Thank you, I’m looking forward to reading these blog posts. I think I see that you’re referring to when the body breaks up at death and not when one awakens in this life.
They are absolutists in the sense that they claim their theories to correspond to reality. For a theory to correspond to reality, assuming an essence that endures change is implied, even if verbally denied. That essence can take a positive or negative form (presence or absence) depending on how the theory is constructed.
Hi Bundokji!
I disagree. What if what keeps moving is not an entity (in an ontological sense), but information? If information is what keeps moving, without needing entities existing permanently, then I would qualify such notion as absolutist. Information refers to a “how” things (what things?) are specifically arranged.
I am not sure if i understand your point. What problem have you solved when you replaced “entity” with “information”?
Whether that presence is of an entity or information, existence is still assumed. Entities do not need to exist permanently to conclude an essence. In fact, the impermanence of entities forms the basis for both confirming and denying an essence. For example, the ability to delay death would negate essence, while the irreversibility of death would confirm it.
What I was trying to say was that it’s hard for me to talk about information and to assign the label “essence” to refer to it. I think that one might think in an informational theory that does not need the persistence of material things, but only the persistence of information.
I may be wrong, though (maybe such theory is not sustainable). But maybe, if there is something as fundamental particles, there could be the case that the “persistence” of that particle over time (even if it’s moving through space) necessarily involves the change of the “constituents” of that particle (that, although described as fundamental, it could come to existence thanks to exaltations in some inmaterial field) so movement could be described and could ultimately be the “change” in the fundamental field, and in every instant of movement there would be changes in the field, but persistence in some information, like, for instance, the kind of particle (and the propierties of such kind) that it’s moving.
I may be not saying anything, since I’m no expert in physics nor metaphysics. I’m just letting my imagination run. I write this because something useful (even its refutation) may come out of it.
Kind regards!
In Bhantes recent talk here…
Linked directly in the below post by Gillian
The framework of looking at suttas from the 4 perspectives of
May be very useful.
The talk (2) itself is really worth listening to, if even just for this section, which is much broader than the Itivutakka, and gives a very nice way to navigate some of these issues.
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The question of early Buddhist ontology is one that got me to write my paper awhile back on whether the Buddha was an anti-realist. (Hint: I don’t think he was). That said, although I think it’s possible to derive an ontology (e.g) of aggregates, realms, and so on from the early dhamma, one has to be a bit circumspect about it.
Traditionally ontology is often intended to delimit ultimates: those parts of reality more basic than which we cannot find. While such claims are made in the abhidhamma, early Buddhist dhamma was more pragmatic. That is, though it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that there is nothing more basic than the aggregates, this is not something the Buddha ever claims. Similarly, although an event-based ontology makes a lot of sense given early Buddhist presuppositions, the Buddha never really formulates such a theory.
Further I do think that if the Buddha were to stumble upon contemporary discussions of ontology he likely would consider them not useful to the life of practice, except insofar as they were understood pragmatically. That is, I don’t think the Buddha was interested in philosophical foundationalism. For these reasons I think it’s best to say the Buddha proposed an inchoate metaphysics, and one that was perhaps intended to remain inchoate.
Depending on how we understand jīva and sarīra in MN 63, he may have included the mind-body problem among the unanswered questions. I’m inclined to think he did, but I suppose it’s debatable.
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Thank your for your input Doug, it will provide much food for thought. I will read your essay soon. I agree that there is an inchoate metaphysics in early Buddhism, though I just happen to think its more idealistic. I happen to agree with Rupert Gethin who states in a paper of his:
I do not want to imply here that all Indian Buddhism shares an explicit and definite metaphysics and ontology, but I am suggesting that there is a general, underlying orientation, which tends to locate reality in the mind and its processes rather than in something “out there” which is other than the mind… To put it another way, there is a loosely “idealist” tendency to all Indian Buddhist thought. It is no accident that one of the most important and influential philosophical schools of Indian Buddhism, the Yogacara, expounded an idealist ontology.
Regarding the points you made in the post above.
Insofar as I am interested in a possible ontological theory which is compatible with early Buddhism, it is precisely pragmatic concerns which drive that interest! Particularly the concern that having a robust ontology can help one ground karma and rebirth in a rational way and thus aid one in attaining and maintaining right view.
That is, I don’t think the Buddha was interested in philosophical foundationalism. For these reasons I think it’s best to say the Buddha proposed an inchoate metaphysics, and one that was perhaps intended to remain inchoate.
Well, one can have an ontology without positing foundationalism per se. That is, I can be an idealist in a general sense, but not necessarily holding that this is an absolute foundation for all reality (after all, in this ontological theory I have sketched above, nibbana is not a consciousness, so all reality is not grounded in one thing after all). Anyways, I am working on a paper on this issue, but it might take me a awhile, I will share when done.
Also, I think you are right that at the Buddha’s time, he taught while retaining the metaphysical issues in the background. However, people in India at the time lived in an enchanted animistic thought-world, we do not live in that world anymore. The Buddha adapted his teaching to suit his audience. So perhaps that inchoate ontology should not be left inchoate anymore. This possibility is what I seek to investigate.
Do you really think jīva is referring to mind or the mental in a general sense in this case? Because it usually refers either to life force/vital life principle, or to an atman. I thought that was the main interpretation of this passage (that it refers to an atman, in the way it is used in Jainism). Why do you think it refers to “mind”? If it does, it would be a rather rare usage of the term, for he could have used citta, viññāṇa, or mano instead, which are the standard words for mind in the EBTs.
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He did explicit state that he agrees with the “wise” that inconstant aggregates do exist (SN 22:94), which would correspond to a process metaphysics (Noa Ronkin in Early Buddhist Metaphysics suggests using the term process is more in line with the suttas with event metaphysics more an Abhidhamma development):
And what is agreed upon by the wise as existing in the world that I too say, ‘It exists’?
Form that’s inconstant, stressful, subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It exists.’
Feeling … Perception … Fabrications…
Consciousness that’s inconstant, stressful, subject to change is agreed upon by the wise as existing in the world, and I too say, ‘It exists.’
To be clear this doesn’t account for Unbinding which by definition is not inconstant, so process metaphysics is only applicable in terms of what we cling to.
With that being said, the Buddha then goes onto say that for those who see the world “with right discernment,” questions of existence of non-existence do not occur (SN 12:15):
But when one sees the origination of the world as it has come to be with right discernment, ‘non-existence’ with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it has come to be with right discernment, ‘existence’ with reference to the world does not occur to one.
From this, I would say that early Buddhism is advocating a form of epistemological idealism but not an ontological idealism. In other words, we know what we know through the mind (Dhp 1: Mind is the forerunner of phenomena), but the question of what exists and what doesn’t exist is put aside.
This is most in line with Husserlian phenomenology and his method of phenomenological reduction. In fact, it could be argued that SN 12:15 is describing the ultimate level of phenomenological reduction.
This does imply however that any pure physicalist conception of the world is untenable like you posit. In a way you could say a form of “ontological idealism” is what we attain when reaching the end goal and liberating the mind, but this way of thinking is unskillful since it has the potential to lead to a Buddha-nature type of view. If we don’t practice and reach the goal, it would not be “true” for us.
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Thanks @Javier. Yes, I think Gethin is onto something in the broad sense of say Indian Buddhism as versus the philosophy of ancient Greece. The Buddha was interested in ending suffering through an understanding of our internal, psychological processes. The Greeks were more interested in finding harmony with the external world. But these are subtle differences and wouldn’t say indicate that the Buddha was an idealist, though his system might as you say be “more idealistic” in certain respects than some others. Idealism is so to say a more “sophisticated” and narrowly philosophical sort of theory of the world than I find in early Buddhism. (There is also evidence against the Buddha being a literal idealist, which I go into in the paper).
Sure, as I see it that was the intention of the early abhidhammikas: to flesh out the philosophy of the Buddha by crossing the “t’s” and dotting the “i’s”. This required them, among other things, to foundationalize it so as to tie up the loose ends. That’s fine so far as it goes, and I have to say it interests me at times too, but in that direction lies scholasticism.
True, and as I say I do think it’s debatable, but I don’t think it could be a literal soul in the sense of an atman, because in that case I doubt the Buddha would have left its identity with the body an unanswered question. Elsewhere he says quite clearly that the body couldn’t be our “self” since it is always changing. My sense is it probably literally means something like “life force” in this context, and our life force is at least arguably identified with viññāṇa in DN 15, where it both supports and is supported by nāmarūpa. In other words, in this context I read jīva as something like a gloss for viññāṇa or some closely related concept. As I say, I could be wrong. But in that case I’m not sure what it was that Māluṅkya was so concerned about. 
Thanks @viriya. Yes, I deal a bit with Ronkin’s approach in my paper as well. This is a fair point, though if process philosophy isn’t understood in event terms I’m not sure exactly what it amounts to. That said, this could simply be another case of inchoate metaphysics.
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Every saying has a background. Firstly you need to find what did Buddha actually say. Secondly try to understand that based on Buddha’s age. Then you will find your answer. Otherwise, the debating will never end, becaused the evidences are contradictory.
But this position is not “agnostic”, it’s critical, it explicitly states that certain questions can’t be answered by “exists” “doesn’t exist” “is the same” “is different”, that is not the same as being agnostic, it is to have a position, the position being that any of the standard positions are incoherent.
but to deny that physicalism could be true is not the same as endorsing Idealism as true.
physicalism might be paraphrased as saying “the mind is the same thing as the body” and you are right the Buddha does not endorse this view. But idealism might be paraphrased by saying “the body is one thing, the mind is another” but the Buddha rejects this view too.
may I ask how? I don’t really see this. (for example plenty of Christians believe in a physical resurrection, so their commitment to an afterlife is not a commitment to a non-physical realm)
Here I agree with you , and as I think Kaustop has pointed out, it’s a problem for a variety of physicalisms too, because it is hard to explain how there can be physical laws, which are non-physical things, in a universe without non-physical things.
I would go further and say that there are statements that rule most of them out, refusing to endorse “the mind is one thing and the body is another” pretty much rules out substance dualism for example.
So I would say there is an explicit ontology in the EBT’s, that is dependence, and it is contrasted to various idealisms, materialisms and skepticisms by showing how phenomena and concepts work in dependance on grounds that are themselves dependent on grounds and so on, turtles all the way down, whereas physicalism makes materials the fundament beyond which nothing can go and Idealism makes such a substance of the mind. the EBT’s staunchly reject this picture.
Anyway, I have only read your OP so far and thought I would give my thoughts, now on to reading the replies!!
Metta
MN 62 seems contrary to the above solipsist view. Also SN 22.79. Also the intro to SN 22.59. Also SN 22.1. Also AN 9.15. Also SN 22.48. Also SN 12.20 and AN 3.136.
According to SN 12.20 = SA 296, the Buddha teaches “arising by causal condition” (paticca-samuppada) and “phenomena arisen by causal condition” (paticca-samuppanna dhamma). So, he does not teach ontology and metaphysics.
Page 150 from The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (80.4 KB)
Yes, I agree with this. I am actually disagreeing with those who think he Buddha had no metaphysics at all…
Ok, but I wasn’t making this argument…
That is not what Idealism is…
Because if you hold that after the body is disintegrated, something else continues on after that to take up another body, then you cannot believe that only the physical exists.
I already said this in the OP, this is why I argued that physicalism must be rejected by the EBT POV
I don’t think you really understand what I was saying in the OP or what Idealism entails. You can have a non-foundationalist and non-substantialist form of idealism, an idealism which is based on dependent arising (indeed, that is what the Yogacara school holds) and just holds that the mental is primary.
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I think you misunderstand what I was trying to say here. I was not endorsing solipsism. I was also not endorsing the view that there are no external rupas and internal rupas.
I was merely saying that the metaphysical nature of rupa is not so clear cut, and certainly it is not the same as modern views of what is “physical”. This means that while I agree the EBTs say there are internal and external sense stimuli that are called “form”, this does not entail that they must be “physical” in the way this term is understood today or in some metaphysical sense (as part of some kind of dualism for example). This leaves open the possibility that these “forms” are in some sense a kind of non-physical phenomena.
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I don’t see anything here which rejects all metaphysics tout court.
Indeed, if we ask questions like, what is causal condition? what is dependence? what is it that is arising dependently? We have entered the realm of metaphysics.
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Respectfully, your ideas are very strange to me. I have studied Buddhism for a long time and gain the impression your concerns are largely a recent Western internet fad/phenomena. Did you actually read the suttas I offered?
Metaphysics and ontology are definitely not a “recent internet fad” @CurlyCarl , and I resurrected this thread in the hope that @Javier might have a conversation with me about the subject, and I am very excited to compose my response to his reply!
The EBT’s are the inheritance of not only all Buddhists but also of the whole world, including those of us who try to understand things “philosophically”.
The EBT’s are NOT the sole intellectual property of orthodox Theravadans. And I would just also gently remind you that this site is not a site for the promotion/discussion of Theravada orthodoxy, but for the EBT’s, though of course the Theravada perspective is an important and significant perspective on the EBT’s both historically and now, just not the only one.
Anyway, after some to-ing and fro-ing I have decided that this site is the best place i have found to discuss my thoughts on the EBT’s, despite definitely not being a Theravada Buddhist, and despite that seeming to be the most commonly expressed perspective here.
So get used to plenty more threads about ontology and metaphysics, mahayana perspectives (although i don’t identify with that school either) and various secular speculations etc- because I’m here to stay (as long as the mods will have me) 
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