SuttaCentral
By coincidence I just happened to watch this the other day. I love the perspective it offers on dhamma. Dhamma as a tool to understanding things the way they truly are 
This is addressed in the first few minutes of the talk.
SN35.160-1 Samadhi and Solitude for Self-awakening: talk by Piya Tan
Iâm afraid there is nothing simple about it. Attempts so far have failed to show that there is a consistent logic behind the usage of manas, citta, and vinnana in the suttas - sometimes they mean similar phenonema, sometimes different, whereas citta and vinnana seem closer to each other than manas.
I think there is a similar ambiguity in the usage of the English words/concepts mind and consciousness except that we have the advantage of modern philosophy, linguistics, etc to hone in on more defined usable meanings. With Pali we are dealing with a dead thought world.
But all Iâm doing is playing at apologetics by showing that there is leeway to chuck pretty much anything I want into the range of manayatana since dhamma is such a potentially broad category. In other words, it is perfectly conceivable that anything that can be experienced that does not partake of the first 5 sensory-fields would have been included under the sensory-field of the mind by the Buddha. It isnât necessarily the case that this is so but it might still be the case.
Besides, there is one sutta I can cite which suggests that if the discourses on the 6 sense spheres and those on the arupas are not coming from two different schools of thought or one muddled thinker then the arupas must fall under the domain of manayatana.
At Savatthi. âBhikkhus, I will teach you the all. Listen to thatâŠ.
âAnd what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all.
âIf anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: âHaving rejected this all, I shall make known another allââthat would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.â - SN 35.23
Somaratne writes here (p.185) that manas and vinnana are being âperfumed by cittaâ - as maddeningly poetic this is where weâd hope for clarity Iâm afraid this really gets as concrete as the suttas are.
I tend to see the suttas as being at times pretty loosey-goosey with terminology. Presumably because that terminology was already being used in a rough, perhaps semi-nebulous, manner, or because the Buddha or the compilers didnât see any need to be too analytical or rigorous in defining their terms, or both.
I donât pretend to have a solution for that (because the suttas donât), but understanding ayatana as locus of experience we cannot assume either that ayatanas are like babushkas: an ayatana within an ayatana within an ayatana. Nowhere do the suttas say that the endless-space-ayatana is within manayatana. A more simple reading (to me at least) is that leaving the salayatana results in reaching the ÄkÄsÄnañcÄyatana.
Iâm not saying their is some babushka hierarchy of ayatanas going on, just that words can be used in different ways. If I said that a football field was in my field of vision that would make perfect sense but I wouldnât usually speak that way. Instead Iâd say I was at a football field and it would be implied that the football field was in my visual field, assuming the person I was talking to knew I wasnât blind. I can imagine that it is similarly implied that if someone says they had been dwelling in ÄkÄsÄnañcÄyatana that they were having a kind of purely mental experience, that they were in contact with some dhamma via manayatana.
And again Iâd refer to the sutta above to suggest that the simpler reading is to include ÄkÄsÄnañcÄyatana within manayatana unless we assume that the suttas on the arupas and those on the six sense spheres come from different authors or one muddle-minded author.
When it comes to the ayatanas and manas-citta-vinnana there is indeed a lot we donât know, either because of loose ancient concepts, lacking transmission or different interpretations on the way.
At least for ayatana itâs safe to say that itâs more specific than just âfieldâ. Please see Gondaâs detailed treatment of the pre-Buddhist ayatana here. Unfortunately the Buddhist understanding of it is very crude. âFieldâ is already better than the meaningless âbaseâ. What is missing is that ayatana is a home-field, the center of my experience, where I rest and eat (in Buddhism of course metaphorically). The place I return to after a venture (to the objects).
That would mean that I donât observe an ayatana (like I could observe a field). Rather from an ayatana I observe the respective object.
Where did I say that ?
And the rest ?
My simple question to your cryptic answer is:
âDo you believe in existence after deathâ ?
And please, donât give me that annihilationism vs. eternalism stuff as a counterproff. I have already covered that. And we are not talking about the âworldâ (SN 35.82) here, anymore.
I donât know about âpure consciousnessâ ; but consciousness does take a lot of different substances, while âtravellingâ paticcasamuppada. And it has very little to do with a spiritual atta.
And consciousness is not circumbscribed to the âworldâ. Buddhism is not anglo sensationalistic empiricism. Might you want it desperately to be so.
Consciousness is âIâ; I am conscious (it could be nothing else). My stream of consciousness seems permanent, but actually upon close inspection and greater samadhi, cracks appear, and arising and passing away is discerned; there is no stream of consciousness and nor any other kind of âstreamâ. Heraclitus the greek philosopher said âyou cannot get into the same rive twiceâ, and he was hinting at not-self here, but of rivers!
with metta
Thatâs great to point out to deepen our understanding of Äyatana.
I think Bhikkhu Sujato has been translating Äyatana as âdimensionâ, at least in the samÄpattiâs. While thatâs probably better than âfieldâ; it doesnât quite capture this other aspect youâve highlighted (maybe âbaseâ is more to your point). Of course, translation is hard, and I personally canât think of any word or phrase that would clearly bring all this meaning together.
Why would it be better,?
Field is closer to the oecumenical philosophical concept of âgroundâ, which seems to apply to ayatana.
And people will understand better âfieldâ, than âgroundâ.
Really ?
There has never been an accurate translation of the fifth jhana in MN 59.
It looks like taboo among the empiricists.
Better to have these uncomprehensible translations.
While it should be the following (see the lexical notes at the end of the latter link) :
- sabbaso rĆ«pasaññÄnaáč samatikkamÄ,
- paáčighasaññÄnaáč atthaáč gamÄ,
- nÄnattasaññÄnaáč amanasikÄrÄ
- âananto ÄkÄsoâti
ÄkÄsÄnañcÄyatanaáč upasampajja viharati.
- with the complete overstepping of perceptions of form (matter),
- with the vanishing of perceptions (based) upon the organs of senses (viz. ajjhattikÄni ÄyatanÄni [including mano]),
- not striving with the mind (manasa/mano) to perceptions of manifoldness (lit. (what is) differently than one),
- aware that âspace is boundless,â
he attains and seizes distinctively, the field of boundless space.
The latter shows experiences out of matter and the sensory world.
With no Buddhist âIâ (asmiâti); but still with Buddhist consciousness (viññÄáča).
Right view is the âFour Noble Truthsâ: the only line of thought compatible with the most refined states of phenomenal cognition. Aj Thanissaroâs rendering of âStressâ is useful in this third definition.
With the successive development of Right View, the path successively unfolds: to attain itâs successive development, the path has to develop as support. In one instance either one is the result of the other, in another instance it is the cause of the other. Hence clarity and skillfulness go hand in hand, ie. samadhi and punna need to develop as occasions present: either one sharpening-up the other.
Trying to see no-self begs the question of who or what is looking. In the perception of endless transience and stress, the complete absence of any unchanging eternal identity may be noted: simply a fresh identity corresponding to each successive observation. In D.O., contact with, or cognition of, an object results in the arising of a feeling. If attention turns to this feeling, it is understood to be a bodily sensation. Thus identity with the initial object wonât arise, though identity with the body may well do so: in which case Stress continues, and the whole tangle of Samsara ensues.
Since this happens unknowingly, the âunbindingâ is simply making this very unknowing fully knowable.
There is no problem if there is an understanding of the âconventionalâ use of words like âIâ, âmeâ and âmineâ.
Experiences arise and cease - there is nothing carried over from one experience to the next. Memory is a re-presentation of events that have ceased to exist. The re-presentation process is also impermanent - much is forgottten.
Through identification with and attachment to memories a personal story is created.
Not-self is realised in the stilling of all formations that includes the (vanishing) of the sense of self then, the sense of self (reappears).
There are perceptions and thoughts about cessation (after) the sense of self returns.
The ideas about emptiness that arise after the stilling of formations are not based on conjecture. There is a clearer understanding of the process of letting go.
What is thought about not-self is also not-self - not-self cannot be reduced to a perception or a cognition or anything at all.
Thinking about the ânonexistenceâ of an imaginary thing - like a flying spaghetti-monster - takes place in the stream of experience.
Thinking about the absence of something - that has ceased to exist - happens in the stream of experience.
The realisation of emptiness takes place when the stream of experience discontinues - it stops.
That which can be known is what is involved in letting-go and, there is the realisation of emptiness when the process of letting-go reaches its natural conclusion.
When it comes to inquiry into the absence of a âattaâ it can be problematic to refer to a subject who is a âdoerâ - a witness, a receiver and, owner of experience.
It might be useful to broaden our reflection on the âstream of consciousnessâ.
âA âriverâ or a âstreamâ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.â - William James
In the link below, the 3rd of the (five characters in thought) i.e. âWithin each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly continuousâ there is an interesting reflection.
Not an unconditioned something - or other. Nibbana is not-conditioned, not-born. That which is phenomenal comes into and goes out of existence. Phenomena makes its appearence and is sustained by supportive conditions and, when the supportive conditions disappear things vanish.
I donât see the interest in that moment to moment stuff in Buddhism. It adds absolutely nothing to the comprehension of the Teaching. Moreover:
There is not a âreturn" of the sense of selfâ.
This is not what the suttas says.
SN 22.47 says:
SC 2.1-2
Thus this way of regarding things (viz. âthis is mineâ/âI am thisâ), and the notion âI amâ (âasmÄ«âti) have not vanished in him.
Again Bhikkhus, as âI amâ has not disappeared, there is a coming down of the five (internal) fields of sensory experience.
âAsmÄ«âti kho pana, bhikkhave, avigate pañcannaáč indriyÄnaáč avakkanti hoti.
Note tha SA 63 only mentions the âthis is mineâ; not the âI amâ.
But anyway, if there is âthis is mineâ, there is also the âI amâ.
https://justpaste.it/vyhx
Important note:
The only real parallel in these 3 texts, is 1. the speculation about the self, in relation to the five aggregates of âclingingâ (appropriated khandhas) - 2. the âthis is mineâ view - and 3., the consequential descent of the fields of sensory experience (into these khandhas). Id est âsensory actualisationâ.
It is not the self that exists or not - It is the khandhas.
One cannot say I will exist, or I will not exist - because it is not the self that exists, but the khandhas.
The self is elswhere to be found. It does not have to exist or not to exist (to live, or to die).
The self is not supposed to die.
IndriyÄnaáč avakkanti
Avakkanti: coming down into.
Avakkamati [ava + kamati, frïŒkram]
. to enterïŒgo intoïŒto fall into.
Ava= down
Kamati [fr. â à€à„à€°à€źà„ kram] = to plunge intoïŒto enter into.
The kind of people from your page at SexoJimboPedia
Wicca buddhism now ?
And âattentional blinkâ(an attempt as a unified theory) , has nothing to do with experiencing one mental event at a time ; but just about choosing one phenomena over another.
Dear Buddha, where are we heading to ?
When I practice this, it is generally in the context of anapanasati.
Basically, I reflect that any of the phenomena related to the sixteen steps are not mine, no a self, not permanent and not under my control and work to release any sense of control or grasping towards them.
It is not easy.
The only âthingâ that carries over from one moment of consciousness to another is the latency of bodily sensation. If perception is slowed down sufficiently this may be noticed and a sense of emptiness realised, otherwise a sense of identity along with perception will continue.
Anatta is a characteristic of phenomena, the phenomena are directly observed and the characteristics become apparent. If Dukkha and Anicca are followed sufficiently clearly for a sufficient sequence or duration of time, Anatta becomes clear as an unsubstantial characteristic of the given currently running event. This includes any sense of identity.
Buddhaâs teaching of wrong questions and wrongly expressed questions is worth looking into in this respect.
Sorry to butt in into this late, but I just wanted to address this claim, since Iâve been reading about it lately:
There was a discussion on this on dhammawheel about the idea that annihilationsm is more acceptable than eternalism. Anyway, Analayo is quoted as saying there is a subtle distinction between the acceptable and unacceptable âannihilationstâ views:
The decisive shift of perspective that is required to really transcend becoming can better be appreciated after taking a closer look at an aspiration that a discourse in the Sayuttanikaya presents as the expression of an annihilationist view, uccheda-diâŠhi (SN III 99). This aspiration reads: âmay I not be, may it not be for me, I shall not be and it will not be for meâ, no câ assa, no ca me siya, na bhavissami, na me bhavissati. The Sayutta-nikaya discourse points out that this aspiration is rooted in ignorance and an expression of craving.
A discourse in the A#guttara-nikaya, however, reckons this type of aspiration as the supreme among heterodox views, agga bahirakana diâŠhigatana (AN V 63). The reason for this comparatively favourable assessment in the A#guttara-nikaya discourse may well be that a somewhat similar maxim was employed in Buddhist circles, with a small but decisive difference. The modified mode of this aspiration reads âmay it not be, may it not be for me, it shall not be, and it will not be for meâ, no câassa, no ca me siya, na bhavissati, na me bhavissati (MN II 24; SN III 55; AN IV, 70; Ud 78). By replacing the
first person formulation in the verb forms with the third person, the need to go beyond the self-notion implicit in the annihilationist
approach becomes apparent.
In other words, saying âI wonât existâ is unequivocally wrong view and is hazardous because it involves identity with the aggregates âe.g., 'I am my body, so when my body dies, I am annihilated," or something like that. On the other hand, saying âIt might not be, and it might not be mineâ isnât quite right, but could be a basis for non-return, as shown in SN 22.5. In the latter case, you see the 3 characteristics in the aggregates and consequently do not self-identify with them.
I think âI wonât existâ is bad because for someone who really believes that, thereâs no motivation to get out of samsara; âwho careâs what happens in the future? I wonât exist then anywayâ.
But if someone takes a more skeptical stance, it makes more sense to practice. If you donât know whatâs going to happen, it makes a lot of sense to let go of the khandas in the case they turn out to be bad.
Or at least that makes sense to my mind 
Good points. Iâd also add that a related downside to saying âI wonât exist in the futureâ is that it could lead to moral apathy, since, if you cease to exist, you can no longer experience consequences of past kamma.
You know, on second thought, I question whether Ven Analayoâs claim holds up to scrutiny. In AN 10.29/AN v 59, Buddha says the least bad wrong view is the annihilationist view w/ first person pronouns:
âBhikkhus, of the speculative views held by outsiders, this is the foremost, namely: âI might not be and it might not be mine; I shall not be, and it will not be mine.â For it can be expected that one who holds such a view will not be unrepelled by existence and will not be repelled by the cessation of existence. There are beings who hold such a view. But even for beings who hold such a view there is alteration; there is change. Seeing this thus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with it; being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate toward the foremost, not to speak of what is inferior.
Iâm curious how the Chinese parallel reads here.
EDIT: I think I was misunderstanding Ven Analayoâs claim (here is his original article). I think he acknowledges that AN 10.29 (what he calls A. V. 63) is worded w/ 1st person pronouns, but suggests that the version w/ 3rd person pronouns was popular in Buddhist circles. Meh, somehow this seems very speculative.
I think the 8FP is the most practical suggestionâŠperhaps even itâs presentation as the 10FP (in the Anguttara I think).
Also, I would recommend reading Mindfulness, Bliss and Beyond a couple times and then The Art of Disappearing in order to get:
A reflective/intellectual understanding of the how toâŠ
A reflective/intellectual understanding of a particular window-into/View of Anatta and how to percieve it in daily life so that it is of use to you.
My View/Perception is based in accepting a couple of things:
The Buddha was Awakened and this is something very much out of the ordinary.
The last factor of the 8FP is synonymous with Jhanas and higher states of mind.
And thus I accept (and practise accordingly) towards achieving Jhanas by laying the foundations for what causes them - the purification of virtue & view and samadhi. And I have accepted that this is a gradual process (with some nice, interesting, useful short term gains along the way).
To me this process involves a few possible ways of
One continues merrily letting go of various aspects of the 5 Khandas as one progresses through the Jhanas so that when one emerges from them one notices, with oneâs incredibly powerful and clear mind: âgosh, parts of myself were completely absent for long periods of timeâŠgoodness me, I can now finally, fully, clearly see that and understand forever that âIâ am not a fixed entityâŠIâm process that can unravel.â
One emerges from a lofty Jhana state and goes about oneâs business in a manner which is infused with having been in that state: i.e. very loving, very peaceful, very clear⊠And as one goes about oneâs business with this extraordinary mindfulness one (due to oneâs previous conditioning/kamma making of practising the 8FP and conditioning oneâs mind with a particular view/perception) one may âsee/perceive/viewâ the Dhamma fully at some point.
I really do recommend that book, though. And wellâŠa bunch of Sutta reading tooâŠ
Sorry if my answer doesnât help. My Practise is heavily influenced by the views Iâve found to ring true and have tested out (as far as I am currently able to) in terms of their usefulness. Itâs possible your views are different and you may not find any resonance or rationality in what Iâve said. Which is cool.
I havenât read the entire thread, so Iâm not sure if this is the case or not⊠But anywayâŠhereâs my two cents!
OhâŠI want to add, as I perceive and have reflectively accepted itâŠbut also as Iâve - to a limited degree - experienced it⊠To âdirectlyâ observe a thing, whether anatta or whatever, is to be in it. To experience it - experientially, emotionally.
A bit like eating oneâs head. But of course you canât because youâre doing/cetana-ing two things at once: getting your head in the right position (letâs just pretend you can) and then making your mouth eat itself from the inside (huhâŠmaybe you can!)âŠ
My point (!) is that one doesnât directly experience anatta and understand that one has done so, at the same time. One directly experiences it, and then one understands one has done so. Because consciousness is only aware of one thing at a time.
Like I said, Iâve not read the whole threadâŠso apologies for any repetition!
EDIT: Oh and just to addâŠthese are just reflectionsâŠintellectual perceptions in the most part⊠Iâm very ordinary ⊠lolâŠwhich is cool.