The fact is that the various existing traditions, including EBTs, of Buddhist doctrine and practice are not entirely true to the teachings of the historical Buddha, and that in some cases they are actually misleading.
So, it is helpful to find out the formation of EBTs and beyond. This can be for both spiritual and academic interest in seeking out the original teachings of the Buddha.
I have seen many instances in the text where even enlightened monks consistently replied that they will remember as Buddha said, or even remember other monks to ask Buddha instead of them. It’s also easy to see that many texts do indeed follow what Buddha said and stop unnecessary speculations about Nibbana, Self, Cosmos etc. Buddha only declared Nibbana is Freedom and stopped describing it any further.
If you don’t think followers of Buddha didn’t try to remember teachings as closely as possible or intentionally altered, I think that assumption would also lead to the inference that the monks who did record were not enlightened. Or their teachers were also not enlightened because they didn’t correct them or their teachers also didn’t know the teachings correctly. It would also imply none of the lineage ever verified teachings(enlightenment) and correct the issues with texts. You are saying even though teachings is filled with sayings such as “There is no beneficial, falsehoods or useful fiction”, “Don’t lie - those who lie can do any evil”, “Remove delusion with truths” etc -they didn’t practice that at all.
If you are convinced that this is true, why would you believe that liberation is possible through Buddhism at all?
Thank you for the questions! I agree they are critical and necessary ones.
There’s a few things to unpack here.
J. R. Bhaddacak, a Theravādin monastic from Thailand, writes in his post:
Does the noble eightfold path have things to do with liberation? As asserted by the Buddha himself, the eightfold path is the way to get enlightened. (…)
A more serious question, however, is what you exactly mean by liberation or enlightenment. I will not go to this metaphysical problem.
I suggest instead that those who lead themselves with the Buddhist way of training eliminate ‘liberation’ or ‘enlightenment’ or ‘awakening’ or ‘nibbāna’ or ‘arhatship’ or the like from their vocabulary. You hardly need the terms. Once you have any concept of liberation, you will set it as a goal and attach to it. Just do your work, and forget about where to go.
So yes, people and texts can be falliable, as it’s warned to us in Kalama Sutta. How much blind faith should we have in a single body of text, tradition or assembly? And what does faith mean; does that imply that everything should be taken without critical thinking?
Conversely, I might have faith in a certain person not to harm me; they might succumb to anger and hurt me, and then apologizing later, correcting their course. Does that mean my faith was ill-placed?
In fact, we see in the very suttas the importance of critical thinking. Buddha invites inspection, Buddha warns us of relying on tradition, literature, ascetics, Buddha tells us to abandon the raft at the right time. It’s all in the canon.
Buddhist Literature is quite unique in the world literature, in its virtue-ethics. Again, from Bhaddacak:
After I studied Buddhism seriously and critically, it happens that many things taught by the tradition have to be discarded. I do not want to make myself in trouble by rejecting the tradition. But rather my integrity does not allow inconsistency happens. When we really understand things critically, we cannot help rejecting things not conforming to what we hold as true.
Still, many things in Buddhism survive the bomb of critical thinking, and we can apply them to our contemporary life.
In short, we don’t need to have a maximalist attitude towards the Pāli Canon (which is not the only Buddhist Canon!) in order to be inspired and leading a good life through it.
Richard Gombrich, one of the most staunch defenders of Pāli Buddhism, doesn’t even personally believe in rebirth. This means he doesn’t believe in the Theravādin account of enlightenment verbatim! And he still has studied the Pāli Canon so much, taught Pāli to countless students, and thinks it’s something so worthwhile to put his efforts into understanding.
Bhantes Sujato and Brahmali still think his opinions are interesting enough to pay attention to him.
In this way, I think they examplify some of the best virtues of Buddhism - open-minded, humble, critical, even if as they disagree with him on the goal of the path.
Their attitude (which is no doubt inspired with Buddhist tradition) speaks volumes for the usefulness of the Canon.
Well, let’s see if anything of this sort has happened in the history of Buddhism. You would be familiar with Mahāyāna, yes?
Theravāda and Mahāyāna famously disagree on just what constitutes enlightenment. Could it be that it represents a strand of traditionalists who disagreed with the increasingly literalist depictions of Nirvana?
Now, “Mahāyāna” is huuge, and one can find many things both extremely critical (Like Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras), and very embrasing (like Lotus Sūtra).
However, many Mahāyāna traditions also study the EBTs extensively, and respectfully. They just have a different interpretation on it. Might that be an example of what you call “correct the issues with texts”?
It isn’t to say Mahāyāna (taken as a whole, a collection of traditions that also conflict with each other) is right or that. It’s just, there’s plenty of evidence of people breaking off and challenging the tradition and establishing different Buddhist traditions, so yes, there are historical examples of what you’re saying.
I don’t know if there’s a warning in suttas against “fiction” per se (I would love to see a sutta reference!); even though I do remember something about “Making up stories”, which is what you might be referring to.
This is, in fact, the very questions I’m asking the “EBT maximalist” position, in that, why would the Sangha make up stories of Jātakas, for example?
And hence again, as I’ve repeated many times in this thread: This is only a problem if their intentions didn’t match their efforts. That is, if they were deliberately telling a fiction as “historical truth”.
Lotus Sūtra, for example, warns not to view Śrāvakayāna Canon as a lie, but rather as a skillful means, accepting the legitimacy of the efforts of the community that transmitted them.
Finally again, the usefulness of the literature doesn’t depend on it being correct on its entirety fully. I very much doubt anything of that sort could happen in real life: Even in life, Buddha’s followers are depicted as sometimes confused and transmitting the Dharma incorrectly in Pāli Canon.
Societies, traditions, literature are vast phenomena. I think it’s unreasonable to expect the Sangha’s understanding of Dharma to be “completely inerrant” even while Buddha was alive, let alone for 2500 years following his Nirvana.
As Bhante Sujato once said in a video: “A map doesn’t have to be perfect; it just needs to get you where you need to go.”
I hope this answers some of your questions. Thank you for directing them patiently and gently, and feel free to press on any other points that may be.
i don’t see any contradiction between these two. look at the 32 marks: they’re basically saying the buddha is handsome, comely, attractive etc. they’re not unusual features. handsome but bald and dressed identically to other monks would make the buddha largely indistinguishable to the casual observer.
your insistence that the suttas represent fictionalised stories means that you’re saying that the dhamma is made up through logical reasoning of some person(s).
then that same applies for the mahayana sutras as well. then there’s no bodhisattvas, no buddhas, no arahants, no enlightenment, and no end of suffering. isn’t that the logical conclusion of your your train of thought?
seeing the end of the path and experiencing the end of the path are two different things. one can see a mountain in the distance and know it exists just as described to you by someone else who has travelled there before. however seeing the mountain in the distance isn’t the same as climbing to its summit.
there are different kinds of knowledges - path and fruit of the four stages. you’re ascribing one kind of knowledge to all noble beings. that’s not the case, and the suttas make that clear.
Again, whether specific descriptions in the suttas are fantastical or not is a whole lot of different bag. All those details and scientific arguments can get back and forth for a while. And a person might still just choose to believe despite scientific plausibility as well, in which case the usefulness of the debate would be questionable to begin with.
Therefore again, I’d kindly ask that this thread is confined to the assumptions that at least not all of the depictions in he Nikayas can be correct. If, however, you’d like to discuss individual descriptions, feel free to make a new thread and I’ll meet you there.
Well, conventionally, we can talk about these things; yet even in suttas, Tathāgata is said “not found” in life. But that’s a different tangent!
But I think basically you’re saying that I assume “Fiction = Unreal, therefore useless”, or something like that: I’m explicitly saying that’s not the case. In fact, both of these things can be true:
An enlightened sage can compose a fictional story as a mnemonic device to help educate people in Dharma.
A schizophrenic patient’s ramblings can be logged correctly and still be useless as a Dharmic device.
What I’m saying is Whether something is fictional or not has no bearing on its usefulness as a Dharma teaching tool.
For example, a story can explain how a car works down to its most minute detail, and still, all the plot can be imaginary, and all the car-mechanic details can be correct.
This, I presume, was also the opinion of the Ancients who included things like Jātakas in their Canon, of which Bhantes Sujato, Brahmali, Analayo (and countless others) have remarked on the fictional status.
The difference between me and these Venerables, is that I think there’s reason to cast the net of “Fictionality” of the Canon deeper than they do so. Hence my questions and investigations!
Well, that’s basically what I’ve said earlier, that knowledge isn’t enough, which you’ve surmised with “Seeing the mountain isn’t the same as climbing to its summit.” So, that is what I was precisely saying earlier.
Dear @IndyJ ; I’d begun to compose my answer before the post was deleted. While moderators’ actions are necessary to keep a civil environment, I’d still like to try to reply to some of your arguments to the best of my abilities.
I might just convince you that my intentions are good, and that I’m offering a path of study that works for me, while inquiring for alternative paths that I can’t think of. And this is a good excuse to practice sīla and kalyāṇīmittatā, so, shall we?
Let’s start with the basics once again:
Suggestion 1: The Theravādin position is that entire Pāli Canon is Buddhavacana.
Suggestion 2: Monastic EBT Scholars such as Venerables Sujato, Brahmali, Analayo have raised doubts on the authenticity of certain parts of the Canon, most notably Jātakas, parts of Vinaya Stories, etc.
Problem: If the Canon was always a historical & faithful recollection of Buddha’s life and Dharma, then how come Ancients started to include materials that Monastic Scholars consider “inauthentic” in the Canon?
Solution 1:The transmission was at fault, monastics started passing off fictional stories as real events for unknown reasons.Note: This is NOT my position, but just a logical conclusion.
Solution 2:Transmission of Dharma always included fictional creativity (even if it’s based on a true person, events & Dharma); historical accuracy wasn’t a priority, and Dharmic faithfulness was more important.Note: THIS is my position.
Origins of the texts is a seriously hard job to do. I’ve briefly touched on what I think could’ve happened, but honestly, your guess is good as mine. We can spend an entire lifetime specifically devoted to the historicity of these texts, and make little real progress.
Therefore, for a Buddhist Practitioner (such as me or you), I think the Solution 2 is a useful strategy (rather than an absolute truth that can be proved) for the purposes of studying Dharma for various reasons:
It doesn’t try to divide the Pāli Canon into “early/late”, “historical/fictional” or “authentic/inauthentic”; it doesn’t divide “Pāli Canon / Mahāyāna Canon” on such divisions either.
1.1. This serves to redirect the discussion from “Did Buddha speak this text / did this really happen?” to “What does this text teach / is it aligned with how things really are?”
1.2. Rather than viewing late materials as an unfortunate fault of the transmission, this Solution tries to meet these texts for what they are, going back to the Point 1.1.
All of these teaches us to be both humble for the texts we prefer, being open minded enough to allow both for ourselves and the texts to be faulty, without clinging to any extremism.
It also allows us to reject some things if they don’t meet our conscience. Garudhamma rules is a famous example that troubles a lot of sensible people. Eating meat is another for me.
You’ve talked about internal integrity of other traditions and Pāli Canon. That’s a fair point - I don’t agree with the logic of most Mahāyāna texts, let alone all of it. I’m not here to defend one school or the other, rather, I’m trying to find a framework that is consistent that enables me to study the broader Buddhist literature fairly and respectfully.
I’ve deliberately refrained from discussing “What’s specifically fantastical or not” - again, for example, 32 marks (something the three aforementioned Venerables also question the authenticity of) is very questionable to me, but seeing @REddison talk about it’s plausibility, I’ve refrained from any further comments.
Just for the sake of discussion, I think we could point to Ud 8.10 as an interesting story:
While venerable Dabba Mallaputta, monks—after going up into the sky, and sitting in cross-legged posture in the air, in the firmament, entering the fire-element, and emerging—was attaining Complete Emancipation, his body burning and being consumed, there was no charcoal and no ash evident.
I don’t think people generally fly into air and burst into flame, so this is just one gentle example.
Furthermore, two people can hold different parts of the Canon truthful and fictional:
Person A thinks X is fact, Y is fictional.
Person B thinks Y is fact, X is fictional.
Without devolving the discussion into “Is X or Y fact or fiction”, they can both discuss why there are things in the Canon that they think are fictional. This is part of the reason I refrained from getting into the specifics of the fantastical elements.
Finally, what we believe or hold true from the Canon is, probably a wide spectrum for the visitors of these forums. Some people might be completely Secular, some people might hold everything to be true. You don’t know what I hold true regarding Canon, so I don’t think it’s fair to be accused of holding “Western sensibilities” (when I am, in fact, neither a Westerner nor raised with such sensibilities).
But perhaps, it would be useful just to briefly touch on a few things, if all these posts have made it seem like I’m a hardline Secularists: Having viewed the idea of Rebirth with skepticism at first, after investigating the matter at the persistence of the Canon & fellow Buddhists, I’ve come to accept it more freely now. Likewise, I accept that there are different dimensions and modes of existence, which we can call “Deva” or “Brahma” or some such other stuff.
I still don’t think that’s relevant for this discussion, but maybe it is, for people to understand where I am coming from, so there you go.
If you’d like to reply, it would be great if you could phrase it without assumptions or crossing the limits of civility, so that we could actually talk without the moderators having to take action.
agree - people don’t generally do this - but arahants do regularly do this. there are stories of arahants in this day and age from the thai forest tradition doing so.
that’s in the very definition of enlightenment provided by the buddha in the pali suttas. the fact that it is apparently corroborated in modern arahants suggests that what’s in the suttas 2000+ years earlier is indeed correct. that’s an offence to our westernised minds, but accepting that there are things that buddhism knows about that western science / knowledge doesn’t is part of the path.
there are many things that can be misinterpreted in the suttas. the 32 marks of a great man are one - they’re not fantastical ridiculous marks. they’re just elements that make a person handsome, and are the results of good kamma.
the garudhammas are another - intended for the protection of female monastics or for the establishment of seniority rules between the two orders (just as they existed previously within the male monastic order), they are frequently misinterpreted as sexist, when ironically, the buddha places the same obligations he lays on individual male monastics equally on the female monastic order.
there are indeed many things that are misinterpreted in the suttas. however that doesn’t mean that what’s in the suttas is wrong - rather, it may actually mean that our interpretation of them is wrong.
on the other hand, there are many things in the suttas that western science has corroborated only very recently (e.g., the presence of galactic clusters, the presence of cosmic voids, the use of urea-based medicines, the health benefits of fasting, the health benefits of congee).
i’m sorry if you’ve felt i’ve been uncivil. you can surely understand that in offering that the suttas are a fanciful creation, you’re bound to offend a large part of your target audience here, and you’re going to get some firm pushback. i don’t believe my response was rude - it did take your intellectual positions to their logical conclusion and ask you some pointed questions that those positions result in. i would have thought that that’s the kind of questions you needed put to you if you were looking for genuine feedback.
my best wishes to you - may you find the true dhamma,
Crossing over to the other shore … for the realisation of the 4NTs ….. everything else is worthless !
He who is so much preoccupied with doctrinal controversy, furnishes, indeed, a fitting illustration of one who carries the raft of the Dhamma on his head or shoulders; and, in his case, this will be not after the crossing but before he has done, or even seriously tried, the fording of the stream.
In fact, this famous parable of the raft will in most cases apply to those who, in the words of the Dhammapada, “run up and down the river’s bank” on this side of the stream, without daring or wishing to cross. We find them using the raft for a variety of purposes: they will adorn it and adore it, discuss it, compare it — indeed anything else than use it.
Few among men are those who cross to the farther shore. The rest, the bulk of men, only run up and down the hither bank.
Hi, so sorry for the late response. I wrote most of this very soon after your reply but I’ve been busy.
My objection is that I don’t think you’ve sufficiently explained why it is more likely that these fictional or ahistorical elements in the canon were intentionally composed compared to the predominant view, which is already well-established and well-evidenced, that they came about through error and the strong trend in Indian literature toward mythologisation.
Yes, it’s unfortunate if the early Sangha let incorrect details in, but all evidence suggests this is exactly what happened, regardless of whether or not it seems out of character for them on the surface.
Quick comparison of our views on the issue
Our views intersect at crucial points but differ on the finer details. To quickly compare our views, I think we agree on the following points (some of which I haven’t expressed here):
Much of this fictional content is important and serves a purpose
There was always a loose distinction between historical and fictional
Over time, fictional elements gained higher status than they had previously
But we disagree on the following points:
The reason why so much of the canon contains fiction
I think it was largely unintentional. A small portion of it may have come from intentionally fictional morality tales like “little Sujāta didn’t give adequate respect to the tiratana, so he was reborn as Dujjāta in hell” but I don’t think these were added intentionally.
How much the early Sangha cared about historical accuracy, and in what way/s
Explained in detail later in this reply
Whether or not believing the early Sangha unintentionally added fictional or ahistorical details to their texts is unduly ascribing error to them
I believe it isn’t.
When fictional elements began to be taken seriously
I believe this was very early.
On the contrary, I think it’s precisely a certain value for accuracy that led to many of these erroneous details being added to texts. If your canonical account of the Buddha’s death doesn’t contain all these well-known stories about all the gods that visited when it happened, or this miracle he performed there, why keep it like that? In some cases this can be relegated to commentary (which many sects incorporated into the root text anyway) but in others there’s no reason not to just place it in the older version of the text.
I do think we cannot say much about
in that we cannot assume them to have had the same strict standards of historical accuracy as we do, but not that we cannot assume that they cared at all about accuracy. It’s obvious they cared to some degree, I just don’t think it was in the way that we do now and so if we don’t find evidence of that it doesn’t mean they were making things up.
We are 2,500 years away from the Buddha and Buddhist Studies is still far from perfect, so we have to account for that separation.
Placing far later, strongly divergent texts as equal to those few possible remnants we have of the actions and sayings of the historical Buddha and his arahant disciples with regard to their potential for truth and accurate dharma is a mistake no matter how open a mind we should ideally have about it.
Not even a problem at all. Thank you for your reply that was generous in content and consideration.
I’ve likewise taken some time (especially with the remark of the previous poster urging me to be more careful and considerate of differing perspectives):
I think it’s understandable that the very word fictional gives the impression of me considering the Canon as a “fanciful creation”, in your words, but that again, is not really the case.
Also, considering that these forums are for EBT studies, with a certain critical perspective of material within the Pāli Canon considered “late” (such as the Abhidhamma, some Vinaya stories, Jātakas, some commentarial materials, etc), the very monastics here are casting certain parts of the Canon as fictional to begin with.
Once we accept that this is the case, that the Canon is likely to contain fictional elements, the next questions are by necessity “Why is this the case?” and “How far does the fiction go?”. From Venerable Sujato & Brahmali’s article:
Clarifying the exact nature and degree of the editorial influences on the EBTs is one of the primary tasks of the student of Early Buddhism.
With these caveats, let’s tackle some of the points raised by @saavaka !
This is the part I don’t understand.
If they’re indeed following the trend in Indian literature towards mythologisation, doesn’t that thus point to “Fictional elements being intentionally composed”?
Maybe an analogy is apt here: We have colors yellow (fact) and blue (fiction), we mix them together and paint some trees. And from the shape of the trees, we’re trying to deduce what shade of a yellow it was.
I might have some ideas on how this might’ve happened, but truthfully, I don’t know. Sangha chose to give us green, for better or for worse, and so I find it more sensible to discuss “What is green?” rather than asking “What tone was the yellow originally?”
All agreed!
Right. I don’t understand how it could be “unintentional” as per my question above.
Sure. We already rely on the Sangha’s transmission at all to conclude who Buddha was and what he taught. What kind of vetting process did they have? Who decided what texts to add and what not?
If they’re deliberately following literary traditions, they’re at no fault. Otherwise, I don’t see how this doesn’t cast a shadow of doubt on the transmission.
Probably true. Probably the second someone uttered these very elements.
I think historical proximity to Buddha has little value on Dharma spoken by a Dharma teacher.
Let’s turn this argument for EBT studies:
Bhante Sujato writes about his own understanding of Dharma.
Jātakas were closer to Buddha than Bhante Sujato was.
Therefore, Jātakas has a greater chance of being correct.
Obviously, this doesn’t work.
Personally, having started of with Zen, then studying as an EBT purist (for quite similar reasons you’ve explained above), now I’ve begun to have even more questions. So, now I try to discard any notion of “historicity”, and try to meet the texts where they are.
Now, we don’t really need to worry about the provenance of some sutta that says “Dana is good”, because well, obviously that’s good, nothing controversial. But let’s be frank, what we’re all really investigating is What is Nirvana?.
I do agree with Bhante Sunyo when he points that suttas describe a literal cessation as a fact. But I also think there are some issues with that reading that doesn’t square off neatly with other points made in the suttas.
Now, I could be wrong, but if indeed the literalist reading (and representation) of cessation is a doctrinal simplification for the message of the Buddha, then we have grounds to suspect that certain Mahāyāna teachings rose as reactions and corrections for some of the contradictions they found within the tradition.
I’ve tried to explain the questions I have regarding the literal cessationin this thread. I’ll try to briefly recap the main points here for the discussion’s sake.
Note, please, if anyone would like to discuss these points, it’d be great if you could post them in that thread. For our discussion here, it’d be enough to say “I agree/disagree, therefore”, etc, so that we don’t devolve this thread into yet another Nirvana discussion!
Literal Cessation
Now, for literal cessation to be true, we should all each have a discreet stream of rebirths, distinct from one another, easily identifiable. I don’t understand how this isn’t a ‘self’ that does the deeds and experiences the results.
I find that it challenges the idea of SN 12.17:
“Suppose that he who does the deed and he who experiences the result are one and the same. Then for one who has existed since the beginning, suffering is made by oneself. In speaking like this, one implies this is eternal.
Suppose that he who does the deed is one, and he who experiences the result is another. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. In speaking like this, one implies this is annihilated.
Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way [Insert DO].
This sutta, interestingly seems to suggest, that saying “he who does the deed and he who experiences the result are one and the same” implies eternalism straight-away.
The arguments, of course are “It’s not a self, it’s just khandas”. However, that to me sounds like saying “It’s not a lemon, it’s just a small, yellow, very sour and acidic orange”.
The conventional understanding of ‘self’ is precisely the discreet entity that’s distinguishable from other such entities.
It is also often stated that Buddha was responding to the Brahmanical idea of Atman, rather then using the self as it’s used conventionally. I think this is reading it backwards; I find it more likely to understand that the Brahmanical texts are trying to define the same conventional Atman that the Buddha is handling.
After all, he mentions in MN 22:
It would make sense to grasp at a theory of self that didn’t give rise to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress. But do you see any such theory of self?
This implies, that there’s not one singular theory of self, but a wide range of theories that try to define what people understand naturally as “Self”. Therefore, it doesn’t follow that “Buddha was responding to the Brahmanical notion of a Self”, when there’s no such single theory to begin with.
Then we have DN 28:
Firstly, some ascetic or brahmin—by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind—experiences an immersion of the heart of such a kind that they examine their own body up from the soles of the feet and down from the tips of the hairs, wrapped in skin and full of many kinds of filth. ‘In this body there is head hair, body hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, undigested food, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, saliva, snot, synovial fluid, urine.’ This is the first attainment of vision.
Furthermore, some ascetic or brahmin experiences that immersion and examines their own body. ‘In this body there is head hair … urine.’ Going further, they examine a person’s bones with skin, flesh, and blood. This is the second attainment of vision.
Furthermore, some ascetic or brahmin experiences that immersion and examines their own body. ‘In this body there is head hair … urine.’ Going further, they examine a person’s bones with skin, flesh, and blood. And they understand of a person that their stream of consciousness is consistent on both sides: established in both this world and the next. This is the third attainment of vision.
Furthermore, some ascetic or brahmin experiences that immersion and examines their own body. ‘In this body there is head hair … urine.’ Going further, they examine a person’s bones with skin, flesh, and blood. They understand of a person that their stream of consciousness is consistent on both sides: not established in either this world or the next. This is the fourth attainment of vision.
This is unsurpassable when it comes to attainments of vision.
This seems like digging deep into the matter of being, if we follow the example #1 to #2, which is the understanding of the same thing deepens progressively, as each section goes further than the earlier section in terms of “deepening” the vision.
Therefore, thinking in terms of “stream of consciousness is consistent on both sides: established in both this world and the next.” seems to be a superficial understanding of the matter; going deeper, they understand that “their stream of consciousness is consistent on both sides: not established in either this world or the next.”
This is quite a Prajñāpāramitā-esque declaration, consistent with the idea of Dharma as a raft: We imagine there being khandas, streams of consciousness, things like that, but all our declarations are placeholder, until we realise the futility of all such concepts.
Another interesting point is in SNP 4.11, which I’ve mentioned here. This is a sutta that outright rejects a “samayaṁ anupādisese”.
Just about all translations I’ve come across agree that Buddha here is rejecting samayaṁ anupādisese here, but they differ in just exactly what it means (“when there’s no residue”).
However, this is a very special word that almost always refers to Nirvana in the suttas - cessation without residue. There are many examples to suttas that use “anupādisese” in this fashion to signify Nirvana in my post above.
There are but a few of the examples I’ve come across in the suttas.
Again, I can speak for days and analyse this topic endlessly (why else are we here but to understand Nirvana? ) but if anyone wants to discuss Cessation further, I kindly invite you again to this topic.
At certain times (not saying you do that), EBT students draw a circular logic: “Most of the suttas talk about X, this sutta talks about Not-X, therefore this sutta is inauthentic”. Same goes to comparing Pāli Canon to Mahāyāna Literature.
Rather, perhaps we can discuss the suttas where they are at (and of course, being charitable enough to try to assume they’re consistent, and being humble enough to the possibility that we’re wrong), rather than trying to establish a circular authenticity argument.
Pointedly, whether Athhakavagga and/or Pariyanavagga precede “Institutional Buddhism” (a term coined by the Korean Monk Venerable Seongryong Lee, in his “Pre-institutional Buddhist Traditions in the Arthapada”) is another debate. There’s a vibrant scholarly discussion around the topic, with Luis O. Gómez famously saying ‘Aṭṭhakavagga cannot be reduced to other, more common teachings of the Pāli Canon without doing some violence to the text’.
Certain monastics (Like Bhante Sujato, Sunyo, many others) see no fundamental differences between Athhakavagga and rest of Nikayas, while some like Venerable Lee and others disagree.
Therefore, we can also analyse whether these “late, divergent Mahāyāna teachings” are actually a reclamation of the warnings in the SNP against conceptualisation, reification and literalism.
Alright, that was another wall of text!
Apologies to the mods that have to go through this, and thanks to the handful of you kind enough to read and respond to these investigations.
Also note that early Buddhist texts, such as Samyukta/Samyutta discourses, were not set down in the original language of the Buddha first. The texts were first used other languages rather than the Buddha’s language.
So, artificial creations are presented in EBTs, and in fact in all Buddhist texts.
There are now different textual languages for the teachings and stories in Early Buddhism and beyond. All Buddhist texts are thus just texts, some edited and compiled early, some later.
How do you jump from Buddha allowing people to use his own language, to the first texts not being set down in his own language?
I am open to the idea that Sakkāya Niruttiyā being “one’s own language”, but how do we go from that to the assumption above?
After all, if there was any preservation effort going on, it would also make sense that some people would preserve the discourses in Magadhi / Buddha’s own language, whether or not that language neatly fits Pāli or not.
The first texts? Do you refer to the Samyukta-discourses that were based on the Buddha’s own language or Sakkāya Niruttiyā, or both at the same time?
The “first texts” were likely Sakkāya Niruttiyā only. The reasons:
In Vinaya, Cullavagga (Vin. II, PTS, p. 139), the Buddha advises bhikkhus not to use Vedic language (Chanda; i.e. Vedic Sanskrit) for the Buddha’s teachings, but use instead your own language/dialect for the Buddha’s teachings.
On this Pali information, see also other versions in Chinese Vinayas, 四分律 and 五分律:
These two schools also belong to the Vibhajyavada school.
Accordingly, anyone in anywhere was and is free to use your own language/dialect for the Buddha’s teaching. That is the teaching of the Buddha: Buddhavacana.
This is because the Buddha wanted anyone to use your own language/dialect (sakāya niruttiyā) for his teachings.
Okay, I think I haven’t made my point across clearly.
Why do you not think this is possible:
Buddha speaks in his own language (let’s call it Magadhi now)
People are inspired and memorise his words in Magadhi
A birth of a Magadhi (proto-)Canon / Tradition
In other words, if there was any serious preservation enterprise going on at all, it would make that people would also memorise Buddha in Magadhi, no?
Just because he says “Learn it in your language” doesn’t mean “Don’t learn it in my own language”! After all, some of the followers would likely be Buddha’s own countryman, whose own language would be whatever language Buddha was most commonly using.
