Per the Nibbedhika Sutta, kamma is defined by intention (cetanā). Reflecting this, unlike Jain ascetics, Buddhist monks conventionally do not sweep the ground to avoid killing insects (as the unintentional killing of insects is not seen as an offense due to the lack of intention to kill).
A somewhat analogous example would be unintentionally killing human pedestrians while driving one’s car. Interpreting purely from early Buddhist texts (and not modern legal interpretation), would this be seen as an offense or an unskillful action? Is this dependent on whether this is the result of intoxication or other impairment?
Because I have been acculturated with a modern, Western ethical understanding, my intuition is that negligent homicide due to DUI is particularly heinous. However, because a modernized, Westernized ethical intuition can be contrary to a Buddhistic understanding of śīla, I wanted to hear how a purely Pali Canon-based interpretation of those actions would be.
What are your thoughts? Are there any texts that would be helpful for interpreting this?
Here are my thoughts about it. If I’m driving and paying attention, obeying speed and rules of the road and a person suddenly walks out in front of my car and is killed, I should generate compassion for the person and the family and friends they left behind. But if it actually wasn’t due to any fault or intentional action on my part, I don’t think it would be right or good for myself to take on guilt or shame. Kamma is intentional action, so the compassion would be the only kamma being generated.
But the Dhamma is pretty clear that consuming alcohol to the point of being negligent is breaking a basic precept. So the above scenario playing out with me under the influence of alcohol might or might not be a factor. If I had zero reaction time before my car struck the person, it would make no difference whether I was sober or had alcohol in my system. But situations are not always so easy to decide if I had reaction time or not! Being under the influence of mind altering substances alters perceptions. So I might think I had no reaction time when i actually did. That would fall under delusion. So the best course of action would be to live blamelessly, skip the bad kamma and stick with good kamma.
Just a thought if I may jump in here…we often tend to take our own intentions into account, while judging others on their actions, alone. Would this fall under delusion?
Welcome to the D&D forum! We hope you enjoy the various resources, FAQs, and previous threads. We encourage you to use the search function for topics and keywords you are interested in.
We also ask you to please take a moment now to familiarize yourself with the Forum Guidelines. May some of these resources be of assistance along the path.
If you have any questions or need further clarification regarding anything, feel free to contact the moderators by including @moderators in your post or a PM.
You might be interested in reading the Vinaya rule on this pli-tv-bu-vb-pj3
An example that is commonly given to monastics learning this rule is something like the following.
A young monastic has a grievance with the dhamma master and decides that they are going to kill them. Later that day, at the time they planned ot shoot the dhamma master the dhamma master and the vinaya master are walking together. The young monastic shoots the gun, aiming at the dhamma master, but hits the vinaya master who dies. Is this still a parajika? No. It’s a thulacaya. The young monastic is still ordained!
Really interesting. It’s still a really serious offence and one of pretty awful ethical intention and very serious result. This is how the vinaya sees this.
@Pasanna That’s a very interesting and relevant example, thank you! Do you know if it appears in any formally written part of the vinaya or a commentary thereof?
That makes a lot of sense and seems to fall in line with the texts. However, it is difficult to reconcile with cases involving the influence of intoxicants.
If someone becomes intoxicated and becomes physically violent, it is easy to see that there is still dosa and cetanā underlying their actions. However, in the case of DUI-involved homicide, there is not really impulsive intention to cause harm. Instead, the alcohol impairs motor and cognitive function, and the poor driving ability results in death. This seems more similar to the cases in the Manussaviggaha @Pasanna cites where “There’s no offense for one who isn’t aiming at death.” The alcohol consumption itself is a breech of conduct, but the negligent homicide would seem to fall outside the scope of what would be condemned as an offense.
(Of course, I do not drink personally. I am just trying to conceptualize how to interpret these cases in a Buddhistic ethical framework.)
This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being is best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be present for there to be the full offense.
1) Object: a human being, which according to the Vibhaṅga includes human fetuses as well, counting from the time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately after conception up to the time of death.
2) Intention: knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wanting to cause that person’s death. “Knowingly” also includes the factor of—
Perception: perceiving the person as a living being.
4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing that person to die.
5) Result: The life-faculty of the person is cut as the result of one’s act.
Thank you, I just meant in the specific example of the young monastic having a grievance with the dhamma master and the vinaya master. The segment of the Vinaya rule you mentioned also says “seek[ing] an instrument of death” constitutes a pārājika. Wouldn’t he have committed a pārājika just getting the gun (with the intention of killing)? Rather than thullaccaya.
The young monastic had a grievance with only the dhamma master, shooting the vinaya master was poor aim.
Seeking the instrument was only one of the five factors. They also need the intention to kill that specific person. A gun or a bow and arrow are both pretty much for killing, but think about the devadatta and the rock situation. A rock isn’t always a weapon, but could have killed either the Buddha or his attendant. If it had killed the Buddha’s attendant, when it was meant for the Buddha then this is what we would in modern times call manslaughter (apparently) in Australia.
You make me rethink my question, thank you! I (think) I meant judging only the result of others’ actions, without looking deeply enough to discern their apparent intentions.
Intoxicants have several possible effects that influence decision-making:
Disinhibition: They reduce behavioral restraints based on morality, social expectations, and fear of possible consequences.
Cognitive distortion: They promote biases and hinder discernment. The most drastic example is delusion, a fixed view incompatible with reality that does not change even in the face of contrary evidence.
Perceptual distortion: A person may have distorted sense-impressions or, in the case of hallucinations, may experience sensations not related to contact with external objects.
Lack of motor coordination: This may occur either through overstimulation or lethargy.
Dissociation: A person may completely alter their pattern of thought and behavior. This includes partial loss of awareness, a disconnection between perception, memory, and action, and alterations in memory, with difficulty recalling events that occurred during the episode.
Regarding kamma, the first three effects do not seem to impair the intentional component of actions, so a person would be fully responsible for actions performed under those conditions. However, some cases of perceptual distortion may cause confusion and lead to fatal outcomes without any intention involved—for example, someone whose vision or sense of distance is impaired due to a substance may cause an accident without intending to do so.
A lack of motor coordination makes it difficult to perform intentional actions and increases the likelihood of unintentional ones. Nevertheless, a person remains kammically responsible for whatever is successfully carried out with intention.
Dissociation is an extreme case, a very altered state of consciousness similar to what the texts describe as “madness” (ummāda). In such a state, the higher the level of dissociation, the less kammically responsible a person is for their actions.
Legally, intention is often used to assess a driver’s degree of responsibility. However, legal definitions vary widely and do not necessarily correspond to kammic responsibility.
Sure, but we are talking about the unintentional case, where there is not intent to kill. If there is not intent to kill, but a fatality results (e.g., due to sensory or motor impairments due to alcohol), is this an offense of conduct? The vinaya passage previously cited appears to suggest not (or, at least, not at the most severe tier).
Regarding intention, there are some legal concepts that can enrich this discussion. Analogies with kamma are imperfect, but still useful. These concepts may vary across jurisdictions. In my country, Brazil, there are various degrees of legal responsibility for a driver in the case of death:
Fortuitous case/inevitable accident: The driver did not contribute to the accident in any way (e.g., they were sober and followed all driving regulations), and therefore, they are not held responsible.
In the following cases, the subject’s actions were causally linked to the fatal outcome:
Involuntary manslaughter with unconscious negligence: The subject was unaware of the risks involved in their actions. There was no intention to kill, but there was negligence.
Involuntary manslaughter with conscious negligence: The subject was aware of the risks involved but mistakenly believed that it would not result in negative consequences (e.g., due to a miscalculation or excessive optimism). Here, there was no intention to kill, but there was self-deception, which is more serious than simple negligence.
Homicide with eventual intent: The subject was conscious of the risks involved, understood that negative consequences were likely, but still proceeded with the risky behavior. In this case, an indirect or conditional intention to kill is implied.
Without murderous intent, one is not kamically responsible for deaths. However, one is still responsible for impairing their mind’s functioning by voluntarily consuming intoxicants. Driving under the influence of intoxicants increases the likelihood of both unconscious and conscious negligence, for the reasons I mentioned in my previous answer.
I am focusing on a general discussion without direct reference to the Vinaya. Even if a monk does not incur severe penalties under the Vinaya, he would not be exempt from legal and social sanctions outside the Saṅgha.
Thank you. I appreciate the discussion, but this thread is meant for discussion under the Dhamma/Vinaya, disregarding legal discussion (which is somewhat arbitrary and varies greatly by geography), as mentioned in the first post.
