SuttaCentral
Does this mean that that the dimension of infinite conscious exist independly of the four elements?
(because the sutta says that these elements find no footing, then there can be no rupa, etc)
A vinnana without rupa?
Do you believe that in this jhana there is no sense of an I or me ?
Thanks, yes, i understand, but to be honest i feel that translators and teachers sometimes tend to wash away all mystic, esoteric, deep tone in the sutta’s by the force of ratio or intellect. I have a hard time with this rational approach of Dhamma. You can see that, ofcourse.
I cannot help but wonder if the texts are still read and translated unbiased. Ofcourse i also look into myself for a honest answer if i am biased. I think i am. I feel deep resistance to the idea that parinibbana is a mere cessation, or even the idea that Buddha really believed he was a human in a human bhava. These are only conventional ideas. There is nothing real about it. The pure mind is not human.
I have a hard time dealing with this tendency to wash away all that is deep, connected to emptiness, transcendent, more mystical, esoteric. And i cannot help to think that this agenda or (what i sense as) rational understanding also dominates the translations and comments on sutta’s.
I can well relate to what you are saying here. As to my own “Dhamma history”, I have originally encountered the Dhamma in the Tibetan tradition, and there you encounter all this stuff you seem to like. I also liked it! I have to say, my encounter was originally very emotional, not much intellectual at all. It felt like “coming home”, so to speak. Ad I loved this colorful, mysterious world!
But after some time the wish to understand things beyond mere faith grew stronger, and I didn’t find much to satisfy this desire in the Tibetan tradition (at least not in this environment I had contact to). At some point I started finding it a bit too much mystery and secret, and I understood that non of those Tibetan teachers would ever reveal to you all that they knew. There would always remain something left for the still more advanced or more trustworthy disciples …
At the same time I encountered teachers like Ajahn Brahm and Bhante Sujato, and this was just totally the opposite! No secret, nothing hidden for the “more worthy”, just everything clear and open! And this attracted me at that point.
And when I started to discover the Suttas (which I hadn’t much the opportunity with the Tibetan teachers) I was totally amazed how rational they actually are! So this is my experience.
Of course there is also a lot of myth in the Suttas, and I love that! But this isn’t the doctrinally relevant stuff; which is indeed pretty rational; and nibbāna is indeed “extinguishment”.
And of course I have my biases—everybody has!
Super interesting your message Venerable!
Interesting. Personally I have a bit of trouble with certain passages, especially in DN 27, I’ve made a topic about it where I detail my thoughts. When things seem to go too far against science (like the myth in DN 27), or seem to be too strange, it bothers me, because I have the impression of being faced with two possibilities:
I don’t know what to think. Both options seem difficult to me:
1/ if the Buddha is wrong on certain subjects, why shouldn’t this also be the case concerning the other fundamental points of his doctrine?
2/ If the false mythological texts are later additions that the Buddha never said, how do we know that this isn’t the case for many other texts that speak of fundamental doctrinal points?
Of course, these questions are as old as the hills and have been asked by many people before me.
I have faith in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, because in my own experience, looking at how my mind works, I find that the central doctrinal points of the Dhamma are simply incredibly true. But sometimes my faith is attacked by this doubt about the mythological things in the suttas.
Venerable, please, how do you avoid this doubt? What do you advise us to do? For example, regarding DN 27, what attitude do you have?
Thank you so much Venerable for your presence, I’m always quite moved when I talk to a Venerable!
“Myth” in the original sense of the word isn’t what we understand in a colloquial sense as “something that isn’t true” or “something that doesn’t represent the facts”. “Myth” in the original sense means a “sacred story” that makes sense in a specific society in order to create a sense of belonging, assigning a role to individuals, giving the events of life and death a meaning and so on.
It doesn’t claim to be factually true, so it often isn’t. But nevertheless, it often carries memories of actual historical facts. What is called ancient myth is not something created deliberately, but something that has grown organically in a society, just by being told time and time again, and also being interwoven with events of life, like certain rituals, artwork, and so on.
Read this essay for more thoughts about what myth is.
Ven. Ñāṇavīra:
RŪPA
In the Kevaddhasutta (Dīgha i,11 <D.i,223>), it is said that the question ‘Where do the four mahābhūtā finally cease?’ is wrongly asked, and that the question should be ‘Where do [the four mahābhūtā] get no footing? Where do nāma and rūpa finally cease?’ Matter or substance (rūpa) is essentially inertia or resistance (see Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>[9]), or as the four mahābhūtā it can be regarded as four kinds of behaviour (i.e. the four primary patterns of inertia—see NĀMA). Behaviour (or inertia) is independent of the particular sense-experience that happens to be exhibiting it…
…
In itself, purely as inertia or behaviour, matter cannot be said to exist. (Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 212.) And if it cannot be said to exist it cannot be said to cease. Thus the question ‘Where do the four mahābhūtā finally cease?’ is improper. (The question will have been asked with the notion in mind of an existing general material world common to all. Such a general world could only exist—and cease—if there were a general consciousness common to all. But this is a contradiction, since consciousness and individuality [see SAKKĀYA] are one.) But behaviour can get a footing in existence by being present in some form. As rūpa in nāmarūpa, the four mahābhūtā get a borrowed existence as the behaviour of appearance (just as feeling, perception, and intentions, get a borrowed substance as the appearance of behaviour). And nāmarūpa is the condition for viññāna as viññāna is for nāmarūpa. When viññāna (q.v.) is anidassana it is said to have ceased (since avijjā has ceased). Thus, with cessation of viññāna there is cessation of nāmarūpa, and the four mahābhūtā no longer get a footing in existence. (The passage at Salāyatana Samyutta xix,8 <S.iv,192>, …bhikkhu catunnam mahābhūtānam samudayañ ca atthagamañ ca yathābhūtam pajānāti, (‘…a monk understands as they really are the arising and ceasing of the four great entities’) is to be understood in this sense.)
Consciousness (viññāna) can be thought of as the presence of a phenomenon, which consists of nāma and rūpa. Nāmarūpa and viññāna together constitute the phenomenon ‘in person’—i.e. an experience (in German: Erlebnis). The phenomenon is the support (ārammana—see first reference in [c] below) of consciousness, and all consciousness is consciousness of something (viz, of a phenomenon). Just as there cannot be presence without something that is present, so there cannot be something without its being to that extent present—thus viññāna and nāmarūpa depend on each other (see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §17). ‘To be’ and ‘to be present’ are the same thing.[a] But note that ‘being’ as bhava, involves the existence of the (illusory) subject, and with cessation of the conceit (concept) ‘(I) am’, asmimāna, there is cessation of being, bhavanirodha. With the arahat, there is just presence of the phenomenon (‘This is present’), instead of the presence (or existence) of an apparent ‘subject’ to whom there is present an ‘object’ (‘I am, and this is present to [or for] me’, i.e. [what appears to be] the subject is present [‘I am’], the object is present [‘this is’], and the object concerns or ‘belongs to’ the subject [the object is ‘for me’ or ‘mine’]—see PHASSA & ATTĀ); and consciousness is then said to be anidassana, ‘non-indicative’ (i.e. not pointing to the presence of a ‘subject’), or niruddha, ‘ceased’ (see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §22). Viññānanirodha refers indifferently to anidassana viññāna (saupādisesa nibbānadhātu, which refers to the living arahat: Itivuttaka II,ii,7 <Iti.38>[12]) and to cessation, at the arahat’s death, of all consciousness whatsoever (anupādisesa nibbānadhātu).[b] Viññānanirodha, strictly speaking, is cessation of viññān’upādānakkhandha as bhavanirodha is cessation of pañc’upādānakkhandhā (i.e. sakkāyanirodha), but it is extended to cover the final cessation of viññānakkhandha (and therefore of pañcakkhandhā) at the breaking up of the arahat’s body.
Well, so did Sunakhatta! His main criticism of the Buddha was
MN12
The recluse Gotama teaches a Dhamma merely hammered out by reasoning, following his own line of inquiry as it occurs to him
… and he longed for the mystical and esoterical…
DN24
the Buddha never performs any superhuman demonstrations of psychic power for me
…
the Buddha never describes the origin of the world to me.
… so much so that he found the dazzling practices of other mystics far more satisfying (DN24).
… And in spite of the Buddha explaining to him why and how attachment to the senses must be given up(MN105) as well as the ways in which the doctrines of other mystics and teachers were wrong (DN24) and despite Sunakhatta knowing and admitting that the Buddha’s rational enquiry approach was successful in the complete destruction of suffering (MN12), Sunakhatta…
left this teaching and training, like someone on the highway to hell.
The Buddha’s approach as described in the EBT is primarily rational enquiry (MN60). While Faith is one of the initial qualities one should have, Wisdom must necessarily be developed by knowing and seeing for oneself.
It is primarily the later traditions that contain transcendent, mystical and esoteric teachings - in suttas which are most likely ‘inauthentic’.
Those who read and translate the EBT are monastics and serious practitioners who have put in decades of effort. Preservation and factual presentation of the teachings of the actual historical Buddha is their only agenda. 
Thank you very much !
Thanks you very much. Much appreciated.
At some time i felt an urge to be as close as possible to the original teachings of the Buddha. Because it all became confusing. One teachers says this. Another that. I think we all know this.
Then i started to study the Pali Canon, also some abhidhamma and parts that are considered non- canonical here.
I have never felt they are exclusively rational (i do not suggest that you say that) but i agree with you that a rational sphere is quit dominant in the sutta’s. I think this is due to inclinations of the people who composed the canon. I do not see the Buddha like this.
Yes, i can see how the Buddha makes use of our love for conceiving. Our obsession with it.
He skillfully makes use of this wrong habit. It has no relation at all to purity and the Noble Path, i believe. It can at best pave the Path.
I believe the Buddha knew that the mind is fond of conceiving, delights in conceiving, but in the end it gets also lost in conceiving. And that is the main message of the Buddha. Conceiving is a disease.
The kind of knowledge that relates to conceiving is never true and direct knowledge.
One tends to believe that what one conceives is true and real and Buddha makes use of this, but in the end you have to break through it, right?
To see Nibbana as extinguishment is, i believe, conceiving Nibbana. I do not consider this yet as real knowledge of Nibbana.
wish you well
You are of course free to see the Buddha in the way that’s most helpful for you. 
I am not speaking of experience here. It’s simply what the word means. 
The sutta’s are very clear that Dhamma is beyond mere reasoning, it is deep, and can only be experienced by the wise. Are the wise the rationalist? Yes, they believe they are:-) They are not.
That’s my conclusion. I leave it at that.
Thank you 
I’m not sure that it’s right to identify consciousness with Nirvana. Maybe some strains of Buddhist thought felt that Nirvana was not simply winking out of existence, that it was “somewhere” outside of the round of rebirth. In which case, the consciousness that “goes there” would be a special kind of consciousness, I suppose. We certainly see these sorts of ideas in early Mahayana texts, which assert that buddhas continue to “exist” in a noumenal sort of way, and that arhats actually become buddhas eventually. That sounds to me like a direct commentary on the concept of Nirvana, saying that it was not literally cessation but departure from existence.
On the other hand, it’s probably a little tone deaf to take those assertions literally. There was an effort to explain how buddhas arise and what their relationship to existence was. If their mission was Nirvana, why arise at all? And when no buddha exists in the world, why does a new one come to be? So, a noumenal buddha was conceived, which seems very Platonic to me. The noumenal buddha was a perfect form that doesn’t exist in the world but is the model for buddhas that do. Buddha nature is like that, too, but it’s immanent in sentient beings rather than being an otherworldly principle. But it still explains how buddhas arise.
I think the problem for early Buddhists was that they rejected the idea of a heaven where liberated people go like in other traditions. The afterlife became 100% not a place where liberation happens. But they did have a state of liberation that a person entered, which they didn’t want to be considered a place in another life. So, we find them talking about Nirvana as though it were a blissful place like a heaven, but they denied that it was when pressed on it. On the other hand, they also tried to tamp down talk of arhats ceasing to exist, too. It’s strange compared to other religious traditions.
Was this concept of Nirvana really the original one? I wonder sometimes. It sounds like it may have been a positive thing, and then it was changed to avoid the assertion. Jains have a heaven for liberated people, and Buddhists have the pure abodes, which is a heaven for the liberated-in-waiting. It kind points to something for me, but whatever it was, it’s lost to the mists of time.
When I read these various accounts on the topic that exist today, though, it seems that the problem for Buddhists revolved around trying avoid the absolutist logic that drove endless debates on the subject of the afterlife among other traditions. Buddhists didn’t exist in a cultural vacuum, after all. They had to deal with these other people who’d try to argue with them about this or that idea. Buddhists wanted to avoid getting wrapped up in an ideological mentality that leads to divisive arguments. So, there was a more practical reason for Nirvana becoming a blissful-yet-undefined sort of nihilistic form of liberation. IMHO, at least it was to exit stage right from the debate stage. So, then I wonder if they once had a positive view of Nirvana that they forgot after a long time trying to avoid arguing about it.
I think they often are describing similar experiences from different cultural and historical perspectives. And we all live in the same kind of world with other humans, so they discover similar answers to the same perennial problems if they are clear thinking. The ideologue will always claim their way is best, but really its another way in the world.
-*When those discourses spoken by the Tathagata that are deep, deep in meaning, supramundane, dealing with emptiness, are being recited they will not be eager to listen to them, nor lend an ear to them, nor apply their minds to understand them; and they will not think those teachings should *
be studied and mastered (SN20.7, Bodhi))
Is this not what is actually happening?
There is nothing that is allowed to be deep, deep in meaning, nothing supramundane is allowed, even while the texts also distinguish between the noble path and mundane noble path still based upon defilements (MN117). There are more clues, many, but it is all washed away by the force of intellect and reasoning. But why? Why is it so important that there no deep meaning in Dhamma?
No, he longed for the demonstration of special abilities and that is something completely different then longing for the mystical and esoteric.
And ‘longing for the mystical and esoteric’ is also not the issue. The issue is that many long to hammer out with reasoning and study a Dhamma that is seemingly consistent in their head. Like a puzzle in which the pieces nicely fit. But the problem is, ofcourse, there are many different puzzles and there are many who claim they have the right Dhamma-puzzle. This is how Sangha’s become divided.
Because they feel this dhamma puzzle is the real Dhamma.
If we are honest we can all see and understand this Dhamma understanding is nothing else but a system of thoughts, the fetter of views, the love for ideas. It is all about grip and not about letting go. It is all about conceiving, not about direct nor true knowledge.
Dhamma is about letting go but who lets go of a thought-system in which so many time and energy is invested and is even considered to be the true understanding? I understand the need for consistency, for clarity in thoughts, but this need is part of tanha and avijja. It is part of the problem we must solve. Not by endlessly making a puzzle, reasoning, hammering things out, but by seeing what we are doing. We are involved in the sankhara khandha. Slaves of tanha and avijja. That is the real seeing and real deal. And if we are honest to ourselves we really admit that we are all the time involved in sankhara khandha, love it, do not see the problem, we love conceiving. Well, then, i feel, we skipped some crucial lessons, right?
In the formless dimensions there is no rūpa present, that’s literally what the name says. But they are still dependent on rūpa. How? The rūpa of the past. In order to get in such states you have to meditate and to develop the rūpa jhanas beforehand. So they are independent of present rūpa but dependent on past rūpa. In other words, they are a state of a temporary suspension of rūpa.
Perhaps you might use an analogy of gravity. If I hold up a ball, it is suspended for a time in the air, but it is still attracted by the force of gravity and dependent on the strength of my arm. But if I throw it far enough, like super duper high, it will go into orbit. There it might “remain for many years without returning” (which is a direct quote from snp5.7:5.1). But it is still subject to the law of gravity, it is in fact falling all the time, and eventually will crash back to earth.
The qualifier “this” is misleading. No jhana intrinsically requires a sense of “I or me”. That’s why the Buddha and arahants keep practicing them. But if one has a sense of “I or me” then one will see the jhana in that light, regardless of what kind of state it is.
I’m afraid he’s wrong.
The text speaks of the “cessation of consciousness”, just like any number of other Buddhist texts, and says nothing of it being “unconditioned”, yet you have ended up in a place where you are trying to understand the persistence of an unconditioned consciousness, literally the exact opposite of what it says.
Don’t equate “deep” with “esoteric”. The teachings of the Vedic traditions are highly esoteric (“for the gods love hidden things”), but the Buddha argued that they hide shallowness behind pseudo-profundity. One of the Buddha’s most salient teaching characteristics was to reject esotericism in favor of plain speech. Translators translate in that way because that is the kind of texts they are.
Venerable, perhaps the text uses the term “consciousness” with two different meanings (once to speak of nibbana, a second time to speak of a samsaric consciousness)?
However, I have to say that I also find this interpretation a little strange. But it doesn’t seem so absurd to me if we take into account this passage from MN 49 speaking of a consciousness without surface beyond its 6 senses (thus including beyond the mind), the “All”:
“‘Consciousness without surface,
endless, radiant all around,
has not been experienced through the earthness of earth… the liquidity of liquid… the fieriness of fire… the windiness of wind… the allness of the all.’9
Ven. Analayo questions the authenticity of this passage, but I’m not personally convinced by his arguments.
Nope. There’s simply no textual support for this idea. The consciousness it speaks of is a kind of meditation attainment, it has nothing to do with Nibbana.
Take a step back. Is it really plausible that the Buddha would have concealed his true meaning, and only hinted at it in discussions that have a strongly Brahmanic context, requiring the student to know these specific passages and to interpret them in this esoteric sense? If all he was doing was agreeing with the Upanishads, then why not say that? The Upanishads are able to state their meaning plainly enough.
Or would he have said exactly what he means in plain language hundreds of times?
It’s textually ambiguous, but I think in that case the speech is that of Brahma, not the Buddha.
Actually for me the suttas speak of two perennial views. sassatavada and ucchedavada.
EBTs, such as the four principal Nikayas/Agamas, in history can be identified as either essential teachings (such as knowing-seeing the four noble truths, the notion of anicca, dukkha, anatta, and the middle way) or non-essential teachings (such as adaptations of Vedic religious myths) of Early Buddhism. But the texts are just texts, some edited or collected early, some later.