Is there a sutta that supports the idea that a fully enlightened one (Arahant) experiences Saṅkhāra Dukkha until his demise?
If so whats the reason behind?
2 Likes
There are many on the forum who believe this to be the case. No doubt they will shortly link suttas claiming tooth aches and other bodily pains for Shakyamuni. However, after the Teacher laid down his burden and no longer appropriated the aggregates it is hard to understand how/why we should appropriate them on his behalf.
When we insist that the Teacher experienced bodily pains we are insisting to appropriate the body aggregate on his behalf. The same is true of the other aggregates.
The Teacher did not identify with the aggregates after his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree. They were no longer reckoned in terms of “I” or “me” or even “mine.” Given that the Teacher no longer reckoned in these terms why would we insist to reckon him in terms of these on his behalf?
4 Likes
I think the hidden assumption here is that there’s a subject who doesn’t appropriate the burdens (namely, a reality of Tathagata beyond conventions), and perhaps that is indeed your view. 
But depending on how you read into anatta, there’s no being that is outside of the aggregates either. So, that would amount to there being suffering, but no one to claim that suffering as “mine”.
2 Likes
Ah, but you go looking for that suffering it is also hard to find turning up empty and void just like burning chaff 
To the extent there is a Tathagata who does not appropriate the aggregates; this Tathagata too is a convention and does not exist ultimately nor does any suffering.
2 Likes
And as always we have the ontological vs epistemological debate 
Of course the experience of suffering is not sufficiently explained with language (thus it evades our semantic appropriations, or “turning up empty and void” under analysis"). Does that mean there is no reality underlying the discomforting feeling? 
In other words: does it turn up empty and void because they’re empty and void, or is it because our methods of linguistic analysis can’t compute them properly?
1 Like
Hi Yeshe,
I know this is a topic we and others have discussed and I respectfully would like to point out that I and others have clearly stated that the Buddha and arahants are free from any identification with the aggregates. So, no appropriation…
The point is regarding direct experiences, since the senses and aggregates are still present while an awakened one is alive.
Whether one identifies or not with these conditional experiences, they still take place while alive and there is the fact of sheer pain – which compared to no possibility of any pain after the final death, can be understood as dukkha.
Jellyfish have, as best as we can tell, no view of “I, me mine” yet they retreat from noxious stimuli.
Pain is pain for the awakened and unawakened.
SN45.165
“Mendicants, there are these three forms of suffering.
“Tisso imā, bhikkhave, dukkhatā.
What three?
Katamā tisso?
The suffering inherent in painful feeling; the suffering inherent in conditions; and the suffering inherent in perishing.
Dukkhadukkhatā, saṅkhāradukkhatā, vipariṇāmadukkhatā—"
6 Likes
And of course you remember that I’m not intending any ontological claim when I say, “ultimately non-existent.”
Take linguistic analysis, or any other form of analysis and they still can’t be found. The assumption I’m making and of course I think it is a very good one is that if something existed in the manner under question - ultimately, ontologically, truly/really - then it would be precisely the kind of “existence” that would stand up to some form of analysis.
If someone wanted to posit an existence that does not stand up to any kind of analysis whatsoever and insisted to label that existence “ultimate”, then I would just offer that we are using words differently. Specifically, I’m taking “ultimate” to mean one that does stand up.
2 Likes
Yes, there is still dukkha in Jambudvīpa even after an enlightened one awakens. This is evident by all the beings experiencing dukkha that are not yet enlightened. After Shakyamuni stood up from the Bodhi tree for instance Devadatta experienced much dukkha.
However, to say that it was Shakyamuni who experienced it is to appropriate that dukkha on his behalf. This is what I would object to. To identify any dukkha whatsoever with the awakened one is to appropriate it on his behalf when an awakened one has explicitly laid down that burden.
3 Likes
Haha! Which in my perspective it’s completely otherwise. 
I’d posit that it’s precisely our views, filters, appropirations, semantic-inclined mentality is what’s keeping us from experiencing the non-conceptual ontological reality, so that’s how I define ignorance.
That’s how I’m attempting to read Nagarjuna - to see him poking fun at trying to treat our concepts as sacred, ridiculing our forms of analyses - showing that these sort of reductive analysis always lead to self-contradicting statements.
It’s kind of like trying to measure the colours with a microphone, in a way.
But I’m not sure we should keep our shenanigans in this thread, or if we’re devolving people away from the topic. I suppose we’re still on point, but it might not appear so to everyone!
1 Like
Yes, but see my addendum. Simply speaking, if you wish to define some kind of “existence” that can’t be verified by any kind of analysis “ultimate”, then I would say we’re not really arguing at all just using words differently. I’m expressly interested in defining “ultimate existence” to mean one that stands up to analysis.
1 Like
Alright, in which case we can conventionally talk about there being the experience of suffering, but no tathagata to actually appropriate it. So conventionally, it’d be better to feed the body rather than starve it for two months just because there’s no tathagata to appropriate the worsening suffering as “mine”.
Would you agree with that?
I do understand the distinction you’re trying to make, I think.
So it would depend on how the question was formulated and how it’s answered. Seeing how arahants use “I” conventionally, it can be understood how Buddha would talk about “his back pain” as well.
That shouldn’t imply there’s actually a separate phenomema called Buddha who experiences the pain. And you object to ultimately positing “Arahant experiences pain” on these grounds. Is that right?
Thanks for your reply.
But this seems like a bit of word-play – we know that the Buddha spoke of conventional uses of labels and words, and this is the same thing.
We use “Buddha” here as a conventional designation of the stream of conditions that continued as experiences until the final death, (of course, there are no defilements or āsavas present – so no further rebirth and much peace here and now).
So it’s not about “A Buddha” as a something having dukkha. Rather, dukkha persists, as we appear to agree, until the senses and aggregates are fully extinguished.
2 Likes
It isn’t just word play. At this point, to really communicate I think I have to give the caveat that I don’t know the truth of the Teacher’s realization under the Bodhi tree and have not verified it myself. So please take what I say as a hypothesis and not a declaration of knowledge. I’m a blind person with an imagination in other words
However, I try and take seriously the Teacher’s declaration of laying down the burden and imagining what that might be like. To no longer identify with anything at all and to have given up any reckoning of “I” or “me” or “mine” completely in a fully conscious way. In my imagining, it would no longer be possible to identify with any dukkha whatsoever.
Now, about the conventional definition of the Tathagata or Buddha I refer back to various suttas such as SN 22.86. Regarding the senses and aggregates similarly I refer to SN 22.95. These are all just conventional designations and I can’t find any ultimate meaning of any of these terms. They are just skillful word-play existents if you will.
The one big difference that I know we disagree about Jasudho is that I believe the Teacher became fully extinguished under the Bodhi tree. He laid down the burden right there and then and no longer identified with any aggregates or dukkha. I think it is skillful to define things this way.
2 Likes
See this last reply to Jasudho which might clarify what I’m trying to convey. It’s just that I don’t know what it might be like to completely give up identifying with anything at all. To lay down any identification with anything and not pick it up again. However, I can imagine what it might be like and how one might use language after that along with the realization that nothing can withstand analysis.
I can imagine how one might use language skillfully to lead others to knowing this laying down of the burden. So it isn’t just word-play or being willy nilly with definitions. I think the Teacher had a point and a path he wanted people to follow and this is my best attempt to imagine what that point and path might involve.
1 Like
We agree on this regarding identification and I think we agree that the senses and aggregates were still present and operating.
So the only apparent point of not being in agreement is regarding the sheer experiences of pain via the senses as being a form of unpleasantness/dukkha.
After the final death, there no possibility of any pain – so comparatively this would be dukkha-free compared to experiences of pain via the aggregates/senses while alive.
1 Like
Hello Sudheera,
This all depends upon how birth of suffering in the dhamma is understood. When birth in the dhamma is understood as a physical birth, then in life there is no release from suffering.
If, however, birth is understood to be the appropriation of the aggregrates as self, birth has ended when one realizes that the aggregrates are not-self.
Warm regards,
Peter
As per this SN45.165, I assume there is no Saṅkhāra Dukkha for a fully enlightened one, despite it not being stated directly
Even this is us trying to fit it into our own framework where we can’t help but identify senses and aggregates as experiences and then appropriate them on behalf of one who has claimed to have laid them down. We want to talk about Shakyamuni’s senses and Shakyamuni’s aggregates as opposed to some other aggregates and senses. To do so I think is a failure of imagination.
Experience of pain is also just a convention that can’t ultimately be found under analysis just like ‘ambrosia’ or ‘water’ or ‘pus and blood’ can’t be found. It is assuming that ‘experience of pain’ is some real existent that doesn’t depend upon viewpoint. But painful feeling does depend upon viewpoint. What some call ‘pain’ others call ‘pleasant’ and still others call ‘neutral’ and yet others something else entirely or nothing at all.
One that has laid down the burden goes beyond being reckoned in terms of death. We don’t agree even on what death is I’m afraid. I think it is just a convention that depends upon viewpoint. There is no special moment called ‘death’ that is ultimately existent from any other moment. Death doesn’t stand up to analysis.
1 Like
Hey Peter,
As I mentioned in the question, this is, of course, from an Arahant’s point of view.
Further, as I understand, this Saṅkhāra Dukkha is not something that can be experienced.
Hi,
Well, the second form of dukkha is this type.
As we know the word saṅkhāra has various meanings and connotations, depending on the context.
Not looking to get into that here – but it since the aggregates are still present for awakened ones, it’s reasonable to assume there are still conditions like thoughts and responses that arise and cease.
Conditional consciousness is still present, hence also perceptions and feelings. So one could say that the on-going arising of conditional mental processes are still a form of dukkha – even when not identified with or taken as “I, me, mine.”
For example, the Buddha taught that in some states of jhana there is the release of from mental activity like formations and this is more peaceful with less dukkha. So, even activities like saṅkhāra could be seen as a form of dukkha.
Having said this, it’s true that a description of nibbāna, as in AN3.32, has sabbasaṅkhārasamatho – stilling of formations.
This can be understood in a variety of ways and contexts but… there would have to be full awakening to directly know the answer, I’d say.
1 Like