There are also benefits here and now.
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I think Nibbana is all about benefit here and now.
Speaking as a recovering alcoholic, that was well said indeed. Thanks.
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Be strong Andy. March ever forward. Do not ever look back.
With love and best wishes.
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I always thought the comparison with buddhism was incredibly misguided as it’s quite clear philosophically that if anything pyrrhonism was actually influenced by the indian skeptics (in the suttas known as eel-wrigglers) and not buddhism. The reports indicate that he (Pyrrho) met naked ascetics which would also preclude that they were buddhists.
We do not know the identity of the “naked wise men” whom Pyrrho met in India, or what they thought. There are reports of other meetings between Indian and Greek thinkers during Alexander’s expedition, and these tend to emphasize the Indians’ extraordinary impassivity and insensitivity to pain and hardship. Pyrrho (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
But this connection is rather dubious anyway as we’ve no idea how influenced by Pyrrho pyrrhonian skepticism actually was. Suffice it to say that indian skepticism and developed pyrrhonism are identical in many ways but buddhism and pyrrhonism are a great chasm different. See again the link:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pyrrho/#InfPyr
Doctrines of Endless Equivocation: Views 13–16
“There are, monks, other dharmas, profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak. And what are these dharmas?
There are some recluses and Brahmāns who wriggle like eels; and when a question is put to them on this or that they resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling, and this in four ways. Therefore, some recluses and Brahmāns who wriggle like eels, resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling on four grounds, when a question is put to them on this or that.
Therein, some recluse or Brahmāns makes thus a statement, holds thus a view: ‘I do neither see nor understand whether there will be a wholesome result after performing a wholesome action or there will be an unwholesome result after performing an unwholesome action. For I do neither see nor understand whether there will be a wholesome result after performing a wholesome action or there will be an unwholesome result after performing an unwholesome action, so that I thus say I do neither declare there will be a wholesome result after performing a wholesome action nor there will be an unwholesome result after performing an unwholesome action.’
There are some recluse or Brahmān who is erudite and well-heard, wise, clever, experienced in controversy, and respected by the world. He is good at distinguishing any viewpoint. He thinks: ‘when I be questioned about the profundity of this or that point, I might not be able to reply. If I could not reply, that would distress me, and that distress would be an obstacle for me. Therefore, out of fear and loathing of being distressed, I have to answer in this way, as my refuge, as my island, as my house, as my path of deliverance. So when someone put a question to me on this or that, I should answer like this: “I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that is neither this nor that.” This is the first case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort to evasive statement and to endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.
Therein some recluse or Brahmān makes thus a statement, holds thus a view: ‘I do neither see nor understand whether there is a world beyond or there is no such a world beyond.’ There are some recluse or Brahmān who can see things far beyond with his divine eye and read others mind, when I come close to him, he is not seen by me. Such a person understands whether there is a world beyond or there is no such a world beyond. But I do neither see nor understand whether there is a world beyond or there is no such a world beyond. If, without understanding, I were to declare there is to be a world beyond or there is to be no world beyond, my declaration might be false, that would distress me. Therefore, out of fear and loathing of making a false statement, I take this as my refuge, as my island, as my house, and as my path of deliverance. So, when someone puts a question to me on this or that, I should answer like this: ‘I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that it is neither this nor that.’ This is the second case. It is in this way, on the one of the four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort to evasive statement and to the endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.
Herein, some recluse or Brahmān makes thus a statement, holds thus a view: ‘I do not see or understand as it really is what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. If without seeing or understanding, I were to declare something to be wholesome or unwholesome, desire and lust or hatred and aversion might arise in me. Under these circumstances, desire and lust or hatred and aversion might cause a rebirth. In order to eliminate the pain of remorse, I go forth from the household life into the homelessness. Therefore, out of fear and loathing of the falling into that state, (he does not declare anything to be wholesome or unwholesome), he takes this as his refuge, as his island, as his house, and as his path of deliverance. But when some one puts a question to him on this or that, he resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation, and he answers like this: ‘I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that it is neither this nor that.’ This is the third case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.
Herein, some recluse or Brahmān is dull and stupid. Due to his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned about this or that point, he does the same as others do—resorts to evasive statements and to endless equivocation: ‘I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that it is neither this nor that.’ This is the fourth case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort evasive statements and to endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.
It is on these four grounds, monks, that those recluses and Brahmāns who are endless equivocators resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation when questioned about this or that point. Whatever recluses or Brahmāns there may be who resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation, all of them do so on these four grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.
This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: These view-points thus grasped and thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of these who trust in them. He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not attach to. And because he is free from attachment, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the arising and passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathagata is emancipated through non-clinging.
These are those dharmas, bhiksus, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak.”
From Outlines of Pyrrhonsim by Sextus Empiricus, translated by R.G. Bury:
Chapter IV: What Skepticism Is
Skepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of “unperturbedness” or quietude. Now we call it an “ability” not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its “being able”. By “appearances” we now mean the objects of sense perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or “judgments.” The phrase “in any way whatsoever” can be connected either with the word “ability”, to make us take the word “ability”, as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase “opposing appearances to judgments”; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways- appearances to appearances, or judgments to judgments, or alternando appearances to judgements, - in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase “in any way whatsoever” to “appearances and judgments” in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase “opposed judgments” we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to “conflicting judgments”. “Equippolence” we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgments takes precedence of any other as being more probable. “Suspense” is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgment we shall explain in our chapter (XII) “Concerning the End”
One can see the similarities between greek skepticism and what the buddha considered doctrines of endless equivocation. Of course, keep in mind the brahmajala is trying to insult the skeptics while Sextus is explaining his own philosophy.
An amusing account of Pyrrho by Diogenes Laertius 9.61-2:
Pyrrho of Ellis was the son Pleistarchus, as Diocese too narrates. According to Apollodorus in his Chronicles he was formerly a painter; and, according to Alexander in his Successions, he attended the lectures of Bryson, son of Stilpo, then Anaxarchus’, accompanying the latter everywhere in his travels, even spending time with the Gymnosophists in India and the Magi. From this experience, he seems to have theorized in a most noble way, introducing the idea of ungraspability and suspension of judgement, according to Ascanius of Abdera. For he said that nothing was either honorable or shameful, just or unjust; similarly for all cases he said that nothing exists in truth but that men do everything the basis of convention and custom; for each thing is no more this than that. He was consistent with this view in his manner of living, neither avoiding anything nor watching out for anything, taking everything as it came, whether it be wagons or precipices or dogs, and all such things, relying on his senses for nothing. He was kept alive by his acquaintances who followed him around, according to the school of Antigonus of Carystus. Aenesidemus, however, says that he only theorized about the suspension of judgement, whereas he did not actually act improvidently. He lived to be almost ninety years old.
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Not-of-this-world and ‘beyond conceivable existence’ would be much the same thing. The wordling lives in the world I.e. they are preoccupied with the eight worldly concerns. This is the world where the Buddha cannot be found. He does not exist or nonexist or, neither, in this world. There is no truth that is seperate from conception. All compounded things have their conception, their beginning, middle and, end - where? There are no beings or discrete and autonomous ‘things’ seperate from conception. Where is world? Ajahn Brahm said that according to one take on the ‘Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics’ there is nothing fixed and perceivable without an act of observation. Observation without an observer would be a fact for the Buddha. If there is no observer where is the world? “Mind is the forerunner of all things …” - Dhammapada