SuttaCentral

Hearing sounds in samādhi, jhāna


#84

So are you asserting that when someone who reads a book and has goosebumps, those goosebumps have nothing to do at all with his mental activity while reading a book?

So now you say there is a tactility-born pleasure that actually comes originally from the mind via the CNS, but it should not be said that it is mind-born because that would be in contradiction with a particular interpretation of Pali texts?

I think I prefer simple, straightforward thinking and I would have long abandoned a view that would force me into such mental gymnastics.


#85

It would certainly contradict this and MN 43 -

If, friends, internally the body is intact but no external tangibles come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the body is intact and external tangibles come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the body is intact and external tangibles come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. : MN 28


#86

Not really. Mine is the rather innocuous suggestion that the Stream Winner is also the antithesis of the person at the head of the sutta, ie the one who has doubt concerning the six cases (ie the 5 Aggregates and the Upanisadic trope of “diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā”). This no doubt would be MN 11’s attavā­du­pādā­na, given the reference to the trope diṭṭhaṃ etc that forms much of the basis for the Upanisadic musings on the Self.


#87

This interpretation does not appear to be consistent with SN 22.45 and the following sutta:

viññāṇadhātuyā ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi. vimuttattā ṭhitaṃ. ṭhitattā santusitaṃ . santusitattā na paritassati. aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati. ‘khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā’ti pajānātī”ti.

If, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu’s mind has become dispassionate towards the consciousness element, it is liberated from the taints by nonclinging. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’

You may notice that the first two participles, ṭhitaṃ and santusitaṃ, are declined at the neuter nominative singular, which indicates that their subject is the neuter cittaṃ, rather than the person in question. However, it appears correct that the subject of the verb na paritassati would rather be the person.

This only helps bolster my case that

and that therefore the case for tadāyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedeti in AN 9.37 necessarily applying to all lower jhanas is pretty weak.

I don’t think there was any misunderstanding on this point. I may have earlier expressed myself not clearly enough though.

I believe you are rather talking about a translation you made up earlier -I imagine, supposedly on my behalf - translation that for whatever reason you are now attributing to me, although I do not agree with it, and never have.


#88

Would you care to explain yourself? I really don’t see how that quote supports your claim or invalidates mine.

silence:
Do you mean to say that SN 24.1 demonstrates that a sotapanna is ‘without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change’? Does the statement made in this sutta not rather simply mean that when a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity, he is a sotapanna?

I believe your statement was actually a suggestion that anupādāya (‘without clinging’) applies not only to arahants but also to sotapannas:

So it appears that what you said afterwards (Not really. Mine is the rather innocuous suggestion that the Stream Winner is also the antithesis of the person at the head of the sutta) does not agree with what you said before (I don’t think anupādāya necessarily is the monopoly of arahants… clearly applied to a Stream Winner?).


#89

Didn’t you say -

Evaṃsaññīpi kho, āvuso, tadāyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedeti at the end of AN 9.37 seems to apply to all that was described just before (ie. the 5 afore mentioned items, plus possibly aññā)

Surely I do not misrepresent you when I address what the above entails? Would it be better if I said -

If you wish to argue for your interpretation

I fully agree on your grammatical analysis. But I’m not sure if you can infer from that fact that SN 22.45’s agreement of noun (citta) and adjectives (ṭhita, santusita) that the same syntax governs AN 9.37. Bear in mind, SN 22.45 has a complete sentence before the adjectives. In AN 9.37, it is a mere subordinate clause. Secondly, the vimuttattā ṭhitaṃ syntax already shows that the state of ṭhitatta is a result of liberation. Is there any reason to assume that this quality occurs concurrently with the dispassion?

Have you considered reviewing DN 34’s identification of Right Concentration as being predicated by na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata?


#90

Anupādāya does not mean “without clinging”. It is not an adjective.

It is the negation of the absolutive upādāya.

So, when it says that “Stream Winners anupādāya”, it is not saying that Stream Winners are without clinging. It simply means “the Stream Winner, by not clinging”, or if you prefer Buddhist Hybrid English, it means “the Stream Winner, having not clung”.

Both Stream Winners and Arahants are fully capable of not clinging (adverbal, not adjectival here); they just drop different fetters. The Stream Winner simply na upādiyati different things such as attavā­da.


#91

MN 28 and MN 43 do not allow this possibility -

If, friends, internally the body is intact but no external dhammas come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the body is intact and external dhammas come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the body is intact and external dhammas come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.


#92

Pls give me some time on this. It will probably require a full thread by itself. The notion “support for the establishing” is a neologism, judging by BB’s fn 112 to SN 12.38. But if you look closely at the Pali of that sutta, you’ll notice something odd.

Standard cessation presentations have this -

If not-A, then not-B.
If not-B, then not-C.
If not-C, then not-D.

SN 12.38 breaks this mould with -

Ārammaṇe asati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti. (If not-A, then not-X)
Tadappa­tiṭṭhite viññāṇe avirūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbha­vā­bhi­nib­batti na hoti. (When not-B, then not-C)
Āyatiṃ punabbha­vā­bhi­nib­bat­tiyā asati āyatiṃ jāti jarāmaraṇaṃ soka­pari­deva­duk­kha­do­manas­supāyāsā nirujjhanti. (If not-C, then not-D)

I suspect that due to the similarity of pa­tiṭṭhita and patiṭṭha (being different by only one syllable), some textual corruption occurred very early in these texts. I think the 1st line originally would have read -

Ārammaṇe asati patiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇassa na hoti.

I’m taking the allowance that sometimes past participles can function as substantive nouns, with patiṭṭhitaṃ being establishment. Notice how the 2nd line struggles with a normal locative absolute, instead of the existential locative absolute typical of the cessation series.


#93

Yes you do:

Yes that would be a start. But then you would also have to retract what you said afterwards, which was a comment on your translation, comment you addressed to me as if I was the author of said translation:

Let me ask again: can you point to any reason that would be completely separated from any propensity to interpret the texts in a light that favors your overall opinion on this subject, to believe that the presence of another clause before the statement vimuttattā ṭhito, ṭhitattā santusito would necessarily change the nature of its subject from one that (in your opinion) does not bolster your case to one that does?

This looks to me like a hair splitting technicality that serves the purpose of criticizing the words I used earlier, but has nothing much to do with the discussion. It appears that the gerund here can be translated as ‘without clinging’ for the sake of understandability.

Well, for your information, SN 24.1 never actually says that. Rather:

“yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, api nu taṃ anupādāya evaṃ diṭṭhi uppajjeyya

But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?


#94

My comment stands, as your interpretation requires the adjectives to break with the nominative and suddenly transform in the ablative, while retaining its connection to the subject.

I’ve given ample reasons for that. The subject is pretty clear from the Pali in AN 9.37. I am not sure why you would insist otherwise. I just cannot see how we can accommodate the fact that the disagreement of case between the first set of adjective with the ablative in the subsequent clause can be explained away to fit your preference. It’s a very basic rule in Pali grammar. I’ve used axiomatic textbook rules to break down the clause and its subsequent clauses. If you don’t accept those rules, should we make the allowance for that? Just to be clear, must subordinate clauses and main clauses share the same subject in Pali? They do, in absolutive constructions. But not the case, especially in the famous DO sets.

It makes all the difference, as you assumed that I understood and used anupādāya as an adjective, when it is clearly describing the Stream Winner not taking up a view.

I was giving a hypothetical, not referring to SN 24.1.


#95

For the sake of the quality of this discussion, here is a little reminder:


#96

Okay. Time to put an end to this conversation. I will not engage further. Have a nice day.

Edit: actually, not sutta ever

Chasing non-existing rabbits down never ending rabbit holes is not for me


#97

Looks like it’s a cultural thing, since an explanation of a grammatical point concerning a dead language does not entail that the actual construct must actually exist. Does your academia read the proposition “So, when it says that “Stream Winners anupādāya”,” I can only use a real existent example, and not a hypothetical sentence? If one is trying to illustrate a grammatical point, it seems perfectly legitimate to posit a hypothetical.

Rather than split hairs over my intention, here are some very interesting findings about the suttas in SN 22 which use -

Vimuttattā ṭhitaṃ. Ṭhitattā santusitaṃ. Santusitattā na paritassati. Aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati.

I’ve compared them to their SA parallels. As mentioned previously, the SA sutras do not have the above in the wisdom sutras. Instead, they use this other pericope in the wisdom sutras -

解脫已,於諸世間都無所取、無所著;無所取、無所著已,自覺涅槃:『我生已盡,梵行已立,所作已作,自知不受後有。』

Being liberated, in the world there is no thing to which to cling and no thing to which to hold on. There being no thing to which to cling, or to which one is to hold on to, one realises extinguishment. One knows: ‘For me birth is finished. The Holy Life is established. Done is what had to be done.’ One knows: ‘I will not experience future becoming.’
SA 39, parallel to SN 22.54, transl Ven Analayo

Variants of this are found in eight SA sutras, based on the SC search engine, 5 of which are parallels to the suttas in SN 22 which you cited.

Needless to say, the above pericope comes close to the Pali -

So evaṃ amaññamāno na ca kiñci loke upādiyati. Anupādiyaṃ na paritassati. Aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati. ‘Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti.

Since he does not conceive anything thus, he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’ : SN 35.30

The trope “na ca kiñci loke upādiyati” is also well-known from the satipaṭṭhāna texts.

It looks very suggestive that the Pali tradition may have picked out the wrong pericope to append to the SN 22 series, since the SA parallels to the SN 22 sutras, as well as the SN 35.30/31 wisdom texts use the other pericope about “not clinging to anything in the world” to lay out the causal sequence leading to non-agitation.

I wonder why Bhikkhu Bodhi treats the silent hoti in “vimuttattā ṭhito” as implying “it is”. Elsewhere, ṭhito comes out very clearly as a reference not to a meditation but to a jhana-attainer. Eg -

Here, householder, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. He considers this and understands it thus: ‘This first jhāna is conditioned and volitionally produced. But whatever is conditioned and volitionally produced is impermanent, subject to cessation.’ If he is steady (ṭhito) in that, he attains the destruction of the taints. : MN 52

See similar passage in MN 64, AN 11.16, and AN 9.36. In all of this cases, it is the meditator who is ṭhito.

Likewise, with the exception of the SN 22 suttas, the other instances of contentment largely refer to persons, rather than the nuts-&-bolts making up the experiental entity.


#98

Okay. Let me explain why intentions matter: if I do not trust that my interlocutor holds up to the principles of intellectual honesty I have outlined earlier, then I consider the debate is not worth my time.

So to make myself really clear, let me summarize how we have come to this point:

1- you claim

2- @Piotr remarks:

3- to make a long story short, you claim:

and then:

4- I reply:

5- to which you answer:

6- so I ask:

7- but you answer:

8- I point out to you the inconsistency of your argumentation:

9- to which you reply:

Notice that you use the words ‘when it says’, which are clearly different from ‘if it said’ (with a conditional), the words one would normally use when ‘giving an hypothetical’

10- then you now claim:

If you were actually ‘giving a hypothetical’, then it would be completely illogical, given the history of this conversation. Here is why. Let me summarize the above summary:

1- you bring up SN 24.1, claiming that in this sutta, anupādāya ‘is clearly applied to a Stream Winner’, (which is a bogus claim)

2- I point out that this appears to not be the case

3- you claim that you are not wrong since your point is actually that ‘the Stream Winner is also the antithesis of the person at the head of the sutta’

4- I point out your inconsistency

5- you make an irrelevant point about anupādāya being an absolutive, and then say ‘when it says that “Stream Winners anupādāya”…’

6- I point out that both your claims at point #1 which you appear to have repeated at the end of point #5 are bogus, since no sutta says such a thing

7- you deny making such a statement, claiming you were ‘giving a hypothetical’. Please bear in mind here that you earlier wrote: ‘anupādāya… is clearly applied to a Stream Winner’.

I simply do not engage with such shapeshifting argumentation.

Hoping that I have now made myself sufficiently clear, I withdraw.


#99

What you’re saying about the grammar past participle may be true, but it’s irrelevant to the argument, a red herring, a misdirection. The key point is the explicit emergence from meditative attainment, which only occurs in AN 9.35, and not the other twenty times it occurs in the EBT. The other twenty times are all nearly identical with this version from Bodhi:

standard 4j formula

“Here, brahmin, secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the first jhāna, which consists of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by thought and examination. With the subsiding of thought and examination, he enters and dwells in the second jhāna, which has internal placidity and unification of mind and consists of rapture and pleasure born of concentration, without thought and examination. With the fading away as well of rapture, he dwells equanimous and, mindful and clearly comprehending, he experiences pleasure with the body; he enters and dwells in the third jhāna of which the noble ones declare: ‘He is equanimous, mindful, one who dwells happily.’ With the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous passing away of joy and dejection, [164] he enters and dwells in the fourth jhāna, neither painful nor pleasant, which has purification of mindfulness by equanimity.

the 4th jhana imperturbable pericope, not a different state, you’re still in 4th jhana quality of samadhi:

332(1) “When his mind is thus concentrated, purified, cleansed, unblemished, rid of defilement, malleable, wieldy, steady, and attained to imperturbability,

(and then the 3 of the higher abhinna follow, or all 6 abhinna in DN)

he directs it to the knowledge of the recollection of past abodes. He recollects his manifold past abodes, that is, one birth, two births, three births, …

Here are all the 20 suttas you can find this same exact pericope.
Hopefully readers can clearly discern intellectual honesty from red herrings, eel wriggling and pali grammar misdirection and trickery.

STED malleable, wieldy, steady… imperturbability.

“so evaṃ samāhite citte
“When my concentrated mind
parisuddhe pariyodāte
(was thus) purified, bright,
an-aṅgaṇe vigat-ūpak-kilese
Un-blemished, rid-of-imperfection,
Mudu-bhūte kammaniye
malleable, wieldy,
ṭhite āneñjap-patte
steady, imperturbability-attained,

DN 2: two bonus powers + 6 abhiñña

vipassanā-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.24),
insight knowledge
mano-may-iddhi-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.25),
mind made (body) spiritual-power
iddhi-vidha-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.26),
1. (supernormal) power
dibba-sota-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.27),
2. divine ear knowledge
ceto-pariya-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.28),
3. mind reading knowledge
pubbe-nivās-ānussati-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.29),
4. previous-life-recollection
dibba-cakkhu-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.30),
5. divine eye knowledge
āsavak-khaya-ñāṇaṃ (DN 2.31),
6. asinine-inclination destruction

DN 3, 10 seem to repeat all the same text as DN 2

MN 4, 19, 27, 36 39 51 60 65 76 79 85 94 100 101 125

Just the tevijja, the powers 4,5,6. DN seems to be the exception in using the imperturbable pericope for all 6.

AN 3.59, 3.60, 4.198, 8.11

Just the tevijja, the powers 4,5,6. DN seems to be the exception in using the imperturbable pericope for all 6.

#100

Thanks for taking time to articulate and prove your point clearly. Most people would just become exasperated and leave.

With the election of Trump, some basic principles became really clear to me. As far as the court of public opinion goes, truth doesn’t matter. What matters in winning votes, influencing the most people is persuasiveness, confidence, and crafty cultivation of image, and ability to cast doubt on opposing views even if, especially if they’re true and counter to your agenda.

Hopefully we can all strive to be intellectually honest, recognize where we may be not quite as honest as we should be, and improve.


#101

Actually I am sick at home today and can’t meditate, so I really don’t have much else to do. On any other day, I would probably have just left the conversation without taking the time to explain myself so clearly.

Sadly, this has become relevant even to Buddhist forums (although here, thanks to a really honest and dedicated team of moderators, it is generally much nicer). But in this particular case, I think that state of affairs has different roots and dates back to earlier times.


#102

And again, it seems like it’s a cultural thing. Presumably, French usage?

While I may not be a native English speaker, I am not familiar with this distinction above being so rigid in English. Which was my query about academia as you know it. If you take a handy example which you should have nearby, flip open Warder’s Introduction to Pali, and see how he uses “when”. Does it make sense now why I use “when” for a hypothetical?

Respectfully, I think you’re just miffed that I pointed out your mistake in interpreting anupādāya as meaning “without clinging” in your query here -

Had you bothered to audit the translation from its idiomatic form into a precise rendering, you would have realised that the key passages identifying the Stream Winner would have said -

Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipari­ṇāma­dhammaṃ, api nu taṃ anupādāya evaṃ diṭṭhi uppajjeyya:

But not having clung to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise:

(keeping BB’s clause inversion for the sake of readability)

Be well.


#103

Frank, Frank, Frank. Where do I even begin? I don’t think you’re intellectually dishonest, since it is obvious that you were not even aware of the locative absolute until I pointed it out.

Frank, making your mouse cursor hover over Pali texts to get a glossary of the stem does not make a translation. The above translation is so plainly wrong, as it is quite apparent that you are not familiar with the grammatical rule on the form of the locative absolute. You are treating “samāhite citte” as a standalone agent when the rule requires only the citte to be the agent, with the predicate being furnished by all the participles “samāhiteparisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte”.

If you wish to treat the pericope as being a temporal discussion on the timing of the concentration and the timing of the supernormal powers, the Pali cited from A New Course in Reading Pāli is crystal clear. What then is your basis for insisting on -

when the grammar makes it pointedly clear that your interpretation is only correct if the pericope had used present participles. But the pericope uses only past participles, thereby cutting off your simultaneity interpretation. Your proposal would lead to the pericope being translated as -

While the mind was thus concentrated etc etc.

No Pali grammar is going to allow that, since the “while” is only possible with present participles, which are patently absent here.

I’m not going to be so charitable hereafter, since I’ve explained the grammar to you clearly. If you wish to insist on your temporal reading of simultaneity in violation of the grammars, perhaps you should consider publishing a new Pali grammar?

So, I don’t see any red herring here, since it is directly on point to your interpretation.
I don’t think there’s any eel-wriggling on my part, since there is no equivocation when I directly confront your mistake. But I can live with the accolade that I am ujjhānasaññika.