Bhante @Sunyo, I didn’t realize this new thread had been started, so I seem to have arrived late to the festivities. The essay looks great, though. I really enjoyed your contribution to the other thread (as I said over there), so your going into more detail here promises to be good! I’m going to take time and go through it (and the responses) with a fine-toothed comb.
In the meantime, however, just scrolling through, I have a question for either/both you or/and Bhante @Vaddha:
I didn’t understand the post about the proposed distinction between the senses of “the world” as used by the Buddha. I understand that and how one could suppose that loka has the capacity for two distinct senses, though I probably disagree. However, I wasn’t able to follow any of the reasoning, in neither the original post nor the response.
I believe we cannot really escape the fact that whatever we perceive and the way we perceive it, is part of a phenomenological world. A world-for-us. For us, from our human perspective, grass is green, mountains are inpenetrable, and this and that exist. But it is also merely our human perspective. It is to be expacted that other beings have different ideas of what exist and does not exist and what characteristics things and others beings have. What would be the perspective of a mosquity?
I think that is the idea of SN35.23. That the world as all beings experience it to be is a phenomenological world. A world-for-us.
I believe it shows how relative all is. Also judgements about existence. In the end one can only choose to open oneself to the fact that what we perceive as the world can be very different from what other beings perceive as the world. The All, the world as we perceive it to be, is a constructed world.
What we perceive as characteristics of an object, and which appear to be independend of us, such as colour, shape, hardness/softness, inpenetrability, beauty/ugly are not independend of us. It is merely our perspective and not some objective knowledge about this object. This is all relative truth.
There is also no intrinsic meaning to anything. It is always a meaning for us. All this is also relative.
I believe this helps, because it helps to see that we have no objective knowledge of someone or something. It is merely perspective. I feel, seeing this it is also more easy to let go. It is just madness to cling to something that is so relative.
The function of these suttas, is, i believe, that we really open up to other perspectives and abandon this impression that our own perspective is superior, objective, absolutely true, something else then merely a perspective.
That the All continues to exist is fact for one who takes again rebirth. That might be the All of a deva state, or animal state or something else, but rebirth means that there arises again a phenomenological world, a perspective.
That the All again arises, does not refer to eternalism. Because it is always a new All that is being experienced. Also in this very life. All vinnanas arise momentairy. There is not such as a constant present All. This also means that in the end, rebirth is the re-arising of a perspective. Maybe the perspective of a human again, or of a deva or animal?
Parinibbana is then the definitive end of a re-arising perspective.
That was indeed a point of discussion which I took to be clear in the essay but which wasn’t. I’ll clarify my thoughts on this later, either here or in the previous discussion on the “world”.
Yes, it would be great if somebody would do such an analysis. To analyze differences between the traditions is a lot of work, though, and not my aim here. It’s already difficult enough to highlight where their ideas overlap!
Since I don’t read Chinese, and since much of it hinges on details of translation, I did focus on Pali and Sanskrit texts instead. Not just Theravadin ones, though. The most direct evidence for the basic meaning of (n)atthitā actually came from a Mūlasarvāstivāda parallel to the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, where nāstitā describes materialistic annihilationism. So this interpretation isn’t unique to the Theravadin tradition.
The “world”, as you and others already know, is defined by the Sarvāstivāda tradition as the six sense organs in SA233, which is in line with the Theravadin understanding as well. SA1307 defines it as the five khandhas, which conveys the same basic idea: that the “world” is the being. (Some of these are likely commentarial glosses that made it into the sutta, as pointed out in Ven. Anālayo’s The Influence of Commentarial Exegesis on the Transmission of Āgama Literature. But the overlap is still noteworthy, if not even more so, since it shows that some of the commentarial glosses were shared between traditions as well.)
I had a look at translations of other parallels, but I didn’t see anything that was hugely relevant to this particular discussion on natthitā. A lot comes down to the meaning of the statements “all exists/does not exist”, which I plan to address later in detail.
But I probably missed some things! Hence one of the reasons for making this a public discussion is so more knowledgeable people can give their input. So thanks for pointing me to some parallels! I will look at them more closely. (SOme of the differences have already been pointed out before by Choong Mun-keat and Ven Anālayo, however, though without any satisfying conclusion, so I see no need to do so again, especially since pointing out mere differences is not my aim. My aim is to explain an interpretation of the Kaccanagotta Sutta which aligns with my understanding of the stream enterer’s right view.)
Finally but most importantly, please don’t think your translations are in vain! In a previous writing on this topic I referenced the Āgamas quite a bit, directly quoting your translations a number of times. Your translation of SA233 will likely also find its way into whatever will be my final writing on this topic. And I’m sure others benefit from your works as well.
An interesting parallel passage in the Mahanidāna Sutta which I plan to point out at a later date is the following. From the Pali:
Ānanda, if anyone should say of a bhikkhu whose mind has been thus liberated, that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata exists after death’—that would not be proper; or that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata does not exist after death’—that would not be proper; or that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death’—that would not be proper; or that he holds the view ‘A Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’—that would not be proper. For what reason?
Because that bhikkhu is liberated by directly knowing this: the extent of designation and the extent of the pathway for designation, the extent of language and the extent of the pathway for language, the extent of description and the extent of the pathway for description, the extent of wisdom and the extent of the sphere for wisdom, the extent of the round and the extent to which the round turns. (DN15, Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi)
From the Dīrgha Āgama:
“Ānanda, when monks truly and correctly observe this [series of] principles, their minds will be uncontaminated and liberated. Ānanda, these monks should be called ‘those liberated by wisdom.’ Such a liberated monk will know the existence of the self, the non-existence of the self, both the existence and non-existence of the self, and neither the existence nor non-existence of the self. Why?
“Ānanda, this is the extent of language, the extent of answers, the extent of limits, the extent of explanations, the extent of wise observation, and the extent of sentient beings.” (DA13, Charles Patton)
This clarifies what the statements on the Tathāgata are about: just like atthitā and natthitā, they are statements about a self surviving death or not. Each of them assumes a Tathāgata to be a self.
This principle is what SA63 may be about as well:
With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of knowledge he does not [proclaim] existence, does not [proclaim] non-existence, does not [proclaim] existence-and-non-existence, does not [proclaim] neither-existence nor-non-existence. (SA63, Ven. Anālayo)
In some sense materialism is the opposite of the idea of an annihilation, i feel. It expresses the idea that the constituents of a being are never really annihilated but they are just recycled, as it were. In the case of Kesakambali the elements just return to their natural cycli. In the case of modern materialism the atoms etc. just return to their natural cycli and are recycled. There is no real annihilation taking place. One can see it as decay, as falling apart.
The mental life is also not really destroyed but just finds no support anymore when these elements, or that material base for the mental life, falls apart. But to see this as annihilation of a self? I feel that is not really correct. If the projection on a screen ends, because there is some issue with the projector, is the projection now destroyed and annihilated?
Materialism more or less rejects that annihilation is really taking place.
I do not know enough of Kesakambalis views to know what his real position was. My feeling is that views of others teachers are often only described in a very coarse way, to slander them. What they really taught, how they really meant things, i believe this is not that clear. I also do not think that one must seek knowledge of vedanta or other teachings with buddhist that are only wanting to critize the teachings.
But Buddha- Dhamma is also not really about a surviving or not surviving self, or surviving or not surviving being or even a surviving or not surviving lifestream, i believe. That still reifies/establishes some kind of permanent existence.
It think is more about an ongoing process of building up and breaking down of states of existence. But just like a caterpillar, butterfly, egg, pupa are really different things, they are still part of an unbroken causal continuum. Their existence depends on this causal continuum. One cannot remove on of them. The same with states of existence i think.
I also do not think we must see this socalled vinnana sota as something substantial but it might refer to the idea that constant a new perspective arises, such as the perspective on the world of a caterpillar and based upon that the perspective of a butterfly on the world arises. Both are very different perspectives, but still they are part of an unbroken continuum. The clue seems to be: one cannot describe the arising of the one without the other. Still it are very different beings and perspectives on the world.
Underlying all this, is the reality that is one, asankhata.
I feel those suttas are all about seeing the difference between conceiving and that kind of understanding that is free from conceiving. Conceiving something is an act of reifying something. An act of distortion.
There is never such as a cloud with a fixed shape and existence but if one conceives a cloud it has fixed qualites. Conceiving something introduces fixed aspects that are absent in reality. Conceiving is an illness. That is what the suttas say.
If i conceive an oak that oak is very concrete but in reality i cannot even find the point that an acorn sprouts and becomes an oak. This world where all seems to have its fixed and ordered place is a dream world. We grasp at it as truth, as reality, but it is imaginery.
And all this stuff about self and not-self, about existence and non existence is all about conceiving. Conceiving does never lead to right understanding. The way one conceives things to exist is not the way they exist.
When you conceive form you’re bound by Māra. Not conceiving, you’re free from the Wicked One. When you conceive feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, you’re bound by Māra. Not conceiving, you’re free from the Wicked One. (SN22.64)
Passion leads to conceiving.
If i am angry i conceive a person to be evil, really bad, all madness. But we as humans are very much in love with conceiving. Constant involved in it and dealing with it as truth, as reality, as it really is. That is our delusion.
The more one wanders around in this world of conceiving as if it is reality, the more one feeds delusion.
The wonder about being a human is that we can be very involved in conceiving, mental proliferation, mental stories but also become aware of this and also at once step out of it. Suddenly all the storytelling is gone. Foetsie…And where has this reality gone?
It becomes so obvious that our passions determine what we experience as true and real.
Apologies if I misunderstand your question. But if it’s helpful, the distinction I assume Ven. @Sunyo was drawing is between the moment-by-moment arising and ceasing of sense experience vs. the arising of the whole potential of sense experience in general, i.e. the senses.
The latter is the meaning of ‘loka’ in this context. Even though beings experience momentary instances of sense experience that arise and cease, general experience will continue to arise in some way or another so long as the senses continue to manifest.
One basic way of distinguishing this is to think that an arahant will still experience the moment-by-moment arising and ceasing of sense experience the same as any non-arahants. When someone becomes an arahant, their senses generally wouldn’t immediately cease. So for an arahant, the general ‘world’ of sense experience is arisen, even if momentarily instances of experience are arising and ceasing.
For there to be a genuine cessation of the ‘world,’ there would have to be the permanent non-arising, non-manifestation, or non-occurrence of the world of sense experience, i.e. the senses. This is precisely what the 12 links of dependent origination are about. They describe how existence manifests from life to life, how the senses arise. Not just the momentary instances of sense experience, which is only the links of phassa and vedanā really.
It’s common for some Buddhist interpreters to say the ‘arising of the world’ refers to momentary instances of sense impression, and that ‘cessation of the world’ refers to those instances of sense impression ceasing. But this form of arising and ceasing has nothing to do with defilements; it is merely resultant (vipāka). In dependence on the sense of vision, visible forms, and visual consciousness, arises sensory contact; when those conditions disperse, the corresponding sensory contact ceases. This does not explain the root reason or origin of all of those conditions, just their momentary meeting.
So in this context, the ‘origin’ or ‘arising’ (samudaya) of the world is actually craving and other defilements. Dependent origination is meant not just to describe how passive resultants operate, but also how defilements (the active conditions, i.e. kamma) produce them. So ‘loka’ is a resultant (vipāka), and ‘samudaya’ is an active condition (i.e. kamma). Given that it is possible for sensory contact to occur even if there is no craving—such as in arahants—then ‘the world’ here must mean the senses arisen from craving, not just individual occurrences of sense experience. If that helps!
In terms of atthitā and natthitā, both views actually base themselves on resultants (vipāka) rather than acknowledging the corresponding active conditions that maintain and sustain those resultants. Dependent origination is supposed to demonstrate the relationship between both kamma and vipāka, because suffering (dukkha) is ultimately a vipāka. Therefore suffering cannot be removed just by removing the arisen suffering; the underlying root condition has to be addressed, which is craving.
Atthitā claims that there is an eternal or persistent resultant, such as an eternal soul or eternal immaterial reality, which is taken for granted as existing without a condition. ‘The world’ or existence / life is assumed to be self-sustaining or self-existing somehow, so ‘the cessation of the world’ is not considered possible.
Natthitā assumes that some kind of resultant (the body, or some other notion of self) simply ceases to exist at death, without acknowledging that there are conditions that sustain the manifestation of that resultant—namely, craving. So a real ‘origin of the world’ is not actually acknowledged. It’s like equating an illness with the symptoms. Although they are related, removing the symptoms does not remove the actual illness. And if the symptoms dissipate, it does not mean the illness is actually cured; symptoms will re-arise due to the underlying condition that is left unacknowledged.
So SN 12.15 must be about the relationship between defilements and resultants, not the arising and ceasing of mere resultants alone, which would not give a complete picture for someone to resolve the dichotomy of atthitā and natthitā. The Visuddhimagga actually seems like it might mention the same idea at Ch. XVII Paragraph 10 in Ñānamoli’s translation, but I’m not entirely sure what it is refuting.
Yes, but it is not really the same. In a still passionate mind, sense-vinnanas tend to establish in the mind. They take root and they grow. In a pure mind such is not possible. Feelings do not establish. Perceptions etc. do not establish. They arise and cease again. I believe this means that a really dispassionate mind experiences three kinds of contacts: emptiness, signless, and undirected contacts.
I think also a momentary cessation of the world of the senses is a genuine end of the world in this very life. But parinibbama is a definitive cessation of the world.
There must also be an element of engagement per MN28. I believe this is also supported by science. Raw sense info is processed and subconsciously a choice is made what this raw info means. Like a code that is translated and a different output is generated. The output is the sense vinnana arising. All sense vinnanas arise as interpretations i believe. Sometimes this also goes wrong. Some scientist also try to explain out of body experiences this way. The brain receives moments before this OBE such strange info that it makes a choice that one is now seperated from the body as impression. It just tries to make sense of the info and gives this impression of OBE as result.
But the general idea is that behind the scenes constant such choices are made.
There is much more going on with vinnana then merely sensing something that exist. There is not such as green grass but still the eye vinnana presents it this way to us. This presentation is a choice but it is very easy to believe it is not a choice.
I think this is why Buddha called vinnana a magician. What we experience never is felt as choice, as an interpretation. Like a good magician it deceives the public.
I agree with your description of PS. I also believe that it is meant to illustrate how the combi of avijja and passion keeps the wheel turning from birth to birth. But i must say that this idea that we need a third element for a growth of an embryo in a womb or in virto, and for birth to happen, still appears very antique and a form of magical thinking. Or a vinnana- sota connecting to a chicken egg or egg of a fly?
Cannot help but to see this as farfetched but i try to keep an open mind.
Well sādhu to keeping an open mind and investigating these ideas! But remember that according to the Buddha, consciousness is not itself physical (rūpī), so it would not be like a literal thread traveling through space and connecting to something, or some kind of quasi-physical soul that abides in matter. It would just be referring to the re-arising of consciousness in dependence on a separate basis in space; it’s not some thing that travels or moves from life to life. Consciousness is said to be embodied and embedded in space because it arises in dependence on name and physicality (nāmarūpa), but it does not exist in isolation.
It’s mostly obvious to us that if consciousness permanently ceases to arise in dependence on a particular body, that the body will not be alive or grow anymore. The Buddha’s teaching is not that viññāna is some ghost in the machine animating the body which we should form a concept about in the mind; it’s meant to point to a more empirical and subjective experience. So you can reflect on this relationship between consciousness and nāmarūpa from your internal experience of having a body, instead of building a speculative notion of a consciousness-soul that transmigrates.
I cannot understand what it all means to be honest.
Some buddhist believe that here i die in the Netherlands and the next moment i take birth as human in India (for example), or the lifestream i represent starts there all over again. How do you explain such? How do i go from the Netherland to India?
Oke, not a soul travels, not a stream of vinnana, but how do i get there in India??
But what i said more about sense vinnana is, i believe, not so speculative. But i see you choice to ignore that.
But oke. Ach…the suttas also do not make it easy using such wordings as a descent into a womb, and sometimes even making a conscious decent and conscious abiding in a womb. What descents?
This is why the consciousness in the context of transmigration and consciousness in the context of sense experience are defined the same at e.g. SN 12.2 Or see MN 38 for an entire discussion on consciousness. These concepts are not describing fundamentally different things. ‘Stream of consciousness’ just means the flow of sensory awareness, the flow of experience. Not something external which flies around in space.
You can think of it like your first-person perspective. Your perspective will continue in a flow. It will just arise in dependence on different conditions. Such as in a dream if you are suddenly in a different location and as a different person. Your perspective and the flow of awareness continue, but the conditions that the awareness arises in dependence on change.
How does sensory consciousness go from one sense to the other? Does it have to quickly run from sense to sense as different impressions arise? Or does it just arise and cease when the conditions meet?
Or we can ask: how does the fire get to the candle wick? Does it have to travel from the closest fire in the area and run over to the wick as you light it? Or does fire arise when the conditions are in place, and stop arising when the conditions run out? It doesn’t move around; it arises in dependence on things. Fire is of course physical, but you can at least get a sense of the difference.
The discussion was in some sense a bit more involved than this, in particular a disagreement brought up by Ven. Ajahn Brahmali, which I never replied to (because of going offline for a while). I may address it later, or at least I will attempt to clarify my view in any final versions of the essays. For now I’ll assume Knotty will be satisfied with your reply.
I think we all agree that there are causes for the arising of sense experiences(DO - 12 steps). And there are causes for the arising of outside world/universe.
That is :
Causes for sense experience/Being/Rebirth/All - i.e ignorance & craving
Causes for world/Universe - i.e Evolution, Big bang, etc
The argument stems from the fact that one argues that these two causes are the same(i.e ignorance) and the other argues that they are not(big bang etc != ignorance).
The people who have the 1 = 2 view should prove why the world act as a concrete entity as far as verifiable via normal experiences. Why it doesn’t change with ignorance and our views?
The people who have the view that 1 != 2 should prove why is it possible to alter the reality through psychic powers? Why the purification of mind(removal of craving - Jhana) allows a person to alter reality and catch sun and moon? or are they just hallucinations?
If they are hallucinations(delusions), why would Buddha repeatedly claim that they are true and advice to develop them? Then what about rebirth? Is the super-normal knowledge of rebirth also a hallucination?
Maybe. I think there might be a difference. The flow of vinnanas in this very life depends on having a coarse body with senses and especially an active brain. But this is not the case after death.
Thanks. But it does not help me to understand how I die here in the Netherlands and are reborn in India.
To be honest, i believe it is most likely that the idea of a individual lifestream is not real in ultimate sense. I believe it describes something that is really absent but present for the avijja mind. An avijja mind that is clinging to the khandhas as me, mine, my self. Only such a mind can form ideas about a continued individual or personal existence. If the mind would never take any experience as me, mine and my self the whole idea of a continous lifestream cannot arise. The condition for this idea to arise is attachment.
In this sense i believe rebirth is taught because this is the perspective of a deluded mind who cannot help to relate to khandhas as me, mine, my self. As illusion rebirth also truly exist like also a mirage is truly existing but still an optical illusion. The idea of a continous individual lifestream is then like the cognitive illusion of the deluded mind. It truly exist for this mind because truly experiences have been seen as me, mine, my self. At the same time that was truly an illusion.
In short: rebirth is the perspective and memories of a deluded mind.
Regarding the sense bases i feel this is relevant:
“Bhikkhus, this supreme state of sublime peace has been discovered by the Tathagata, that is, liberation through not clinging, by understanding as they actually are the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of the six bases of contact. Bhikkhus, that is the supreme state of sublime peace discovered by the Tathagata, that is, liberation through not clinging, by understanding as they actually are the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of the six bases of contact.” (MN102)
I feel this all refers to what is known in this very life, also the disappearace of the six bases of contact. In my opinion this is similar to the knowing the cessation of the world in this very life, which is known as the end of suffering.
It is not about a cessation of the 6 sense base that will happen at a last death. How do you see this?
Sophist: Having practiced the art of sophistry in natural philosophy. Oldest natural philosophy: The first natural philosophy. Natural philosophy: Of the world it is extensive, extensive for foolish and ordinary people of the world. Regarded as grand and deep, but this doctrine is of a limited nature. Unity: A single nature. Here he enquires about this permanent nature. Plurality: A different nature from the former nature, as with gods and humans etc who, first having been, afterwards do not exist. This enquiry then is in connection with annihilation. Thus, in this case “Everyone Exists, All is Oneness” both these two should be known as Eternalist views whilst “Everyone does not Exist, Everyone is Diverse” both these two are Annihilationist Views.
You have disagreed with my use of “Everyone” for sabbaṁ on the basis that it is singular, but “everyone” in English is grammatically singular.
Digital Pāḷi Dictionary
sabba
pron. all; every
pron. everything; everyone; all
pron. whole; entire; complete
I used that particular word as I felt it was closest to the meaning of the commentary, namely that sabbamatthi & sabbaṃ natthi are referring to beings continuing to exist or not when dead (Everyone exists in death, Everyone is destroyed in death". On my use of Natural Philosophy for lokāyata, I think we can set this aside as its not that important to the discussion.
On the Brahmin understanding of sabbamatthi, which I admit is for the most part lost to history (it seems to fell out of favour as a concept) Gonda has raised an interesting point which, if I recall, you have already mentioned in one of these threads. Namely that the “All” is referring to the Ātman & Brahman. Olivelle discusses this in one of his notes in his book “The Early Upanishads: Annotated Text and Translation”
the Whole: the exact sense of the term sarva, here translated as “the Whole,” has been much debated. As Gonda 1955a has shown, the term in its earliest usage did not mean “everything” but carried the sense of completeness, wholeness, and health. It is, thus, opposed to what is partial, broken, sick, or hurt. In the Upanisads the term is used to indicate not all things in the universe but a higher-level totality that encompasses the universe. Gonda (1955a, 64) observes that the phrase sarvam khalv idam brahma at CU 3.14.1 does not mean “‘Brahman is everything here,’ but ‘Brahman is the complete here, this whole (one),’ or: ‘Brahman is what is the whole, complete here, is what is entire, perfect, with no part lacking, what is safe and well etc., i.e. Completeness, Totality, the All seen as the Whole.’” Unless the context dictates otherwise, I translate sarvam throughout as “the Whole” and the phrase idam sarvam as “this whole world.” To the English reader the term “whole” should evoke the senses of totality and completeness (all there is), as well as perfection, soundness, and wholesomeness.
If we accept this then this would be a counter to your claim that the commentaries didn’t understand the doctrine of the Upanishads, since they understand sabbamatthi to mean the Ātman which exists eternally. Now you further claim, and this is getting more to the central point, that the commentaries support your view that these terms about the survival or not of a being after death rather than being about the insubstantial nature of dhammas. I suppose we could frame this as you arguing for the emptiness of a self being the original teaching, rather than the emptiness of a self and dhammas (please do correct me here). You are correct that the commentary here makes that claim, and I would agree with you that that is what is meant in the Kaccānagottasutta (SN 12.15). On that we have an agreement. Where we disagree, as far as I can see, is if one entails the other. If by the emptiness of a self the insubstantial nature of all dhammas is also meant (of course, this is indisputably true vice versa). I, of course, think that it does mean that. I do so on the basis that the atta the Buddha was denying was a substance. It is a product of that type of thinking, and it was that worldview which the Buddha saw as being distorted. I think we can see evidence of this type of thinking in the suttas, and even more so in non-Buddhist early sources such as the Upanishads and other Brahmin traditions such as Vaiśeṣika. If we look at the suttas first SN 12.17 is a good place to start
“Whether you are asked: ‘How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?’ or ‘Is it created by another?’ or ‘Is it created by both?’ or ‘Is it created by neither?’ in each case you say: ‘Not so, Kassapa.’ When you are asked: ‘How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.’ When asked: ‘Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.’ Venerable sir, let the Blessed One explain suffering to me. Let the Blessed One teach me about suffering.” “Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism. But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”
Here the Buddha is being asked by his interlocutor if suffering is created by oneself or another etc. The Buddha states that if one says the one who acts is the one who experiences the result then this is Eternalism. If they say the one who acts is different to the one who experiences the result then this is Annihilationism. The Buddha rejects these in favour of dependent origination. What is being asked here, which the Buddha clarifies, is if there is some entity which persists through time undergoing modifications or if there is an entity which is destroyed and a new one takes it place. This is a perfect example of substance or essence based thinking. The words “substance & essence” aren’t used, but the view of the world is exactly the same. Its the same kind of thinking we see in the pre-Socratics, in Greek philosophy and Western Philosophy generally (obviously apart from the sceptics and Empiricists). This is also the view of the commentaries, as per my translation:
Unity: A single nature. Here he enquires about this permanent nature. Plurality: A different nature from the former nature, as with gods and humans etc who, first having been, afterwards do not exist. This enquiry then is in connection with annihilation. Thus, in this case “Everyone Exists, All is Oneness” both these two should be known as Eternalist views whilst “Everyone does not Exist, Everyone is Diverse” both these two are Annihilationist Views.*
We can see here then that the atta which the other ascetics (except the sceptics) had in mind, and which the buddha denies via the teachings on anatta and emptiness, is a substantial one. An enduring substance which always is or is now but will not be. If the atta then is a substance, and dependent origination undermines this substance, then it follows that all other types of substances are denied too be it matter or mind etc. In fact according to the suttas these types of worldview, Materialism and Idealism, are preceded by the view of there being a substantial atta. I would argue this further supports the claim that the emptiness of an atta also means the insubstantial nature of the dhammas. In other words, for someone to claim matter exists or all is mind they have already committed the original sin of thinking of themselves as being real by rarefying (grasping) one or more of the aggregates.
There are other examples I can give, which I will just touch upon. This one was pointed out by Sujato:
He said: Great king, these seven substances are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other. They’re unable to cause pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain to each other. What seven? The substances of earth, water, fire, air; pleasure, pain, and the soul is the seventh. These seven substances are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other. They’re unable to cause pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain to each other. And here there is no-one who kills or who makes others kill; no-one who learns or who educates others; no-one who understands or who helps others understand. If you chop off someone’s head with a sharp sword, you don’t take anyone’s life. The sword simply passes through the gap between the seven substances.’
DN 2
Bhante has chosen to translate “kāyo” here as “substance” and he is right to do so. In this philosophy there are 7 enduring and eternal entities which do not interact. This is just another iteration of substance metaphysics. In some philosophies substances interact, and that causes change which we experience as sensory qualities. In other systems they don’t. Its all the same view though. That of an enduring entity which persists forever or which persists and then is destroyed. To give now some examples from outside of Buddhism:
O Somya, it is like this: By knowing a single lump of earth you know all objects made of earth. All changes are mere words, in name only. But earth is the reality.
O Somya, it is like this: By knowing a single lump of gold you know all objects made of gold. All changes are mere words, in name only. But gold is the reality.
This is taken from the Chandogya-upanishad. Its part of a set of arguments which are put forward to prove the Ātman. Here it is claimed that phenomenal changes, the sensory qualities we experience (name & form here) are mere concepts. Underneath them is a enduring entity, which always is. The example of gold is given. A necklace or a ring are mere concepts. The true reality is the gold substance which persists through all modifications. I would argue at this point that the Buddha new this passage, but for him there is no substance which endures. That is a concept, as too are the changing qualities.
Another example of substance metaphysics is from Vaiśeṣika
The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge, produced by a particular dharma , of the essence of the Predicables, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination, by means of their resemblances and differences.
pṛthivyāpastejo vāyurākāśaṃ kālo digātmā mana iti dravyāṇi || 1.1.5 ||
Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and Mind (are) the only Substances.
Attributes [qualities] are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, and Volitions.
I’ve taken snippets from the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra here. Its quite obvious that Kaṇāda is also working within a substance metaphysics here, and when you read the texts you can see that its not different in worldview and aim (though not necessarily in content and conclusions) than Aristotle in his works. Finally we have the Jains, which again I’ll just touch upon.
In the suttas we routinely find certain questions framed in terms of 4 ontological categories:
Existence
Non-Existence
Both Existence and Non-Existence
Neither Existence nor Non-Existence
In the history of Indian thought, the Jains have consistently been associated with option 3 (refer to Jaina Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)). They do this on the basis of their own substance metaphysics. For example the Self persists and is eternal, yet it also undergoes modifications and changes due to the influx of karmic particles which “colour” it. For the Jains then it can be said that the Self exists but that it also does not exist. Both are true, depending on your point of view. Its this substance metaphysics which is the basis for their Anekāntavāda doctrine. As I slight digression, I think the above categories can be assigned as follows
Existence - Eternalists
Non-Existence - Annihilationists
Both Existence and Non-Existence - Jains
Neither Existence nor Non-Existence - Vedic e.g. Nāsadīya Sūkta
I think option 4 aligns well with the view of Nāsadīya Sūkta based on its opening verses
Then even non-existence was not there, nor existence,
There was no air then, nor the space beyond it.
What covered it? Where was it? In whose keeping?
Was there then cosmic fluid, in depths unfathomed?
Then there was neither death nor immortality
nor was there then the torch of night and day.
The One breathed windlessly and self-sustaining.
There was that One then, and there was no other.
This is still substance based metaphysics in my view, since there is some Entity which is claimed to be beyond Existence and Non-Existence. Its contradictory IMO, but substance based philosophies always are.
Anyway, to get back to the topic at hand I think its clear the ancient Indians were engaging in the same kind of philosophical enquiry regarding identity and change, what is real and not and so forth as their western counterparts. None of this is unique to the Western mind, and its in this religious and philosophical context the Buddha found himself in. The Buddha encountered numerous views regarding the atta substance. It exists forever. It is destroyed. It exists despite undergoing changes, or its ineffable. In response, based on his own version of Empiricism, the Buddha denied there even was an atta substance to begin with. Since we all can know is the changing flow of experience, and since in that experience we can’t point to anything which persists or is destroyed, but rather we can only conceptually say that there is a dependent relationship (for example as there is between milk, butter and ghee) we then have no basis for claiming there is some essence or substance in experience which is the basis for the self and indeed to claim there is a substance, say matter, is to have already grasped form as self. The emptiness of self then also means the emptiness of dhammas. What are the implications of that? I think the Diamond Sutra puts it quite well
All conditioned phenomena Are like a dream, an illusion, a bubble, a shadow, Like dew or a flash of lightning;
Thus we shall perceive them.
This doesn’t mean however that we can’t use language like exists or does not exist. The Buddha uses “is & is not” all the time. He also talks about persons too, yet says that ultimately the world is empty. If we stick to our experience then we can say that “there is a red apple” or “the red apple no longer exists”. If we do this knowing these are conventional designations then its fine. If though we say that with a tainted view, and view things as substantially existing, as being real, then we have a problem. In SN 12.15 its the substance based “existence and non-existence” the Buddha is addressing. That which goes beyond experience and rarefies it into something real, something with an independent nature (matter or mind), something substantial.
kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam|
pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā||7||
yadyastitvaṃ prakṛtyā syānna bhavedasya nāstitā|
prakṛteranyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate||8||
prakṛtau kasya cāsatyāmanyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati|
prakṛtau kasya ca satyāmanyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati||9||
astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstītyucchedadarśanam|
tasmādastitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ||10||
asti yaddhi svabhāvena na tannāstīti śāśvatam|
nāstīdānīmabhūtpūrvamityucchedaḥ prasajyate MMK Ch. 15
It seems pretty clear here that Ven. Nāgārjuna is not re-interpreting ‘uccheda’ or ‘nāsti.’ He agrees with the common interpretation that ‘natthitā’ means something which previously had some kind of lasting existence ceasing to exist, versus ‘atthitā’ meaning something with fundamental or eternal lasting existence. Rather than the idea that “nothing whatsoever exists,” at least in this particular passage of his work. Maybe elsewhere he uses it differently.
In SN 12.15, this would be referring to people who have a permanent essence or a temporary one. But the reason the Buddha gives is precisely that dhammas are dependently arisen. Dependent arising describes a list of dhammas that are dependent. For example, the six senses are described as dependently arisen. That means that they are dependent, not independent; impermanent, not permanent; and governed by causal principles, not under the ultimate control of a self or soul. This is precisely Nāgārjuna’s argument for emptiness:
If the six senses are dependently arisen, then according to Nāgārjuna that means you can’t identify a substance or essence or agent in them. This seems no different than the Buddha’s description in terms of it’s main message — even if there are different nuances or emphases.
It reminds me of the common dichotomy people sometimes mention, where they say the Prajñāpāramitā claims that the five aggregates are empty, but Theravāda says only self is empty. But in the suttas, the Buddha says the self is empty because five aggregates are empty! They aren’t necessarily different doctrines. I do think there are differences that emerge, especially in language and emphasis.
Definitely Nāgārjuna is dealing with much more refined philosophical arguments in more subtle areas of doctrine. And the Buddha was mainly focusing on teaching personal meditative introspection, not natural philosophy. But I wouldn’t say they are fundamentally different ideas. The Buddha also used examples of external objects to discuss ‘emptiness’, like the dairy simile Ceisiwr mentioned or the fire simile or the similes at SN 22.95, and inversely much of MMK seems to be about things like the senses, aggregates, karma, etc. (i.e. about life and people, not rocks and chairs).
Pakudha Kaccāyana’s view in DN 2 is a perfect example, because it seems that a big part of Nāgārjuna’s project was critiquing the Buddhist version of that type of view. Just replace “seven substances” with “ultimate realities of Abhidhamma” and see how it compares to Sarvāstivāda, for example. Also, Chapter 27 of MMK seems to actually specifically be about persons and dependent arising at e.g. SN 12.15. That chapter is actually a very interesting analysis of the statements the Buddha makes in SN 12.
It’s good to keep in mind that Nāgārjuna was mostly critiquing various Buddhist views that he thought went too far. Not just Sarvāstivāda, but also Pudgalavāda views and others. So it’s meant to be practical and relevant to experience, not just abstract ideas about random objects. I imagine his project is mostly to address philosophical views of his time which led to subtle forms of self-grasping, rather than sheer disagreements in terms that are irrelevant to practice. Just as the Buddha says the six senses are dependently originated, so for an Abhidharma school to believe there is some eternal essence in the six senses would be grasping at something permanent in them even if they say it is non-self.
He also makes very shocking arguments which are actually very relevant and common to this day! Like Chapter 16, where he argues that there is ultimately nothing which can be bound or freed from samsara. This addresses the mentality of “I want to attain enlightenment.” And Nāgārjuna is saying something like “Nobody gets nothing.” And that chapter too is very much about views of what continues through samsāra, similar to SN 12.15.
But I will of course admit to not being very familiar with MMK/Nāgārjuna’s works and the schools of thought that followed. I can hardly follow many of his arguments! He is just a main example of arguments for emptiness.
At the end of the day, I think Ven. @Sunyo ’s main point is also about what’s practical. The Buddha taught things for a reason, and the Buddha should be our teacher first and foremost. The Buddha wouldn’t have left out important teachings he thought were necessary. So any additional teachings we receive should ideally be used with that in mind, rather than distract away from the Buddha’s intended message.
Because of course the teachings are not meant to be about having complex philosophical conversations. They are supposed to be medicine for beings to apply to their lives to find freedom and peace. If studying ideas about emptiness helps clarify the Buddha’s instructions for someone so they can apply them properly to their reflection and meditation, then I’d say that’s what both the Buddha and Ven. Nāgārjuna would consider most important.
As I stated previously in another relevant topic, according to Choong MK’s The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism (pp. 22-42), there are two levels (pp. 23, 32) on which to understand the “emptiness” of conditioned genesis (i.e. paṭiccasamuppāda) in early Buddhist texts:
Emptiness from the viewpoint of conditioned genesis as impermanence
Emptiness from the viewpoint of conditioned genesis as the middle way
The Kaccāna tradition/lineage, or proto-Mādhyamika belongs to the second one in the early Buddhist period. That is, the five aggregates are empty. This is also based on the notion of “the middle way” of conditioned arising dharmas (phenomena) is neither “existence” nor “non-existence”, neither eternalism nor nihilism. The five aggregates are empty of the two extremes: the self-based view of existence and the self-based view of non-existence. In SN 22.95 (= SA 265) it simply states that the five aggregates are void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asāraka).
The Pali tradition that says “only self is empty” belongs to the first level. The five aggregates are not empty, but empty of self only.
I consider they are in fact different levels of teaching on emptiness.
I see. Such contextual translations are reasonable enough. I must say I still don’t understand why you quoted this commentarial passage, though, because it seems to support my interpretation of atthitā and natthitā. It’s exactly about beings continuing to exist or not.
Not exactly. First, I certainly don’t agree with the Pali commentaries all the time. They are kind of hit and miss, to be frank. Even in the case we just discussed, I think the commentary actually doesn’t recognize the historical implications of the statements. As I said, “all” to the Brahmins most likely refers to something more universal, to the singular Universe and not individual persons. Hence, I won’t be quoting this particular commentary, not in full agreement at least.
Also, I’ve quoted the commentaries to show my interpretation of the Kaccānagotta Sutta is old. I don’t rely upon them as a source for “the original teaching”, which are the earlier texts. It’s more like I’m saying: “This ancient tradition read the same suttas and came to the same conclusion on this or that point.” Maybe I should make this more clear.
(To be honest, I seriously considered leaving the commentarial references out altogether, exactly to avoid such confusion. When quoting the commentaries, people (not saying you) often think you just rely upon them, not thinking critically for yourself. When quoting modern scholars, nobody ever says such a thing, however, for whatever reason.)
I agree that the major way of misperceiving something as an attā is to see it as an entity or substance, whether eternal or destroyed. I don’t think many would deny that.
But in this sutta, too, this entity is considered to be part of the one who undergoes suffering, i.e. of the being. It’s not something insentient. Apples, to use your example, don’t suffer. So their (non)existence is not being questioned here.
I probably have to apologize, but I therefore again fail to see how this text makes your point. It would seem to support mine. The notions of eternalism and annihilationism here apply to the being that suffers, not to things in general. So by analogy, that’s also what atthitā and natthitā are about.
But isn’t this jumping to conclusions? If one type of substance (a self of a being) is denied, that doesn’t mean that all other types of substance are also denied. It’s like saying: if one swan is proven to not be black, then it follows that all other swans are also not black.
Unless I’m missing something, in the Pali suttas, these questions are usually framed around the postmortem existence of a tathāgata, which again limits their scope to the being and its fate after death. In some instances it concerns something that remains after the six senses cease, which again is about some subjective, experienced part of the being. (Since apples don’t have six senses.)
As Charles pointed out earlier, in some early Āgamas we find some more unqualified statements about (non)existence. But since they don’t specify what they apply to, my bet is they were also meant to apply to the being. They surely don’t directly say that they apply to insentient matter.
The “substance” view of DN2 I would consider as a whole, just like all other views in the same sutta. We can’t just pick one part of it and conclude the Buddha denied specifically that, let alone in the Kaccānagotta Sutta, which is a different text. And this “substance” view also asserts a soul and denies morality, which is even clearer when it’s quoted in full at MN76. So this view also sees the being or soul as a central part of it. This soul doesn’t change and exists forever like a mountain, and hence the view is a form of eternalism or atthitā. If the view would describe physical matter alone with no consideration of the soul, things would be different, but it doesn’t.
You draw some interesting analogies with texts of other traditions. Thanks for those! But the connections are already tentative, and I feel that’s also the case for the conclusions you draw from them: that the Buddha was specifically disputing such ideas and that the dispute was about substances in general, not just substances of beings. The Jain view, for instance, is about the Soul/Self. It’s not about physical matter in general, at least in the way you presented it.
But all that aside, even if the Buddha was engaged in disputes about substance in general, that doesn’t show this is what the Kaccānagotta Sutta is about, nor its notions of atthitā and natthitā. I feel the historical analogies I’ve drawn, in particular the ancient āstika and nāstika debate, are much more direct in showing what these notions were about. But even then, I admitted that they by themselves are not conclusive.
To analyze differences between the traditions is a lot of work, though, and not my aim here. It’s already difficult enough to highlight where their ideas overlap!
which I never replied to (because of going offline for a while). I may address it later, or at least I will attempt to clarify my view in any final versions of the essays. For now I’ll assume Knotty will be satisfied with your reply.
He is just a main example of arguments for emptiness.
Thanks for that.