People come to adopt the view of hard determinism completely independently of Buddhism - I spent some time tripping out about this theory before becoming a Buddhist, after delving into some writings by Dawkins, Dennet, Harris (“The three horsemen of the apocalypse”). So - I’m not convinced that this view is the result of serious meditation practice or Buddhist contemplations. Apparently, it is possible to continue believing in a “self” even after intellectually accepting this view, otherwise there are a lot of physicalist paccekka Buddhas and/or non-Buddhist stream-enterers out there!
I only meant understanding this can be used as a tool toward that end. It certainly doesn’t guarantee it. My meditation practice has only shown me this firsthand, but it isn’t necessary to reach the same conclusion through inference.
Or…
The underlying aggregates create the idea of free will and a self capable of owning that idea. The self then holds the idea as their own.
A different set of aggregates create the idea of no free will and a self that is capable of owning that idea. This other self perceives the first self as holding a different idea and goes into dispute with that self.
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True.
The idea of the Self arises as a labelling error. Ignorance (avijja) represents itself through labelling (sanna) and labels consciousness as self, or something else that arose in a stream of experiencing. Furthemore a memory of a past stream of experience (ie a mental construct-fabrication sankhara) may have elements that are labelled incorrectly as self as well.
The idea that no-self is wrong view, only arises if the person persistently believes there is a self and attempts to swallow not-self. This four fold negation was used when talking to people outside of the dispensation so that they would not be confused and give rise to questions like ‘did I have self before, but have no self now’ etc.
with metta
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My point is that the question of is or is there not a self cannot be known. Therefore, any assumptions derived from the notion that there is or is not a self is baseless. Which I think is why holding such views is considered wrong view. Can’t we just have mysteries?
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Previous post from a similar thread:
The question though, is not whether or not there is a self, it is whether there is agency within the aggregates. The Buddha did not answer regarding the self question, but he did say that everything that has to do with our minds and actions is wrapped up within the aggregates, and that those aggregates are not-self, uncontrollable, and without agency. So even if there is a self hidden somewhere, there still isn’t free will, because our decisions and actions are totally made up from the aggregates. Basically, if agency exists it must be from the aggregates, and because it clearly cannot be, then it isn’t there.
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Care to provide backup sutta references, especially the highlighted word? The Four Right Exertions proves that there’s definitely something we humans can control, quite contrary to the “no free will” idea.
Yeah for sure. So SN22.59 says that they are uncontrollable, and SN22.100 says that everything we do is the result of some combination of the aggregates.
The 4 exertions are just more processes that are caused and conditioned. Just by reading and learning them, you have integrated them into your mind, and if you are so inclined and your mind has already jumped up with the thought of the dhamma, then you will naturally act on that new information. It’s all processes, all causes and conditions, none of it is actual volition or free will. Your mind is just responding to everything it comes in contact with in the only way it can. Whether or not some kind of randomness or probability is thrown in there, it still doesn’t give you agency or free will.
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Please cite exactly where in SN 22.59 and SN 22.100 that there’s no “control”, and more specifically “no actual volition”?
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Do you think you may be taking about a Soul?
When we think of the Self, we usually think of something within this mind and/or body. Those things usually are phenomena we can experience, thus are not mysterious or mysteries.
They are observable and not recognisable as a Self.
With metta
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The Sutta I quoted earlier (AN 6.38) shows the Buddha confirming “agency.” I’m using this definition of the word (Wiktionary):
The capacity, condition, or state of acting or of exerting power; action or activity; operation.
But if one construes it as ultimately a “self” exerting agency, free will, volition, or what have you, then one is seeing things in terms of self-view, i.e. in a deluded way.
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Okay, well in SN22.59 it says:
“Bhikkhus, form is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’ But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’
“Feeling is nonself… Perception is nonself…. Volitional formations are nonself…. Consciousness is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of consciousness: ‘Let my consciousness be thus; let my consciousness not be thus.’ But because consciousness is nonself, consciousness leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of consciousness: ‘Let my consciousness be thus; let my consciousness not be thus.’”
That is clearly no control, specifically no control over the aggregates.
And in SN22.100 it says:
“Suppose, bhikkhus, an artist or a painter, using dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or crimson, would create the figure of a man or a woman complete in all its features on a well-polished plank or wall or canvas. So too, when the uninstructed worldling produces anything, it is only form that he produces; only feeling that he produces; only perception that he produces; only volitional formations that he produces; only consciousness that he produces.“
This is clearly saying that everything we do comes from the aggregates. So if you can’t change the aggregates, and you have no control over them, and everything we do comes from the aggregates, then we have no control over anything we do. Again, all uncontrollable processes.
And this isn’t the only place, the buddha says many times that all of our thoughts and behavior are within the aggregates. Look at any sutta that explains what they are. Sankhara is said to be our bodily, verbal, and mental actions, and also in SN22.79 it says it is what constructs the other 4 aggregates. So if it says you can’t “Let my sankhara be thus” or “Let my sankhara not be thus” then that is clearly saying you have no control over your bodily, verbal, or mental actions, or any control over the construction of the other 4 aggregates. And besides no control over their construct, you have no control at all over them, as it says that for all the aggregates in the first sutta I cited.
Also you may try to argue that in the second sutta it says uninstructed worldling so that doesn’t apply for arahants, and maybe it doesn’t, but arahants are still bound to their aggregates until they die which it says it SN35.232. So yes, maybe once you attain parinibbana this all changes, but that certainly isn’t the argument here. I of course have no place to say how parinibbana will be.
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Please note the term ‘uninstructed worldling’. This would be someone that had not been exposed to the teachings and taken them to heart - which implies that if one does accept the teachings this will not be the case. Which implies a choice and in fact, as has already been noted - the entire path requires will and intention.
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Not at all, that sutta has nothing to do with control, only with whether there is anything more than the aggregates. The buddha states many times that all of our thoughts, speech, and actions are from the aggregates. This not just an uninstructed worldling thing.
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Actually you’ve just helped me proving that you’ve been wrong: volitional formation is non-self, but there IS volitional formation. it says right there in the very sutta you quoted!
How does that make sense? There is volition but you have no control of it? Volition is just a poor translation. It is often translated as “conditioned formations” and this is a much better fit for the reason you just gave. And this isn’t about the word volition, this is about free will. You can call our bodily, verbal, and mental actions whatever you want, but if we have no control of them, which is clearly stated in that sutta, then we have no free will.
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Hi Mat,
No, I am saying that the EBTs are not addressing the issue of what ultimately exists or does not exist and if we read into the teachings notions about the ultimate nature of reality then we can get into all kinds of theories that serve no useful purpose and have no support in the EBTs. By rejecting the view that the Buddha taught there is no self as opposed to not self (for the purpose of training) people may think I am saying there is a self or soul - I am not - I am just saying both views are unprovable - so going down that road is pointless.
Wrong again. Sankhara means a lot more than just “conditioned formations”. This is basic Buddhism 101.
The control comes from the aggregates. Volitional formations are themselves among the aggregates. They are, of course, caused on the Buddhist picture. So while the mental energy and determination to direct events in a particular direction is a real mental phenomenon, playing in real role in how things go, those determinations are themselves caused by previous mental events. But we can say that there is no independent controller somehow standing outside of, and uninfluenced by, the course of skhandic events and processes.
The Buddha never argues against what we would now call “causal determinism” - although he doesn’t seem to have viewed these issues through our kind of conceptual framework in any case. He argues against what is sometimes called “fatalism” - the view that our actions don’t matter because what will be just will be, independently of our mental determinations and volitions. Some of his contemporaries seem to have held this silly view. But of course our volitions do matter. Even if they are causally determined by previous events via a strict determinism, they play an essential causal role in determining future events.
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