulness, the four right strivings and the noble eightfold path, but says nothing about the term beyond that.

So apart from an uncommon term usually meaning the eightfold path, majjhimā paṭipadā barely occurs in the prose collections, and the few times it does all seem to derive directly from SN56.11.

After the fundamental teaching the second section of SN56.11 is a declaration of the four noble truths, followed by the claim that they are not truly understood until they are understood in “three rounds” and “twelve aspects”. these two technical religious terms occur nowhere else in the prose collections, and in fact nowhere else in the canon until the late Patis and Milinda.

Compare the phrases:

majjhimā paṭipadā: 13 occurrences in the four prose collections
dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā: 195? occurances in the four prose collections (with many more occuring hidden by “pe…” in the shortening of the trope at DN2 that is repeated at DN3, DN4, DN5, DN6, etc).

In short the idea that the rarely occurring majjhimā paṭipadā is a more fundamental or important term in the early prose than the vastly more common and frequently referred to dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā is absurd.

Next time we will examine the aggregates and anattā in SN22.59 before turning to satipaṭṭhānā in SN47.1 before returning to the eightfold path and finally the four noble truths, the last of which after all are already part of our “fundamental” trope at DN2 anyway.

Once the survey is complete we will hopefully make a systematic comparison between the majjhimā paṭipadā of anattā and satipaṭṭhānā and the āsavanirodhagāminī paṭipadā of abyākata and nissaraṇa and be able to make an informed assesment of which cluster of concepts, traked by thier technical religious terminology, is the more fundemental and likely earlier, in the four principle prose collections of the Pali Nikayas.

If we are not totally exhausted by then, some effort will be made to indicate the transitional cases by reference to divergences between the Pali and the Chinese.

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You may review their works on Early Buddhism, particularly Yin Shun.

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Moving to SN22.59

At one time the Buddha was staying near Varanasi, in the deer park at Isipatana.
Ekaṁ samayaṁ bhagavā bārāṇasiyaṁ viharati isipatane migadāye.

There the Buddha addressed the group of five mendicants:
Tatra kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi:

“Mendicants!”
“bhikkhavo”ti.

“Venerable sir,” they replied.
“Bhadante”ti te bhikkhū bhagavato paccassosuṁ.

The Buddha said this:
Bhagavā etadavoca:

“Mendicants, form is not-self.
“Rūpaṁ, bhikkhave, anattā.

So the teaching here is that form is anattā. anattā occurs nowhere in DN, the closest being anattasaññaṁ a perception listed, alongside usually six other perceptions at DN16, DN33 and DN34.

It occurs in MN first at MN2 as attānaṁ where the passage directly contradicts the idea that a person has no self:

When they apply the mind irrationally in this way, one of the following six views arises and is taken as the truth.
Tassa evaṁ ayoniso manasikaroto channaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati.

The view: ‘my self exists’ arises and is taken as the truth.
‘Atthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

The view: ‘my self does not exist.’ arises and is taken as the truth.
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

The view: ‘I perceive the self with the self.’ arises and is taken as the truth.
‘attanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

The view: ‘I perceive what is not-self with the self.’ arises and is taken as the truth.
‘attanāva anattānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

The view: ‘I perceive the self with what is not-self.’ arises and is taken as the truth.
‘anattanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

Or they have such a view:
atha vā panassa evaṁ diṭṭhi hoti:

‘This self of mine is he, the speaker, the knower who experiences the results of good and bad deeds in all the different realms. This self is permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable, and will last forever and ever.’
‘yo me ayaṁ attā vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ vipākaṁ paṭisaṁvedeti so kho pana me ayaṁ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassatī’ti.

This is called a misconception, the thicket of views, the desert of views, the twist of views, the dodge of views, the fetter of views.
Idaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, diṭṭhigataṁ diṭṭhigahanaṁ diṭṭhikantāraṁ diṭṭhivisūkaṁ diṭṭhivipphanditaṁ diṭṭhisaṁyojanaṁ.

The equivilent passage in the Chinese parallel at MA10 gives the same views for the first 5 views, but a different 6th view:

彼作如是不正思惟，於六見中隨其見生而生真有神，此見生而生真無神，此見生而生神見神，此見生而生神見非神，此見生而生非神見神，此見生而生此是神，能語、能知、能作、教、作起、教起，生彼彼處，受善惡報，定無所從來，定不有、定不當有，是謂見之弊，為見所動，見結所繫。凡夫愚人以是之故，便受生、老、病、死苦也。

" ‘The soul speaks, knows, acts, teaches, initiates actions, and initiates teachings. It’s born in one place or another and receives the results of good and bad [actions],’ ‘It certainly comes from nowhere … certainly doesn’t exist … certainly won’t exist.’ "

So the Pali gives the 6th view as “This self is permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable, and will last forever and ever.’” While the Chinese has this self "certainly comes from nowhere … certainly doesn’t exist … certainly won’t exist.’ "

(This is not relevant right now, but will become so when it comes time to integrate our understanding of anattā with our understanding of abyākata.)

The next time anattā occurs in the canon is MN35.

It is worth noting that this is one of those suttas where a person who isn’t the Buddha gives the teaching first, and then the Buddha, “deep in the woods” endorses what the person has said by repeating it word for word.

It is worth pausing to reflect on what possible reasons there could be for this occurance. Why, if this teaching is so fundamental, is it taught for the very first time in the canon in this form, using this technical language, by Assaji, and not by the Buddha.

If this is a teaching of the Buddha, and Assaji is correctly reporting it, why has it not been taught in these terms in the entirety of the long collection?

If this is a teaching of the Buddha, in these terms, why is it not given by the Buddha first?

What purpose is served, even in this sutta itself, in telling the Assaji part first? Why not just begin in the woods with the actual teacher?

Hopefully these provocations get you thinking.

The next thing that will hopefully get you thinking is that the Chinese parallels disagree with the Pali in this sutta.

SA110 gives:

佛告火種居士： 「我為諸弟子說諸所有色，若過去、若未來、若現在，若內、若外，若麁、若細，若好、若醜，若遠、若近，彼一切如實觀察非我、非異我、不相在。 受、想、行、識亦復如是。 彼學必見跡，不斷壞。 堪任成就，厭離知見，守甘露門。 雖非一切悉得究竟，且向涅槃。 如是弟子從我教法得離疑惑。」

Which @cdpatton translates as

The Buddha told Agnivaiśyāyana, “I teach my disciples that whatever forms there are, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, crude or fine, beautiful or ugly, or distant or near, all those forms are not self, not different than self, and neither is present in the other. Feeling, conception, volition, and awareness are likewise. Those trainees are sure to see the path and not destroy it. They’ll have the capacity to accomplish it, to know and see disillusionment, and to guard the entry to ambrosia. Although not all disciples attain their final end, they’ll still be headed toward nirvāṇa . Disciples become free of doubts when I teach the Dharma in this way.”

Note importantly that where the Pali simply has “anattā” as at:

“This is how I guide my disciples, and my instructions to disciples generally proceed on these topics:
“Evaṁ kho ahaṁ, aggivessana, sāvake vinemi, evaṁbhāgā ca pana me sāvakesu anusāsanī bahulā pavattati:

‘Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness are impermanent.
‘rūpaṁ, bhikkhave, aniccaṁ, vedanā aniccā, saññā aniccā, saṅkhārā aniccā, viññāṇaṁ aniccaṁ.

Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness are not-self.
Rūpaṁ, bhikkhave, anattā, vedanā anattā, saññā anattā, saṅkhārā anattā, viññāṇaṁ anattā.

All conditions are impermanent. All things are not-self.’
Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā anattā’ti.

This is how I guide my disciples, and how instruction to my disciples generally proceeds.”
Evaṁ kho ahaṁ, aggivessana, sāvake vinemi, evaṁbhāgā ca pana me sāvakesu anusāsanī bahulā pavattatī”ti.

The Chinese has 非我、非異我 “not self, not other than self”.

Again, this will be important in integrating our understanding of anattā with our understanding of abyākata.

*(無我 “non-self” in EA37.10:

色者無常，無常者即是 苦，苦者即是無我，無我者即是空也，空者彼 不我有，我非彼有。如是者智人之所學也。 痛、想、行、識無常，此五盛陰無常者即是苦，苦 者即是無我，無我者即是空，空者彼非我有， 我非彼有。卿欲知者，我師教誡其義如是， 與諸弟子說如是義。

“Form is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self is emptiness. What is empty does not possess self, and self does not possess it. This is the knowledge that wise people learn. Feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness are also impermanent. These five aggregates of clinging are impermanent, which means they are suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self is emptiness. What is empty does not possess self, and self does not possess it. If you wish to know, this is the teaching my teacher instructs, and it is by this teaching that he speaks to his disciples.”

So here we have some subtle differences again, with EA not including the “all form” trope, and also making explicit the connection from impermanence to suffering to to not-self .)

So to summarise our points about MN35; First, it is a teaching by Assaji, only later confirmed by the Buddha “deep in the dark woods”. Second the schools dispute which collection it belongs in, with the Sarvistavadans placing it in their Samyukta. Third the surviving parallels all give different teachings, with SA110 in particular claiming that forms are not self but neither are they other than self. Finally neither of the Chinese parallels contain the idea that sabbe dhammā anattā, both giving simply the aggregates.

anattā next occurs in MN at MN109, the Agama parallel for this is again in SA, not MA at SA58, and here again we have the difference:

MN:

“But sir, how does identity view come about?”
“Kathaṁ pana, bhante, sakkāyadiṭṭhi hotī”ti?

“It’s when an uneducated ordinary person has not seen the noble ones, and is neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the noble ones. They’ve not seen good persons, and are neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the good persons.
“Idha, bhikkhu, assutavā puthujjano ariyānaṁ adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinīto sappurisānaṁ adassāvī sappurisadhammassa akovido sappurisadhamme avinīto They regard form as self, self as having form, form in self, or self in form. rūpaṁ attato samanupassati rūpavantaṁ vā attānaṁ attani vā rūpaṁ rūpasmiṁ vā attānaṁ;

They regard form as self, self as having form, form in self, or self in form. r
ūpaṁ attato samanupassati rūpavantaṁ vā attānaṁ attani vā rūpaṁ rūpasmiṁ vā attānaṁ;
…
That’s how identity view comes about.”
Evaṁ kho, bhikkhu, sakkāyadiṭṭhi hotī”ti.

SA:

“云何生我慢？」”,
“How did conceit of self arise?”",

“佛告比丘：「愚癡無聞凡夫於色見我、異我、相在，於受、想、行、識見我、異我、相在，於此生我慢。」”,
"The Buddha told the monks, “Foolish, unheard worldlings see a self, what’s other than self, and what’s present in form, and they see a self, what’s other than self, and what’s present in feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness, which gives rise to conceit of self.”,

MN:

“So you should truly see any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’
“Tasmātiha, bhikkhave, yaṁ kiñci rūpaṁ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṁ ajjhattaṁ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṁ vā sukhumaṁ vā hīnaṁ vā paṇītaṁ vā yaṁ dūre santike vā sabbaṁ rūpaṁ: ‘netaṁ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā’ti evametaṁ yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṁ.

SA:

“佛告比丘：「諸所有色，若過去、若未來、若現在，若內、若外，若麤、若細，若好、若醜，若遠、若近，彼一切非我、不異我、不相在；受、想、行、識亦復如是。”
"The Buddha told the monks, “All forms that exist, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, beautiful or ugly, and distant or near are not self, not different than self, nor are either present in the other; likewise are feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness.”
[/quote]

Returning to the Anattalakkhaṇasutta, he next part of the sutta begins to explain why forms aren’t the self.

For if form were self, it wouldn’t lead to affliction. And you could compel form:
Rūpañca hidaṁ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṁ rūpaṁ ābādhāya saṁvatteyya, labbhetha ca rūpe:

‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’
‘evaṁ me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosī’ti.

But because form is not-self, it leads to affliction. And you can’t compel form:
Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, rūpaṁ anattā, tasmā rūpaṁ ābādhāya saṁvattati, na ca labbhati rūpe:

‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’
‘evaṁ me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosī’ti.

More to come

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Goodness gracious :wink:

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majjhimā paṭipadā: 13 occurrences in the four prose collection.

dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā: 195? occurances in the four prose collections

aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo: 161 occurances in the 4 collections.

D: 10 (from DN6)
M: 32 (from MN3)
S: 104 (from SN12.27)
A: 15 (from AN3.62)

so dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā:

D: 11 (from DN2)
M: 25 (from MN2)
S: 106 (from SN16.12)
A: 53 (from AN2.43)

So the dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā is more frequent, and starts earlier in every collection than the aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, except in the case of MN mentioning aṭṭhaṅgiko slightly more. (haven’t checked other spellings folks, hit me up with refrences to places I have missed)

so dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā: is never described as far as I can tell as “just this aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo” and therefore the more frequent term is likely the earlier.

aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo is a 16 word condensation of a text every ancient Buddhist would have already known, the dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā at DN2 etc.

A very near 3 thousand words description of the whole of the Buddhist Path in narrative detail.
And a very near 1 thousand word description of the sila in three parts

When we examine the short sila, even in it we can discern some features that may help dat it as early:

And how, great king, is a mendicant accomplished in ethics?
Kathañca, mahārāja, bhikkhu sīlasampanno hoti?
It’s when a mendicant gives up killing living creatures, renouncing the rod and the sword. They’re scrupulous and kind, living full of sympathy for all living beings.
Idha, mahārāja, bhikkhu pāṇātipātaṁ pahāya pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti. Nihitadaṇḍo nihitasattho lajjī dayāpanno sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī viharati.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They give up stealing. They take only what’s given, and expect only what’s given. They keep themselves clean by not thieving.
Adinnādānaṁ pahāya adinnādānā paṭivirato hoti dinnādāyī dinnapāṭikaṅkhī, athenena sucibhūtena attanā viharati.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They give up unchastity. They are celibate, set apart, avoiding the vulgar act of sex.
Abrahmacariyaṁ pahāya brahmacārī hoti ārācārī virato methunā gāmadhammā.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They give up lying. They speak the truth and stick to the truth. They’re honest and dependable, and don’t trick the world with their words.
Musāvādaṁ pahāya musāvādā paṭivirato hoti saccavādī saccasandho theto paccayiko avisaṁvādako lokassa.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They give up divisive speech. They don’t repeat in one place what they heard in another so as to divide people against each other. Instead, they reconcile those who are divided, supporting unity, delighting in harmony, loving harmony, speaking words that promote harmony.
Pisuṇaṁ vācaṁ pahāya pisuṇāya vācāya paṭivirato hoti; ito sutvā na amutra akkhātā imesaṁ bhedāya; amutra vā sutvā na imesaṁ akkhātā, amūsaṁ bhedāya. Iti bhinnānaṁ vā sandhātā, sahitānaṁ vā anuppadātā, samaggārāmo samaggarato samagganandī samaggakaraṇiṁ vācaṁ bhāsitā hoti.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They give up harsh speech. They speak in a way that’s mellow, pleasing to the ear, lovely, going to the heart, polite, likable and agreeable to the people.
Pharusaṁ vācaṁ pahāya pharusāya vācāya paṭivirato hoti; yā sā vācā nelā kaṇṇasukhā pemanīyā hadayaṅgamā porī bahujanakantā bahujanamanāpā tathārūpiṁ vācaṁ bhāsitā hoti.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They give up talking nonsense. Their words are timely, true, and meaningful, in line with the teaching and training. They say things at the right time which are valuable, reasonable, succinct, and beneficial.
Samphappalāpaṁ pahāya samphappalāpā paṭivirato hoti kālavādī bhūtavādī atthavādī dhammavādī vinayavādī, nidhānavatiṁ vācaṁ bhāsitā hoti kālena sāpadesaṁ pariyantavatiṁ atthasaṁhitaṁ.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

They refrain from injuring plants and seeds.
Bījagāmabhūtagāmasamārambhā paṭivirato hoti …pe…
They eat in one part of the day, abstaining from eating at night and food at the wrong time.
ekabhattiko hoti rattūparato virato vikālabhojanā.
They refrain from seeing shows of dancing, singing, and music .
Naccagītavāditavisūkadassanā paṭivirato hoti.
They refrain from beautifying and adorning themselves with garlands, fragrance, and makeup.
Mālāgandhavilepanadhāraṇamaṇḍanavibhūsanaṭṭhānā paṭivirato hoti.
They refrain from high and luxurious beds.
Uccāsayanamahāsayanā paṭivirato hoti.
They refrain from receiving gold and currency,
Jātarūparajatapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
raw grains,
Āmakadhaññapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
raw meat,
Āmakamaṁsapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
women and girls,
Itthikumārikapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
male and female bondservants,
Dāsidāsapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
goats and sheep,
Ajeḷakapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
chickens and pigs,
Kukkuṭasūkarapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
elephants, cows, horses, and mares,
Hatthigavassavaḷavapaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
and fields and land.
Khettavatthupaṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti.
They refrain from running errands and messages;
Dūteyyapahiṇagamanānuyogā paṭivirato hoti.
buying and selling;
Kayavikkayā paṭivirato hoti.
falsifying weights, metals, or measures;
Tulākūṭakaṁsakūṭamānakūṭā paṭivirato hoti.
bribery, fraud, cheating, and duplicity;
Ukkoṭanavañcananikatisāciyogā paṭivirato hoti.
mutilation, murder, abduction, banditry, plunder, and violence.
Chedanavadhabandhanaviparāmosaālopasahasākārā paṭivirato hoti.
This pertains to their ethics.
Idampissa hoti sīlasmiṁ.

So first off there’s no mention of such a thing as alcohol. That puts this text earlier than the pancasila of later books.

It starts as an oath of non-violence, non-stealing, non sexual-activity, and non lying.

These four are clearly the most fundamental the list then going into greater detail with regards to speech, which should not be divisive, critical, or nonsensical.

such a person is implied to have a sufficient character to receive the food of the faithful, and therefore is not practicing agriculture to feed themselves

They refrain from injuring plants and seeds.
Bījagāmabhūtagāmasamārambhā paṭivirato hoti …pe…

I think we can see evidence that the eat in one part of the day was an active controversy even in the times of the composition of M, so the list from that point on in the short is probably later, however the initial segment

All the monks who where only eating once a day but stillpopping of to the races or the dancing girls probably never got the point in the first place :slight_smile:

Nevertheless the entire 3 parts are all ignorant of alcohol and so the whole 3 sections are already very old.

more to come.

51

In DN2, “Seyyathāpi, mahārāja, puriso dāso assa anattādhīno parādhīno na yenakāmaṅgamo.”

52

anattādhīno means “not belonging to oneself” i.e a servant or slave. It has nothing at all to do with the anattā perception or the anattā doctrine.

the anattā doctrine, as I say, occurs nowhere in DN, the anattā perception occurs, beginning at DN16.

For more details, check out the thread

https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/whats-bound-to-be-another-wildly-popular-observation-around-here/

53

and just noodling about in the sources for the next installment it occurs to me that the first time we see the maggo equated with the patipada is at DN6:

“But, sir, is there a path and a practice for realizing these things?”
“Atthi pana, bhante, maggo atthi paṭipadā etesaṁ dhammānaṁ sacchikiriyāyā”ti?

“There is, Mahāli.”
“Atthi kho, mahāli, maggo atthi paṭipadā etesaṁ dhammānaṁ sacchikiriyāyā”ti.

“Well, what is it?”
“Katamo pana, bhante, maggo katamā paṭipadā etesaṁ dhammānaṁ sacchikiriyāyā”ti?

“It is simply this noble eightfold path, that is:
“Ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo.
right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right immersion.
Seyyathidaṁ—sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṅkappo sammāvācā sammākammanto sammāājīvo sammāvāyāmo sammāsati sammāsamādhi.
This is the path and the practice for realizing these things.
Ayaṁ kho, mahāli, maggo ayaṁ paṭipadā etesaṁ dhammānaṁ sacchikiriyāya.

This sutta is probably sectarian, being absent from DA and having later characteristics like “fetters” etc, it is also wierdly short for a long discourse.

So we have to go to DN8/DA25 to get the first sutta-with-a-parallel and guess what, the eightfold path trope from above is not present in the DA source, which has the awakening factors instead:

  1. “Kāśyapa, there’s a path and a way that a monk cultivates, and then he himself will know and see: ‘The ascetic Gautama’s speech is timely, genuine, meaningful, the teaching, and the discipline.’ Kāśyapa, what is the path and what are the way that a monk cultivates, and then he himself will know and see: ‘The ascetic Gautama’s speech is timely, genuine, meaningful, the teaching, and the discipline’?

  2. “Kāśyapa, a monk cultivates the awakening factor of mindfulness based on stopping, lack of desire, and escape. He cultivates the awakening factor of the teaching … effort … joy … calm … samādhi … equanimity based on stopping, lack of desire, and escape. Kāśyapa, this is the path and the way that a monk cultivates, and then he himself will know and see: ‘The ascetic Gautama’s speech is timely, genuine, meaningful, the teaching, and the discipline.”

  3. Kāśyapa said, “Gautama, there’s only this path and this way that a monk cultivates, and then he himself knows and sees: ‘The ascetic Gautama’s speech is timely, genuine, meaningful, the teaching, and the discipline.’ It’s only the dirty ascetic practices that make it possible to be named a priest or an ascetic. What dirty ascetic practices make it possible to be named a priest or an ascetic?
    DA25

DN22 has;
katamañca, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ? ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo seyyathidaṃ — sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṅkappo sammāvācā sammākammanto sammāājīvo sammāvāyāmo sammāsati sammāsamādhi.

again the sutta is not present in the DA

so of the major suttas in D, only DN16 is left which has:

217**.** atha kho bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi — “siyā kho pana, bhikkhave, ekabhikkhussāpi kaṅkhā vā vimati vā buddhe vā dhamme vā saṅghe vā magge vā paṭipadāya vā, pucchatha, bhikkhave, mā pacchā vippaṭisārino ahuvattha — ‘sammukhībhūto no satthā ahosi, na mayaṃ sakkhimhā bhagavantaṃ sammukhā paṭipucchitu”’ nti. evaṃ vutte te bhikkhū tuṇhī ahesuṃ. dutiyampi kho bhagavā. pe. tatiyampi kho bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi — “siyā kho pana, bhikkhave, ekabhikkhussāpi kaṅkhā vā vimati vā buddhe vā dhamme vā saṅghe vā magge vā paṭipadāya vā, pucchatha, bhikkhave, mā pacchā vippaṭisārino ahuvattha — ‘sammukhībhūto no satthā ahosi, na mayaṃ sakkhimhā bhagavantaṃ sammukhā paṭipucchitu”’ nti. tatiyampi kho te bhikkhū tuṇhī ahesuṃ. atha kho bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi — “siyā kho pana, bhikkhave, satthugāravenapi na puccheyyātha. sahāyakopi, bhikkhave, sahāyakassa ārocetū”ti. evaṃ vutte te bhikkhū tuṇhī ahesuṃ. atha kho āyasmā ānando bhagavantaṃ etadavoca — “acchariyaṃ, bhante, abbhutaṃ, bhante, evaṃ pasanno ahaṃ, bhante, imasmiṃ bhikkhusaṅghe, ‘natthi ekabhikkhussāpi kaṅkhā vā vimati vā buddhe vā dhamme vā saṅghe vā magge vā paṭipadāya vā’”ti. “pasādā kho tvaṃ, ānanda, vadesi, ñāṇameva hettha, ānanda, tathāgatassa. natthi imasmiṃ bhikkhusaṅghe ekabhikkhussāpi kaṅkhā vā vimati vā buddhe vā dhamme vā saṅghe vā magge vā paṭipadāya vā. imesañhi, ānanda, pañcannaṃ bhikkhusatānaṃ yo pacchimako bhikkhu, so sotāpanno avinipātadhammo niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo”ti.

again, the combination is absent from the chinese:

The Buddha told the monks, “If you have any doubts about the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha or doubts about the path, you should be quick to ask about them. Now is the time to do it. Those who don’t may regret it later. While I’m still here, I will explain these things for you.”

The monks remained silent and didn’t say anything.

The Buddha again told them, “If you have any doubts about the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha or doubts about the path, you should be quick to ask about them. Now is the time to do it. Those who don’t may regret it later. While I’m still here, I will explain these things for you.”

The monks again remained quiet.

The Buddha again said, “If you don’t dare ask questions because you’re embarrassed, you should have someone you know quickly come and ask for you. Now is the time to do it. Those who don’t may regret it later.”

Again, the monks remained quiet.

Ānanda said to the Buddha, “I believe this is an assembly of pure faith. Not one of these monks doubts the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha or the path.”

(汝等若於佛、法、眾 有疑，於道有疑者，當速諮問)

so just 道

This means that the vast majority of cases where the patipada is equated with the magga in the pali of the long collections are sectarian additions.

aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo

aṭṭhaṅgikaṁ maggaṁ

ariyaaṭṭhaṅgikamaggesu

dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā

nirodhagāminī paṭipadā

54

evaṃ me rūpa occurs here, MN35 and the identical Vinaya passage, it is otherwise absent from the canon.

What do you think, mendicants?
Taṁ kiṁ maññatha, bhikkhave,
Is form permanent or impermanent?”
rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti?

“Impermanent, sir.”
“Aniccaṁ, bhante”.

“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vā taṁ sukhaṁ vā”ti?

“Suffering, sir.”
“Dukkhaṁ, bhante”.

“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus:
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, kallaṁ nu taṁ samanupassituṁ:
‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
‘etaṁ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’”ti?

“No, sir.”
“No hetaṁ, bhante”.

rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ doesn’t occur in DN, occurs only in MN22, MN35, MN109 , doesn’t occur in AN and in SN outside of SN22 and SN24 only at SN12.70 SN18.10 and SN44.2

55

So lets review.

DN1 and DN2 contain a long pair of discussions of how Buddhism differs from the schools of thought that where current at the time of their composition.

DN2 further contains a long piece of prose, the nirodhagāminī paṭipadāti, that includes a code of conduct that appears to pre-date the pātimokkha and a method of practice that appears to predate the suttas that it is contained in.

This piece of prose, and the subsequent elaborations and clarifications of it, constitute the earliest presentation of Buddhism we have in prose.

SN56.11 and SN22.59 present an alternative presentation, centred around the terms:

majjhimā paṭipadā
aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo
tiparivaṭṭaṁ
dvādasākāraṁ
yaṁ kiñci samudayadhammaṁ sabbaṁ taṁ nirodhadhamman
vedanā anattā
rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ
sabbaṁ rūpaṁ

A careful examination of these terms demonstrates that they are much less widespread, much less commented on, much more often disputed in their placement in the parallels.

It also demonstrates that several of these terms have “precursors” in the nirodhagāminī paṭipadāti, several places where we have “and what is this nirodhagāminī paṭipadāti? just this aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo.” we never see the opposite claim, the aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, where it is introduced, always relies on the prior knowlege of nirodhagāminī paṭipadāti not the other way round.

From these and other clues, like SN quoting DN but not the other way round, we conclude that there is substantive development in the prose across the four principle collections.

The question then becomes, if we accept that the SN presentation of “Numerical Buddhism” is a later formalisation of the teaching, to what extent does it agree or conflict with the earlier fom presented at DN1 and DN2.

My contention is that for the most part it doesn’t.

However, at MN35, SN22.90, SN22.85, and SN5.10 there is what appears to be an argument interpretable as claiming that “there is no such thing as a self” is a true statement.

This appears to be in more or less direct contradiction to DN1 and DN2 and MN2, as well as countless other suttas, where view about for alternatives; being, not-being, both being and not being, none of being, not being, or being and not being, are rejected as “undeclared”.

The questions about being and not being are clearly pre-Buddhist, have deep Upanishadic roots as pointed out by Jayatilike, and are, again deeply, analogous to near contemporary metaphysical speculations by the pre-Socratic greeks, including particularly Parmenedies.

These questions are already conceptually prior and fully aware of the possibility of refining the Being position into a “my” Being position, in fact DN1 elaborates at least several such alternatives including mind-body dualism.

The central claim of the texts at DN1 and DN2 is that if we leave aside the questions of Being, Non-Being, etc we may still say that "given any presented phenomena we can understand that phenomena’s presentation, appeal, imperfection, dismissal, and the way to see it’s dismissal.

This includes atta’s, anatta’s, etc.

The subsequent development of the Therevada tradition appears to fall into the error of attributing “Being” to the aggregates, and attributing “Non-Being” to an “atta”.

This falls into a kind of endless fallacy of harms caused to Non-Beings by impersonal “Beings” and frankly in the end just makes no sense from a Metaphysical or Epistemological (the two are really one and the same in Early Buddhism) point of view.

Buddhism in it’s presentation at DN1 and DN2 is a stance critical of conceptions of Being, Non-Being, Both, Neither, on conceptual grounds. Those grounds where almost certainly quite subtle and developed and are buried in the suttas at every level.

Fundementally the claim appears to be that any of the alternatives have logical consequences that would render “freedom of mind” impossible, and are therefore worse than false, in modern terms we might claim that they where “meaningless” or “unverifiable in principle”.

The Buddhists put forward an alternative account of epistemology, which seems to call for a logic that today we might call “constructve” or “intuitionistic” on technical grounds, but that fundamentally was about taking it to be the case that any term/thing/concept that is introduced/appears/arises, must do so because of conceptually prior conditions, and those conditions being present or absent account for the presence or absence of the term/thing/concept.

There is, under this scheme, “no discernable beginning”, that is for any given thing, there is always an identifiable condition, and then for that condition there is always an identifiable condition for that, ad infinitum.

This means that the focus moves form the Lokāyatika approach of attempting to ground all predicates on “Being” or “non-Being” or combinations of both or the denial of any and towards accepting the chastened reality of whatever is arisen (in conversation, debate, life) and analysing it in terms of it’s arising, ceasing, appeal, defect, and the path to it’s ceasing, or in constructive logical terms, it’s introduction, it’s function, it’s elimination and the path to it’s illumination.

The extent to whih it may be fruitful to pursue this connection to contemporary logic is unclear, but the general flavour of the concerns seem to be more or less identical with the state of play philosophically in India all those years ago.

This philosophical, rationalist flavour, what is, at base, a philosophical argument, understandable to the intellect, not reliant on any specific meditation technique, places the Buddhism of DN1 and DN2 at the stage of the early Upanishads, which Jayatilike rightly points out undergo a phase of rationalist metaphysics at the very beginning before turning toward mystical meditation techniques as a valid source of knowledge.

More to come.

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