Thanks for sharing.
Sergio:
If anyone is familiar with Phenomenology, these assumptions are roughly what Edmund Husserl refers to as “the natural attitude”, and his famous “phenomenological reduction/epojé” is basically his methodological answer to this dogma: we suspend the belief in these assumptions and start with what is actually given.
This is close to the Buddha’s teachings in SN35.23
Well, not quite. you may wish to have a look at DN15: "What is a condition for name and form?’ you should answer, ‘Consciousness is a condition for name and form.’
Consciousness and nāmarupa are co-dependent. We might say,consciousness and all experiences are co-dependent.
Regarding definitions in the EBTs for consciousness and mind, Ven. Sujato:
While there have been many attempts to show that these are either the same or different, in my view that is missing the point somewhat. The terms are, generally speaking, synonyms, and their usage overlaps to some degree, but they tend to be used in different contexts:
Viṇṇāṇa is part of the khandhas and āyatanas , and hence pertains to the first noble truth : it is suffering.Mano is typically used in an active sense of will or volition, closely related to kamma, and hence pertains to the second noble truth , the cause of suffering.Citta is to be developed and thus pertains to the fourth noble truth .The cessation of all these is, of course, the third noble truth .
And
This morning I was asked by Ayya Kāruṇikā about the relation between mano, dhamma, and manoviññāṇa, and I felt I didn’t give a very satisfactory answer. So thinking about it a bit more, here’s what I came up with.
The six senses are each analyzed in a threefold way, for example, eye, sights, and eye consciousness. For the physical senses this is fairly straightforward, but for mind consciousness it’s not entirely clear. The mind is, after all, quite different from the other senses, even though …
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