How can there be no-self when there seems to be a self?

Q & A
126

If I might point out an interesting consequence of what I hope is proper application of the Buddha’s anattā teaching specifically concerning self-conceptions, identities, and self-views:

You have stated a few times that you do not believe in any “RE-births”, and I myself am skeptical-leaning-towards-agnostic about the continuity of consciousness between any “present” birth and the any past birth whose karma is inherited by said “present” birth.

Yet we can both unequivocally say that[quote=“Brother_Joe, post:44, topic:5041”]
life only happens once for each person
[/quote]despite not having our stances concerning rebirth be entirely congruent, even if I, for example’s sake, say that I do definitely believe in “RE-birth” according to what I think is proper application of anattā-teachings.

The Buddha doesn’t not teach his students, I do not think, that births-and-deaths which occurred in the past should be identified with as “me” or “mine”. Similarly, we are not supposed to identify inherited karma as “me”, however it is considered “mine” in some respects (see the quote a bit later), which is a bit of a mystery to someone who believes that the Buddha taught the truth of no continuous or eternal self-entity.

However if we start with the premise that self-conceptions, identities, and self-views are all to be discarded (which is where the interpretation comes in, barring someone producing some handy Buddhavacana that happens to agree with these musings), it makes sense that even if quotes like this:[quote]“Student, beings are owners of kammas, heirs of kammas, they have kammas as their progenitor, kammas as their kin, kammas as their homing-place. It is kammas that differentiate beings according to inferiority and superiority.”

-MN 135[/quote]seem to imply that “selves” exists which are strictly formations of kammic consequence (i.e. “selves are kamma”), conceptualizing of them as “selves” or identifying with this kamma as “what I am” would be another self-view, a saṅkhāra if one will, which is just another thing that should be discarded.

In fact, regardless of if the “reincarnation of past lives” exists as something “more” or “other” than kamma-inherited, identification with those past lives as “me” would, regardless of if it were true or not, be another self-conception, it seems to be at least. That is perhaps why the Buddha calls such memories and/or the recollection of them saṅkhāra? Because they are just more (or just lead to more) identity-formations?

That is just a thought I had upon reading this thread.

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127

Those who express opinions, without personal experience, have only Views about the Self. But if it is based on experience it is the ‘knowledge of way things really are’.

“What do you think, monks — Is form constant or inconstant?”
“Inconstant, lord.”
“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”
“Stressful, lord.”
“And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: ‘This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am’?”
“No, lord.”
SN22.59

The above quote also says a Self doesn’t exist even if someone maintains ‘Self isn’t feelings but it is actually impercipient’.

"Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: “Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?”
When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.
“Then is there no self?”
A second time, the Blessed One was silent.
Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.
Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Ven. Ananda said to the Blessed One, “Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by Vacchagotta the wanderer?”
"Ananda, if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism . If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"
“No, lord.”
“And if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: ‘Does the self I used to have now not exist?’” SN44.10

The Buddha didn’t reply (or refuse not-Self) because 1) it would confuse the listener 2) the other party would be talking about annihilationism whereas the Buddha was referring to a misperception of the aggregates.

With metta

Matheesha

128

My question to the adherents of anatta-buddhism is simple: where in the 1000s of suttas do we find “atta doesn’t exist”?

Poor Vacchagotta in SN 44.10 might have become bewildered. But what about Sariputta, Kassapa, Anuruddha, Ananda. Nowhere, really? So if I understand correctly ‘no-self’ is the central point of Buddhism, the one distinguishing feature, but nowhere seems the Buddha to be bothered to simply state it?

Of course he doesn’t state the opposite either…

129

Bhante, somebody has already kindly asked you to explain memories. Could I politely ask for the inclusion of creativity, if you decide to answer? How do you see the works of Einstein, Tesla, Mozart, etc. in the anatta teaching. Or perhaps, who built pyramids,cities, bridges, atomic bomb? It is clearly not a habitual thinking.

And second thing, Bhante, in the anatta teaching, since the self isn’t in control of five clinging aggregates we were told to train ourselves thus, five clinging aggregates are not I, not me, not myself. Who is it that should be trained to know and remember this?

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130

Looking is the first step. But after looking, each person has to decide what among the Buddha supposedly said is what he actually said—and there’s a lot to choose from, especially when you include Mahayana/Vajrayana teachings. That decision process is what leads to the plethora of interpretations.

131

Yes, I certainly agree (attā meaning soul) also the same with statements about the existence of God, which Buddhism seems to love to state the Buddha taught does not exists. What I find the Buddha teaching is how the concept of a Creator God would arise. In these cases I see he talks about concepts, which I believe are real things, not whether the concept mirrors something exisiting in the external world.

Unfortunately, I believe, it is attā (soul) that is spoken of there, not self (aham). This is a common ‘translation’ error imo and adds to the widespread confusion of the two terms.

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132

If these following EBTs with parallels are not enough to prove that there is a doer; then I suppose that commentators and late talks, might prove the contrary.

SN 24.6 - And - AN 6.38, with its comparison study with SA 459

There is definitely a clear difference between “self”, ¨¨ & ¨¨ “I” (aham) - “am” (asmi).
The only relationship between "self and “I”, is that there must be the belief in a self, for the “I” to occur. And that will lead inevitably to a paradox.

Search for “continuity” on this site, and you might find what “self” means - as far as “Self/self” is concerned.
Brahmali is right on that matter.

¨
SN 12.61 >> It is better to take kaya (body) as “self”, than mind/heart (citta) and intellect (mano),
This summary of the pericope in that sutta, might also help to understand the paradox of having to conceive a pseudo-atta as long as we live. Even if this pseudo atta is anatta, because inherently uncontinuous.
It’s a paradox! - It’s a paradox! - It’s a paradox!
In other words, it is better to believe that your kaya is a “self”, than to believe that your mano is a “self”; because kaya lasts longer (namely is "continuous " longer). Even if this atta is paradoxically not-continuous.

As far as “I” is concerned, it has to do with making the khandhas of nāmarūpa “yours” - [important note, I suppose: nāmarūpa components which, by the way, are rightly considered in the Agamas as form, feeling, perception, saṅkhāras and consciousness (viz. the khandhas) - and nāmarūpa components that are also rightly considered as form, feeling, contact, cetanā and manasikāro, when nāmarūpa that is "inherited by saḷāyatana, strive in the latter - (SN 12.2 vs. SA 298).
Therefore, – “I” – means: to make the components of nāmarūpa (viz. the khandhas) “yours” - SN 22.33, (but also the ayatanas “yours” - SN 35.138).

The fact that people mix both, have them mix up everything, I suppose.

As far as considering a “Self” as, or beyond Nibbāna; that is something Buddha did not address - but did not deny also.

133

And just to clarify what I said earlier when I said there are no personal past lives, I was speaking from the standpoint of an ultimate perspective. On a relative level, of course there are beings and rebirth and kamma and Buddhas and all that. And that is what we have to work with. But all of this is ultimately empty of an I or self to be found anywhere.

To use an imperfect physics analogy, we speak of people and trees and brains and thoughts and whatnot, but ultimately it is all just due to the interactions of subatomic particles and fundamental forces. That’s all that is ultimately going on. Keep in mind that the point of this analogy is to show that seeing things from different levels of perspective is not exclusive to Buddhism, not to claim that this is indeed the case! And physicists, please forgive me if my knowledge is incorrect and kindly provide us with what is ultimately occurring from a physical standpoint.

I think a lot of confusion and miscommunication is caused by not making this distinction between different perspectives of things, when our focus becomes too narrow and we think “only this is true, everything else is wrong.”

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134

I don’t believe karma (action) is inheritable, it is the consequence (vipāka) of the action that is inheritable. E.g. we inherit the consequence of previous generations cutting down many trees, in that we have harsher weather conditions e.g. drought and flood…

I don’t believe in RE-birth, but I believe in many births and deaths, within this very life, which are not moment to moment, but are experiential and possible to reflect on.

To me this is a mixing up of two different philosophies. I don’t see how one could identify with something as ‘mine’, but could only identify something as ‘mine’. Thus I don’t accept the ‘translation/s’ of reflecting that 'this is not I, me, mine’ but rather think it should be 'this is not I, me, myself’. I have no problem with ownership, in the sense of responsibility, not control. The responsibility of a temporary self (the Five Aggregates), not a soul.

For me selves exist, which are temporary, conditioned things (the Five Aggregates) and they can own (be responsible for) things.

I don’t agree, cause I don’t have a problem with self-concept, as long as it’s a conditioned, impermanent self (the Five Aggregates). If you changed the sentence to say ‘soul-concept’ I would agree whether you said ‘past-lives’ (which I don’t accept as personal) or ‘past-births’ (which I do accept as personal).

[quote=“Coemgenu, post:126, topic:5041”]
seem to imply that “selves” exists which are strictly formations of kammic consequence (i.e. “selves are kamma”)[/quote]

yes, I agree (vipāka, not kamma) and there is wholesome and unwholesome vipāka

I have not problem with conceptualising them as ‘selves’ that are impermanent and conditioned. I have a problem with identifiying with them as ‘what I am’ as that is an expression of the conceit ‘I am’ and would be another soul-view (and self-view) to be discarded.

135

They are not my options. I choose between supposedly and probably, not supposedly and actually. As the latter led me to arrogance.

136

If I may put this open question: is the ‘ultimate perspective’ not a trap - or more dogmatically: isn’t it wrong view? I’m really not criticizing. I wonder if our way of philosophizing isn’t misleading.

On the one hand we have the ‘tangible’ reality with experiences, sukha and dukkha; and on the other we create an image/concept of an ‘ultimate reality’, a mental space where pure truth supposedly exists. Isn’t this in a way just a comfort in order to not to deal with the experiential world?

Maybe you’d kindly like to comment on that?

137

Well yes, the best we can conceive of is “probably.” But what we act upon is “actually.” :slight_smile:

138

Please speak for yourself.

best wishes

139

I believe it is wrong view to think the Buddha taught two truths: ‘conventional truth’ and ‘ultimate truth’. vis 'The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events. Khathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā (Jayatilleke: 363, in McCagney: 84).

I have not found that the Buddha used the terms ‘samuttisacca’ or ‘paramattasacca’. A digital search shows that the term samutti does not occur in the First Four Nikāya. ‘Paramatt*’ can be found 8 times in all digitised Pāli texts, twice in the First Four Nikāya, both in verses, one at S i 75 as paramattakāmo and the other at DN20 - D ii 261 (SuttaCentral verse 61) where it is the name of a Brahmā god (an alternate reading is Paramattho with a h.). Paramatth* with a ‘h’ is much more numerous with 347 occurrences in all digitised Pāli texts. Only two in the First Four Nikāyas:

  • A ii 115 - AN4.113 - https://suttacentral.net/en/an4.113: as paramasaccaṃ/paramatthasaccaṃ, ‘Resolute, he both realizes with his body the highest truth and, having penetrated it with discernment, sees.’
  • A v 64 - AN10.29 - https://suttacentral.net/en/an10.29: as paramatthavisuddhiṃ. ‘Bhikkhus, there are some ascetics and brahmins who proclaim supreme purification. Of those who proclaim supreme purification…’

I have found that the Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths. The theories of samutti-sacca - conventional truth and paramatt(h)a-sacca - ultimate truth, which are so extensively used to interpret the Buddha’s teaching, are obscurely based on his clear instructions to use local terminology for the names of concrete nouns, rather than trying to enforce one’s own usage. The example given at MN 139 is a ‘bowl’ . SuttaCentral

We have evidence that the Buddha giving clear definitions to abstract nouns in ‘this Dhamma and Discipline’ (see (PDF) 20120701 The Noble Language - Thesis Extract.pdf | Joe Smith - Academia.edu), that is, in his own teaching. So, it would seem to me, either he is not following his own advice, or the advice is only (mainly?) to be applied to concrete nouns. If the Buddha didn’t give new meanings to words (abstract nouns), then we would not have the First Noble Truth, which I see as the Buddha’s definition of suffering (dukkha).

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140

IMO, there is only so much fungibility between minds. The way our minds work is so different and the meanings we ascribe to words are always changing based upon the conditions at the time. This is what makes miscommunication so easy in mundane things, let alone communicating about important spiritual matters!

I say this because I don’t understand where you’re asking. :slight_smile:

141

But the Buddha did. Refer to MN 98 & SN 1.25, where ‘conventions’ are referred to.

Whenever there are teachings given to ordinary people about making good karma for themselves, these are conventional truths. If ordinary people do not believe in a ‘self’, they will not do good karma for a good rebirth in future lives.

When the Dhammapada states: “self is the refuge of self”, this is conventional language.

:seedling:

142

'Fraid not. I think this applies to everybody’s mind. When we act, we act upon what we understand as actual. That’s why it’s called _act_ually :slight_smile:

So if you conceive of everything as probable, that is the understanding that you are actually acting upon.

143

And I think it’s wrong view to reject the teaching of rebirth, or “this world and the other world.” This is explicitly supported in the texts.

[quote]
“And how, householders, are there three kinds of mental conduct not in accordance with the Dhamma, unrighteous conduct? Here someone is covetous; he covets the wealth and property of others thus: ‘Oh, may what belongs to another be mine!’ Or he has a mind of ill will and intentions of hate thus: ‘May these beings be slain and slaughtered, may they be cut off, perish, or be annihilated!’ Or he has wrong view, distorted vision, thus: ‘There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ That is how there are three kinds of mental conduct not in accordance with the Dhamma, unrighteous conduct. So, householders, it is by reason of such conduct not in accordance with the Dhamma, by reason of such unrighteous conduct that some beings here on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappear in states of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell.

MN 41[/quote]

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144

[quote=“Brother_Joe, post:134, topic:5041”]
To me this is a mixing up of two different philosophies. I don’t see how one could identify with something as ‘mine’, but could only identify something as ‘mine’.
[/quote]To “identify with” something, in vernacular usage, is to point out a similarity between something else and one’s self, and to say “I am like this” or “this quality is part of me also”. For instance, if one identifies with a given political stance, one’s identity is also partially that political stance, because that external political opinion is now being considered “a part of me” or “something I have/am”. For instance, let us say that I identity with a popular protest movement, or a movement of political dissent, I “am” now a follower of X or Y ideology they hold most likely, because I “consider myself” one of them, for example’s sake.

But this is mostly semantics over “with vs as”.

We have different motivations for our ability to form the phrase:[quote]life only happens once for each person[/quote]and we have different explanations as to why that is most likely the case, but both diverse lines of discourse both strangely result in the same place on this one subject, interestingly enough.

145

Hello Brother_Joe,

Just to get this clear, there is a distinction between:

No Self (anaham): in that this actually means self. Of which Buddha says it is unwise to reflect on this as it can lead to wrong views of atta (which means soul).

and

Not Self (anatta): in that this specifically means ‘no soul’ and it is acceptable to reflect on this.

Am I getting this right?