“Ānanda, when a bhikkhu does not consider feeling as self, and does not consider self as without experience of feeling, and does not consider: ‘My self feels; for my self is subject to feeling’—then, being without such considerations, he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Not being agitated, he personally attains nibbāna. He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no returning to this state of being.’
“Ānanda, if anyone should say of a bhikkhu whose mind has been thus liberated, that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata exists after death’—that would not be proper; or that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata does not exist after death’—that would not be proper; or that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death’—that would not be proper; or that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’—that would not be proper. For what reason? Because that bhikkhu is liberated by directly knowing this: the extent of designation and the extent of the pathway for designation, the extent of language and the extent of the pathway for language, the extent of description and the extent of the pathway for description, the extent of wisdom and the extent of the sphere for wisdom, the extent of the round and the extent to which the round turns. To say of a bhikkhu who is liberated by directly knowing this that he holds the view ‘One does not know and does not see’—that would not be proper.
Does anyone understands the second paragraph? What happens to the consciousness of Tathāgata in this body and after the death of the material body? Is this even an answerable question or a valid question?
It’s not a valid question. SN 12 has several suttas about invalid questions—a few excerpts are below. Even asking “Who feels?” or “Who is born?” or “Who dies?” are not valid questions, let alone questions about a tathagata. Seeing things through the view of a self and trying to establish a self among things is what leads to seeing these questions as valid. Seeing things through the lens of the 3 characteristics and dependent origination is what leads to seeing these questions as invalid.
At Savatthī. “Bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.”
When he had said this, a certain bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, what now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “Bhikkhu, whether one says, ‘What now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?’ or whether one says, ‘Aging-and-death is one thing, the one for whom there is this aging-and-death is another’—both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing. If there is the view, ‘The soul and the body are the same,’ there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, ‘The soul is one thing, the body is another,’ there is no living of the holy life. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With birth as condition, aging-and-death. ’”
-SN 12.35
“Bhante, who feels?”
“That is not a valid question,” the Blessed One said. “I do not say ‘One feels.’ If I said, ‘One feels,’ then this would be a valid question: ‘Bhante, who feels?’ But I do not say that. Since I do not say that, if someone asked, ‘Bhante, what is the condition for feeling?’ then that would be a valid question. And the proper explanation would be, ‘Based on sense-contact there are feelings, and based on feelings there is craving.’”
-SN 12.12
The question assumes the Tathagata is a kind of entity.
But it’s all just processes, causes and conditions. And processes can cease.
Consider
Snp3.12:
“All the suffering that originates is caused by consciousness. “Yaṁ kiñci dukkhaṁ sambhoti,sabbaṁ viññāṇapaccayā.” With the cessation of consciousness, there is no origination of suffering. Viññāṇassa nirodhena, natthi dukkhassa sambhavo.
SN22.97
“Mendicant, there is no consciousness at all that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever.”
