How odd. MN 118 is not the only place in the Canon which dispenses with a fulsome “body of something” in favour of a shorter “body”. Take a look at SN 12.25 -
Ignorance is comprised within these states. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance that body does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally; that speech does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally; that mind does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally. That field does not exist, that site does not exist, that base does not exist, that foundation does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally.
What might that “body” refer to in the above passage?
To me, the common translations of both suttas mentioned above are questionable, particularly SN 12.25. In other words, I personally see little correlation in the above question.
Regarding SN 12.25, ‘kaya’ quoted above obviously means ‘physical body’ since it is clearly distinguished from speech & mind. However, the common translation of “kāyasaṅkhāraṃ (bodily volitional formation)” is questionable since it occurs within the context of ‘kāyasañcetanāhetu’ (bodily volition). Why would the Buddha, within two paragraphs, use the different terms kāyasañcetanāhetu & kāyasaṅkhāraṃ as though they were synonymous, as seems to be translated? If ‘kāyasaṅkhāraṃ’ was intended to refer to bodily kamma, then the term ‘kamma’ should have been used. Worse is the translation of ‘sukhadukkhaṃ’, which is not generally used for ‘pleasurable’ and ‘painful’ feelings (vedana), as inferred, but as karmic ‘happiness’ & ‘suffering’ in general (i.e., the final outcome of dependent origination).
I have posted somewhere before that Step 3 of MN 118 (experiencing sabba kaya) is obviously the same scope as Step 7 (experiencing citta sankhara), just as Step 4 (calming kaya sankhara) is the same as Step 8 (calming citta sankhara). ‘Sankhara’ here cannot mean ‘formation’ (since ‘citta formation’ would fall into the 3rd tetrad). The term ‘kaya sankhara’ was probably not used in Step 3 because the practise is greater in scope than experiencing how the breath (kaya sankhara per MN 44) conditions/influences the physical body (kaya). To me, ‘sabba kaya’ means ‘all kaya’ & the practise involves experiencing the conditioning relationship between the mind (nama-kaya), breath-kaya & body (rupa-kaya). Please note the special & important sub-explanation in MN 118 about the 1st tetrad is: “I tell you monks that in & out breathing is a kaya among other kaya”. Thus ‘kaya’ here is not one thing (only the physical body), which is why the translation of ‘all kaya’ makes sense to me. Since when was “sabba” translated as “whole” (kevala) rather than “all”?
In conclusion, the word ‘kaya’ in SN 12.25 may not have the same meaning as in step 3 of MN 118.
Leaving aside the substantive issues that you’ve raised, I cited that passage to alaber to illustrate one redaction phenomenon. He argues that it is is wrong to treat the “body” in MN 118 to refer to the body of breath, and that it simply means the physical body.
SN 12.25 illustrates this in its final paragraph where the “body” is not a physical body but the bodily intention in an earlier paragraph. This is how the Comy explains it and I concur. If you look at the earlier passage, the physical body is discussed vide the existential locative absolute, followed by bodily volition. This is a typical This-That Conditionality proposition where the cause is expressed in the subordinate clause with an existential locative absolute. When you get to the final para, you find that “body” is not discussed using the existential locative absolute “kaaye asati”, but with the copula used in the main clause of This-That Conditionality, ie “kaayo na hoti”.
Given that this redaction phenomenon pops up here as well, I would argue that it can also explain a similar occurrence in MN 118. This weakens the argument that that “body” in MN 118 can only mean the physical body.
Thank you sincerely for the Pali class. It did take me around 20 minutes to finally learn (hopefully) what you were sharing. However, at this stage, assuming I correctly comprehended your post, it does not change my view.
To me, hopefully in agreement with you, in the earlier passage, the physical body is discussed in a generic or neutral way, being merely the body (like a blank canvas that can be painted) that is capable of being the object of & subjected to intention towards it (e.g., the intention to use the body to dig a hole).
In the last passage, to me, the body is discussed as something that can be & has been (previously) conditioned/affected/polluted by ignorance, sankhara, intention, etc. In other words, in the last paragraph, the body is not something static (as it is neutral or generic in the earlier paragraph). For example, the intention/action of sleep conditions/gives rise to a different body than the intention/action of snorting cocaine. While the various conditioned/tainted bodies include within their neurology the various mentality & intentions that condition/taint them, they remain a body since various physical changes also happen to these conditioned/tainted physical bodies, such as changes in blood flow, adrenaline, hormones, etc. Thus, for me, the body in the last paragraph remains the physical body rather than exclusively bodily intention. To me, it just states the physical body is no longer tainted (changed; altered) by ignorance, as in the following passages:
His bodily disturbances & mental disturbances grow. His bodily torments & mental torments grow. His bodily distresses & mental distresses grow. He is sensitive both to bodily stress & mental stress. MN 149
So if a monk should wish: ‘May neither my body be fatigued nor my eyes, and may my mind, through lack of clinging, be released from fermentations,’ then he should attend carefully to this same concentration through mindfulness with in-&-out breathing. SN 54.8
Since the sutta refers to kaya, vaci & mano intention creating sukhadukkha (happiness & suffering), the discussion in the sutta about ‘sukha’ appears to be not about Nibbana but about karmic (worldly) happiness (that remains subject to suffering when lost). This seems to be the case when it states: “because of bodily volition pleasure and pain arise”. Thus, to me, the ‘bodily volition’ referred to is never pure (i.e., a factor of the noble path) but ordinary volition, tainted by ignorance. Thus, with the cessation ignorance, in my non-scholarly opinion, this ‘bodily volition’ must also cease (rather than becomes Ariya Samma Sankappa).
I suppose this is the never-ending problem with the rendering in English “conditioned by”. I wonder where we can actually find it in the Pali. Anyway, compare the 2 bodies in these 2 passages -
kāyo na hoti yaṃpaccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ
Do you see that it is not saying that the body is “conditioned by” but is actually saying that the “body” is the condition for pleasure and pain to arise? Hetu = paccaya.
I am no Pali scholar. I have always thought ‘hetu’ = ‘cause’ rather than ‘paccaya’ (condition’). The kāyasañcetanā (intention) is the cause (hetu) for the uppajjati (rebirth) of ajjhattaṃ (internal) sukhadukkhaṃ (happiness & suffering). Where as the body is a (supporting) condition (paccaya) for happiness & suffering to arise but not the ‘cause’.
Earth, wind, fire & water are not ‘causes’ (hetu) of happiness since happiness is something mental (nama-dhamma) or immaterial (arupa). A corpse does not generate or cause happiness. Example, the physical body does not cause malaria. Mosquitoes & various viruses or bacteria (whatever) are the cause (hetu) of malaria. However, the body is a supporting condition (paccaya) for malaria. But the body can exist without malaria where as malaria cannot exist without a (host) body. The body is not the cause (hetu) of malaria, just the body is not the cause (hetu) of happiness & suffering.
Therefore, regardless of the linguistic gymnastics of the Pali, what I posted is not wrong; just as the the Lord Buddha could not have been a sloppy speaker. If the Lord Buddha intended to say ‘kāyasañcetanā’ in the last paragraph, he should have. As I previously posted or inferred: “that body (tainted by ignorance, ignorant sankharas & ignorant intentions) is the condition (paccaya) for the rebirth (uppajjati) of happiness & suffering”'; just as the body is the condition (host) for malaria.
Dependent origination explains consciousness is a condition (paccaya) for the origination or rebirth of suffering. When the Buddha ended ignorance, do you believe the consciousness of the Buddha ended with that ending of ignorance because, if ignorance was a cause (hetu) of consciousness & consciousness was a cause (hetu) of suffering, that consciousness would have ended when the Buddha ended both ignorance & suffering?
Here a bhikkhu is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, the holy life fulfilled, who has done what had to be done, laid down the burden, attained the goal, destroyed the fetters of being, completely released through final knowledge. However, his five sense faculties remain unimpaired, by which he still experiences what is agreeable and disagreeable and feels pleasure and pain. It is the extinction of attachment, hate, and delusion in him that is called the Nibbana-element… Iti 44
My impression has always been ‘paccaya’ (condition) can be substituted in some contexts for ‘cause’ (hetu) (such as for some links in D.O.) but cause (hetu) cannot be substituted for ‘paccaya’ (condition). If consciousness & the body were ‘causes’ (hetu) of suffering, they would have been mentioned in the 2nd noble truth, together with craving, becoming, lust, delight, etc.
To conclude, SN 12.25 has the deliberate use of the terms ‘cetana’ & ‘sankhara’ and ‘hetu’ & ‘paccaya’ in it. I doubt these terms were intended to be used synonymously; just as the term ‘kaya’ in the last paragraph was probably not intended to be used as a substitute for the ‘kayacetana’ previously mentioned.
I think this is where we part company on our lexical understanding of hetu-paccaya. I follow the consensus that in the EBTs, the 2 are synonyms; it is only in the Abhidhamma that a distinction is drawn between them.
You can see this equivalence in the waxing syllable phenomenon of “ko hetu, ko paccayo” pericope all over the suttas. My favourite example is SN 22.82 -
Ko nu kho, bhante, hetu ko paccayo rūpakkhandhassa paññāpanāya; ko hetu ko paccayo vedanākkhandhassa paññāpanāya; ko hetu ko paccayo saññākkhandhassa paññāpanāya; ko hetu ko paccayo saṅkhārakkhandhassa paññāpanāya; ko hetu ko paccayo viññāṇakkhandhassa paññāpanāyā”ti? “Cattāro kho, bhikkhu, mahābhūtā hetu, cattāro mahābhūtā paccayo rūpakkhandhassa paññāpanāya. Phasso hetu phasso paccayo vedanākkhandhassa paññāpanāya. Phasso hetu phasso paccayo saññākkhandhassa paññāpanāya. Phasso hetu, phasso paccayo saṅkhārakkhandhassa paññāpanāya. Nāmarūpaṃ hetu, nāmarūpaṃ paccayo viññāṇakkhandhassa paññāpanāyā”ti.
What is the cause and condition, venerable sir, for the manifestation of the form aggregate? What is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate?… for the manifestation of the perception aggregate?… for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate?… for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate?”
“The four great elements, bhikkhu, are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the perception aggregate.
Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate. Name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate.”
Other suttas supporting their equivalence would be -
DN 34, AN 8.2 - paṭhamo hetu paṭhamo paccayo ādibrahmacariyikāya …
SN 42.9 - aṭṭha hetū, aṭṭha paccayā kulānaṃ upaghātāya…
AN 8.70 ditto for cause and condition for earthquakes
Do you actually have any textual support from the EBTs to back-up your belief that hetu and paccaya are not synonyms in the context of discussions on conditionality/Dependant Arising?
As for this -
I think too much has been built into this interpretation of Dependant Arising. I’ve actually surveyed the Pali suttas for how the short catechismal listings of DO (eg the list in SN 12.1) are applied and explained, and the sense I get is that DA is always applied in retrospect after the First Noble Truth is established/accepted. I’ve not actually seen a sutta that applies DO/Second Noble Truth to predict a particular aspect of Suffering will come to be. DA is always used to explain howbhūtamidaṃ (this has come to be) (SN 12.31 and MN 38) came to be.
Nowhere is this clearer than in DN 15, where Dependant Arising is explained as follows -
“It was said: ‘With existence as condition there is birth.’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If there were absolutely and utterly no existence of any kind anywhere—that is, no sense-sphere existence, fine-material existence, or immaterial existence—then, in the complete absence of existence, with the cessation of existence, would birth be discerned?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for birth, namely, existence.
See also how DA 13 expresses the same notion of dependency/conditionality in the parallel passages.
Can you see how Dependant Arising is explained vide the negative existential locative absolute (bolded) used in Cessation? This is quite clear that DA purports to explain the necessary condition for a consequence, not that the condition is sufficient to give rise/cause the consequent.
That being the case, does your hypothetical concerning consciousness being a hetu/cause for Suffering apply Dependant Arising properly? You are using Dependant Arising in a predictive manner, but as the longer exegetical suttas demonstrate, Dependant Arising is used to explain how Suffering has come to be, not that Suffering will come to be.
Surely you must be familiar with the notion that the Attainment of Cessation takes place despite the presence of the Six Bases? If Dependant Arising were inexorable and predictive as you put it, it cannot account for Cessation taking place despite of the Six Bases.
[quote=“Sylvester, post:61, topic:3262”]
You can see this equivalence in the waxing syllable phenomenon of “ko hetu, ko paccayo” pericope all over the suttas. [/quote]
No. I do not “see” your point of view. Explaining what we personally believe the suttas to say does not necessarily mean our explanation is true. The suttas are only comprised of ancient words; the exactly meaning of many probably being lost or distorted.
[quote=“Sylvester, post:61, topic:3262”]
My favourite example is SN 22.82 -
What is the cause and condition, venerable sir, for the manifestation of the form aggregate? What is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate?… for the manifestation of the perception aggregate?… for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate?… for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate?”“The four great elements, bhikkhu, are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate[/quote]
This may be your favourite but it does not refute my previous post. In fact, I provided this very kind of example in my previous post.
Here, in SN 22.82, the four elements are the cause (hetu) of the body; contact is the cause (hetu) of perception, nama-rupa is the cause (hetu) of consciousness. I do not disagree with this.
I said in my previous post that paccaya (condition) often replaces hetu (cause) but hetu (cause) cannot always replace paccaya (condition). This is impossible.
For example, when AN 10.61 discusses the hindrances are the ‘ahara’ (food) of ignorance, it states this ‘ahara’ is a ‘paccaya’. But to say the five hindrances are the ‘cause’ (‘hetu’) of ignorance would be fatal because ignorance is the cause (hetu) of the five hindrances & the five hindrance are the ahara of ignorance, that is, a condition (paccaya) that sustains the continuance of ignorance.
I do not need any further evidence because, contrary to your former post, the body does not cause happiness. This is evidence enough. In fact, the evidence you seem to be asking for you yourself have provided. in the form of the very SN 22.82 you quoted, which states it is contact that is the immediate cause (hetu) for pleasant feelings (rather than the body, which is an immediate cause of consciousness rather than an immediate cause of feelings).
Thank you. This example does not refute my point of view & alter what I previously posted. Bhava is an akusala dhamma that is the cause (hetu) of jati, which is another akusaladhamma. Ignorance, craving, attachment & aging-death are also akusaladhammas. In the D.A. formula, they act as causes (hetu). I already pointed this out when I said only aksuala dhammas are included in the 2nd noble truth definition.
As for consciousness, mind-body, sense spheres, contact & feeling, there are merely the five aggregates (as explained in SN 22.1; SN 22.48). They are not causes (hetu) of suffering. They only become causes (hetu) of suffering when they are polluted by ignorance. That is why it was probably safer to use the word ‘paccaya’ in the D.A. formula rather than ‘hetu’. The word ‘hetu’ would cause all kinds of problems.
Obviously, SN 22.53 does not support your point of view that consciousness is a cause (hetu) of suffering in the same way that bhava is the cause (hetu) of jati.
If a monk abandons passion for the property of consciousness, then owing to the abandonment of passion, the support is cut off, and there is no landing of consciousness. Consciousness, thus not having landed, not increasing, not concocting, is released. Owing to its release, it is steady. Owing to its steadiness, it is contented. Owing to its contentment, it is not agitated. SN 22.53
Consciousness does not ‘cause’ (hetu) suffering to come to be. This is shown in many suttas. It is only ‘consciousness tainted by ignorance’ that causes (hetu) suffering to come to be. SN 22.81 makes this clear, when it refers to ‘ignorant contact’. This is probably why it was safer to use the word ‘paccaya’ in D.A. rather than ‘hetu’. From memory, MN 9 uses ‘samadhaya’, which can be problematic. While ignorant sankharas do cause consciousness to ‘arise’ (samudhaya), consciousness can arise in a different way. Not all consciousness arises due to ignorance.
I do not really have time to look up English dictionaries to comprehend your posts. However, I will make this last point.
You seem to be very much focused on the phrase: “Comes to be”. However, imo, there is a difference between Idappaccayatā & Paticcasamuppada.
The part of SN 22.82 you quoted does not sound like Paticcasammupada. It is not about the arising of dukkha. It sounds like it is only about Iddappaccataya. For example, that 2 parts hydrogen & 1 part oxygen (whatever) create water is Iddappaccataya rather than Paticcasamuppada. Similarly, that the four great elements are the cause (hetu) of the body (rupa) or nama-rupa is the cause (hetu) of consciousness is Iddappaccataya & not Paticcasamuppada. However, where SN 22.82 states: "These five aggregates subject to clinging, bhikkhu, are rooted in desire” is Paticcasamuppada & also Iddappaccataya.
All dogs are animals but not all animals are dogs. Similarly, all Paticcasamuppada is (a type of ) Iddappaccataya but not all Iddappaccataya is Paticcasamuppada. Thus, all ‘coming to be’ is not Paticcasamuppada (unless that coming to be is ‘bhava’ & ‘jati’, which must manifest as dukkha).
I would say nirodha-samāpatti is not related to Paticcasamuppada since Paticcasamuppada, including its reverse order, as described in MN 38, is about the arising & cessation of suffering while the sense spheres are functioning.
Nirodha-samāpatti is just a form of samadhi. The causes (hetu) that result in Nirodha-samāpatti appear to be Iddappaccataya (even though the complete tranquilizing of the dhammas that make up 2nd, 3rd & 4th links of D.A are the dhammas involved in Nirodha-samāpatti). If the tranquilizing of nama-rupa, consciousness & sankharas do not result in the destruction of ignorance, it is not related to Paticcasamuppada, imo, since only wisdom/vipassana can uproot ignorance.
To end, I think my example of AN 10.61 is very strong. To substitute ‘hetu’ (‘cause’) for ‘paccaya’ (‘condition’) in AN 10.61 would be fatal since the five hindrances are certainly not the ‘cause’ (hetu) of ignorance.
What might above mean? The people studying Textual Criticism here are not as cynical as your above post suggests.
That’s most odd. I believe SN 22.82 says that the 4 properties are the cause (hetu) and condition (paccaya) of the Form Aggregate. Ditto for the rest. Have you misread it, perchance?
Any textual evidence to offer for this? If none, any expert opinion you would like to cite? How does that square with the evidence that I’ve offered for their equivalence? You’ve offered no response other than an unsubstantiated opinion.
This simply begs the question of whether or not there is a distinction between hetu and paccaya. You’ve simply asserted without arguing why “ignorance is the cause (hetu) of the five hindrances”. Pls elaborate.
Even if you could produce a textual basis for saying that “ignorance is the cause (hetu) of the five hindrances”, why would that preclude one from asserting that “the five hindrances are the ‘cause’ (‘hetu’) of ignorance”? Surely you’ve not overlooked the whirlpool between consciousness and Name-&-Form as follows from DN 15 -
Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa—yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ.
“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for mentality-materiality, namely, consciousness.
:::
Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo viññāṇassa yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ
Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for consciousness, namely, mentality-materiality.
I’m rather surprised that you could have missed this, given how prominent the co-dependency of consciousness and Name-&-Form is in the EBTs.
Certainly, you may not require proof of your belief, but I am asking you to justify your premiss leading to your conclusion logically. I don’t think we should let standards on Discourse slip so low… I would suggest you read my previous post a little more carefully. If I had expressed my agreement with the Commentary that the “body” in final paragraph of SN 12.25 which causes/is the condition for pleasure and pain is bodily intention, how in the world did you misrepresent me as saying that it means the “body”?
Pls read that sutta more carefully. It says -
Phasso hetu phasso paccayo vedanākkhandhassa paññāpanāya.
Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate.
You’ll have to take this up with DN 15, as each and every one of the conditions are also described to be the cause for its consequent by this formula -
eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo ABC yadidaṃ XYZ
I’m looking forward to a proper defence of your thesis, not ex cathedras. I trust you will be able to oblige.
I have already mentioned this & I have answered all of your queries with a proper defense. I argued that SN 22.82 does not support your case & only supports my defense since the hetu-paccaya discussed in relation to the 5 aggregates is not paticcasummupada. It is just material science (idappaccayata; bija-niyama; citta-niyama), similar to biology or neurological brain science. It is not about dukkha-samudhaya.
Similarly, the co-dependency of consciousness and mentality-&-materiality is only idappaccayata & not paticcasummupada (unless those two dhammas are tainted by ignorance). Also, DN 15 is not the ideal sutta to use since the nama-rupa therein is Brahmanistic to me plus I do not recall it mentions ignorance.
The five hindrances are obviously not the cause of ignorance because when the 5 hindrances end in jhana, ignorance is not necessarily extinguished. This is another reason why AN 10.61 strongly supports my EBT case that ‘hetu’ (‘cause’) cannot always be substituted for paccaya (‘condition’) although paccaya can be substituted for hetu.
The ‘whirlpool’ you mention is found in MN 9, where ignorance & the asava are treated as a mutually dependent ‘whirlpool’. However, it is only arahantship that ends both (unlike only neighbourhood concentration being required to end the five hindrances). Also, one of the asava is ignorance, just as one of the anusaya is ignorance. These seem to be all the same things, essentially, that may be subject to a ‘whirlpool’, except the five hindrances, which are not.
And what, bhikkhus, is dependent origination? With ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called dependent origination. : SN 12.1.
Is this objectionable?
If it is not objectionable, how can the distinction that you draw, ie “not all Iddappaccataya is Paticcasamuppada” possibly sit with this pericope -
Tatra kho, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako paṭiccasamuppādaññ eva sādhukaṃ yoniso manasi karoti: ‘iti imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati, yadidaṃ—avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā; saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ … pe … evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. Avijjāya tveva asesavirāganirodhā saṅkhāranirodho; saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho … pe … evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hotī’”ti.
Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple attends carefully and closely to dependent origination itself thus: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering." : eg SN 12.37
I have bolded yadidaṃ/ “that is” above to indicate that this pericope is saying that idappaccayatā is paṭiccasamuppāda, whereas the eva/ thus bolded in the first sentence is saying that paṭiccasamuppāda is idappaccayatā .
May I also ask for your views on SN 12.49 - 50, where the standard formula for paṭiccasamuppāda is expressed in the existential locative absolute language of idappaccayatā ? Why would the redactors record this, if the 2 were not equivalent?
See also the equivalence drawn by MN 26 for the 2, as well as a variant of the earlier pericope as recorded in AN 10.92. More tellingly, see also the discussion in DN 15 on the existence of the idappaccaya (idappaccayā = from what idappaccaya) required for each consequent to arise, and how that is answered in the standard paṭiccasamuppāda formula.
We can continue our discussion on the difference, if any, between hetu and paccaya after we’ve resolved this.
That water, soil & seed come together to produce a plant is idappaccayatā related to biology.
That ignorance, craving & attachment come together to produce suffering (dukkha) is idappaccayatā related to dukkha; which is specifically called ‘paṭiccasamuppāda’.
Paṭiccasamuppāda, the law of suffering, is a type of idappaccayatā, just as the laws of physics, chemistry, biology & cognition are types of idappaccayatā.
Therefore, the part of SN 22.82 you quoted is about the laws of biology (namely, the physical body is caused by food, such as porridge & rice) & the laws of cognition (consciousness is the cause of feeling; body-mind is the cause of consciousness, etc). These laws of biology & cognition are idappaccayatā but they are not paṭiccasamuppāda.
The laws of nature, although uniformly based on the principle of causal dependence, can nevertheless be sorted into different modes of relationship. The Buddhist commentaries describe five categories of natural law, or niyama. They are:
1. Utuniyama: the natural law pertaining to physical objects and changes in the natural environment, such as the weather; the way flowers bloom in the day and fold up at night; the way soil, water and nutrients help a tree to grow; and the way things disintegrate and decompose. This perspective emphasizes the changes brought about by heat or temperature.
2. Bijaniyama: the natural law pertaining to heredity, which is best described in the adage, “as the seed, so the fruit.”
3. Cittaniyama: the natural law pertaining to the workings of the mind, the process of cognition of sense objects and the mental reactions to them.
4. Kammaniyama: the natural law pertaining to human behavior, the process of the generation of action and its results. In essence, this is summarized in the words, “good deeds bring good results, bad deeds bring bad results.”
5. Dhammaniyama: the natural law governing the relationship and interdependence of all things: the way all things arise, exist and then cease. All conditions are subject to change, are in a state of affliction and are not self: this is the Norm.
I suppose this is OK. I do not know the Pali so I cannot really agree or disagree.
If ‘paccaya’ is mentioned once in the Pali, why do translators need to bring in the idappaccayatā formula, that is used as an introduction? Cannot the translation just be: “ignorance is the condition for fabricators/conditioners; fabricators are the condition for consciousness”, etc?
I explained this at the start. I follow the view that the laws of chemistry, biology, physics, cognition, etc, are Iddappaccataya but not paticcasamuppada. Paticcasamuppada is the Iddappaccataya specifically pertaining to dukkha. Therefore, the discussion about the five aggregates in SN 22.82 is Iddappaccataya but not Paticcasamuppada. Therefore, the term ‘hetu’ or ‘cause’ is very relevant to SN 22.82 but not relevant to AN 10.61, where it would be fatal.
This seems to not change my point of view since the sutta refers to the idappaccayatā (‘cause & effect’) of paṭiccasamuppāda. The sutta states:
…the instructed noble disciple attends carefully and closely to dependent origination itself thus: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, fabricators come to be;…
I have no issues with SN 12.49 since idappaccayatā (‘cause & effect’) is the fundamental process of paṭiccasamuppāda. SN 12.49 - 50 does not change my point of view. For me SN 12.49 - 50 does not make paṭiccasamuppāda & idappaccayatā equivalent. SN 12.49 - 50 only states paṭiccasamuppāda is a type of idappaccayatā, as follows:
Bhikkhus, the instructed biologist has knowledge about this that is independent of others: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When there is eggs, chicks come to be. When there are chicks, hens & roosters comes to be. When there are hens & roosters, eggs comes to be…: ‘In such a way the chickens originates.’
I raised the matter of idappaccayatā because the part of SN 22.82 you quoted to argue your case that paccaya & hetu are equivalent is about idappaccayatā rather than about paṭiccasamuppāda. In paṭiccasamuppāda, I do not regard consciousness itself as a ‘cause’ (hetu) of suffering but only a condition (paccaya) of suffering unless that consciousness is tainted by ignorance. Thus, I speculated it was probably safer to use the more flexible term ‘paccaya’ in paṭiccasamuppāda rather than the absolute term ‘hetu’ (cause).
To end, this matter is not particularly important to me, since I am content in my views. I think AN 10.61 irrefutably supports a case that ‘hetu’ cannot be substituted for ‘paccaya’ in all contexts.
That’s very odd. Try as I might, I could not find any reference to rice or porridge in said sutta. Ditto for food/nutriment. Where did you infer these in SN 22.82? Perhaps you are conflating “body” with “form” in the pericope from other suttas?
body endowed with form, composed of the four primary elements, born from mother & father, nourished with rice & porridge
The 5 Clinging-Aggregates discussed in SN 22.82 are Suffering. What difference do you see in that sutta’s search for the “cause and condition” of each Clinging-Aggregate and the presentation in AN 3.61 on the same -
“And what, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering? Birth is suffering, old age is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and anguish are suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering. This is called the noble truth of suffering.
“And what, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the origin of suffering? With ignorance as condition, volitional activities come to be; with volitional activities as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and anguish come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This is called the noble truth of the origin of suffering.
It is clear from AN 3.61 that the Second Noble Truth is paṭiccasamuppāda, and that SN 22.82’s analysis of the “cause and condition” of the Clinging-Aggregates also points to paṭiccasamuppāda.
Does this tract from Phra Payutto say that idappaccayatā is not paṭiccasamuppāda?
Now, I see that Ajahn Buddhadasa opines -
Now, idappaccayatā is, as mentioned, the law behind all things, behind everything, but where it concerns people, and especially when it’s a matter of the dukkha of human beings, we change the name and call it paṭiccasamuppāda, or, to give its full title, idappaccayatā-paṭiccasamuppādo. If we just say ‘idappaccayatā,’ it applies to everything without
_exception that either has or doesn’t have life, to everything _ that is concocted, conditioned, but if we’re only concerned with people, and particularly with the arising and quenching of their dukkha, then we change the title and call it ‘paṭiccasamuppāda.’ The Buddha often used the longer version, but we won’t, we’ll stick with paṭiccasamuppāda. So, we know that idappaccayatā is the general Law of Nature, covering everything that happens, while paṭiccasamuppāda is the Law of Nature where it concerns humans and their dukkha.
But where’s the textual evidence for this? Just because he declared it, does not make it a correct representation of what the early texts posit.
I’m not sure I understand you on this. Paccaya is mentioned 11 times in the ablative form.
No, it cannot. Your proposal has only a sentence that is not made up of a subordinate clause and main clause, unlike the Pali formula.
Given that I have demonstrated that -
SN 22.82 is about paṭiccasamuppāda, and
I have not seen Ajahn Buddhadasa offer any textual support for the supposed difference between paṭiccasamuppāda and idappaccayatā , and
idappaccayatā is paṭiccasamuppāda and vice versa : SN 12.37, MN 26, DN 15
it is up to you to furnish primary material (and not tertiary material in the form of proffered opinions) to substantiate your proposition bolded above.
Could you explain how you translated or interpreted that passage to mean that idappaccayatā is the “cause and effect of paṭiccasamuppāda”? Do explain the syntactic or idiomatic rules you are invoking. It’s nothing I’ve encountered before in Pali. It appears to me that you’ve missed out idappaccayatā completely when you cited -
The “that is” (yadidaṃ) as I was at pains to point out earlier is explaining idappaccayatā found in the part which I italicise below -
…the instructed noble disciple attends carefully and closely to dependent origination itself thus: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, fabricators come to be;…
As far as the dictionaries go, yadidaṃ means a closed list (id est), not examples (exempli gratia).
I will trouble you to also address my earlier point -
Moving on -
Actually, it is a closed list, going by the passage -
When what exists does what come to be? With the arising of what does what arise? When what exists do volitional formations come to be? When what exists does consciousness come to be? When what exists does name-and-form come to be?… When what exists does aging-and-death come to be?’
It is restricted to asking about the 12 standard constituents of paṭiccasamuppāda. Nothing to indicate that it’s applicable to Gallus gallus and eggs.
Oh, I would not be so sure about that. Read the Chinese MA parallels to AN 10.61 and AN 10.62. Instead of paccaya/ pratyaya/緣, it says 因/ hetu. One of the other parallels has hetu-pratyaya.
No. The SN 22.82 part about the cause of the aggregates is not paṭiccasamuppāda. My point was correct. For me, there is no point to continue discussing what is self-evident & plain. SN 22.82 states:
The four great elements, bhikkhu, are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the perception aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate. Name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate.”
Paṭiccasamuppāda does not teach that the four great elements are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate; contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the formations aggregate; name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate.
Paṭiccasamuppāda teaches consciousness is the condition for form (rupa); feeling is the condition for the formations aggregate; consciousness is the condition for name-and-form, as follows:
With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one objectifies. MN 18
To me, your question here is not relevant because the cause & condition for each aggregate in SN 22.82 is not related to suffering or AN 3.61.
About the cause of suffering, SN 22.82 states: "“These five aggregates subject to clinging, bhikkhu, are rooted in desire.” This is OK. But this part is not related to the cause of each aggregate.
AN 3.61 states the opposite of the cause (hetu) of consciousness found in SN 22.82.
Name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate. SN 22.82
With consciousness as condition, name-and-form AN 3.61
You have posted nothing that demonstrates your view correct either. For me, Buddhadasa makes much more sense since the suttas do not always use the term idappaccayatā, such as:
Now, the Blessed One has said, “Whoever sees dependent co-arising sees the Dhamma; whoever sees the Dhamma sees dependent co-arising.” And these things — the five clinging-aggregates — are dependently co-arisen. Any desire, embracing, grasping, & holding-on to these five clinging-aggregates is the origination of stress. Any subduing of desire & passion, any abandoning of desire & passion for these five clinging-aggregates is the cessation of stress.’ MN 28
The suttas never ask the question: “What is idappaccayatā?” The suttas always as the question: “What is paṭiccasamuppāda?” & in the answer ‘idappaccayatā’ is used as an explanatory principle.
I think the evidence shows the Buddhadasa view is more likely to be correct since ‘idappaccayatā’ on its own reveals nothing about how suffering arises .
I was only asking. This is not relevant to the topic.
No.
You did not demonstrate 100% of SN 22.82 is about paṭiccasamuppāda.
For me, this is irrelevant because the Buddha did not speak Chinese. I cannot see the point of using Chinese literature as a guide to Pali Buddhism. If my recollection is accurate, Analayo’s work on MN 117 clearly showed the Chinese texts were wrong since the Chinese MN 117 appears to state that the mundane right view with asava of acknowledging gifts, mother & father, kamma, etc, leads to Nibbana. My recollection of Analayo’s work is the Chinese MN 117 did not even include the transcendent (‘lokuttara’) factors of the path.
Regardless, I have already said numerous times that if every condition in D.O. is taken to be tainted with ignorance then those conditions (paccaya) are causes (hetu) of suffering. However, I also said it is much safer to use the word ‘paccaya’ since D.O. could be misconstrued as explaining consciousness, nama-rupa, sense-spheres & contact themselves are causes (hetu) of suffering.
To end, AN 10.61 shows hetu (cause) cannot be substituted for ‘paccaya’ (condition) in all contexts.
I think AN 10.61 and my view on SN 22.82 shows I am correct here. For me, your reliance on SN 22.82 did not at all demonstrate your point of view.
With metta
**Paṭiccasamuppāda & Idappaccayatā in SN 22.82**
**Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_Those are the five aggregates **subject to clinging**, bhikkhu: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate **subject to clinging**, the perception aggregate **subject to clinging**, the volitional formations aggregate **subject to clinging**, the consciousness aggregate **subject to clinging**._
**Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_These five aggregates subject to clinging, bhikkhu, are rooted in desire_.
**Not Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_Bhikkhus, **that clinging is neither the same as these five aggregates** ..._
**Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_But rather, the desire and lust for them, that is the clinging there._
**Not Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_In what way, venerable sir, does the designation ‘aggregates’ apply to the aggregates?”_
_Whatever kind of form there is, bhikkhu, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: this is called the form aggregate._
**Idappaccayatā** **Not Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_What is the cause and condition, venerable sir, for the manifestation of the form aggregate? What is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate?… for the manifestation of the perception aggregate?… for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate?… for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate?”_
_“The four great elements, bhikkhu, are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the perception aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate. Name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate._”
**Paṭiccasamuppāda**
_Venerable sir, how does identity view come to be?”_
_“Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling, who is not a seer of the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self … perception as self … volitional formations as self … consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That is how identity view comes to be_
It is quite evident that your reasoning boils down to 2 varieties -
appealling to the unsubstantiated opinion of Ajahn Buddhadasa; and
begging the question.
What might I mean by #2? Simply asserting that idappaccayatā is not paṭiccasamuppāda because of SN 22.82, and when pressed on SN 22.82, you assert that SN 22.82 cannot be about paṭiccasamuppāda because the relevant passage was discussing idappaccayatā and not paṭiccasamuppāda. Surely we can do better than this fallacy of petitio principii?
This is obviously incorrect, going by the discussion of the 4 Great Properties and Dependant Origination -
(after an exposition on the 4 Great Properties)
If, friends, internally the mind is intact but no external mind-objects come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the mind is intact and external mind-objects come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the mind is intact and external mind-objects come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.
“The material form (rūpa) in what has thus come to be is included in the material form aggregate affected by clinging (rūpupādānakkhandha). The feeling in what has thus come to be is included in the feeling aggregate affected by clinging. The perception in what has thus come to be is included in the perception aggregate affected by clinging. The formations in what has thus come to be are included in the formations aggregate affected by clinging. The consciousness in what has thus come to be is included in the consciousness aggregate affected by clinging. He understands thus: ‘This, indeed, is how there comes to be the inclusion, gathering, and amassing of things into these five aggregates affected by clinging. Now this has been said by the Blessed One: “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination.” And these five aggregates affected by clinging are dependently arisen (paṭiccasamuppannā). The desire, indulgence, inclination, and holding based on these five aggregates affected by clinging is the origin of suffering. The removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for these five aggregates affected by clinging is the cessation of suffering.’ At that point too, friends, much has been done by that bhikkhu.” : MN 28
If there’s still any doubt about the place of dependently originated things (paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā) in the paṭiccasamuppāda schema, look no further than SN 12.20. And unsurprisingly, it also says -
Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this, the inerrancy, the nototherwiseness, specific conditionality ( idappaccayatā ): this is called dependent origination.
Are you saying that “cause” (hetu) is the same as “root” (mūla)? Do elaborate and why you feel this is relevant to the discussion.
Sigh, each of these 2 suttas is taking one aspect of the whirlpool of consciousness with Name-Form. For example, the whirlpool is analysed in DN 15. A shorter discussion of the whirlpool is found in SN 12.67 -
Just as two sheaves of reeds might stand leaning against each other, so too, with name-and-form as condition, consciousness comes to be; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form comes to be.
The fact that you’ve avoided my invitation to examine the evidence I have offered by way of MN 26, DN 15, the SN 12.37 pericope (especially its yadidaṃ predication) is perhaps more probative of the problem than the manner you have characterised it. If and when you decide to rise to the challenge of explaining away the yadidaṃ predication in SN 12.37, you may also wish to attend to the same formula in SA 299 which uses 謂 to equate idappaccayatā with paṭiccasamuppāda. The fact that Ajahn Buddhadasa was unaware of this equation should be reason enough to reject his opinion as not being in line with the suttas and sutras.
I don’t think this forum has a place for Pali chauvinism. Need I remind you, this site is about EBT, not Pali Buddhism. If this is not to your liking, perhaps you could open another forum.
Your recollection is quite wrong. Ven Analayo acknowledges the existence of SA 785, which has the MN 117 dichotomy.[quote=“Deeele, post:14, topic:3345”]
I think AN 10.61 and my view on SN 22.82 shows I am correct here. For me, your reliance on SN 22.82 did not at all demonstrate your point of view.
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We have not even graduated past the idappaccayatā / paṭiccasamuppāda issue, as you have declined to address the suttas I raised. SN 22.82 is relevant in the manner demonstrated above.
You were suggesting the teaching that the four elements cause the body & that nama-rupa cause consciousness & that contact mental formations is dependent origination, which it is not.
