Can a Stream Enterer or even an Arahant have a soul?

The Watercooler
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Its a very, very long book. If it were ever written down in full, it would be the longest book ever written. There the Ābhidhammikas try to account for every conscious moment possible within the framework of 24 conditions. For example:

  1. Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by root condition.
  2. Dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate;
  3. At the moment of conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.
  4. Dependent on state associated with painful feeling, arises state associated with painful feeling by root condition.
    Dependent on one aggregate associated with painful feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.
  5. Dependent on state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arises state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling by root condition.
  6. Dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate;
  7. At the moment of conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.

Object, etc.

  1. Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by object condition … by predominance condition (there is no conception in predominance) … by proximity condition … by contiguity condition … by conascence condition … by mutuality condition … by dependence condition … by strong-dependence condition … by prenascence condition.
  2. Dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate; (Dependent on heart-)base, (arise aggregates associated with pleasant feeling) by prenascence condition (Abbreviated.)

Repetition, etc.

  1. Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by repetition condition … by kamma condition … by resultant condition.
  2. Dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate;
  3. At the moment of conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.
  4. Dependent on state associated with painful feeling, arises state associated with painful feeling by resultant condition.
    Dependent on one aggregate accompanied by pain-accompanied body-consciousness, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.
  5. Dependent on state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arises state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling by resultant condition.
  6. Dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate;
  7. At the moment of conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.

Nutriment, etc.

  1. Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by nutriment condition … by faculty condition … by jhāna condition … by path condition, … by association condition … by dissociation condition.
  2. Dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate. (Dependent on heart-)base (arise aggregates associated with pleasant feeling) by dissociation condition.
  3. At the moment of conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate. (Dependent on heart-)base, (arise resultant aggregates associated with pleasant feeling) by dissociation condition.
  4. Dependent on state associated with painful feeling, arises state associated with painful feeling by dissociation condition.
    Dependent on one aggregate associated with painful feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate. (Dependent on heart-)base, (arise aggregates associated with painful feeling) by dissociation condition.
  5. Dependent on state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arises state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling by dissociation condition.
  6. dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate. (Dependent on heart-)-base, (arise aggregates associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling) by dissociation condition;
  7. At the moment of conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate. (Dependent on heart-)base, (arise aggregates associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling) by dissociation condition. (Abbreviated.)

Presence, etc.

By presence condition … by absence condition … by disappearance condition … by non-disappearance condition. …

1. Conditions: Positive—(ii) Enumeration Chapter

By Ones

With root (there are) 3 (answers), with object 3 … non-disappearance 3.

Root, etc.

By Twos, etc.

With root condition and object (there are) 3 (answers) … resultant 2 … non-disappearance 3. …

With object condition … with predominance condition and root (there are) 3 (answers) … resultant 2 … non-disappearance 3. …

With repetition condition and root (there are) 3 (answers) … kamma 3, nutriment 3 … non-disappearance 3. …

With resultant condition and root (there are) 2 (answers), object 3, predominance 2 … prenascence 3, kamma 3 … jhāna 2, path 2 … non-disappearance 3. …

With jhāna condition and root (there are) 3 (answers) … resultant 2 … non-disappearance 3. …

With path condition and root 3 … resultant 2 … non-disappearance 3. …

With non-disappearance condition and root 3 … absence 3, disappearance 3. …

(Expand in the same way as the enumeration of conditions in Faultless Triplet.)

2. Conditions: Negative—(i) Classification Chapter

Not-root 3

  1. Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by not-root condition.
    Dependent on one rootless aggregate associated with pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.
  2. Dependent on state associated with painful feeling, arises state associated with painful feeling by not-root condition.
    Dependent on one aggregate accompanied by pain-accompanied body-consciousness, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate.
  3. Dependent on state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arises state associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling by not-root condition.
  4. Dependent on one rootless aggregate associated with | neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate;
  5. At the moment of rootless conception, dependent on one aggregate associated with neither painful nor pleasant feeling, arise two aggregates; dependent on two aggregates, arises one aggregate;
  6. Dependent on doubt-accompanied or restlessness-accompanied aggregates, arises doubt-accompanied or restlessness-accompanied delusion.

Not-predominance 3

Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by not-predominance condition.

(Conception is to be completed for not-predominance.)

Not-prenascence 2

  1. Dependent on state associated with pleasant feeling, arises state associated with pleasant feeling by not-prenascence condition.

Some of these conditional states are just conditions, but others are more like causality where a dhamma exerts a “force” to bring about an effect. For the most part it’s not something I would bother with too much. As far as I’m aware Ābhidhammikas don’t expect everyone to have insight into all of this. Mostly its an attempt to map the awakened mind of a Buddha.

I have a question, more like a favour to ask, since you are our resident Abhidhamma specialist.

Thank you but I wouldn’t say I’m a specialist. I did adopt the Abhidhamma for a time, but I’m not an Ābhidhammika anymore.

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If I think Santa Claus is an imaginary figure, then I will also think my parents are not Santa Claus. You can negate something absolutely and still say x is not y (which doesn’t exist). You can do so if y can be shown to be completely imaginary and/or its existence is absurd, which would then mean that x cannot be y. For the Buddha the atta, in the sense of a real and substantial thing, is imaginary and absurd. It exists only in the mind of those who believe in it. Therefore, everything is anatta. Its actually impossible for the atta to exist, in any real sense.

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To back up a bit of what I said earlier, regarding not having to know all these dhammas and their conditions, here is a quote from Ledi Sayadaw:

The fleeting nature of phenomena is, therefore, aptly compared in the scriptures to a flash of lightning. However, the rapidity of the occurrence of mental phenomena is far greater than that. Their arising and vanishing may even be reckoned in hundreds of thousands of times within a flash of lightning. The rapidity is beyond human comprehension. Therefore, it is not advisable to make such subtle phenomena the object of one’s contemplation. Try as one might, these phenomena will not be comprehended even after contemplating for a hundred or a thousand years. The meditator who tries this will not gain a single ray of insight, but will be beset by more befuddlement and despair. The scriptures say that mental phenomena take place billions and trillions of times within the blink of an eye, a flash of lightning, or the snap of your fingers. Now, the duration of the blink of an eye itself is so fleeting that attempting to contemplate the occurrence of mental phenomena to the billionth or trillionth part of that duration becomes sheer folly. Therefore, one should be satisfied with comprehending the unreliable and transient characteristic of all phenomena, which, after all, is the main purpose.

As for the exact nature, i.e., the swiftness, of mental phenomena, the understanding of which is the domain of the wisdom of the All-knowing Buddha, one has to accept the authority of the scriptures. Any talk about contemplating the three characteristics of mental phenomena is mere humbug. It is never based on practice, but only on hearsay from the scriptures. If someone were to try it, it would be a far cry from insight.

bp426s_Ledi_Manual-Of-Light.pdf (bps.lk)

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Congratulations! :laughing:

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I should say though that I think Abhidharma, of any type, can be very useful to people. Just don’t take its concepts as being reality. The same for EBT concepts too for that matter.

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Reality.

So, speaking of via negativa over here … Ad Reinhardt already explored this in his art - including in relation to Buddhism. He was in Japan during WWII, in the navy if I recall, and was exposed to Buddhism there. He developed an interest in mandalas. He became good friends with Thomas Merton, before he became his famous Trappist monk self, at Columbia University, and they had a lifelong adventure together in via negativa. NYC Reinhardt also became part of the coterie of Abstract Expressionists around DT Suzuki. I’d have to go back and check into Reinhardt’s biography, but he likely met Suzuki, because they had some kind of regular coffee clutch and Suzuki was dragged there at least once or twice by one of them. And they used to go to his talks and such.

His black paintings, which are taken to be most representative of his via negativa phase, are justifiably famous.

I think this one’s Abstract Painting no.5, 1960-61 It’s part of MOMA’s collection.

image
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This is the kind of stuff he said:

The one work for a fine artist, the one painting, is the painting of the one-size canvas—the single scheme, one formal device, one color-monochrome, one linear division in each direction, one symmetry, one texture, one free-hand-brushing, one rhythm, one working everything into one dissolution and one indivisibility, each painting into one overall uniformity and non-irregularity. No lines or imaginings, no shapes or composings or representings, no visions or sensations or impulses, no symbols or signs or impastos, no decoratings or colorings or picturings, no pleasures or pains, no accidents or ready-mades, no things, no ideas, no relations, no attributes, no qualities—nothing that is not of the essence. Everything into irreducibility, unreproducibility, imperceptibility. Nothing “usable,” “manipulatable,” “salable,” “dealable,” “collectible,” “graspable.” No art as a commodity or a jobbery. Art is not the spiritual side of business.

From Monk’s Pond, a little magazine he and Merton worked on together.

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You misunderstand the logic here.

Step 1 - X is not Y (so you are excluding Y from the definition of X)
Step 2 - You deny the reality of Y altogether.

Now you are pretending that the assertion in step 1 still is valid, but you are actually excluding an unreal thing from a real thing - which is absurd.

Since such an exclusion never will work, you then have to imagine it back into existence momentarily to assume you are excluding a real thing. Then you imagine it out of existence to claim its unreality.

This is a type of cognitive dissonance where you need the referent to be both real and unreal at the same time to make such an absurdity sound OK.

It is like you cannot subtract a non-number from a number. It would be an absurdity.

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I don’t need a referent to be both real and unreal. I just need it to be unreal, in this case, to say that my father is not Santa Claus. I am greeted with a proposition, namely that my father is Santa Claus. I can deny that by saying either Santa Claus is real, but is a different person to my father, or I can deny it by denying the mind-independent existence of Santa Claus. If I say that Santa Claus is not real, I do not assert his reality. I am saying it remains a concept only. The concept I can’t deny, but its substantial existence (Dravyasat) I can. The same with the Buddha. He had a concept of the atta. Eventually he saw that such a thing did not exist and couldn’t be known. His rejection then of the substantial nature of the concept didn’t make the concept real. It remained for him just that, a concept and so, ultimately, it can’t be said to exist. Since it can’t be said to exist, views such as Eternalism (It always has been and always will be) and Annihilationism (It is now but will not be later) do not apply. They become meaningless. Following from this denial of the atta, nothing can be said to actually exist. By denying the atta substance, he denies all other substances too and without independently existing realities, nothing can be said to be real or ultimately unreal either. That is nibbāna. The letting go of everything, even views and our tendency to reify concepts & words.

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I mean lets look at this. Lets say someone comes to me and says “this is a square triangle” I then reply “this is not a square triangle, because such a thing does not exist”. According to your logic, I can’t deny a square triangle unless one exists. But there is no such thing. A square is not a triangle. By definition, such a thing cannot be. One then can deny a square triangle without needing it to be real, and without cognitive dissonance.

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That’s not the problem.

The problem is you are claiming “This shape is not a square triangle” which is an absurd claim precisely because a square triangle is an absurdity, it is unreal.

You cannot make such a claim and pretend it makes sense, for you are trying to exclude an absurdity from the definition of a real shape which you cannot meaningfully do.

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According to your logic you can’t say a square triangle doesn’t exist at all, as you would need to assert its existence to deny it. This is the problem I’ve been highlighting to you.

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You cannot say a square triangle does not exist, for it means you’ve made an effort to find an absurdity and proved that it doesnt exist. Else it means that it has a theoretical possibility of existence, but just happens to not exist at the moment for some reason.

You can only say a square triangle cannot exist.

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OK. Let’s break down @srkris logic.

The atman is real because the buddha postulated not-atman (the conditioned), which is not real.

Let’s apply the language games to another prized possession, in parallel fashion.

The conditioned (not-atman) is real because Buddha postulated the unconditioned, which is real.

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In my scenario I was greeted with the claim that a square triangle exists. I denied x was a square triangle, because square triangles do not exist. They do not exist because by definition a square is not a triangle. Now, according to your previous arguments I can’t say a square triangle does not exist, because you can’t deny fully deny the reality of anything. You can’t, according to you, because you can only deny something is x if there is a potential that it might be x. So, for you square triangles cannot be said to be non-existent. In my scenario you can only say that x is not a square-triangle, but you can’t deny square-triangles outright at all despite the fact that by definition such a thing is impossible. This is absurd and so via reductio ad absurdum your argument is rejected. Now, by way of my argument there is no absurdity in claiming that x doesn’t exist at all. None that you have shown at any rate so far and so I maintain my position that the atta, a substantial one, does not exist.

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I was meditating, and the following image came into my mind

Square Triangle
Square Triangle1745×2275 263 KB

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That is not however the postulate that compares to the canonical statement “rūpa is not the ātman” - where as per the statement you’re comparing, it would be you yourself (not someone else) making the original statement that ‘this shape is not a square triangle’ (so you utter the initial statement of absurdity) and then you yourself also make the claim that the square triangle is unreal i.e. you also assert that a square triangle is an absurd conception and hence never had the possibility of being real. Therefore having the referent reduced to a void, and to then say “this shape is not a square triangle” is the statement of an absurdity, and devoid of a referential integrity, turns out to not contain any factual sense. The first sentence is therefore firstly an inanity, and a hollow vacuous falsehood.

Even if you want to have the original statement the way you want it, i.e. a positive assertion of absurdity “this shape is a square triangle”, you would be the same person making it and simultaneously claiming its unreality and absurdity. For you are the one that was defending the simultaneous accuracy of both statements. Now you are pretending the original absurdity was uttered by someone else.

The statement “this shape is not a square triangle” is as absurd as the statement “this shape is a square triangle”, because you are theorizing with an absurdity as an integral part of the statement of the theory (by giving that unreal thing a conventional reality to make the sentence appear semantically valid). Whether you say “is” or “is not” doesnt make the statement meaningless, it is the use of an absurdity in one side of the equation that makes the whole sentence meaningless.

Thus it turns out you are making mutually contradicting statements (by even pretending that it is truly possible to define something real by excluding from it a void - like attempting to take-away/subtract a non-number from a number, or vice versa).

In an excel spreadsheet, put in a formula where you reference cells in other worksheets within the same workbook, then delete the sheets that the formula is trying to refer to, and see whether you get a referential integrity error or not. Try convincing Excel that it must not report any error (and still process the rest of the formula as if the missing reference never existed in the first place) when you delete the reference cells that you originally relied on as being real when you wrote the formula. Or better yet, in the formula try to refer to a non-existing cell and see if the formula works, such as A1=B1-(imaginary cell).

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I will try to be balanced, being a worldling my self.

Is it the case that some sophisticated people have an inkling of an implicit truth or is it the case that they have not an inkling of the true depth and scope of the teachings on Khandha, ayatana, dhatu and so forth?

I’ll just leave this for consideration.

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You think its absurd to say there are no square-triangles? This is back to your peculiar logic where nothing can be absolutely negated, which would mean that absolutely everything we think of might really exist. I know there are hyper-realist philosophers who adopt this view, but it makes little sense. A square-triangle cannot exist as by definition a square is not a triangle. Its a contradiction. When someone then claims that x is a square-triangle, I can dismiss said claim by referring to the impossibility of such a thing. Regarding the atta the Buddha was met with claims that x is the atta. He showed how this was a contradictory claim, because what was being claimed as the atta was dependent not independent (like the atta is supposed to be). Some then would argue that the atta is beyond all we experience, but to this his reply was that you can’t possibly have knowledge of things beyond your sense experience. Someone then claiming there are things like substances, attas or noumenon is talking out of his range. In other words, they are just things he has imagined and then taken to be real. The Buddha really was closer to David Hume than Ādi Śaṅkarācārya.

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Yes, there is a difference between saying

  1. a square triangle cannot exist - versus saying that
  2. a square triangle does not exist.

The latter statement implies that if certain conditions are satisfied, square triangles can possibly exist.

If you’re claiming that the first statement above is true, then you shouldnt be using the concept of a square triangle to exclude any shape i.e. you cannot say for example, statements like “a square triangle is not a circle” or “a circle is not a square triangle”.

On the contrary if you make a statement like “a square triangle is not a circle”, and claim it to be true and meaningful, then it follows that a square triangle is a real referent and a circle can meaningfully be excluded from its definition i.e. it is something other than a circle but should be considered (either axiomatically, or has been proven to be) real. Here you are merely excluding and not denying the referent (or vice versa, you are excluding the other from the definition of the referent).

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Sure. If something cannot exist then it does not have existence. We can’t visualise a square-triangle, but we have the words. Since a square-triangle cannot exist, the concept does not have existence. It remains a (contradictory) concept only. I can say “a square triangle is not a circle” because a square-triangle cannot exist, and so do not exist, and that by definition a circle is not a square or a triangle. The statement can be denied by appealing to the non existence of the square-triangle and/or the definition of a circle. If a circle is a square, then its not a circle.