Your confidence: “I can say with confidence that this interpretation is unprecedented, unique” is not well grounded:
Nanamoli Thera writings precedes it. As far as written words goes. Because in fact dependent arising is the general formula, so any ariya sees it. All comes to one point, either one sees this or not:
Now this has been said by the Blessed One: “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination.” And these five aggregates affected by clinging are dependently arisen. The desire, indulgence, inclination, and holding based on these five aggregates affected by clinging is the origin of suffering. The removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for these five aggregates affected by clinging is the cessation of suffering.’
MN 28
And I think Ajhan Chah would give quite proper interpretation of this passage.
Edit [Quote from the book A Still Forest Pool
Those who speak of death are speaking the language of ignorant children. In the language of the heart, of Dharma, there’s no such thing.
“When we carry a burden, it’s heavy. When there’s no one to carry it, there’s not a problem in the world. Do not look for good or bad or for anything at all. Do not be anything. There’s nothing more; just this.”
A visiting Zen student asked Achaan Chah, “How old are you? Do you live here all year round?”
“I live nowhere,” he replied. “There is no place you can find me. I have no age. To have age, you must exist, and to think you exist is already a problem. Don’t make problems; then the world has none either.]
And this statement: The fact that Sartre and Heidegger laid the theoretical foundation for such an interpretation in the 30s and 40s—only two decades prior—is what gives me such confidence that Ven. Ñanavīra’s interpretation is unprecedented and without any historical Buddhist antecedent.
sorry to say, is just a nonsense. That four noble truths are descriptions, it should be quite obvious to any averagely intelligent man, you really do not need Heidegger, nor Sartre to understand this.
If the second noble truth is a description, it’s reformulation in the terms of dependent arising also must be description.
Edit:
What I mean nobody in his senses interpretes the second noble truth in terms of three, two, one existence or existence from moment to moment. But when the second noble truth is reformulated in terms of dependent arising suddenly what is a atemporal description of the state of puthujjana, and his state is that of being, suddenly various temporal interpretations appear.
The reason for this that sine qua non relationship between items undermines the most fundamental puthujjana certainty: that of being. And there is absolutely no direct relation between Heidegger and Dhamma, that his philosophy was helpful for Ven Nanavira says more about ven Nanavira then about universal validity of Heidegger writings for all who aspire to understand Dhamma.
Ajahn Chach could manage to do it without Heidegger
That quote of Ven. Ñanamoli is from A Thinker’s Notebook which was published in…1973—afterNotes on Dhamma. But admittedly Ven. Ñanamoli died in 1960, so the words themselves must have been written prior to the publishing of Notes on Dhamma. Regardless, Ven. Ñanavīra and Ven. Ñanamoli were not only contemporaries but intimate friends who lived together in the same flat in London before coming to Ceylon, also together, to ordain at the Island Hermitage, also together. In light of that intimacy, to claim that Ven. Ñanamoli’s interpretation precedes Ven. Ñanavīra’s is…like claiming that the mother of an elder sibling is older than the mother of a junior sibling. It is overwhelmingly likely that we’re talking about one and the same woman here, and who is truly the elder sibling in this case is likely unverifiable and ultimately a rather trifling distinction. Ven. Ñanavīra and Ven. Ñanamoli were part of the same intellectual milleu and no doubt exchanged ideas with each other extensively.
Well, it is like claiming who first seen dependent arising, and it obviously had some importantce to Ven Nanavira who according to some monk made a statement in the middle of Sangha: “I have nothing more to learn from my friend Nanamoli.”
But of course presently it doesn’t matter, and any way it would be difficult to find someone who thinks he can learn something from Ven Nanamoli.
This claim rests on assumptions that are at least disputable.
In order for it to work we have to take SN as the “earliest sources” and somehow sweep under the rug the fact that the silakandhavagga of DN has only a 7 link DA as in DN1;
Now, when those ascetics and brahmins theorize about the past and the future on these sixty-two grounds, all of them experience this by repeated contact through the six fields of contact. Their feeling is a condition for craving. Craving is a condition for grasping. Grasping is a condition for continued existence. Continued existence is a condition for rebirth. Rebirth is a condition for old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress to come to be.
yepi te samaṇabrāhmaṇā pubbantakappikā ca aparantakappikā ca pubbantāparantakappikā ca pubbantāparantānudiṭṭhino pubbantāparantaṁ ārabbha anekavihitāni adhimuttipadāni abhivadanti dvāsaṭṭhiyā vatthūhi, sabbe te chahi phassāyatanehi phussa phussa paṭisaṁvedenti tesaṁ vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti.
and that DN in it’s entirety has not one single example of a 12DA, giving only a 10DA at DN14 and DN15 as in;
‘This consciousness turns back from name and form, and doesn’t go beyond that.’ ‘paccudāvattati kho idaṁ viññāṇaṁ nāmarūpamhā, nāparaṁ gacchati.
It is to this extent that one may be reborn, grow old, die, pass away, or reappear. That is: Ettāvatā jāyetha vā jiyyetha vā miyyetha vā cavetha vā upapajjetha vā, yadidaṁ
Name and form are conditions for consciousness. Consciousness is a condition for name and form. Name and form are conditions for the six sense fields. The six sense fields are conditions for contact. Contact is a condition for feeling. Feeling is a condition for craving. Craving is a condition for grasping. Grasping is a condition for continued existence. Continued existence is a condition for rebirth. Rebirth is a condition for old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress to come to be. nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṁ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṁ, saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti.
That is how this entire mass of suffering originates.’ Evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti’.
And that SN acknowledges the priority of 10DA at SN12.67.
All this is to say that unless you deny that DN is one of the earliest sources, you cannot claim that 12DA traces back to all the “earliest sources”.
Here again we have a sleight of hand whereby the scholastic abbhidhammic schools of the beginnings of the common era are uncritically asserted to simply explain what is “meant” in the discources and “what the buddha gained insight into.” This is simply false on it’s face. there is NOT ONE WORD in the actual sutta material tha states that DA is a temporal process metaphysics that occurs over 3 lifetimes, and NOT ONE WORD to the effect that there are “two parallel sequences each containing one of the two roots”.
In the actual sutta material, hundreds of years older than the abbhidhamma material that advances the 3 lives doctrine, something that even groups within the “ancient schools” recognised, the actual presentation is counterfactual, not temporal, as in ;
Then Vipassī thought,
Atha kho, bhikkhave, vipassissa bodhisattassa etadahosi:
‘When what doesn’t exist is there no old age and death? When what ceases do old age and death cease?’
‘kimhi nu kho asati jarāmaraṇaṁ na hoti, kissa nirodhā jarāmaraṇanirodho’ti?
Then, through rational application of mind, Vipassī comprehended with wisdom,
Atha kho, bhikkhave, vipassissa bodhisattassa yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo:
‘When rebirth doesn’t exist there’s no old age and death. When rebirth ceases, old age and death cease.’
‘jātiyā kho asati jarāmaraṇaṁ na hoti, jātinirodhā jarāmaraṇanirodho’ti.
or
Rebirth is suffering; old age is suffering; death is suffering; sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress are suffering; association with the disliked is suffering; separation from the liked is suffering; not getting what you wish for is suffering. In brief, the five grasping aggregates are suffering.
Jātipi dukkhā, jarāpi dukkhā, maraṇampi dukkhaṁ, sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsāpi dukkhā, appiyehi sampayogopi dukkho, piyehi vippayogopi dukkho, yampicchaṁ na labhati tampi dukkhaṁ, saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā—
This is called suffering.
idaṁ vuccatāvuso, dukkhaṁ.
And what is the origin of suffering?
Katamo cāvuso, dukkhasamudayo?
It’s the craving that leads to future lives, mixed up with relishing and greed, taking pleasure wherever it lands. That is,
Yāyaṁ taṇhā ponobbhavikā nandīrāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī, seyyathidaṁ—
craving for sensual pleasures, craving for continued existence, and craving to end existence.
kāmataṇhā bhavataṇhā vibhavataṇhā—
This is called the origin of suffering.
ayaṁ vuccatāvuso, dukkhasamudayo.
And what is the cessation of suffering?
Katamo cāvuso, dukkhanirodho?
It’s the fading away and cessation of that very same craving with nothing left over; giving it away, letting it go, releasing it, and not clinging to it.
Yo tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo—
This is called the cessation of suffering.
ayaṁ vuccatāvuso, dukkhanirodho.
And what is the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering?
Katamā cāvuso, dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā?
It is simply this noble eightfold path, that is:
Ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṁ—
right view … right immersion.
sammādiṭṭhi …pe… sammāsamādhi—
This is called the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering.
ayaṁ vuccatāvuso, dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā.
The suttas never say that the craving occurs in the past, nor that the suffering occurs in the future rather that one depends on the other, leaving exactly how (or when) unexplained.
Then, hundreds of years later, the 3 lives model appears, to qoute wikipeadia:
The three life interpretation can first be seen in the Paṭisambhidāmagga (I.275, circa 2nd or 3rd c. BCE).[191] It is also defended by the Theravāda scholar Buddhaghosa (c. fifth century CE) in his influential Visuddhimagga (Vism.578–8I) and it became standard in Theravada.[192][193][194] The three-lives model, with its “embryological” interpretation which links dependent origination with rebirth was also promoted by the Sarvāstivāda school as evidenced by the Abhidharmakosa (AKB.III.21–4) of Vasubandhu (fl. 4th to 5th century CE) and the Jñanaprasthana.[194][3][76] Wayman notes that this model is also present in Asanga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya and is commented on by Nagarjuna.[76]
This occurs at the EXACT SAME TIME (i.e hundreds of years after the buddha) as the appearance of the “structural” or “single moment” interpretation, to qoute wikepedia again;
Prayudh Payutto notes that in Buddhaghosa’s Sammohavinodani, a commentary to the Vibhaṅga, the principle of dependent origination is explained as occurring entirely within the space of one mind moment.[25] Furthermore, according to Payutto, there is material in the Vibhaṅga which discusses both models, the three lifetimes model (at Vibh.147) and the one mind moment model.[3][25][199] Similarly, Cox notes that the Sarvastivadin Vijñānakāya contains two interpretations of dependent origination, one which explains the 12 nidanas as functioning in a single moment as a way to account for ordinary experience and another interpretation that understands the 12 nidanas as arising sequentially, emphasizing their role in the functioning of rebirth and karma.[74]
So first, DA is NOT explained as a 3 lifetime process metaphysics in the earliest sources, in fact it’s not even explained as having 12 links in all the earliest sources, and second when the 3 lifetime interpretation emerges in the later material it emerges alongside the mind moment and mind series interpretations, ALL of which have lengthy pre-modern histories so it is simply untrue to say:
And equally completely untrue to say that
since these have just as long a lineage as the 3 lives school of thought, going back centuries, but NOT to the suttas.
So in answer to your questions;
Answer: with the abhidhamma.
Answer: even a cursory examination of the basic Wikipedia article gives ample counter-examples, some of which are given above.
In summary the OP assumes something new is something old, i.e assumes that the 3 life interpretation of DA goes back to the suttas when it doesn’t and then assumes that something old is new i.e that “structural” or “momentary” interpretations of DA don’t go back to abhdhamma projects when in fact they do.
Hence the OP creates an illusory past where everyone agreed and is confused about an equally illusory modernity where people disagree.
Insofar as any previous “structural” interpretations were also momentary interpretations, they were not Ven. Ñanavīra’s interpretation because his interpretation is not a momentary one. The rejection of momentary-ness is a very important part of Sartre’s ontology of temporality, and Ven. Ñanavīra takes that rejection to an even more extreme and fine-grained level in the Dynamic Aspect subsection of the Fundamental Structure section of Notes on Dhamma. There’s a lot of Sartre-specific jargon in the following quote that I understand will sound like nonsense without any context, but here’s a bit of Sartre on the notion of the instant to give just a taste:
[The] totality [of temporalization] never is achieved; it is a totality which is refused and which flees from itself. It is the wrenching away from self within the unity of a single upsurge, an inapprehensible totality which at the moment when it gives itself is ready beyond this gift of self. Thus the time of consciousness is human reality which temporalizes itself as the totality which is to itself its own incompletion; it is nothingness slipping into a totality as a de-totalizing ferment. This totality which runs after itself and refuses itself at the same time, which can find in itself no limit to its surpassing because it is its own surpassing and because it surpasses itself toward itself, can under no circumstance exist within the limits of an instant. There is never an instant at which we can assert that the for-itself is, precisely because the for-itself never is. Temporality, on the contrary, temporalizes itself entirely as the refusal of the instant. (Being and Nothingness, p. 211)
This ecstatic, “always-beyond-itself” nature of temporality is why I referred to Ven. Ñanavīra’s interpretation as trans-temporal, rather than atemporal as Knigarian did. Though they may bear superficial resemblance by placing the links of DA “next to” each other rather than sequentially one after the other as in the causal interpretation, any pre-modern “structural” interpretations that remain bound within a single mind-moment differ significantly from Ven. Ñanavīra’s interpretation. This might sound like nit-picking, but the thoroughly non-instantaneous, ecstatic, “overflowing” nature of existential temporality is precisely what allows DA to be both universal across past, present, and future and also be akaliko, ehipasiko, opanayiko… etc. Jettisoning the mind-moment is the only way for DA to be a principle that covers all three times without requiring any form of induction (that would carry with it the Problem of induction) whatsoever.
So, again, I am quite sure that Ven. Ñanavīra’s interpretation is unprecedented. The resemblance between it and any previous “structural” interpretations are superficial, though I admit I was unaware of the ancient single-mind-moment interpretations and thank you for bringing them to our collective attention. Ven. Ñanavīra’s interpretation really very much required the work of the existential phenomenologists to build upon. Obviously I am not saying that no-one prior to the existentialists ever had an authentic intuition of the nature of temporality or of DA, but no such persons ever expressed that intuition in the context of DA with the level of rigor that Ven. Ñanavīra did, because the intellectual tools that enabled such rigor simply did not exist prior to the idea of existential temporality first expounded by Heidegger in his distinction between temporality and historicity, and later given even more detailed ontological elaboration by Sartre.
I’ve also been interested in the sources of the various interpretations of DO, especially the moment to moment interpretation. I’ve been puzzled by the claim that this interpretation can be traced to the Vibhaṅga of the Theravada Abhidhamma. Here is the passage that is sometimes referred to:
In this case, what is “existence is the condition for birth”? That which is the birth, being born, coming forth, coming into being, manifestation of those various things: this is said to be “existence is the condition for birth”.
“Those various things”, tesaṁ tesaṁ dhammānaṁ, presumably refers back to the four mental aggreagtes (khandhas) mentioned in the immediately preceding definition of existence (bhava). Here is that definition:
In this case, what is “taking up is the condition for existence”? Apart for the taking up, it is the feeling aggregate, the perception aggregate, the will aggregate, the consciousness aggregate: this is said to be “taking up is the condition for existence”.
The moment to moment proponents then argued that because bhava is defined as the four mental khandhas this must refer to the moment by moment arising of mental phenomena.
It is interesting, of course, that the Abhidhamma leaves out rūpakkhandha, and this certainly needs to be explained. Yet the broader context suggests that this, too, is about rebirth. The words used in the Abhidhamma are essentially the same as those used for rebirth in the standard sutta explanation of DO. Here is a comparison of the two definitions of jāti, starting with the sutta definition:
The two are obviously closely related. If the sutta definition relates to rebirth, it is hard to see why the Abhidhamma definition would be seen differently. But again, the differences need to be explained.
So why might rūpakkhandha, “the form aggregate”, be missing from the Abhidhamma definition of bhava? We know that the Abhidhamma is essentially about classifying and relating the constituents of reality to each other. To make DO universally applicable is makes sense to take out rūpa (perhaps it should be regarded as subsumed under one of the other factors, such as saññā), thereby including all the realms of existence, also the arūpa realms, into its formulation. I think this is at least a plausible reason for the unusual formulation. There may also be others.
It’s important to note here that also the other factors of DO, as defined in the Abhidhamma, have had the rūpa element removed. So we find nāma instead of nāmarūpa and chaṭṭhāyatana (“the sixth sense base”, that is, the mind) instead of saḷāyatana (“the six sense bases”). And I think this is also the explanation for the difference in the definition of jāti. The Abhidhamma definition leaves out precisely those terms that involve rūpa, that is, okkanti, khandhānaṁ (pātubhāvo), āyatanānaṁ paṭilābho (In the suttasokkanti or avakkanti is often related to nāmarūpa.) And I think the same argument can be made for old age and death, for which, again, the rūpa aspect seems to be left out. (Indeed, this how the commentary explains it.)
In sum, without having delved into all the details, it seems to me that there is no particularly good reason to think that the Abhidhamma teaches some kind of moment to moment DO. If this is correct, it seems likely that this is entirely a modern phenomenon. This may not have been the question your were asking, @Vaddha, yet it may still be illuminating in its own way. It looks likely to me that the moment to moment interpretation is a modern projection onto the suttas. In other words, it is the result of a cultural bias coming from societies where the idea of rebirth is often questioned, if not outrightly dismissed. This gives a good foundation for understanding why such ideas have arisen. Moreover, it is a good reminder of how easy it is to backread our own biases into the suttas.
Hi, Joseph. Thanks for the contribution. It seems you’ve misread or misinterpreted about every line in my post that you’ve commented on. I don’t think it too necessary to go into the details, but for the sake of clarifying any misreadings from others, here are some reflections.
I said “common to all Buddhist schools” not ‘all earliest sources.’ Followed by ‘our earliest sources,’ by which I mean the major early Nikāyas as a whole. Of course it’s interesting to consider the historical layers within those books, but the fact remains that as of now, we know of no Buddhist school that did not have these Nikāyas in some form or another, and several Nikāyas do mention the 12 links (SN, AN, MN, Snp) with the Chinese Dīrghāgama also mentioning them in its parallel to DN 15. So even if there were passages among the four main nikāyas earlier than others that did not have the twelve links, the fact remains that as of now, the consensus is that we can only trace back the four nikāyas as the group of earliest sources. Everything else is speculative and tentative. Had I said:
then you may have had a point. But I did not say that.
Again, I did not claim this. I said that these Abhidhamma explanations “are considered [by their exponents]] to be…” I feel that is clear enough in the writing, as I was writing about what the traditional texts say, but now I’ll make it more explicit. There is no doubt that these treatises considered their exegesis to be accurate analyses of the suttas when they say as much. The momentary interpretations not so much, because even when explicit it seems—from what I can guess—that this is considered an expansion of Abhidhamma by the authors.
I did not claim there was. Rather, I said a common thread in the Abhidhamma literature of the schools is using the three time periods to discuss the chain. And this is an expository device for getting a grasp of the links. It’s simply a misunderstanding if people think this is what they limit the chain to mean. It is more significantly and quite commonly broken up into condition and resultant, mirroring kamma and vipāka. And as I said a bit above, the multiple lifetime model is more like an infinite regression stuck in place with defilements of the mind and dismantled with the end of craving.
Again, I was discussing the Abhidhamma exegesis. That said, and I’ll limit myself here, there is a common stock passage in the discourses that comes up in relation to dependent arising or samsāra. It goes:
Here, two roots are mentioned. One craving, the other ignorance. The image of craving being a ‘root’ is common in Early Buddhist poetry, and we also see ignorance or unknowing referred to as a ‘root.’ There are also several discourses where ignorance is said to have ‘no known beginning,’ and others were craving is said to have no known beginning. There have also been many scholars who believe that there are separate chains combined to form the 12 links total, and one of the main ideas is between 1-7 and and 8-12. The first starts with ignorance and goes up to contact/vedanā. The other starts with craving and goes up to aging-and-death. One reading is that the former sequence is essentially just filling in how contact, feeling, etc. arises to be a condition for craving in more detail, which is assumed when the discourses say craving is the condition for continued existence/rebirth. The idea being that feeling is a result of existing or being born, and craving emerges from it to continue the cycle. But that’s enough for now.
Joseph, I quoted a reference to momentary interpretations of the Jñānaprasthāna in the original post. I’ve already mentioned here that small-scale interpretations exist in the early schools. The difference, as I said before, is that these same texts and schools do not deny what they consider to be in the discourses, that is, a conditional chain for the process of rebirth. They present the other chains as additional analyses and tools, not alternatives that dispose of the rebirth explanation. This has all been made clear in my other posts here.
All of this was already covered, and not what I was referring to.
I was explicit not to claim this in the posts before. Though the parallel chains is more my rough summary of what I take the suttas to present that also fits generally with how the Abhidhamma schools later analyzed it, with room for details like ‘bhava’ being divided into two kinds or consciousness sometimes being seen as bridging both prior conditions and resultants.
And I was explicit that this did happen before.
I think we’ve discussed enough now and cleared this up sufficiently. I probably won’t be responding further.
That seems reasonable, indeed. The main question is what tesaṁ tesaṁ dhammānaṁ refers to. In support of your interpretation, the Abhidhamma (in its explanation of the sutta) speaks of catuvokārabhavo and pañcavokārabhavo: existence with four/five constituents, referring to the khandhas apparently. Then it explains the sutta interpretation with five khandhas, and the Ahidhamma interpretation with four.
But on the other hand… What made me interpret the Abhidhamma explanation as momentary (apart from just believing others who said so ), is that it leaves out some parts of the sutta definitions. Compare the following:
First the sutta definition found in the Abhidhamma (Vb6), with the bold parts are unique to this sutta explanation, missing in the Abhidhamma explanation:
The Abhidhamma definition, with the bold parts unique to the Abhidhamma definition, missing in the Abhidhamma’s explanation of the sutta interpretation:
It seems like the Abhidhamma left out the factors that most explicitly refer to rebirth. For example, maccu (‘death’) and jīvitindriyassupacchedo (‘cutting off the life faculty’), as well as others. Is this just because it leaves out rūpa in its explanation of rebirth? Or does it leave them out because it doesn’t intend to teach rebirth?
It seems like death and cutting off of the life faculty will still occur in the formless realms. Since these are left out, clearly intentionally, that may be because the Abhidhamma explanation is not about rebirth. (?)
Also interesting is that the Abhidhamma explanation includes aniccatā, which may tend towards a momentary explanation too.
Still, the Abhidhamma does include āyuno saṁhāni (‘the dwindling life’) in its definition of ‘jarā’ (‘old age/decay(?)’), and I find it hard to interpret this as a momentary thing (though perhaps it is possible).
Either way, even if the Abhidhamma taught a momentary process, then it still does not neglect the rebirth interpretation, of course. Quit the contrary: it clarifies that this is the interpretation of the sutta. Not only does it effectively call it “the sutta interpretation”; also because of the inclusion of such terms as upapatti, which are not found in the sutta definition of bhava.
Hi Stephen. I believe it can be taken in both ways. It depends on the context. Here I think the question about the Abhidhamma is more broad, just asking if any kind of momentariness is relevant.
Thanks!
I find the discussion a bit hard to follow since there seems to be varying ideas of what ‘momentary’ might mean.
A comparison of the nidanas to the causality of kamma-vipaka would be a different interpretation than the one offered by Ven Nanavira, correct? He seems to reject any temporal framework. (Perhaps this aligns with definition #2 and rejects #1)
The Buddha’s insight, and what is supposed to be the knowledge of all arahants, repeated dozens of times in the suttas, is that they have ended rebirth and continued existence. This is not something Ven. Ñāṇavīra would have disagreed with as far as I understand him; maybe someone will say otherwise. So how does the Buddha know that, then? That is referring to something in the future, the effect of a change that is due to removing the conditions for a particular dependent condition to not come about or arise. We can word this in a structural way, as several suttas do: “Rebirth is dependent on continued existence. Continued existence is dependent on grasping. With the cessation of grasping, there is no condition for continued existence, and therefore rebirth would come to an end.” Structurally this is true; but it also refers to the fact that future rebirth will not arise. There is the prior vipāka of the grasping from a previous life, which is why the current rebirth or life of an arahant must be exhausted until the end of their life-span. This is referred to as ‘remannt’ or ‘remainder’ (sesa; sa-upādisesa). What does that remnant of existence contain? Consciousness (viññāṇa), name-and-form (nāma-rūpa), the six senses (saḷāyatana), contact (phassa) and feeling (vedanā). See SN 12.19 for a clear discussion of this. So the resultant links which are equivalent to jāti remain, it is just that the conditions for future jāti have been removed, and the arahant understands that conditional structure, which leads to their knowledge that no more rebirth will arise once the current vipāka is exhausted.
If he did reject this framework, it would be the equivalent of saying the Buddha did not, in fact, know what he claimed to know and what he claimed was the knowledge of any arahant. Keep in mind that change and time are inseparable in terms of our perception, and the doctrine of kamma is a core idea that is really talking about the role of ethical intentions in shaping how change occurs, rather than change being completely random and chaotic. So even if we talk about, say, the potential of dying being present to us, that still must refer to a real event of change that can occur, otherwise it loses all meaning. I’m not sure if this has answered your question, but it may shed some light on the whole issue.
Knowing deed as deed, and result as result; Kammaṁ kammanti ñatvāna, vipākañca vipākato; seeing dependently originated phenomena as if they were in a clear light. Paṭiccuppannadhammānaṁ yathāvālokadassano; …
Thag 6.8
Supporting this, a legitimate aspect of knowing in the suttas can be by inference, as in SN12.33:
"A noble disciple understands choices, their origin, their cessation, and the practice that leads to their cessation. This is their knowledge of the present phenomenon. Yato kho, bhikkhave, ariyasāvako evaṁ saṅkhāre pajānāti, evaṁ saṅkhārasamudayaṁ pajānāti, evaṁ saṅkhāranirodhaṁ pajānāti, evaṁ saṅkhāranirodhagāminiṁ paṭipadaṁ pajānāti, idamassa dhamme ñāṇaṁ.
With this present phenomenon that is seen, known, immediate, attained, and fathomed, they infer to the past and future. So iminā dhammena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena pariyogāḷhena atītānāgatena yaṁ neti."
Perhaps more clearly, grammatically speaking, in MN12:
" But there’s no way Sunakkhatta will infer about me from the teaching:. Ayampi hi nāma, sāriputta, sunakkhattassa moghapurisassa mayi dhammanvayo na bhavissati:‘That Blessed One is perfected, a fully awakened Buddha, accomplished in knowledge and conduct, holy, knower of the world, supreme guide for those who wish to train, teacher of gods and humans, awakened, blessed.’"
“Bhikkhus, an instructed noble disciple does not think: ‘When what exists does what come to be? With the arising of what does what arise? [When what exists do determinations come to be? When what exists does consciousness come to be?]132 When what exists does name-and-form come to be?… When what exists does aging-and-death come to be?’
“Rather, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple has knowledge about this that is independent of others: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises.
SN 12: 49
But of course regarding future appearing of the new body in the field of consciousness we may say that Venerable Sariputta has no any such direct knowledge, so you are justified to say that he "inferred it:
But, Sāriputta, if they were to ask you: ‘Friend Sāriputta, through what kind of deliverance have you declared final knowledge thus: “I understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being”?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”
“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, I would answer thus: [54] ‘Friends, through an internal deliverance, through the destruction of all clinging, I dwell mindfully in such a way that the taints do not flow within me and I do not despise myself.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”
“Good, good, Sāriputta! This is another method of explaining in brief that same point: ‘I have no perplexity in regard to the taints spoken of by the Ascetic; I do not doubt that they have been abandoned by me.’”
SN 12: 32
In other words Venerable Sariputta has a direct knowledge:
‘This field of perception is void of the taint of sensual desire; this field of perception is void of the taint of being; this field of perception is void of the taint of ignorance. There is present only this non-voidness, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’ Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’ MN 121
Whether “this non-voidness, namely, that connected with the six bases that are dependent on this body and conditioned by life” will be replaced or will not be replaced by another body without supernormal powers, you are right, arahat only inffers.
And I inffer, that it doesn’t matter, since it is enough to know:
I have no perplexity in regard to the taints spoken of by the Ascetic; I do not doubt that they have been abandoned by me.’”
Definitely ven Nanavira is right when he says:
ariyasàvaka has direct, certain, reflexive knowledge of the condition upon which birth depends. He has no such knowledge about re-birth, which is quite a different matter.
Q: Yet, you must believe in having lived before.
M: The scriptures say so, but I know nothing about it. I know myself as I am; as I appeared or will appear is not within my experience. It is not that I do not remember. In fact there is nothing to remember. Reincarnation implies a reincarnating self. There is no such thing. The bundle of memories and hopes, called the ‘I’, imagines itself existing everlastingly and creates time to accommodate its false eternity: To be, I need no past or future. All experience is born of imagination; I do not imagine, so no birth or death happens to me. Only those who think themselves born can think themselves re-born. You are accusing me of having been born — I plead not guilty!
Of course there’s direct knowledge. But that can’t be experienced directly with respect to future events.
Inference in this case depends on the context in which it is used.
Clearly, in the Discourse to the Kalamas, AN3.64, practitioners are taught not to rely on it. A different context than the suttas I cited.
Thank you, Venerable, for taking the time to give an extensive answer. I think we may be talking past each other regarding this, probably due to my own lack of clarity on the subject.
But I’ll continue to think about it and hopefully circle back soon.
Yes, this is an important point. As for the momentary process of the Abhidhamma - assuming this is the correct understanding - I am not convinced it is actually about DO. I have replied further over here.
Whatever [other] ascetics and brahmins in the future will directly know old age and death, their origin, their cessation, and the practice that leads to their cessation, all of them will directly know these things in exactly the same way that I do now. This is their inferential knowledge.
Same in MN12, where people infer qualities of the BUddha.
I myself am hesitant to call the knowledge of the ending of rebirth “inferential”. It has too much of an intellectual slant. Either way, I don’t disagree that some knowledge is more direct than other. The knowledge of the ending or rebirth I say will be really direct, though.
I agree. It’s not about DO in the sense the Buddha meant it, and not in the sense that one has insight into it.
@Vaddha, sorry for getting off topic. To answer the questions: (1) I don’t know. (2) I don’t know either.
Thanks for your post and good point regarding the quote I cited.
Nevertheless, although about others, it is still via inference that we assert what they will directly know.
Another form of inference, it seems, can be made regarding Satipaṭṭhāna practice, when there is contemplation of the “external”. Although this is directly experienced by the meditator, it’s by inference that they contemplate the forms of others.
Finally, the assertion that
is itself an inference.
Regarding the cessation of rebirth, although there may be some inference in the earlier stages of practice, the direct experience of cessation, especially of consciousness, leads to the knowledge of the ending of rebirth, as you said.
), is that it leaves out some parts of the sutta definitions. Compare the following:
