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Ajahn Brahm - some remarks on Paticca Samuppada.pdf (179.1 KB)
Ajahn Brahm Paticca Samuppada.pdf (229.3 KB)
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Thank you. It works now.
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Thank you. I am able to access.
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Thank you, Ajahn Brahmali, for bringing this great paper up again. I’ve read and referred to it several times.
There’s one part where Ajahn Brahm relates the story of the kittens in the coal mine. A few years ago I read it to be an urban legend. I’m not sure either way.
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In this passage, Ajahn Brahm states that insight based on jhāna shows that “the mind”/“mental consciousness” is “independent of the body” and is “drive[n]… through and beyond death.” I’m fairly new to this topic, and I’m wondering if anyone can point me to the suttas where this is stated most directly, i.e. that “the mind”/“mental consciousness” is (a) independent of the body, and (b) moves “through” death?
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This is specifically to counter materialism philosophy, which believe that when the brain dies, the mind dies, nothing after death, no possibility of rebirth or any afterlife.
There’s rebirth mentioned in super a lot of suttas, so by that alone, you can get the thing you asked for.
Hello and welcome to the forum!
The question you are asking is deep and requires a good grasp of Dependent origination as well as an experiential acquaintance with jhana.
The Buddha described his own investigation and understanding of the relationship between Consciousness and the underlying physical processes of Name and Form (mental processing supported by the body) as
SN12.65
This consciousness turns back from name and form, and doesn’t go beyond that. 3.3This is the extent to which one may be reborn, grow old, die, pass away, or reappear. That is: name and form are conditions for consciousness. 3.4Consciousness is a condition for name and form.
and
SN12.64
If there is desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness becomes established there and grows. 2.2Where consciousness is established and grows, name and form are conceived. 2.3Where name and form are conceived, there is the growth of choices. 2.4Where choices grow, there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future.
Suppose an artist or painter had some dye, red lac, turmeric, indigo, or rose madder. And on a polished plank or a wall or a canvas they’d create the image of a woman or a man, complete in all its various parts.
4.2In the same way, if there is desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness becomes established there and grows.
How then does consciousness keep re-arising? It is because name and form keep re-arising in a linked manner. The next consciousness and name/form which rearises after the breakup of the previous one is not exactly the same, nor is it completely different.
T1670b
The king asked, “When a person dies, and he is reborn in a good or in a bad realm, does the body and spirit remain the same as the old one or become another?”Nāgasena replied, “It is neither the same old body and spirit, nor is it apart from the old one.”
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Another sutta that addresses this would be SN 44.9:
I declare, Vaccha, rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel. Just as a fire burns with fuel, but not without fuel, so, Vaccha, I declare rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel.”
“Master Gotama, when a flame is flung by the wind and goes some distance, what does Master Gotama declare to be its fuel on that occasion?”
“When, Vaccha, a flame is flung by the wind and goes some distance, I declare that it is fuelled by the wind. For on that occasion the wind is its fuel.”
“And, Master Gotama, when a being has laid down this body but has not yet been reborn in another body, what does Master Gotama declare to be its fuel on that occasion?”
“When, Vaccha, a being has laid down this body but has not yet been reborn in another body, I declare that it is fuelled by craving. For on that occasion craving is its fuel.
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Here a two references that point to consciousness being independent of the body. To get the most out of these excerpts, it’s best to read the entire suttas to establish context.
DN 55
‘Consciousness is a condition for name and form’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. If consciousness were not conceived in the mother’s womb, would name and form coagulate there?”
“No, sir.”
“If consciousness, after being conceived in the mother’s womb, were to be miscarried, would name and form be born into this state of existence?”
“No, sir.”
“If the consciousness of a young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name and form achieve growth, increase, and maturity?”
“No, sir.”
“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and condition of name and form, namely consciousness.
‘Name and form are conditions for consciousness’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. If consciousness were not to become established in name and form, would the coming to be of the origin of suffering—of rebirth, old age, and death in the future—be found?”
“No, sir.”
“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and condition of consciousness, namely name and form. This is the extent to which one may be reborn, grow old, die, pass away, or reappear. This is how far the scope of language, terminology, and description extends; how far the sphere of wisdom extends; how far the cycle of rebirths proceeds so that this state of existence is to be found; namely, name and form together with consciousness.
MN 43
“How many things must this body lose before it lies forsaken, tossed aside like an insentient log?”
“This body must lose three things before it lies forsaken, tossed aside like an insentient log: vitality, warmth, and consciousness.”
Also, you might want to get a copy of Bhikkhu Analayo’s book “Rebirth in Early Buddhism & Current Research”. The first chapter eloquently and concisely defines the basic aspects Dependent Origination.
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For the first one, you need go no further than the standard jhāna formula (pericope) where you find the following phrase:
vivicceva kāmehi
This can best be rendered as “fully separated from the five senses”, which of course includes the body.
As for moving through death, the following is instructive:
Purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṃ pajānāti, ubhayato abbocchinnaṃ idha loke patiṭṭhitañca paraloke patiṭṭhitañca. (DN 28)
“You understand a person’s stream of consciousness, established in this world and the next, continuous on both sides.”
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Thanks so much to everyone for your helpful messages. I originally created separate replies to a few individual users, but the site suggested that I combine them, so I’m folding everything together in this message.
@faujidoc1:
Thank you so much for the kind welcome. I had not encountered the passage from the Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra, and I found it quite interesting. If you’re willing to offer a few more thoughts, I do have one follow up question:
The passage you cited from SN12.65 indicates that name and form are dependent of consciousness, but also that consciousness is dependent on name and form. This makes clear that consciousness is different from name and form, but it also seems to cut against the notion that it is independent of name and form. If it is true that “When name and form don’t exist, there is no consciousness. When name and form cease, consciousness ceases,” that seems almost by definition to mean that consciousness is not independent of name and form. Connecting this line of thought to my original question above: If name and form have something to do with the body (which may be an incorrect assumption?), then this suggests that consciousness depends on the body, rather than being independent of it. Do you have thoughts on this reading, or additional suttas to suggest that might clarify the point?
@Adutiya
I replied just above to @faujidoc1 with a question that I think also applies to the quote you offered from MN15 (am I correct that you meant 15, not 55?). If you have any thoughts on that point, I’d of course be grateful.
Regarding the quote you offered from MN43 (and thank you for suggesting that sutta), to my eyes the statement that “This body must lose three things before it lies forsaken, tossed aside like an insentient log: vitality, warmth, and consciousness" could just as easily be read to suggest that consciousness is a quality of the body, and therefore not independent of it. Are you able to say more about why you are reading this passage as justifying the independence of consciousness from the body, rather than their interrelation?
In any case, I had wondered in the past about trying to get a copy of Bhikkhu Analayo’s book on rebirth, and you have convinced me that I should do that now!
@Brahmali
Thank you so much for your reply, Ajahn. That reference to DN28 is extremely helpful. If you are willing to say a little more, I have one question about your explanation of the “fully separated from the five senses” quotation from the jhāna formula. In the past, I have always interpreted that statement as referring to the “object” of consciousness, i.e. that no sight-consciousness, sound-consciousness, etc. arise. I haven’t seen it as saying anything about the “conditions” of consciousness, such as whether or not consciousness depends on the body. But it sounds like you are reading it that way, i.e. to mean that consciousness in jhāna is not only not directed towards the body, but also that consciousness is in no way dependent on the body? If I’m understanding you correctly, are you able to say a bit about why that more expansive reading seems right to you, and/or where else in the suttas it’s elaborated?
Thank you so much again to everyone!
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IMO, one must think of Consciousness and Name/Form not as entities but rather as mutually interdependent processes occurring within the inter linked non trivially recurrent cyclic process of Dependent Origination - they are fuelled by craving. Processes can cease, but they can also restart so long as there is fuel and the appropriate conditions reappear. Though the process of Consciousness runs on the nominal shell of what superficially appears to be a unique entity viz the body, it is not restricted to it… the body and its sense bases represent appropriate conditions true, but the body itself is not the fuel. Hence, even when this particular body is no longer operative, the processes of Consciousness and Name/Form do not go out of existence- the fuel of craving is not yet over. Instead, they re-establish on the basis of another suitable body (See the analogy of the spark going from one bonfire to another in SN44.9 posted by Christopher above).
Another way to understand the independence of the mind from the body, using modern analogies is by means of a thought experiment I described here.
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The quote is from Digha Nikaya 55.
Regarding the quote from MN 43, here is the key:
“The life forces are not the same things as the phenomena that are felt. For if the life forces and the phenomena that are felt were the same things, a mendicant who had attained the cessation of perception and feeling would not emerge from it. But because the life forces and the phenomena that are felt are different things, a mendicant who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling can emerge from it.”
“How many things must this body lose before it lies forsaken, tossed aside like an insentient log?”
“This body must lose three things before it lies forsaken, tossed aside like an insentient log: vitality, warmth, and consciousness.”
“What’s the difference between someone who has passed away and a mendicant who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling?”
“When someone dies, their physical, verbal, and mental processes have ceased and stilled; their vitality is spent; their warmth is dissipated; and their faculties have disintegrated. When a mendicant has attained the cessation of perception and feeling, their physical, verbal, and mental processes have ceased and stilled. But their vitality is not spent; their warmth is not dissipated; and their faculties are very clear. That’s the difference between someone who has passed away and a mendicant who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling.”
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Well yes, this is a bit tricky. First of all, it’s not just that consciousness is not directed towards the body. In jhāna you can no longer access the body, and so you have to give up the body in much more fundamental sense. In fact, this is one of the reasons accessing jhāna can feel scary, because it seems as if you are leaving your body behind. By giving up access to something, you are giving up ownership of that thing. Giving up ownership is equivalent to seeing the nonself nature of the body.
Is it possible to draw a definitive conclusion on this basis that consciousness can exist independent of the body? Perhaps not. But the intuition is that it is so. It certainly is a powerful pointer in that direction.
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Thanks so much for your responses, @faujidoc1, @Adutiya, and Ajahn @Brahmali - I really appreciate it.
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No doubt Ven Brahmavamso is a skillful logician, and any intelligent person should agree with him, cause and effect is a temporal relation. But as far as relation between birth and death goes, things are much more complicated and ambiguous. Again definitely one is justified to see such relation as temporal. In fact, this is precisely as every puthujjana sees it. “I was born” and “I will die”. The point is: is it exclusively and unambiguously the only one possible relationship between these two items?
Perhaps the problem of suffering lies precisely in puthujjana inability to see this relationship in quite different way?
As Ajahn Chah said,
I think if you really want to cry, then it would be better to do so when someone’s born. (…) If you’ve got to cry, cry at the root, cry at the birth. Look closely: if there was no birth there would be no death. Can you understand this?
There is at least one passage in Suttas which clearly shows to unbiased puthujjana that relationship between the two items: when this is - this is … not necessarily must be that of cause and effect.
”“Well then, friend, I will make up a simile for you, for some intelligent people here understand the meaning of a statement by means of a simile. Just as two sheaves of reeds might stand leaning against each other, so too, with name-and-form as condition, consciousness [comes to be]; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form [comes to be]. With name-and-form as condition
SN 12: 67
Is the relationship between the two sheaves of reeds the temporal one, that of cause and effect? Certainly not. The relationship is that of dependence, certain thing is present (in experience) because it is supported by the another thing, and it is simply impossible that with removing such support it will still persist in experience.
Another example: with feeling as condition, craving.
Again, there is an ambiguity here, and such relationships can be seen as a temporal, first arises certain feeling, and after some time craving arises towards this feeling. But certainly it is not the only possible way of seeing it. Perhaps Lord Buddha says to us that craving can be removed from experience and that without feeling its presence in experience is simply impossible? That in this relationship feeling is sankhara and craving sankhata dhamma?
So coming back to the relationship “with birth as condition death”. Perhaps we are dealing here with the point of the first importance, namely because of taking for granted that between birth and death there could be only temporal relationship, puthujjana doesn’t see that the death can be avoided, not in some future time but now and here by seeing it now and here as impermanent, determinated, and dependently arisen.
With vision of such atemporal dependence one can by stepping back, come to see that all that chain of dependently arisen things, depends on ignorance. So while description of birth in Suttas is unambiguous, so in no way birth in dependent arising can be seen as symbolic, but when relationship between ignorance and birth is seen, it neither can be seen as “my birth”. Body was born and body will die. But according to the Lord Buddha, body has to be seen as: “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”
OK, let’s admit that to insist that one wasn’t born may seem little bit excentric, but this is a matter of insight, so no need to proclaim it to everyone one meets, and excentric or not, it has a really great advantage: one cannot die.
This note should be seen just as the food for thought, no need to push anyone towards immortality, or towards seeing the death as impermanent, determined and dependently arisen on the present condition.
Summarise, Ven Brahmavamso is definitely right that cause and effect is temporal relationship and with this Ven Nanamoli Thera agrees. But he also says:
[ dependent arising] «is not a logical proposition, nor is it a temporal cause-result chain. Such an approach makes an understanding of it impossible.»(Thinker’s Notebook)
But whether presently Ven Brahmavamso agrees or disagrees with Ven Nanamoli, I am not in position to say. Anyway on the first place it is not scholastic matter, and I think everyone here is or should be interested in his own immortality, so perhaps if one disagrees with Ven Nanamoli this is so because one already found one’s own way towards it and he is perfectly satisfied with it. If so, I apologise, the note is not an attempt to change his way of seeing things as they are, but some people are still in the search, so perhaps they may find Ven Nanamoli’s ideas on dependent arising at least interesting.
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I do not think Dependend Arising really gives insight in rebirth. I believe at best it shows how things keep rolling on, in a circular motion. A motion fed by avijja and tanha. But it does not really serve as something that gives deep insight into how rebirth works. At least not for me. The step between death and new birth? How? I believe different schools have different ideas.
Well, all this problems with suffering are they not merely related to ego? Ego does not want to feel pain, become sick, weak, loose hairs, teeth, be burdened, decay, die. It wants to rule and be in controll.
It wants to experience this but not that.
For ego suffering is like failure and being a looser, and happiness is being a winner. Most of the time that is why one does not want to have trouble. Not because suffering is not nice, but one wants to be the superhero, the healthy person, the winner, the strong person, the never weak person. Problems with suffering are most of the time related to imago/persona not really to a sincere wish to find the truth, i believe.
Now, let’s be little more precise … These descriptions are valid but in fact the First Noble Truth can be stated in much more fundamental way:
in short, the five aggregates affected by clinging are suffering. This is called suffering. MN 9 Other synonym for suffering is sakkaya or person and since the common man sees himself as a person (sakkaya) his very being (bhava)- attitude “I am” can be render as suffering.
So in your terms, to be precise you should say: ego is suffering. And since there cannot be ego without upādāna, arahat can be described only in terms of aggregates not affected by upādāna. Suttas mention four kinds of upādāna, and arahat is free from any kind of upādāna.
But what should be obvious, puthujjana takes his self, and his being very seriously so it is quite possible that he misunderstans idea of cessation of being now and here as annihilation of existing creature. But in the case of Buddhist puthujjana, who by the very definition doesn’t understand suffering and its cessation, it is possible that he will insist that the true nibbana, the true cessation of suffering is only after death of arahat.
But the question “does arahat suffer?” belongs to the category of questions which have to be analised before answering*, since as a matter of fact bodily pain is classified as dukkha. Also any kind of experience, whether described in terms of senses, or aggregates also can be classified as dukkha.
On the other hand the highest happiness is described in Suttas as follows:
Pleasurable is dispassion in the world,
The getting beyond sensuality.
**But the putting away of the conceit ‘I am’ **
> —this is the highest pleasure.
Udana 11
Cessation of conceit “I am” excludes possibility of any kind of mental suffering whatsoever that is way problem of arahat’s suffering cannot be resolved by merely affirmation or negation, and it has to be analised on the first place.
*See AN IV : 42
“Bhikkhus, there are these four ways of answering questions.722 What four? (1) There is a question to be answered categorically; (2) there is a question to be answered after making a distinction; (3) there is a question to be answered with a counter-question; and (4) there is a question to be set aside. These are the four ways of answering questions.”
One kind is given a categorical answer,
another is answered after making a distinction;
to the third, one should raise a counter-question,
but the fourth should be set aside.
When a bhikkhu knows how to answer
each type in the appropriate way,
they say that he is skilled
in the four kinds of questions.
He is hard to attack, hard to defeat,
deep, hard to assault;
he is proficient in both
what is beneficial and harmful.
(…)
And now, when Venerable Brahmavamso insist in the article that:
Even arahants, enlightened monks and nuns, experience suffering. They are not released from suffering, they are still in the world, in jail. The main difference between an ordinary “prisoner” and an arahant is that the latter is certain to leave soon.
He is mistaken not so much because his words aren’t true, since arahat as a puggala most certainly still is in the “world”, and painful feelings associated with the body as we said can be classified as suffering. The “guilt” of Venerable is much more subtle namely making “categorical” statement about the problem which has to be analised, or as Ven Bodhi translation says: about the problem where one has to make distinction; in this particular case before the answer is made one has to distinguish various kind of “suffering”.
And so since in the world is only arahat’s body, and with cessation of concept “I am” Tathagata actually and in truth is not to be found even now and here, in this sense arahat cannot “localised”* in the world.
Do notice that you can verify by yourself to a certain level at least, that being in the world, or being extended in space and time, depends on self-identification with the body. It is enough to focus one’s attention on the body, taking it as an object of consciousness, not the place “here” where “you” are, but an object which is “there” - guided by Buddha’s instruction, and seeing it as “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”. Conceit “I am” still will persist, so at this point seemingly bizarre question: “where am I?” starts to make some sense. After all “I am”, but I am not “there” in the body. Of course the question belongs to the category of questions which has to be put aside, it based on wrong assumption that I am, so any kind of answer will afirm that wrong assumption. But since only arahat is free from conceit “I am”, it has some existential validity and can be used by anyone who is somehow impatient and prefer to leave the world now and here, not after the death of the body. And there is nice pun about such present “delocalizsation”.
Odd how now and here is nowhere (Nanamoli Thera)
*As much as “What am I?”:
The world, of course, remains ‘there’ but he regards it as accidental (Husserl says that he ‘puts it in parentheses, between brackets’), and this means that he dismisses whatever positive identification he may have as irrelevant. He is no longer ‘a politician’ or ‘a fisherman’, but ‘a self’. But what we call a ‘self’, unless it receives positive identification from outside, remains a void, in other words a negative . A ‘self’, however, is positive in this respect—it seeks identification. So a person who identifies himself with himself finds that his positivity consists in negativity—not the confident ‘I am this’ or ‘I am that’ of the positive, but a puzzled, perplexed, or even anguished, ‘What am I?’. (This is where we meet the full force of Kierkegaard’s ‘concern and unrest’.) Eternal repetition of this eternally unanswerable question is the beginning of wisdom (it is the beginning of philosophy); but the temptation to provide oneself with a definite answer is usually too strong, and one falls into a wrong view of one kind or another. (It takes a Buddha to show the way out of this impossible situation. For the sotāpanna , who has understood the Buddha’s essential Teaching, the question still arises, but he sees that it is unanswerable and is not worried; for the arahat the question no longer arises at all, and this is final peace.)
Nanavira Thera
Arahat and the end of the world are synonyms.
There is no self without world, and there is no world without self. attā ca loko ca
It is enough to investigate the Dhamma: we know that certain wrong views in Brahmajala don’t mention self only just make statements about the world. And yet, since ultimately all views in Brahmajala are dependent on sakkayaditthi, and sakkayaditthi is inseparable from attāvada, we see confirmation, the very mention of the world implicitly assumes self, which lives in the world. When there is attāvada there is also concept of the world.
The concept of the world is dependently arisen, when duality in the name-and-matter, eye + visible forms, (and so on) what with consciousness constitute strictly impersonal experience of seeing, due to ignorance is interpreted subjectively: "I see things in the world ". The body with the sensory organs becomes “self”, and surrounding it matter create “external world”.
Idea of external world is dependent on ignorance, since primarily all experience is in the field of consciousness, and there is nothing external to consciousness.
In his statement Ven Brahmavamso completely ignored diversity of puggalas. Of course it is true that regardless it is puggala who carries the burden of sakkaya, (puthujjana) or it is puggala without sakkaya (arahat) such puggala as a certain component of impermanent things, is in space and time.
But in the case of arahat, such puggala is as much part of objective reality as sticks and grass. In other words there is no person (sakkaya) who is in the world, in the case of arahat. When things are described from this stance, we can say that there is no one who is in space, and no one who is subjected to duration, no one who has past or future.
‘I was’ is not for me, not for me is ‘I shall be’;
Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs?
Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants—
For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear.
Theragāthā 715, 716
Fear however is a quite rational emotion in the case one who considers himself to be person, living in the world. Since as a matter of fact there is no such thing as safe place. To be is a very dangerous thing.
Fortunately Buddha teaches us that world is empty of self. While it contradicts the direct experience of puthujjana, when he properly understands Dhamma instructions, he doesn’t have to wait for the death of the body in order to leave the world. What puthujjana sees as events in his world, arahat sees as events in the field of consciousness, but there is no any such person (sakkaya) as arahat “who is there” in the field.
There is nice pun, localization (loka) is a state of puthujjana, but seeing things through lens of right view we aren’t able to localize an arahat even now and here.
“But, friend, when the Tathāgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here and now , is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death’?”
“Formerly, friend Sāriputta, when I was ignorant, I did hold that pernicious view, but now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable Sāriputta I have abandoned that pernicious view and have made the breakthrough to the Dhamma. SN 22 : 84
Being is a state of puthujjana, and the death of the body doesn’t change his state at all. Cessation of being is the state of arahat, and it is such no matter the body is alive or dead.
Puthujjana not so much experience suffering (which of course is true in certain sense), but he is suffering, or his very being (conceit “I am” and attavada) is suffering. To be is to suffer. What puthujjana doesn’t understand, the state of being isn’t compulsory. No need to localize oneself in space and time by self-identification with things extended in space and time.
The point is that one who is a victim of such localization, doesn’t understand his own situation, and takes for granted existence of external world where he lives. And so the insistence that the presence of living body in the field of consciousness = being.
“He understands thus: ‘Whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of sensual desire, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of being, those are not present here; whatever disturbances there might be dependent on the taint of ignorance, those are not present here. There is present only this amount of disturbance, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
He understands: ‘This field of perception is void of the taint of sensual desire; this field of perception is void of the taint of being; this field of perception is void of the taint of ignorance. There is present only this non-voidness, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’ Thus, Ānanda, this is his genuine, undistorted, pure descent into voidness, supreme and unsurpassed.
MN 121
In short, the question “is arahat in the world” is a question which has no one-sided answer, and it has to be analyzed before answering it.
Since arahat can be described as certain puggala and such puggala can be localised in space and time, on very gross level (accessible to puthujjana understanding) we can say that arahat is in the world.
But this is a very gross level, since if puthujjana wants to cease to be puthujjana, and this should be his primary concern, he must understend that Tathagata is not to be found even now and here and as such has to be described in term “cessation of being” and cessation of world.
But it cannot be done by one who transforms doctrine of anatta into wrong view “there is no self” and next starts wondering “if there is no self, how can be such thing as rebirth”? And proposes dependent arising as an answer to that question.
But rebirth is possible only when notions of subjectivity, attavadupadana and being which is dependently arisen on upādāna, are present.
“It is fitting for you to be perplexed, Vaccha, it is fitting for you to doubt. Doubt has arisen in you about a perplexing matter. I declare, Vaccha, rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel. Just as a fire burns with fuel, but not without fuel, so, Vaccha, I declare rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel.”
SN 44: 9
Sa-upādānassa khvāhaṃ Vaccha upapattiṃ paññāpemi no anupādānassa. There is a double meaning here, with upādāna meaning both “fuel” and subjective “clinging,” but I have translated the sentence in consonance with the following simile.
Bhikku Bodhi