You are right that most sutta quote impermanence first. However, if this is the right order, then it makes it more strange that it wasn’t presented as the first argument.
It follows the usual order in Buddhist thinking, for example in the four foundations of mindfulness, body precedes the mind. The first argument is related to the ‘body’ of anatta or how it operates in its environment, the second is mental.
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I mean the two arguments as in the first post. Shouldn’t impermanence, dukkha and not self be stated first before the argument about the five aggregates leading to affliction?
In fact, Ven Analayo’s statement about progression from impermanence is not exactly true for Anattalakkhaṇa sutta. As quoted above, it started with a statement that five aggregates are not self because they lead to affliction. The triad anicca, dukkha, anatta is the second argument.
Mendicants, form is not-self. For if form were self, it wouldn’t lead to affliction.
I am a person who is searching for a life of true happiness and true freedom. Let’s call that life as “self”.
If form is that “self” then it should be truly freedom for me, and I can do whatever and whenever I want with it. Otherwise, it is not freedom for me. However, I cannot always be able to control form. Therefore, it is not true freedom, or it is not the “self” that I am looking for.
If form is that “self” then it should be true happiness, but because it is impermanent then it is suffering. Therefore, it is not true happiness, or it is not the self that I am looking for.
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Thanks for the explanation. Referring to first post, the question is why two arguments when one would suffice? Why the first argument categorically state not self while the second is for the audience to consider?
I replied hard way and soft way above, not sure if you got that.
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Yes, certainly. I’ve read it and it could be a way to understand it. Thanks.
I am looking for a self that is true freedom and true happiness. However, if that self is true freedom but not true happiness, or it is true happiness but not true freedom then I may accept it if nothing else can be found. However, form is not true freedom and also not true happiness. Therefore, I cannot accept it.
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In SN22.59 Anattalakkhaṇasutta, two arguments were presented. In the first argument, five aggregates were categorically stated as not-self because they lead to affliction and cannot be compelled otherwise as desired. The second one question if they are fit to be regarded as self since they are impermanent, perishable and Dukkha.
Any thoughts on why two arguments were presented. Why the first is firm on stating Anatta while second ask if they are befitting to be considered as self which seems more tone down?
Let me try. In this sutta, the Buddha illuminates two sides of the grasping process. aggregates are always viewed from two sides.
1.The objective state of the aggregates. Their nature, lakkhana. That is, something that does not depend on desire, personal perception, etc. Usually these lakhnas are described through negation, emptiness. There is no useful auspicious quality in things. And this is their objective nature:
- Anicca - impermanent;
- Dukkha - unsatisfactory;
- Asubha - unattractive or impure;
- Anatta - uncontrollable or selfless.
2.There is another contour - this is personal perception. Consciousness can adopt a thing or reject it depending on wisdom or ignorance; disgust, lust, or equanimity. For example, grief, despair, unhappiness are forms of dukkha perceived subjectively. Things can seem constant, stable, or they can be perceived with the help of a philosophical view: this is how a stable column is seen already broken.
The Buddha constructs his argument about the nature of anatta in two ways. It destroys the idea of an objectively existing ontological I, soul - showing uncontrollability, a composite nature. And he also considers subjective self-grasping to things, from a subjective standpoint - is it worth to cling to? Is it worth taking it as “I” and “mine”, or is it better to perceive it as Not-I, alien, hostile? The two contour - subjective and objective - leave no room for speculation, no loophole for craving
Аre the two arguments related in any way?
Seeing objective impersonality, you can change your subjective view. And vice versa - by changing the subjective view, we lose our distorting lenses and see things as they really are, without speculation and proliferation. Papancha caused by our desire affects the way we perceive things.
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"In contrast to his opponents, the Buddha termed himself a defender of ‘analysis’ or ‘vibhajjavada’. He held that after proper rational analysis, assertions could be classified in the following way:[32]
- Those assertions which can be asserted or denied categorically (ekamsika)
- Those which cannot be asserted or denied categorically (anekamsika), which the Buddha further divided into:
- Those which after analysis (vibhajja-) could be known to be true or false.
- Those like the avyakata-theses, which could not be thus known."—Wikipedia
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Thanks. Interesting viewpoint of approaching the arguments in objective and subjective aspects.
You explain it with the second argument but I suppose it applies to the first as well.
The first argument concerns the first objective contour the inherent characteristic of dhammas. I wrote about it in point 1. That is, it is the empty nature of dhammas. Lack of lasting, ideal qualities in them. For this reason the Buddha in the first argument convincingly asserts the characterization of aggregates.
And it does not require questions about whether it is worth perceiving a thing this or that. it is in its nature.
Lack of control really does not depend on personal desire or way of perception. This is an objective proven fact. The second argument is built on a change in personal perception and experience. For example, a long contemplation of impermanence, changeability, unsatisfactoriness leads to disappointment, to letting go, detachment. The mind tends not to perceive the thing as “I”.
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Good point. Lack of control and impermanence can be observed objectively. Phenomena are originated depending on senses and corresponding objects. Since neither are under the control of a Self or persistent, the resultant phenomena will inherit the same characteristics.
However, dukkha, asuba and anatta are subjective experiences. Relying on and seeking security over phenomena that are impermanent and not within control is obviously not satisfactory.
I think this is not entirely true. Dukkha is a danger latent in aggregates, dissatisfaction. That is, samskaras that cannot be enjoyed — they are dukkha, non-sukkha. That is, regardless of whether we cling to formations or not, they have a danger, the potential to bring suffering and not bring happiness. It is the same with anatta. Heartlessness is not about personal attitude. For example, a child can play with a doll representing it as alive and as a person, however, there is not a grain of animation in it.
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Dukkha can be seen as a liability to suffer. Whenever there is clinging to aggregates, there is a risk to suffer - Dukkha. With relinquishment of aggregates, Dukkha cease.
Once, the Buddha asked the sangha if they will suffer if someone remove the branches, twigs and grass from the monastery. They answered ‘No’ since they don’t consider they own them. Similarly, if one don’t take ownership of the five aggregates, one will not suffer when they change.
After further consideration, I think maybe the first argument is more suited for one who is still deeply engaged in sensual pleasure. It will be a very strong motivation to practise restrain and be secluded from sensuality because one would recoil from pain instinctively.
On the other hand, for one who has achieved seclusion and is experiencing pleasure that are not based on sensuality and not to be afraid of, the second argument of impermanence would take one further.
For someone who is not well developed in the Dhamma, perception of impermanence may become a tool for self serving purpose to further the grasp of sensual pleasure. For instance, one could think of painful covid lock down situation as impermanent so as to get by until one could go socialise and travel again. “This too will past” so to speak. Conversely, one may grasp tighter to sense of self and feel anxious against that perception like Channa in SN22.90.
In any case, one needs to discern with wisdom and grap the Dhamma snake appropriately so that one will not be bitten by it.
First Argument
Mendicants, form is not-self. For if form were self, it wouldn’t lead to affliction. And you could compel form: ‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’ But because form is not-self, it leads to affliction. And you can’t compel form: ‘May my form be like this! May it not be like that!’
Second Argument
What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Suffering, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
“No, sir.”
“So you should truly see any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’
An interesting thought just dawned on me.
Often non-Buddhists do not understand, and Buddhists understand, but only intuitively, what anatta is and how it is that me do not have that same Self, “I”
The Dhamma usually leads to the analysis of the aggregates. And so it turns out that there are aggregates, but there is no I.
What’s the difference then? After all, these same aggregates can be called I, what is the problem?
Other schools saw this and began to say that the aggregates is also an illusion, or a mental fantasy (which requires the approval of a certain transcendent mind) or emptiness at all, nothing, just emptiness shines with illusory highlights of being. “Form is emptiness, emptiness is form”.
In short, these schools had good intentions. Where this fixing of the Dhamma led to is the second question. But they repaired the Dhamma because they did not quite understand what was meant.
…
Or, for example - it is not always clear what Buddha means when he speaks - it is uncontrollable, fleeting, suffering, so it cannot be I and there is no I next to it.
So what is it - atta and anatta?
And so, my explanation.
“I” is not any pile of sticks, stones, meat, brains, metaphysical mental energies, phenomena, and so on.
“I” is a very specific thing. It doesn’t matter what it consists of - meat, emptiness, aggregates, consciousness, soul, or nothing
“I” - is a certain thing with certain functions. If it does not perform these functions, then, accordingly, this contraption is not Me.
Not every collection of legs, eyes, hair and torso is a toy.
Give your daughter a doll that lacks the qualities of a doll, and even if “it” even looks like a doll, your daughter will quickly figure it out.
There is a good example in visudhimagga. The monk wants to buy himself a bowl. A desire arises in him in relation to the some bowl, looking at it, he sees three holes in the bowl. The bowl loses all use in his eyes, becomes useless for him. He loses all interest and leaves.
The bowl is the five aggregates. three holes - three characteristics. Gazing is vipassana. And leaving the bowl is a disappointment, viraga.
And so, Self, “I” must perform some specific functions.
For example, to bring happiness, otherwise for why such a self is needed. It should be constant. Otherwise, what kind of selfhood is it, which, having arisen, immediately perished.
Finally control or be subservient to yourself. be alive.
If this is an inanimate heap of hostile and suffering mechanisms, then what a “Self” is this? How does it differ especially from any other objects of nature?
And so, “I” is a certain stuff with certain functions. If dhamma does not fulfill the function of the Self, then the dhamma is not the Self.
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Thank you for the very apt simile. I suppose viraga has the connotation of weariness too. An analogy could be one tries to fill the bowl with water but it keep leaking out from the bowl. Finally, one grows tired of doing it when Dhamma eye sees the leak.
Also, although one don’t consciously think of constancy, satisfactoriness and self, they are hidden behind the veil of ignorance. They are projected out through one’s thoughts, speech and deeds.
Thanissaro Bhikkhu explained that there are two ideas of self.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/selvesnotself.html#talk4
This question contains two ideas of self. The first is the idea of the self as agent, the producer of happiness; the second is the idea of the self as the consumer of happiness.
In this case, we can also view the first argument as one coming from the producer end. One cannot have total control over body and mind. Ultimately, it will perish one day.
For the second argument, one could see it from consumer perspective. When one experiences anything, keep the context that it is not constant, it is or will lead to dissatisfaction. Due to that dissatisfactory nature, is it skillful to uphold it as me, mine or Self?
Using this two prongs approach, one skillfully use the perception to reduce grasping or fuel for existence.
There are two ways to look at five clinging aggregates. They may belong to self or they can be the existence itself.
As peripherals for existence, one is unable to control them as one wishes so that one will not be afflicted. Ultimately, one will perish one day.
As the existence itself, it is conditioned, willed, dependent originated and, hence, impermanence. It follows that one couldn’t satisfactorily seek security in it and deemed it as self.