Hearing sounds in samādhi, jhāna

Well, the search function doesn’t seem to work very well, so I had tried to manually scroll through the entire thread, and in that process, the detail of your statement eluded me, so I have to retract the claim that I fully don’t disagree.

Once again, DN 34 shows that some sammāsamādhi has the quality na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata, and that such quality should be actively sought, but it does not necessarily follow that 100% of sammāsamādhi must always have that quality at all times.

/Facepalm/

Really? Do you really want to assert now that the following passages don’t ‘even come close to matching’ one another?

SN 22.55
By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated.

SA 64
Because of not being active anywhere, it is steady. Because of being steady, it is content. Because of being content, it is liberated.

It looks like if you entered ‘he is not agitated’ into google translate and that you translated it into a couple languages before translating it back to English, you might well end up with ‘not being active anywhere’.

So, yes, it looks very much like these passages correspond to one another, but the words have been a little mish-mashed, which I suppose is far from being uncommon in Pali-Chinese comparative studies.

As far as I am concerned, it’s case closed. I just needed one of those suttas to have a decent parallel to drive my point home, and I have one. No one can in good faith come to the conclusion that this passage of SN 22.55 doesn’t ‘even come close to matching’ the corresponding passage in SA 64. It’s just more preposterous mental gymnastics.

Yes, that happens very often, everywhere in the Nikayas. I don’t see a problem.

Just because an expression is rare doesn’t mean the text is corrupt. Unless it conveniently plays into your narrative, I suppose.

Please keep your sealioning to yourself. If you want it, just go get it, my friend.

I don’t see why seeming inconsistency in the Chinese versions should necessarily invalidate consistency in the Pali versions. And anyway as I have said, I only need one sutta to have a decent parallel to drive my point home, which I have. Once again, case closed. Enough inane gymnastics already.

I’ll leave it to you as your homework. Enough sealioning already.

I believe I have to retract this claim in light of Sylvester’s more careful investigation above. This does not have much influence though over my conclusion. One Pali sutta (SN 22.55 ) has an almost perfect match in a Chinese parallel (SA 64). Why assume they are both corrupt? Actually, if anything at all, the fact that other Chinese parallels are rather inconsistent in their formulation among themselves as well as in comparison to their Pali counterparts only reinforces the credibility of the SN 22.55 - SA 64 convergence as a token of authenticity.

Could you explain how you derive this? When a set is designated by a nominative of label, any proposition made about that set applies to all of its members. Could you perhaps point to some examples where this is not true?

Certainly, one could point out that the suttas have a broad range of phenomena under Right Concentration, but the context of DN 34 seems clear that it does not include the mere ekagatta variety without seclusion from “sensuality”. It appears to be limited to the Four Jhanas.

You conveniently omitted my reason for that assertion, ie -

In case you have not noticed, SA 64 shows another textual corruption -

Consciousness will not be further established and it will not further increase, expand or evolve. Because consciousness is not established anywhere, it does not increase. Because of not increasing, it is not active anywhere. Because of not being active anywhere, it is steady. Because of being steady, it is content. Because of being content, it is liberated. Because of being liberated, there is no clinging to anything in the whole world. Because of not clinging to anything, there is no being attached to anything. Because of not being attached to anything, one personally realizes Nirvāṇa, knowing: ‘Birth for me has been eradicated…

So, you have a situation that there is no establishment of consciousness which is the standard idiom used to describe the post-mortem condition of the arahant, ie not born again. According to this text, the not-born attains steadiness. This violates the standard model -

無使無攀緣識住;無攀緣識住故,於未來世生、老、病、死、憂、悲、惱、苦滅,如是純大苦聚滅
If there are no defilement, there is no establishment of causal consciousness, if there is no establishment of causal consciousness, birth, aging, sickness etc etc cease.
SA 359

Tadappa­tiṭṭhite viññāṇe avirūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbha­vā­bhi­nib­batti na hoti.
When consciousness is unestablished and does not come to growth, there is no production of future renewed existence.
SN 12.38

It is clear that establishment of consciousness is always a post-mortem event; see also the pronoun “wherever” -

Kabaḷīkāre ce, bhikkhave, āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandī atthi taṇhā, patiṭṭhitaṃ tattha viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ. Yattha patiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ, atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti.

Kabaḷīkāre ce, bhikkhave, āhāre natthi rāgo natthi nandī natthi taṇhā, appatiṭṭhitaṃ tattha viññāṇaṃ avirūḷhaṃ. Yattha appatiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ avirūḷhaṃ, natthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti.

If, bhikkhus, there is lust for the nutriment edible food, if there is delight, if there is craving, consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth. Wherever consciousness becomes established and comes to growth, there is a descent of name-and-form.

If, bhikkhus, there is no lust for the nutriment edible food, or for the nutriment contact, or for the nutriment mental volition, or for the nutriment consciousness, if there is no delight, if there is no craving, consciousness does not become established there and come to growth. Where consciousness does not become established and come to growth, there is no descent of name-and-form.
SN 12.64

Is it really a good strategy to clutch at an obviously corrupt text that contains material that should be used in another context and which does not make sense with the rest of otherwise standard dhamma? I think SA 64 is so patently mixed up in that the establishment trope obviously does not belong there. If you excise the corrupt material, what is left of “one of those suttas to have a decent parallel to drive my point home”?

The one who asserts that the subsequent 2 adjective predicate the concentration has to prove his case. But, if you are prepared to consider the grammatical reasons why this is not so, let me know. I’ve prepared the citations from Warder.

I have already done so, following ven. Bodhi’s argument in note 1929 of NDB. I leave it to you to go back and see the case with cittaṃ, ṭhitaṃ, santusitaṃ in one of the SN 22 suttas. You actually agreed with the analysis but of course not with the conclusion. So, let’s agree to disagree and move on.

It’s not rocket science, it’s just common sense logic. Just follow the principle of least assumption, or go back and read again carefully what I wrote and then read again carefully what the text says.

Look, you asked my opinion, I gave it to you. If you are not satisfied with my answer, I don’t have time for never ending sealioning. You want to disagree, that’s fine. Move on.

That is because your reason obviously does not support your conclusion.

And here we go again, ever deeper into your never ending rabbit hole.

Let me summarize the situation.

  1. You claim that AN 9.37 shows that one in the 4 lower jhanas does not experience sense objects
  2. I bring up SN 22.55 & friends to show that the end of AN 9.37 likely speaks of a state more advanced than the formless attainments, likely linked to arahantship, and not the 4 lower jhanas
  3. You try to divert the discussion towards the expression anupadaya, in an effort to show that the end AN 9.37 might be talking about a sotapanna, and therefore surely does.
  4. I knock down your arguments and further point out that anyway it’s actually the whole expression ‘vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi’ (is liberated from the taints by nonclinging) that you should have taken into consideration.
  5. Since you can’t knock down my SN 22.55 & friends argument, you then move on to try and discredit those suttas by claiming that the parallels do not contain the expression mentioned at #4 that sheds light on the meaning of AN 9.37
  6. I point out that while this is partly true, it is not completely, since actually SA 64, a rather close parallel to SN 22.55, does contain that expression, effectively knocking down your attempt to discredit SN 22.55.
  7. You refuse to acknowledge the obvious and claim that SN 22.55 and SA 64 don’t ‘even come close to matching’ one another regarding the relevant part.
  8. I point out the nonsensical nature of this claim and declare case closed.
  9. Since you can’t argue anymore about the sentence that SA 64 has in common with AN 9.37, you now point out what you claim to be a textual corruption or inconsistency in a preceding part of SA 64 and use use it to justify declaring that after all, that sutta, which has now turned out to be just another major contradiction to your narrative, is ‘an obviously corrupt text’. So you suggest to conveniently disregard the parts of this sutra that contradict your narrative.

Can you see what has been going on here? I am just tired. All this goes to show that the pattern here has not been to analyze the data on its own merit for what it is, but to use every possible tactic to defend a case that is so obviously non-existent, not because the points raised at each step were relevant, accurate and well devised (they have consistently been shown to be otherwise) but because they support a cherished narrative that just doesn’t withstand careful analysis.

I have earlier given the benefit of the doubt, but I see the sophistry goes on and on and never strops. So I declare case closed and disregard your attempts to discredit SA 64, as if I needed it to be flawless to drive home my point about the end of AN 9.37 via SN 22.55.

1 Like

My basis is reading Bodhi’s English translation, trusting his English grammar is accurate. I did quote the entire section of Bodhi’s translation in my original post, from the 4 jhanas to the imperturbable pericope to the exercise of supernormal powers, but the fact that you instead zero in on my amateur translation passage just makes you look like you’re building up a straw man and throwing red herrings at it.

In addition, Bhante Gunaratana, presumably a Pali expert as well, in his book “Beyond Mindfulness” also takes this view (that one doesn’t “emerge” from fourth jhana, one is still in a state with fourth jhana quality of samadhi).

If you want to make a convincing argument, show where Bhante Bodhi is wrong in his translation, and why Bhante Gunaratana is wrong in his interpretation.

And get an objective 3rd party EBT pali expert to vouch for you, because you have a zero credit score in the intellectual honesty department. I’m not going to believe you at this point even if you’re right.

I don’t need to, and I do not criticise BB’s translation of the pericope. Heck, I won’t even criticise Ven Thanissaro’s translation. Why? For the simple reason, neither of them translated that locative absolute with a “while”. It’s so obvious in Pali.

As for Bhante G, I believe it was his belief that emerging from jhana would result in sensuality returning and clouding the ability to attend wisely, if memory serves me. That has been criticised by Piya Tan, on the basis of AN 9.35. I would add to that by noting that while DN 9 does suggest that one regains kāmasaññā outside of the jhanas, kāmasaññā is part of a series of saññā that marks each stage of the meditation, ie viveka­ja­pīti­su­kha­su­khuma­sacca­saññā, samā­dhi­ja­pīti­su­kha­su­khuma­sacca­saññā, upekkhā­su­kha­su­khuma­sacca­saññā etc etc. The listing is dealing with cognitive content, not affective responses. Kāmasaññā would likewise be cognitive, not an affective response, which means that kāmasaññā is kāmānaṃ saññā. Kāmānaṃ = genitive plural of kāma, which ties back to the first seclusion from the kāmā (plural) in the First Jhana pericope.

Do construct your syllogism to show how this is valid a priori.

Now, now. You seem to have overlooked my concession here -

But I’m so energised! In fact, I’m so energised, I’ll start by making a few observations about this proposition from AN 9.37 :

yāyaṃ, bhante ānanda, samādhi na cābhinato na cāpanato na ca sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gato, vimuttattā ṭhito, ṭhitattā santusito, santusitattā no paritassati

In case it was not obvious to you why I made the distinction between the SN 22 sets with the above, on the basis that the adjectives in AN 9.37 are in a subordinate clause, it hinges on the other fact that we have a yāyaṃ staring at us clearly as a relative pronoun. This means that the above sentence has a relative clause standing in a relation to a main clause. What do the grammars say about such relations -

  1. the demonstrative pronoun ta need not be used;
  2. the agent in the relative clause need not be the same as the agent in the main clause.

(would you need the examples from Warder?)

This gives us, in ugly Buddhist Hybrid English

Bhante Ananda, with reference to the concentration that is na abhinato, na apanato and na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gato, from being liberated, one is steady; from being steady, one if content; from being content, one is not agitated.

The silent copula hoti in the 3 periphrasis above can read to refer to a meditator, instead of the concentration.

That is my basis for asserting on grammatical ground that the subsequent 2 adjectives ṭhita and santusita refer to the meditator, given the usage of ṭhita in the context of jhana attainers in the other citations.

Coming now to the SN 22 passages relied upon to assert that AN 9.37’s concentration is some elevated state unconnected with the jhanas. Taking a typical example, eg -

Viññāṇadhātuyā ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi. Vimuttattā ṭhitaṃ. Ṭhitattā santusitaṃ. Santusitattā na paritassati. Aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati. ‘Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā’ti pajānātī”ti.

If his mind has become dispassionate towards the consciousness element, it is liberated from the taints by nonclinging. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’

First off, let me admit my mistake concerning anupādāya being applicable to Stream Winners in all contexts. While the SN 24 suttas suggest Stream Entry from not clinging, they are probably inapplicable here where the matter is not mere anupādāya, but “cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi”. If I compare Ven Sariputta’s situation versus his uncle’s in MN 74, it is clear that anupādāya āsavehi refers to attainment of Arahanthood, while his uncle’s Stream Entry was described by another pericope.

That out of the way, I can deal with the inconsistency in the SN 22 passages. We know that anupādāya āsavehi refers to the occasion when Arahanta is obtained. But, we also know that the statement"Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being’" is another pericope describing the occasion of obtaining Arahanta. Here are some examples -

Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion his mind is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It’s liberated.’ He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’ : SN 22.12 & 76/ SN 35.28/ SN 46.5/ MN 4 & 148 etc

We have an interesting variation of this in MN 112 and MN 121 -

When he knows and sees thus, his mind is liberated from the taint of sensual desire, from the taint of being, and from the taint of ignorance. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It is liberated”. He understands “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.”.

I bring this up, because knowledge of liberation from the taints is full awakening.

The SN 22 sequence does violence to this very standard model. According to the problematic SN 22 passages, after full awakening (described by the anupādāya āsavehi trope), the arahant undergoes the process of being steady and content, leading to non-agitation, with full awakening repeated all over again.

There is simply no attestation anywhere else in the suttas and sutras, other than the ones relied on by silence, for the need for an arahant to undergo full awakening twice. The MN 112 model clearly equates liberation from the taints as full awakening and describes it with the “It is liberated” pericope. No need for subsequent non-agitation, since it is by non-agitation that a person becomes an arahant in the first place. Why does the arahant need to under non-agitation again under the SN 22 model?

So why did these suttas in SN 22 include the steadiness, contentment and non-agitation predicates? The simplest explanation for me would have been a recitation error (unlikely to be a scribal error, since scribes have the luxury of time to cross-check). The proximity of the “liberation of the mind from the taints” to the 3 qualities could have been caused by a reciter thinking that the steadiness trope found in AN 9.37 was relevant. It may not have been a conscious decision though.

I would therefore propose that none of the occurrences of the "Vimuttattā ṭhitaṃ. Ṭhitattā santusitaṃ. Santusitattā na paritassati. " passages belong in SN 22. Leaving them there creates a model of obtaining Arahanta twice! Once they are discounted in SN 22, where does that leave AN 9.37?

Silver linings

No wonder, it’s a common feature among sealions. But rest assured, the arguments put forward in this conversation have become so ludicrous that it’s becoming an entertainment.

I suppose you would also throw DN 15 under the bus, since the following exerpt has a very similar structure as SN 22.55, to which your above logic should also apply:

so evaṃ na samanupassanto na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṃ na paritassati, aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati, ‘khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti.

Oh, and this pericope also appears at MN 11, MN 37, MN 140, SN 12.51 (which you wanted to rely on earlier in this conversation… remember?), SN 35.30, SN 35.31, SN 35.90, SN 35.91, SN 35.234, and AN 7.61.

Should we also throw them all under the bus because they contradict your narrative?

I don’t even mention the suttas that have “avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ hoti, ‘khīṇā jāti” which according to your logic would also describe a person attaining arahantship twice in a row.

That is, unless one understands that those are just two different ways of saying the same thing, rather than a description of the same thing happening twice in a row. Not rocket science.

Hee hee hee. You forgot that my objection is to the presence of the steadiness and contentment bit right after Arahanta. Don’t speed read!

I’ll say that the appearance of the non-agitation bits in the above are not at all problemmatic for all of the suttas you cite. Why? None of them, as far as I can tell use the stock phrase for Arahanta “anupādāya āsavehi”. It is just anupādiyaṃ, which does not seem to be identified with Arahanta.

Well, I did raise it wrt MN 112 and MN 121’s -

Tassa me evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha, bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha, avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccittha. Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ ahosi. Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyāti abbhaññāsiṃ

I don’t see the problem, since I was of the view that knowledge of liberation from the taints is full awakening. Might you explain the problem? And how is that relevant to the issue of steadiness and contentment making their way into an arahant?

I didn’t. You seem to conveniently forget that you did include non-agitation to your objection regarding what may or may not come after arahatta/full awakening:

So the only thing left for your to defend your case is to claim that the phrase ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati’ in DN 15 & friends does not describe the state of an arahant:

Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary throughout the EBT. Can you provide any evidence at all that one can have no upadana and still not be an arahant?

Hint: That would violate the 9th and 10th links of dependent origination:

upādānanirodhā bhavanirodho; bhavanirodhā jātinirodho

with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth

Of course, on the flipside, this argument is resolved in the simplest way:

I never said that there’s a person with no clinging who’s not an arahant. I was quite explicit that “without clinging” was poorly understood by you in relation to the absolutive “having not clung”. Which led to SN 24.1 which shows the Stream Winner not having clung to the Aggregates as the reason for the absence of a certain type of clinging. If SN 24.1 is obtuse, try the following sutta.

Clinging is given up in bits. I don’t need to educate you on the clingings given up by the Stream Winner.

Hee hee. The burden rests on you to prove that anupādiyaṃ is equivalent to anupādāya āsavehi. You were the one who cited it.

As for the 9th and 10th links, you’re again assuming that the adjective anupādiyaṃ predicates only an Arahant. A simple example would show that this relation also works in part for Trainees. The Non-Returner has given up clinging to kaamaa. He transcends kaamabhava forever.

You did write

Do I need to remind you that the quote from DN 15 in response to which you formulated the above reads:

na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṃ na paritassati, aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati

So, if your argument had any relevance at all to this discussion, it must have been applicable to the entire formula ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṃ’.

In other words, for you to make any sense, you must have claimed that ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṃ’ ‘does not seem to be identified with Arahanta’ or else you are just blatantly playing wordy smoke and mirrors.

Which does mean that you suggest, contrarily to what you just claimed above, that there is a person that satisfies the condition ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati’ and who ‘does not seem to be identified with [an] Arahant’.

More irrelevant smoke and mirrors. We have already discussed this. You misunderstand SN 24.1, and no, I am not going to take your bait at trying to change the subject, so I am not willing to keep discussing this.

Actually, what I need to prove is that ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati’ is equivalent to arahantship. Which, as I have pointed out earlier already, dependent origination does.

I take this opportunity to remind you that the burden rests on you to prove that ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṃ’ ‘does not seem to be identified with Arahanta’. Because I can provide ample evidence to the contrary.

You keep conveniently addressing only the word ‘anupādiyaṃ’ in the expression ‘na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṃ…’. Please change your rhetoric, it’s becoming indecent.

Dependent origination states:

no clinging to anything at all in the world > no bhava at all > no birth anywhere whatsoever

which means… the person is an arahant.

You seem to have forgotten SN 22.7 and 8.

Evaṃ kho, bhikkhave, anupā­dā­apari­tassanā hotī”ti.

The view not clung to in SN 22.8 is also reported in SN 24.2. The Stream Winner is identified as the person who does not cling as such.

You’re still labouring under the misconception that the term anupādiyaṃ means “without clinging whatsoever”. Yet, SN 22.8 read with SN 24.2 clearly identifies the Stream Winner who is non-agitated on account of not-clinging.

If this is owing to DN 15’s reference to the world, what is the world but the 5 Aggregates in brief (= Suffering : SN 12 44).

You’re still labouring under the misconception that the term anupādiyaṃ means “without clinging whatsoever”

No, that this is what ‘not clinging to anything in the world / the 5 khandhas’ mean.

That is true but it does not alter the fact that cessation happens in stages and degrees, depending on the things abandoned. I’ve given the example of the Non-Returner. There’s also the Stream Winner who has escaped the woeful states on account her virtue. The types of afflictive volition abandoned at the 2nd link has closed off some destinies for the Stream Winner. Suffering in hell has ended for the Stream Winner, just as the kaamaloka is closed to the Non-Returner.

Another example would be the person intent on sense restraint. Despite pain, she does not react with aversion. Craving has not ceased without remainder but it has been subdued to a manageable degree. If craving in response to feeling can be mitigated, why should the clinging not be mitigated? How else to account for the loss of one type of Existence for the Non-Returner unless the clinging responsible for that Existence was exhausted?

What do you think it means? Citations pls not ex cathedras.

For me, the locative loke is a locative of reference. It would mean “not clinging to anything with reference to the world”. What does a Stream Winner not cling with reference to the world/suffering/The All/the 5 Aggregates? She does not take up the world as " This I am, This is mine, This is my self" - SN 24.2.

So, my reason for understanding DN 15 as referring to all Noble Ones.

Are you responding to SN 22.8?

As a native English (American) speaker, “when” can definitely have the sense of “if” – as in “when I do …” in the sense of “were I to do …” . In fact, in German (English being in origin a Germanic language), the word “wenn” actually has a rather stronger leaning towards “if”.

“If it said” and “when it says” are very bad comparisons. “When” has a sense of time. “When it says” gives the sense that something was said already. “If it said” gives the impression that something wasnt said but questions if it were then how would it be analyzed.

“When” deals with time. “If” deals with conditions, or conditionality.
I

“If” as conditionality can be divorced from time only in its usage in the mathematical logic sense, which is a purely conceptual realm. The Buddha’s teaching repeatedly dismisses such abstract concepts, and uses conditionality in the phenomenological sense of mental behavior, of the progression of experienced mental processes and the consequences of intentional action (kamma), which can only occur in a temporal framework.

For instance, as Nyanaponika Thera points out (in “Abhidhamma Studies – Buddhist Exploration of Consciousness and Time”), the last book of the (Theravadan) abhidhamma, the Patthana, analyzes in extensive detail how the 24 types of conditionality play out. He characterizes this as working out of the temporal dimension mental behavior, while the first book, the Dhammasangani, investigates the spatial demension, the structure of momentary mental activities (“citta-s”) and their substructures (cetasika-s). The Patthana shows how those spatial structures change from one to the next, and in this context, as in general, “change” is a virtual synonym for “time”.