"Existence" and "nonexistence" in the Kaccānagotta Sutta

Hi Erika,

I’ve never heard such an attitude before from anybody, so I don’t know exactly what’d be behind it. So I am just projecting it. Still, what others here say (@Vaddha, @Jasudho, @Mkoll, @Brahmali) makes sense to me.

But in addition, it seems such a notion would largely come from the intellect, not from intuitive deep-down insights. I’d say, if they really know and accept completely that there’s no “me”, then they’ll be fully enlightened! So then they don’t have to care about future lives, anyway. :rofl:

However, if anybody actually approached me personally and asked about having such a notion, I’d probably reply differently. Maybe they just can’t relate to rebirth as directly as to this present life, which is completely understandable. Maybe they are even skeptical of it. Then I’d just encourage them to practice for the current life, for what they can see, for whatever suffering they can alleviate. I don’t think it would be particularly helpful to try and change their views through some intellectual answer.

Depending on the person and their approach, I may also say that it is the same “me” who is reborn, not a completely different person, just as much as it’s the same “me” who lives on tomorrow. So if you care about your wellfare tomorrow, you should care about your wellfare in the next life.

Those are just some initial ideas. It’s kinda outside of the scope of the essay, so I’ll probably leave it at that. I may be completely missing the point, anyway…

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Right. But the answer that we should care about the “I” in the next life because that is a being too even though it is not the “I” of this life is not satisfying to one who holds tightly to the conceit of the “I” in this life.

Why? Because in just the same way that they are preoccupied with the “I” in this life and in relation to that “I” feel no obligation to the “I” in the next life… in just that same way and to the same extent, they relatively feel no obligation to others in this life or the next. The “I” in the next life might as well be an “other” of which there is no shortage.

Identifying strongly with the “I” in the next life as some sort of continuation of the “I” in this life that we ought to be especially concerned with just builds on ruinous fixation on the “I” in this life.

We should strive to be equanimous in our concern which starts with dismantling the conceit for the “I” in this life. :pray:

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Yes, that is what I understood you to be asserting but I’ll have to read your essay carefully and look at your references to understand if you have new evidence for this.

In the meantime, as I said in response to your previous essay, it seems to me that the question about “what happens after death” is inextricably tied up with the view of personal existence. The very question presupposes the view of personal existence to my mind. :pray:

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I should wait till you read the essay, but since I don’t know when I’ll be online again, in the meantime: :slight_smile:

For “most of the world” what happens after death is indeed tied up in such a way, that’s exactly the point! For the noble ones it is not however, and especially not for the arahants. For instance, when the Buddha says he has knowledge of the future, this isn’t a view of personal existence:

Regarding the future, the Realized One has the knowledge born of awakening: ‘This is my last rebirth; now there’ll be no more future lives.’ (DN29)

Or when in DN16 he says his parinibbana will be three months from now, this also is knowledge about “what happens after death” (or at death) without involving a self.

But please add some critical thoughts to my essay about this, once you’ve read it in full. :slight_smile:

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Hello Venerable,

I just went back and looked at our long discussion that was well summed up by you in the previous essay:

And this confirms for me that I won’t be setting up a straw man when I’ll discuss atthi and natthi in more detail in a later topic. (If it ever comes to that.…) :smiley:

Now that I’ve refreshed my memory of the discussion and where it left off I’ll try and find some time to properly look at how your new essay informs that discussion. Thank you! :pray:

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I think this is at odds with the view of the suttas also. I’ll explain my view more on the weekend, and respond to your other replies Bhante.

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If essence is a contradictory concept, then it could be known. Or rather, it could be known that: It is not the case that, “external form can have essence.”

The Teacher asserted annata but was this an empirical knowledge conducted with six senses that all persons in the entire universe are anatta?

You say that it is an empirical question whether external form has essence, but can you see how it could be the case that it is not? :pray:

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Hi and thanks, tenley!

Hmm, this is not what the sutta in question seems to say to me, though. It’s not just about avoiding the view that external form has essence. It is specifically acknowledging that it does not have “essence” (regardless of what that term exactly implies in this text). It says: “And it appears to them as completely vacuous, hollow, and insubstantial. For what core could there be in form?”

I also haven’t yet completely abandoned the possibility that “external form” in this sutta refers to bodies of others, however. The verses say:

The verses say nothing about matter in general. Hence, I’m not so sure whether the explanation of “external form” in MN28 in fact is meant to apply here.

But another’s opinion on this would be helpful, also @Vaddha, @Ceisiwr

If you know this about your own being, at least this would be a much more direct inference than extrapolating from your own being lacking a personal self to all insentient matter in the universe being without any essence whatsoever.

And I would probably call it empirical knowledge, yes. It’s like laws of physics are empirically testable (in scientific terms) without having to prove them in every corner in the universe at every point in time.

It may not result in absolute knowledge about every corner of the universe, but I would say it is empirical knowledge. Same with anatta of other beings.

(Taking this analogy further, string theory is not empirically known, because it has never been tested. It’s just a mathematical model. I would say it’s similar for general matter being without essence in context of the Dhamma: it is not known through personal, first-person experience.)

I’m not sure what you mean here. I can see that it would be a theoretical question, which can be set aside for dhamma purposes.

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But that was my point. The clinging to an “I” is what generated the question in the first place and is a continuing problem until it ceases.
Meanwhile, dukkha rolls on whether a reborn being recalls prior lives or not.

So the initial question, being asked from the “I” standpoint, might be responded to with “No kallo pañho.”

Agree and never said otherwise. :slightly_smiling_face:

:pray:

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There is no clinging to an I per EBT. There is clinging to a doctrine of self but that is something else. And furthermore there is clinging to khandhas as If this is me, mine my self but also that is not clinging to an I. That causes the conceit I am. Without clinging to aggregates this does not exist (SN22.83)

Never any moment an I or self is really arisen and establishes in the mind. Only the impression of it. Therefor the I or self can also not be abandoned and removed but only the delusion that an I really establishes in the mind.

This never happens and is never real. Even if my Ego is skyhigh, like you know me, there is no establishment of a self in the mind but merely a very strong impression that it has established.

Wherever people see established ego/I/selfs instead of established wrong views/delusion peoples mind takes a wrong course.

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Thanks.

The use of “I” in these posts was conventional and had nothing to do with there actually being a real I/me/mine/self.

:pray:

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No doubt there is much truth to this. But is it absolutely certain? in this context, I wonder especially what you make of the following:

"Sir, this Kapilavatthu is successful and prosperous and full of people, with cramped cul-de-sacs. In the late afternoon, after paying homage to the Buddha or an esteemed mendicant, I enter Kapilavatthu. I encounter a stray elephant, horse, chariot, cart, or person. At that time I lose mindfulness regarding the Buddha, the teaching, and the Saṅgha. I think: ‘If I were to die at this time, where would I be reborn in my next life?’”

“Do not fear, Mahānāma, do not fear! Your death will not be a bad one; your passing will not be a bad one. Take someone whose mind has for a long time been imbued with faith, ethics, learning, generosity, and wisdom. Their body consists of form, made up of the four primary elements, produced by mother and father, built up from rice and porridge, liable to impermanence, to wearing away and erosion, to breaking up and destruction. Right here the crows, vultures, hawks, dogs, jackals, and many kinds of little creatures devour it. But their mind rises up, headed for a higher place.” (SN 55.21)

The broader context is that Mahānāma is normally regarded as an ariya in the suttas. And this sutta is included in the Sotāpatti Saṁyutta.

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:pray: Hi Ajahn,

Although perhaps it’s not wise to universalize such things, to me personally it makes no sense that a stream winner would fear a bad rebirth. Textually speaking, there indeed isn’t a sutta that explicitly says that stream enterers know they won’t have a bad rebirth. And this one may even seem to say the opposite.

But it could perhaps be interpreted differently? Does “bad rebirth” in this case too necessarily mean a rebirth in a low realm? Or could it include a relatively bad rebirth as a human?… Mahanama doesn’t wonder specifically about the low realms, after all, but just generally where he would be reborn. The Buddha replies he is “headed for a higher place”, which implies he will go beyond the human realm, even.

It could also be that Mahanama just wonders whether he will be reborn somewhere with access to the Dhamma (since he mentions the triple gem), and the Buddha indirectly clarifies to others that he is a stream winner, who won’t get a rebirth in a low realm, even though Mahanama already knows that himself…?

Or maybe Mahanama wasn’t a stream winner yet (if it’s the same Mahanama in the first place), and the sutta got put in the Sotāpatti Saṁyutta by accident.

Those are not the most direct readings, perhaps, but that’s what I would suggest for now. (Luckily it doesn’t really matter for the essay, where my clumsy explanation was about the amount of rebirths, not the quality.) :slight_smile:

The parallel at EA41.1 may also be worth considering. It seems Mahanama here surely is regarded as a stream winner. So then my last option doesn’t work.

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Hi Ceisiwr,

Thanks for questioning my translations. Instead of me derailing knotty’s discussion, I’ll continue this here.

Thanks for your translations of the commentary too. But for sabbaṃ to mean ‘everyone’, it would need to be plural. It refers to a singular “all” or “whole”. These are lokāyata views, which are views regarding “all” of the cosmos. (“Natural philosophy” is perhaps a bit too broad to captures this idea.)

To me they are quite clearly Brahmin views, since Brahmins bring them up in the discourse, and to Upanishadic Brahmins the cosmos is All. Their exact meaning in this historical Brahmanical context is a much more difficult matter, which is further complicated by the fact that the brahmins ask their questions with a different connotation of the word sabba than that of the Buddha—just like with the closely related loka (“world/cosmos”). So I’ll leave this historical context aside for now. Maybe you and others have some helpful thoughts on it.

Either way, the commentaries I don’t think are particularly helpful here, since they are (as always) oblivious of such Brahmanical connections. This is perhaps the main shortcoming of the commentaries as a whole.

Still, ignoring all that, the commentary does explain the second set of views as: “gods and humans etc who, first having been, afterwards do not exist.” I don’t see why this in particular makes you think my emphasis on beings not surviving death misses the mark. It seems to me that’s exactly what it is about? Be that as it may, according to the commentary it isn’t some more abstract notion of nonexistence of the kind we find addressed in Mādhyamika thought.

For clarity, I’m not fundamentally opposing here that the emptiness of persons would entail a certain emptiness or, let’s say, “nonsubstantiality” of dhammas. It’s just not what I understand the two wrong notions of the Kaccānagotta Sutta to be about. But I’d like to point out again my footnote 8, in particular the statement that noble ones “will know of what exists that it exists and of what does not exist that it does not exist” (santaṁ vā atthīti ñassati, asantaṁ vā natthīti ñassati) From this it appears that not all notions of existence and nonexistence are wrong to the Buddha, only specific ones.

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Does “All” here refer to being as well? Would that imply does “being” is plural? or “being” is singular as 3rd and 4th views of cosmology.

I think any views held by puthujjana regarding this is a wrong view since if they held a correct view they would be liberated.

It’s difficult, because the word “All” would have had different connotations to Brahmins and the Buddha.

When the Buddha opposes Dependent Arising to these views, I’m sure by “all” he means the six senses and their experiences, similar to how he redefined “the world” (see SN35.23). To say that “all (continues to) exist” (i.e. to exist forever after death) is therefore eternalism; to say that “all does not (continue to) exist” is therefore the view of no life after death at all, which amounts to annihilationism. That’s how I interpret these statements at the moment.

The views of “all” being a unity or plurality to the Buddha I think are probably connected to the view that “one’s suffering is created by oneself” (i.e. unity) and the view that “one’s suffering is created by another” (i.e. plurality). These are said to amount to eternalism and annihilationism in SN12.17.

But clearly those are not really “cosmologies”. :slight_smile: That’s because that is not what the Brahmins had in mind themselves. To them these statements were indeed cosmological.

I haven’t fully made up my mind yet what the exact Brahmanical ideas would have been—they probably changed over time, which makes it even more complicated… I plan to write on this in more detail soon (i.e. months from now). :wink: For now, a few quotes from Gonda’s paper Reflections on Sarva- in Vedic Texts:

The word sarvaṁ can very significantly be used in such a way as to suggest a sense opposite to illness and death. [The Upaniṣads say:] “He who (truly) sees does not see death, nor illness, nor any distress; he who (truly) sees sees the All (i.e., wholeness, completeness, integrity), he reaches (obtains) the All (wholeness etc.) in all respects (entirely).” In contradistinction to distress, illness and death, sarvaṁ must be a condition in which man is safe and uninjured; in which one has overcome death and reached “life eternal”.

It is therefore not surprising to read that by acquiring the insight into the essence of Brahman, or more briefly, by the knowledge of Brahman man becomes “All”: […] “Whoever knows ‘I am Brahman’, becomes this ‘All’.” […] And in the same Upaniṣad, the Self, the “Immortal”, the Brahman, the “All” are expressly identified: “This brilliant person which not being subject to death is in this space, and with reference to the individual, this brilliant person who is not subject to death and who is in the space in the heart, he is just this Self, this existence which is not subject to death, he is Brahman, he is Whole [sarva].” […] Brahman is what is the whole, complete here, is what is entire, perfect, with no part lacking, what is safe and well etc., i.e. Completeness, Totality, the All seen as the Whole. […] Sarvaṁ in this sense goes very well with the well-known “identifications” of Brahma with […] “the imperishable, immutable, unalterable” and with the conviction that Brahma is pure, free from evil, perfect, that it is truth, an indistinguishable unity, that “it transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death”. The sarvaṁ is also “undecaying”.

Between the One and the many there is a relation of genetic dependence and existential contrast. In each of the many the transcendent unity is potentially latent, and by inversion of functionality it can be actualized as [knowledge] of the Whole, of the All. [… ] The Indians, identifying bráhman and sarvaṁ, choose this term for “intact, uninjured, entire, complete” to denote the Whole of Existence, the All, which in being eternally complete, is always free from decay, illness, and death. By realizing that he is sarva-, a man escapes death. […] The idea expressed by this word was […] that of “continuance of life”. The harbingers of death, all that which is injurious to health, hurtful, and prejudicial to the interests of earthly life was considered “harm, injury, loss, diminution, incompleteness”.

For Brahmins, this is no doubt partly behind “the all exists”, and it explains why it amounts to eternalism.

And the notion of All/Whole (sarvaṃ) is connected to the notion of unity as well, as Gonda explains. Other notions of unity and plurality are found in the Upanisads, such as:

“In the beginning this world was only brahman, and it knew only itself (atman), thinking: “I am brahman” As a result, it became the Whole. Among the gods, likewise, whosoever realized this, only they became the Whole. It was the same also among the seers and among humans. […] This is true even now. If a man knows “I am brahman” in this way, he becomes this whole world [i.e. unity]. Not even the gods are able to prevent it, for he becomes their very self (atman). So when a man venerates another deity, thinking, ‘He is one, and I am another,’ [i.e. plurality] he does not understand.”

We see here the Upanishads again posing a certain duality of views, one which the Buddha avoided by posing there is no self in the first place, whether identical with others or different.

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2 posts were merged into an existing topic: Mahākaccāna and “Proto-Madhyamaka”?

DN 15 (Mahānidāns Sutta) actually seems to follow a similar structure to SN 12.15 if you take the passages as connecting to one another and building a theme. I think that DN 15, building up to the Buddha discussing the views on existence/non-existence of a Tathāgata, helps support this reading of SN 12.15.

Also, at Vb 17, it says:

katamā bhavadiṭṭhi? “Bhavissati attā ca loko cā”ti—yā evarūpā diṭṭhi diṭṭhigataṁ …pe… vipariyāsaggāho—ayaṁ vuccati “bhavadiṭṭhi”.
Tattha katamā vibhavadiṭṭhi? “Na bhavissati attā ca loko cā”ti—yā evarūpā diṭṭhi diṭṭhigataṁ …pe… vipariyāsaggāho—ayaṁ vuccati “vibhavadiṭṭhi”.
Vb 17

Not a sutta, but relatively early as it is canonical Abhidhamma. Here, the future verb (‘bhavissati’) is used to define views of existence and non-existence. These two terms crop up in some suttas, again lending support to the idea that these are what ‘atthitā’ and ‘natthitā’ point to.

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What I would really like to see is the inclusion of other EBT sources besides those in the Theravāda tradition. But that’s my standard complaint these days. I mean, I spent several years now translating bunches of them for naught, apparently. But they really do matter when it comes to detecting biases in Buddhist traditions. Otherwise, this is a good explanation of how SN 12.15 was read by the tradition that recited it.

The question I ask myself about SN 12.15 is whether it was intentional to redefine loka as the sense fields in order to force a phenomenological rather than existential interpretation to existence and non-existence. And, if so, just how early would that have happened? Probably when the issue arose, would be the logical assumption. It occurs in SĀ as well, so it was not limited to the Theravāda tradition - perhaps the entire Sthavira branch of Buddhism. But these are questions that go unanswered because we lack the source texts to find those answers.

One thing I find interesting is that in Sarvāstivāda sources, the tetralemma is applied more often. For instance, the parallels to SN 22.47, which seems a straightforward set of views about the afterlife, read somewhat differently because the tetralemma is applied to existence and nonexistence. And then the similar lists of views in MĀ 162 and MN 140 also have this difference, though MĀ 162 reads much more like SN 22.47.

And, of course, let’s not forget the reason the Sarvāstivāda were called Sarva-asti-vāda. There was a Buddhist debate over the existence of things besides oneself or the afterlife. In that case, it’s the existence of the past and future that is the subject of the debate, though it was probably tied up with issues like the sixty-two views.

Anyway, just my thoughts offhand. I’m glad we have people doing the work of digesting the material that’s been translated. It’s an important part of the whole process of understanding what we’re reading.

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Bhante @Sunyo, I didn’t realize this new thread had been started, so I seem to have arrived late to the festivities. The essay looks great, though. I really enjoyed your contribution to the other thread (as I said over there), so your going into more detail here promises to be good! I’m going to take time and go through it (and the responses) with a fine-toothed comb.

In the meantime, however, just scrolling through, I have a question for either/both you or/and Bhante @Vaddha:

I didn’t understand the post about the proposed distinction between the senses of “the world” as used by the Buddha. I understand that and how one could suppose that loka has the capacity for two distinct senses, though I probably disagree. However, I wasn’t able to follow any of the reasoning, in neither the original post nor the response.

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