Consciousness and Nibbāna

[Dogen]

@NgXinZhao

None of this implies a self. These are just naming conventions. Being able to name things doesn’t bring a self into existence. It is when misunderstanding the name to be real, to be independent, referring to an eternal thing that the delusion of self arises.

Bhante, I’ve long dropped any talk of self, because it unnecessarily complicates things. Please do not introduce it for this discussion.

Also, I feel the river analogy unnecessarily complicates things, so I won’t address that either. It gets weird and poetic.

I also feel like you’ve begun to comment without addressing my main concern, so I’ll recap once again, and refrain from further engagement if the point is not met.

@NgXinZhao

It’s perfectly valid to name the individual rivers as different names, just to ease communication

But you’re positing something ultimate, rather than a convention. That’s the problem as I see it.

• It should be impossible to declare “This is me, mine” regarding khandas.
• If you can declare for a fact “This stream of khandas has come to an end”, then there really is a cluster of khandas that factually belong to one another.
• In that case, it wouldn’t have been a wrong view to say “This is mine”.

If you can somehow manage to explain how the khandas that belong to the same stream do not actually belong to each other (hence making it wrong to say “This is me”), I’m all ears.

[NgXinZhao]

You use mine, me, etc, which is basically self.

When I stomp out this fire, another fire somewhere else is still burning.

Is that not enough?

Not being able to label fire as me doesn’t mean all fires share some plasma. Many fires are too far away to share the same plasma.

Parinibbāna is just the stomping out of a fire. With no way to restart it. And also no way to identify it is this fire or that fire when restarted, because of no soul/self after the fire is stopped out to label the fire. (Note analogy breaks down here because while new fires can happen even at the same place, new being cannot be born without infinite past lives)

[Dogen]

@NgXinZhao

When I stomp out this fire, another fire somewhere else is still burning.

Is that not enough?

No, because just as fire was never a self, it should be the same with its constituents, likewise everything. But while you don’t declare fire to be real, you declare oxygen to be real, bhante…

You understand nirvana as the stomping out of a specific fire, as an ontological event regarding the extinction of a certain cluster of khandas. I don’t think that reading is compatible with “Anatta”.

I understandnirvana as the stomping out of any sort of epistemic declaration that could’ve been made anywhere at all regarding anything, extinction of any conceptual device such as buddha, dharma, khandas, etc.

Thus, I’m not sure we’re in much luck to convince each other, but hopefully this was a fruitful discussion for any interested parties to read (and hopefully not too repetitive and boring for mods to handle one of these agaian! )

Thank you for the time spent.

[NgXinZhao]

@Dogen

You understand nirvana as the stomping out of a specific fire, as an ontological event regarding the extinction of a certain cluster of khandas

At least you understand my position.

I don’t see how it is incompatible with no self.

@Dogen

I understandnirvana as the stomping out of any sort of epistemic declaration that could’ve been made anywhere at all regarding anything, extinction of any conceptual device such as buddha, dharma, khandas, etc.

Well, in parinibbāna, there’s no mind to have any concept, so that’s also in a way true.

As Buddha while alive does understand and use concepts, I don’t see that this applies to the living arahant. But not taking those concepts as self is a given. Seeing how concepts arises due to having sense contacts of the 5 aggregates etc is a given.

Is it possible that you are not able to decouple the aggregates from self that you see when I say the aggregates ontologically ceases to mean the self ontologically cease?

Dependent cessation is very clear of things ceasing. That includes the aggregates. Not just the concept of aggregates. Just that the aggregates ceases at parinibbāna, not at attainment of Nibbāna with remainder, some parts of it ceases at attainment of arahanthood like the ignorance, craving, clinging etc.

But while you don’t declare fire to be real, you declare oxygen to be real, bhante

What is real? There’s just fire and no more. Fire being caused. When fire is, there’s contact with fire possible. When fire is not. There’s no contact with it possible. Oxygen too. I don’t see the distinction of fire not real but oxygen real.

There’s no fire-soul. That’s being denied. Hence no meaningful way of answering if the fire went to which direction after ceasing.

[Nikolas]

@Alain

‘transcendent’ has nothing mystical about it!

The transcendental is mystical by nature, as it excludes direct cognition, yet transcends cognition. Cessation is simple, clear, and knowable. Just as we know, once we’ve ascertained that a fire burns dependent on fuel, that by removing the fuel the fire will go out, and we know what this extinction is. Similarly, we know suffering, its cause, and its cessation. Nirvana is nothing other than the cessation of dukkha. The simple knowledge that the cause of dukkha has ceased and dukkha will no longer arise is quite sufficient!

I ask you, what does the idea of ​​nibbana as a positively existing thing contribute if, in any case, consciousness ceases and nibbana is not endowed with the characteristics of cognition? From the perspective of subjective experience, this will still be a complete cessation due to the cessation of subjective experience. What difference does it make whether this reality exists or not if nothing will experience or recognize it?

[Alain]

Dear Sir,
It seems that your knowledge of philosophical vocabulary is limited. “Transcendent” means: that which lies beyond all possible experience. And to answer your question, we base our understanding on the suttas cited by the Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi and adopt his position, namely that nibbāna is not nonexistent (dhatu, ayatana, etc.). Convinced that the Canon refers to nibbāna as a reality (and I’m not even mentioning the Abhidhamma, which is very clear on this point), we then seek to show that this viewpoint is consistent. This is the starting point of my article. That is why I speak of a paradox.
With mettā
AD

Someone replied to your post.

| Nikolas
June 23 |

• | - |

Alain:

‘transcendent’ has nothing mystical about it!

The transcendental is mystical by nature, as it excludes direct cognition, yet transcends cognition. Cessation is simple, clear, and knowable. Just as we know, once we’ve ascertained that a fire burns dependent on fuel, that by removing the fuel the fire will go out, and we know what this extinction is. Similarly, we know suffering, its cause, and its cessation. Nirvana is nothing other than the cessation of dukkha. The simple knowledge that the cause of dukkha has ceased and dukkha will no longer arise is quite sufficient!

I ask you, what does the idea of ​​nibbana as a positively existing thing contribute if, in any case, consciousness ceases and nibbana is not endowed with the characteristics of cognition? From the perspective of subjective experience, this will still be a complete cessation due to the cessation of subjective experience. What difference does it make whether this reality exists or not if nothing will experience or recognize it?

[Jasudho]

Hi,

Just offering a suggestion about using sections of other people’s posts in yours…
It’s easiest for readers if the quoted section is formatted like this:

@Alain

“Transcendent” means: that which lies beyond all possible experience.

rather than as in your post above, in which the text of the other person appears the same as yours.

To do this, simply highlight the section you wish to present in your post, then click on the “Quote” option, and it will appear as it does here.

Otherwise, it can be a bit difficult to distinguish between your text and that of the other person.

Hope this is helpful!

[NgXinZhao]

@Alain

nibbāna is not nonexistent (dhatu, ayatana, etc.).

Nibbāna exist, means rebirth can be ended. There is no need to posit ontological positive to the statement exist.

Absolute Nothingness exist, means the same thing in that we can conceptually imagine it.

Absolute nothingness does not exist can mean that it’s not possible to attain to absolute nothingness.

In Physics, vacuum used to the the nothing and it was considered impossible for nothing to exist by some ancient scientist. Now we know vacuum is not empty, so there’s nothingness concept in physics which is beyond the vaccuum and so far we have no idea if it’s ever possible to destroy the vaccuum to reach true nothingness without gravity or quantum field. But good thing for us, end of rebirth doesn’t require that. When there’s no mind, no rebirth, there’s no issue for the physical universe still existing for other beings.

The mere statement of there is the unborn, uncreated etc doesn’t mean nibbāna is ontologically positive. It can be ontologically negative as well as absolute nothingness is also unborn, uncreated etc.

[Nikolas]

@Alain

“Transcendent” means: that which lies beyond all possible experience.

This means that it lies behind experience in general, that is, it is not really knowable, like the nature of God, etc.

[Nikolas]

@Alain

And to answer your question, we base our understanding on the suttas cited by the Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi and adopt his position, namely that nibbāna is not nonexistent (dhatu, ayatana, etc.).

Although nibbana is not a non-existent thing, whatever it may actually be, if consciousness ceases, and nibbana itself is not endowed with consciousness, then from the perspective of inner experience, from the first person, this will still mean the same complete cessation, the cessation of existence.

[Sunyo]

Hi Alain and others,

As said, we’ve had these kind of discussoins before. I don’t want to repeat those, but there are some unexplored angles here which I find interesting. In particular:

@Alain

the words of one of the great sages of ancient Greece, Epicurus

It’s a great saying. But Epicurus said this because he rejected any kind of afterlife. In his view, death results in the end of existence for all beings, regardless of their knowledge or deeds. Epicurus is saying, when you don’t exist anymore, you cannot suffer either. Therefore, “death is nothing to us”. Epicurus’ teachings are remarkably similar to those of the (materialist) annihilationist in the suttas, who say the soul and the body are the same, are made of matter, are the ‘self’ that after death doesn’t exist anymore.

There is also a famous grave inscription adopted by Epicureans: “I was not; I have been; I am not; I do not care.” Which means: “I didn’t exist before birth. Then I was alive for a while. But now I am death, I am no longer, so I cannot mind that.”

This revolves around an I or self. That assumption is also an intrinsic part of the doctrine of annihilationism in the suttas (which never define or challenge annihilationism in terms of its supposed outcome but in terms of what gets annihilated). For example, there is the annihilationist catchphrase which bears some similarity to the Epicurean epitaph: “I might not be and it might not be mine; I will not be [after death], and it will not be mine.”

Interestingly, the Buddha called this view the foremost view of outsiders (AN10.29), because “it can be expected that those who hold such a view will not be attracted to existence and be unrepelled by the cessation of existence”.

The cessation of existence is how some suttas define nibbāna, e.g. SN12.68: “Extinguishment is the cessation of existence.” That this refers to parinibbāna is clear from Iti44: “that with no residue, which pertains to what follows this life, where all states of existence cease”.

“Extinguishment is the cessation of existence” is an actual definition of nibbāna from the suttas. It is never defined as some existent ontological reality. Still, cessation is possible, so it exists in that sense, as @NgXinZhao indicated. Hence it is said: “There exists a complete cessation of existence.” (MN60) This means the complete cessation of existence is a real possibility, not that it is some really existent something.

Likewise, the Buddha’s middle teaching between “existence” and “nonexistence” also is never explained in the suttas as nibbāna lying beyond both existence and nonexistence, or alike. Instead, the middle is explained as consisting of arising and cessation. This includes the arising and cessation of existence (bhava), of the aggregates including consciousness.

How I (and the (sub)commentaries) make sense of this I have explained before. In short, the wrong notions of “existence” and “nonexistence” are respectively the view that the dead exist forever and the view that there is only a single life. The Upanishads reflect this ancient dichotomy:

There is this doubt about a man who is dead. ‘He exists (asti),’ say some, others, ‘He exists not (nāsti).’”

The Buddha’s view falls in the middle, because he acknowledges that there is life after death, but it doesn’t last forever. There is rebirth (i.e. arising) for a number of lives, but after enlightenment existence comes to an end (i.e. cessation).

Hence the Kaccānagotta Sutta says (in my translation):

Kaccāna, most of the world relies on a duality: the notion of survival (atthitā) and the notion of nonsurvival (natthitā). But if you see the origin of the ‘world’ [of the six senses] by understanding it in line with reality, you won’t have the notion of nonsurvival with respect to it. And if you see the cessation of the ‘world’ by understanding it in line with reality, you won’t have the notion of survival with respect to it. (SN12.15)

Note that the Buddha again doesn’t say that these notions are abandoned by seeing that nibbāna is some ontologically existent reality beyond existence and nonexistence, let alone that it incomprehensible. The middle is seen by understanding the arising and cessation of the six senses (the “world”).

I know some, like Bhikkhu Bodhi, base the idea of nibbāna as an existent ontological reality on words like dhātu and āyatana. However, neither dhātu nor āyatana necessarily refers to an ontological existent. The teaching of annihilationism is also called an āyatana (MN102). There is also such a thing as the dhātu of cessation (Iti51), which refers directly to nibbāna. Dictionaries correctly include for āyatana such meanings as ‘case’ and ‘opportunity’ and for dhātu ‘principle’ and ‘property’. So instead, the cessation of existence—which we have seen is how (pari)nibbāna is defined—is an existing opportunity or principle. To instead conclude it is an ontological existent, is to derive too much from these very broad terms.

That is how I see it, based on the suttas.

But this may all be somewhat moot in view of the discussion, because I agree with @Nikolas: if there is no consciousness, then it doesn’t really matter if there is anything else left. Without consciousness, it can’t be experienced anyway. So for all practical purposes it is the same as a complete cessation.

Anyway, there is something left after parinibbāna, according to SN12.51:

Likewise, they [the enlightened beings] understand that when their body falls apart, after death, when life comes to an end, all that is experienced, not being enjoyed, will cool off [i.e cease] right then, and only bodily remains will be left.

[Nikolas]

@Sunyo

But this may all be somewhat moot in view of the discussion, because I agree with @Nikolas: if there is no consciousness, then it doesn’t really matter if there is anything else left. Without consciousness, it can’t be experienced anyway. So for all practical purposes it is the same as a complete cessation.

The problem is that adherents of such views often implicitly assume a certain form of being/awareness, vaguely calling it “…not non-being.” For them, nibbana as “non-cessation” means precisely this—that the state of nibbana, while devoid of ordinary samsaric aggregates, is not at the same time some complete cessation of existence altogether; nibbana itself, as a reality, state, or element, is this transcendental, non-samsaric existence of the arahant after death. How this nibbana element differs from the later idea of ​​Atman Vedanta or the Purusha of the Yoga Sutras is not entirely clear. Such views fit well with Tibetan Buddhism and ideas about the nature of the Mind/Buddha, which, according to the stated tactical and technical characteristics, is also beyond all extremes and pure and empty of samsaric, polluted and conditioned dharmas, indescribable, beyond logic and at the same time “…not non-being.”

[SunilW]

Anidassanam (non indicative consciousness) Arahat’s consciousness is said to be Anidassana and it means “not pointing to” And how does the ARAHATs experience not point to? It does not point to an Subject “I”. Non Arahats experience always point to a subject (“I”). It is always with holding. Arahat’s reflexive structure NO subjectivity is conceived. That is why Anidassana.

For the non ARAHAT in varying degrees " things are for me" or “things are mine”. For the Arahat " things are". When the life of the Arahat ceases " things are" also ceases. In other words for the non ARAHAT there is “my world” and to the Arahat “my world” has ceased and there is only a world left. When Arahats life ceases the “world” also ceases. This is called Nibbāna without residue.

Residue is the 5 aggregates. Saupādisesa Nibbāna dhatu. MN 121. Without residue is called the Anupadisesa Nibbāna.

[Radius]

@Sunyo

Epicurus is saying, when you don’t exist anymore, you cannot suffer either

Non fui, fui, non sum, non curo

Epicurus was The Man, at least among those Hellenistic philosophers. There was a video linked recently in this thread which I refrained from commenting on. I was surprised that Epicurus didn’t get a mention in that. Sure, there’s a bunch of his teaching which is either nothing to do with Buddhism, or directly contrary to it—but some of it is very similar once descriptive style is adapted for.

The Epicurus position quoted by Sunyo above is what I was trying to say here…

@Radius

With death → no sense organs → no contact (experience) → no feeling → no desire → no suffering. No craving because the condition of feeling is gone, because the condition of contact (experience) is gone, because the sense organs are gone, because of the breakup of the body.

I think it’s a position that many Westerners (inc. me) would find reasonable, but I had previously realized that the above is a suboptimal solution to suffering. If death is the end of consciousness/experience then one won’t know that the suffering has ended because one doesn’t know anything. If liberation from suffering is to be experienced, it has to be experienced while alive. Something like…

@Alain

Can an unexperienced bliss still meaningfully be called bliss?

---

Why am I saying this? Because as recently as last week I had a realization regarding this. In MN109 there’s a Q & A:

“But sir, is that grasping the exact same thing as the five grasping aggregates?
…
“[No]".

One could think that craving (hence suffering) is the same thing as the grasping aggregates, and hence that the craving ends when the body ends. This though is effectively to think that the aggregates are a self, or that a self is in the aggregates which I don’t agree with. Very exciting stuff for me.

For now, I am simply going with an etymological analysis of “Nibbāna” by venerable Analayo. If I recall correctly, he claimed it can be parsed as “No Bending”. That definition, as far as I see things, holds true for the classically dead and also for a (living) Arahant. Neither bend toward one thing with craving nor away from another thing with aversion.

[Viveka]

@Vaddha

It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views:
‘A realized one exists after death’;
‘A realized one no longer exists after death’;
‘A realized one both exists and no longer exists after death’;
‘A realized one neither exists nor no longer exists after death’.

DN 9

A reflection on this issue, from a practice perspective - not as an intellectual philosophical exercise..

Where does the desire to know come from? Where does the desire to control come from? What does the opposite imply?

Dependent upon what is the desire to control? In the absence of what is there an absence of desire to control?

Ultimately all that has a cause to arise has a cause to cease. This includes all the khandas, which are the source of experience- but yet there is an incessant desire to say something about ‘it’, to define some form of ‘experience’ that is outside of sense awareness, outside of consciousness, of Sankharas etc, to grasp it…

The Buddha said that after awakening, beyond the cessation of Khandas, when there will be no more rebirth, nothing can be said. It is outside of what can be known via Khandas.

And just for another angle from which to view this craving - from the perspective of Ditthasava. Dependent upon what is the craving to grasp to views? What would happen if this was let go?

May I suggest that attention is moved from the ‘object’ of parinibbana and onto the process of this movement/momentum to grasp. It may yield an alternative way to move forward.

[SunilW]

Many think that seeing Nibbāna is similar to some kind of vision, an unimaginable vision never seen before. The puthujjana cannot and never will imagine what it could be. But for sure they are compelled to think it is some kind of a visual or imaginary vision, that he will see, that his very “self” will experience. He can turn Nibbāna upside down in whatever direction he may wish, but that is just an illusion. Untill one realises the Four Noble Truths that will remain illusive to him.

Let’s take the case of the Arahat, the living Arahat. He has attained Nibbāna and he is still living. This living Arahat is called the “saupadisesa” Nibbāna means an Arahat with “residue”.
This residue is the 5 aggregates. Further he may have a residual kamma to pay. When the Arahat’s body breaks up after the expiration of his life span, then he is called “anupadisesa” Nibbāna.

So how does Nibbāna apply in both cases. In the first case when he becomes an Arahat it means all defilements are set aside, there will not be further kamma he can accumulate. He has ceased all mental suffering. He has come to the end of Dukkha. Yet he has perceptions from all his six sense bases. Then comes the equation for Nibbāna as “cessation of all perception and feeling”. So if Nibbāna is cessation of all perceptions and feelings what is the perception and feeling the Arahat gets now? That is the perception and feeling NOT bound up with “I, mine or self”.
And as long as his six sense bases are active that becomes the residue he has to go through. But he knows that will be his last. Nibbāna with residue.

Now when his life span is exhausted, his body breaks up so are the bases. Now this is the Nibbāna without residue.

If one talks about Nibbāna it will never be possible without experiencing Nibbāna. The reason is quite simple. When a commoner called the puthujjana in Pali were to reflect what Nibbāna is, it will be inconceivable for him. Because he has not broken through avijja to gain wisdom of the four Truths. This avijja continuesly shields him from gaining wisdom. If we were to look at it in another way, for him this experience would be a vision through his senses. And this vision he needs to perceive as Nibbāna. But the fact is Nibbāna is described as cessation of perception and if that’s what it is how can he perceive a percept which has ceased all it’s perceptions?

So one can see the insurmountable situation the puthujjana is in. But if his Paramis-perfectioms are fulfilled then he will get the (1) guidance of an Ariyan Desicple and (2) listen to the Saddhamma, (3) pay proper attention and (4) live according to the Dhamma. So he follows the four necessary conditions for attaining the Path and Fruit.

It is only through the practice of the Four Stations of mindfulness that he would achieve this.

Sati (mindfulness) in a loose sense can be translated as ‘memory’; but memory is
normally memory of the past, whereas in the Noble Eightfold Path sati is more particularly concerned with the present.

The Pali word for ‘awareness’ is
Sampajanna. In the Suttas it is frequently linked with ‘mindfulness’ (sati) in the
compound sati-sampajanna, ‘mindfulness
and awareness’. In the Satipatthana Sutta
awareness (of bodily actions) is included in the section of mindfulness of the body, so we
can perhaps conclude that, while it is not different from mindfulness, awareness is
more specialised in meaning. Mindfulness is general recollected-ness, not being
scatterbrained; whereas awareness is more precisely keeping oneself under constant
observation, not letting one’s actions (or thoughts or feelings, etc.) pass unnoticed.

If I wish to practise awareness I must go on asking myself this question and answering it, until such time as I find that I am automatically (or habitually) answering the question without having to ask it. When this happens, the practise of awareness is being successful, and it only remains to develop this state and not to fall away from it through neglect. Similar considerations will of course and must be applied of awareness of feelings, perceptions and thoughts.

It is the nature of Right Mindfulness is to detach from the very subject. Right
mindfulness merely observes. And during this observation there is no attachment.

1It is the nature of Right Mindfulness is to detach from the very subject. Right)
mindfulness merely observes. And during this observation there is no attachment!

Now, the Buddha says, Here, monks, feelings are known as they arise, feelings are known as they endure, feelings are
known as they vanish; perceptions are known as they arise, perceptions are known as they endure, perceptions are
known as they vanish; thoughts are known as they arise, thoughts are known as they
endure, thoughts are known as they vanish. (AN.4).

the above paragraph: feeling is known as it arises, feeling is known as it endures, feeling is known as it vanishes. And so it
is with a perception and a thought. In effect one is now directly practising the
Satipatthana (Four Stations of
Mindfulness), which leads one to Nibbana. Sutta says, “He abides seeing in feeling
their arising factor, he abides seeing in feeling their vanishing factor, he abides seeing in feeling their arising and
vanishing factor.” And further, “there is feeling’ is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and mindfulness. And he abides independent, not clinging to anything in the world. That
is how a bhikkhu abides seeing feelings as feelings.” (MN.Sutta 10).

To drive this in further, we shall quote another Sutta (SN.5.Book3.Chap.iv-v/ii).
“Here a monk is fully aware of feeling that arises, fully aware of feeling that settles in him, fully aware of feeling that comes to an end. He is fully aware of the thought that arises in him; it’s settling in him, that it
comes to an end. He is fully aware of the perception that arises in him, that settles
in him that comes to an end. That, monks, is how he is mindful and aware. A monk
should abide mindful and aware. This is our instruction to you.”

It is by seeing this end, the observation of the vanishing, that the mind must and will
come to realise aniccata - impermanence of things. If this is not clearly observed - the end part, then however much is
practised it will not lead the mind to understand and see all what is necessary to be seen.

[knigarian]

@Nikolas

For them, nibbana as “non-cessation” means precisely this—that the state of nibbana, while devoid of ordinary samsaric aggregates, is not at the same time some complete cessation of existence altogether; nibbana itself, as a reality, state, or element, is this transcendental, non-samsaric existence of the arahant after death.

Firstly you gone wrong in your description of view with which you disagree, I would make it more precise, so you will more clearly see with what you disagree.

As far as asserting that there is unborn, or asanhata dhatu, this assertion is stated in positive terms, but it doesn’t include assertion of existence. Asanhata dhatu still could be defined as the cessation of bhava.

Bhava = suffering and it is entirely the state of puthujjana. “Is” in the statments about asanhata dhatu or unborn merely aserts that asanhata dhatu or unborn is realizable by anyone who is intelligent enough to understand Dhamma but doesn’t cover the meaning of the term bhava. For this good reason that bhava is only possible in space and time, but realisation of asanhata dhatu in existential terms should be described as the cessation of time. So no one who understands Dhamma, and takes for granted that there "is asanhata dhatu " would associate it with existence. As long as there is mutual dependence of consciousness and namarupa, verbal descriptions are valid. But cessation of time is synonymous with the cessation of language:

Upasīva asked:

'Then when he the Arahant has gone out does he no longer exist? Or is he made invulnerable for eternity ?

And the Buddha replied:

‘There is no measure of one who has gone out, Upasīva;
There is nothing of him whereby he could be described;
When all ideas have been abolished, all ways of describing have been abolished’.

Sutta Nipāta

So no arahat exist in nibbana, actually even here and now Tathagata is not to be found, much less after the death of the body. Also arahat realsed unborn here and now, so phrase “after death of arahat” contains wrong assumption that unborn can die.

[NgXinZhao]

@knigarian

As far as asserting that there is unborn, or asanhata dhatu, this assertion is stated in positive terms, but it doesn’t include assertion of existence.

I would define the meaning of exist as being able to be contacted and not exist means cannot be contacted.

While alive, arahants can perceive Nibbāna, so Nibbāna exist in that sense. In parinibbāna, there’s no mind to contact parinibbāna, so one cannot say parinibbāna exist… In the sense of nothingness.

But parinibbāna exist means rebirth can end, that’s another way to use exist.

Since after the break up of the 5 aggregates after the eradication of ignorance, there’s no mind or body, no existence can be said of any of those 5 aggregates (other than the corpse), then there’s no conceptual way to differentiate parinibbāna from absolute nothingness.

The previous paragraph is why we use after death of arahant or parinibbāna as short hand.

There’s no meaning to deny that parinibbāna is not utter nothingness and say it cannot be perceived. Nibbāna can be perceived by living people, and it’s basically seeing parinibbāna from the perspective of living people being outside of parinibbāna. So having the wrong idea about what parinibbāna is means to see the wrong nibbāna, and thus not even getting to stream winning.

[knigarian]

@NgXinZhao

While alive, arahants can perceive Nibbāna,

That’s confused description. Arahat is nibbāna.

[NgXinZhao]

Arahant refers to the person who attained to Nibbāna.

Nibbāna is permanent, arahant dies, thus not permanent. Nibbāna doesn’t have 5 aggregates in it, arahant has 5 aggregates, therefore they can perceive, feel, eat etc.