In the standard list of dependent origination, feeling is the transitive condition for grasping. But in the list of the five grasping aggregates, feeling is listed one among other categories which are not explicitly said to involve feeling. Is it the case that grasping can occur with the “bare” aggregates of form, perception, consciousness, and choices, or is it implied that this grasping always operates on feeling intermediate to those aggregates? Please provide sutta references, thank you.
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In standard list, feeling → craving → grasping. It states that feeling and craving as a condition, but does not mention that it operates on them.
Four kinds of grasping listed in MN9: kāmupādānaṁ, diṭṭhupādānaṁ, sīlabbatupādānaṁ, attavādupādānaṁ.
MN109 defines the grasping for the five grasping aggregates as chandarāgo for the five grasping aggregates. Actually I would have a question too, should one translate chandarāgo as “interest and passion” or “passionate interest”?
Thus according to this definition “interest and passion”/“passionate interest” for form would be the grasping. For more details one can refer to the dictionary for the words chanda and raga for alternative translations.
But sir, what is the root of these five grasping aggregates?”
“These five grasping aggregates are rooted in interest (chanda).”"But sir, is that grasping the exact same thing as the five grasping aggregates?
Or is grasping one thing and the five grasping aggregates another?”“Neither. The interest and passion (chandarāgo) for the five grasping aggregates is the grasping there.”
Upadana ultimately depends on ignorance and without ignorance there cannot be upadana. Any puggala is compose of aggregates, so puggala arahat is without upadana. But regarding feeling, whether it is associated with upadana or not, it is necessary condition for the experience either arahat or puthujjana, no feeling no any kind of experience whatsoever is possible.
Which translation are you quoting from? Ven. Sujato has it in MN 109 as:
“But sir, what is the root of these five grasping aggregates?”
“These five grasping aggregates are rooted in desire.” [“Desire” (chanda) is the fundamental driving force underlying all manifestations of the aggregates. It is the same as “craving” (taṇhā).]
“But sir, is that grasping the exact same thing as the five grasping aggregates? Or is grasping one thing and the five grasping aggregates another?”
“Neither. The desire and greed for the five grasping aggregates is the grasping there.”
So going by this translation, if chandarāga could be equated with taņhā, then might we also infer that vedanā is necessarily involved being its condition?
Furthermore in the same sutta,
But sir, can there be disparity in desire and greed for the five grasping aggregates?”
“There can,” said the Buddha.
“It’s when someone thinks: ‘In the future, may I be of such form, such feeling, such perception, such choices, and such consciousness!’ That’s how there can be disparity in desire and greed for the five grasping aggregates.”
Also,
“Sir, what is the scope of the term ‘aggregates’ as applied to the aggregates?”
“Any kind of form at all… Any kind of feeling at all … Any kind of perception at all … Any kind of choices at all … Any kind of consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; solid or subtle; inferior or superior; far or near: this is called the aggregate of consciousness.
That’s the scope of the term ‘aggregates’ as applied to the aggregates.”
So here grasping is equated with thought, and necessarily bound up with the five grasping aggregates, yet four kinds of grasping not explicitly related to the aggregates are given in MN 9. We could however infer that they might fit into the latter for aggregates of the mind.
So in any case, it seems that grasping necessarily takes place through the mind, which would imply the presence of feeling.
no feeling no any kind of experience whatsoever is possible.
I know there is reason to infer this, but is it explicitly stated in the suttas? Would the cessation of feeling and perception still count as experience? I have heard some sources claim that this attainment is also devoid of consciousness, but I am unsure of this. If that was the case, I wonder why it isn’t called the cessation of feeling, perception, and consciousness?
It is so obvious, so do you really need Suttas? Experience requires feeling, how can you experience anything, if it isn’t felt? All aggregates are necessary for experience, or you can do without matter or rupa, but for that you must attain arupa states.
Consciousness is dependetly arisen, and the cassation of three sankharas mentioned in MN 9 is in fact the same as cessation of namarupa. Experience is always temporal, and while cessation of perception and feeling as such is temporal, since entering and emerging is evident, “the very state” between entering and emerging from the cessation is ateporal, there is no consciousness in it to register or cognise things since with the cassation of namarupa, there is nothinig what could support consciousness.
The same but with chandarāga from Digital Pāḷi Dictionary.
Digital Pāḷi Dictionary
1. chandarāga: masc. interest and passion; desire and lust [chanda + rāga]
When making arguments based on single words in translated text, its good to check the Pali.
The Pali text for this sentence is the following, I do not think there is the word “think” in there rather there is “hoti” - “is/becomes”.
idha, bhikkhu, ekaccassa evaṁ hoti:
The mind can only crave what it knows. It knows phenomena through contact. Contact gives rise to feelings, perceptions, and consciousness, which arise together as inseparable aspects of experience. Of these three elements, it is feeling that conditions craving. It is not possible to have perceptions and consciousness without feeling—whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral.
All the aggregates are known by the mind through the feelings, perceptions, and consciousness associated with them. Since they are known in this way, craving for the aggregates is possible. It is not only the phenomena known through contact that are clung to, but also the associated phenomena that condition them. For example, if someone has craving and clinging toward visual objects, it is natural that they will also crave and cling to the eye (which is part of the rūpa aggregate) that conditions the visual experience.
However, it is important to note that clinging to the eye is only possible when the mind forms the concept that the eye is a condition for the feelings associated with the visual experience. The same applies to the other aggregates and their components. In other words, clinging to the aggregates—even when it involves aggregates other than feeling— always involves feeling in some form, even if indirectly, through the process of mental proliferation (papañca), where the mind fabricates further attachment through conceptualization and interpretation of experience.
The only exception to this process is Nibbāna, which is not known by the mind in the usual way it knows other phenomena. Nibbāna is not a conditioned experience, and therefore it is not experienced by the mind in the same manner as other phenomena. It transcends the normal processes of contact, feeling, perception, and consciousness.
It is relatively evident to me, but I came here to find scriptural backing.
It seems to me that it might be possible to experience contact without feeling, but I am unsure. I do not yet have discernment of neutral feeling, which I might conflate with “bare” contact.
On a related note, it seems that vedanā (feeling itself) ≠ vedeti (the act of feeling). In SN 36.6,
Literally, “The wise do not feel feeling". Feeling is there, but they don’t “feel” it attached. I thought this was relevant to mention.
Makes sense. But is the cessation of consciousness ever made explicit in the suttas?
You’re right, thanks. Although hoti is used, it seems odd that a person could “become” or “exist” a wish, so perhaps it it might implicitly refer to thought in this context?
Since chandarāga is a compound noun, I would guess “passionate interest” is more fitting. But chanda on its own is used as well to point to the same concept in MN 109.
Hi SublimeAbode,
In what sense is this transitive vs intransitive? Or are you referring to something else?
In SN 12.1,
Feeling is a requirement for craving.
vedanāpaccayā taṇhā
where vedanāpaccayā looks to be the instrumental or ablative case – I don’t know enough about Pali to say for certain. The DO formula/translation seems to call on the ablative case. There is movement from the one to the other.@stephen ?
This is a different construction from
“These five grasping aggregates are rooted in desire.”
“Ime kho, bhikkhu, pañcupādānakkhandhā chandamūlakā”ti.”
where
chandamūlakā
looks to be a nominate plural adjective declension. There is not grammatical equivalence with the DO formula – from what I can tell 
OK Generally experience can be seen as meeting together of three things. Sensory organ -the eye, its object -visible forms- and the presence of consciousness. It is so called contact.
But Suttas also says that there is no consciousness without perception and feeling.
It simply means that when there is contact there is also feeling. And when there is not perception and feeling there is no consciousness. It is as simple as 2+2 = 4
It is good to be uncertain about things which are complicated. But to doubt what is clear and obvious?
With metta