How should "Kaya" in MN 119 be interpreted?

It may be that I am using the term incorrectly. I am not a scholar like many here so let me say what I mean without it.

I believe that Ud 1.10 is saying that the “self” and “that” or “the world” exist in opposition to each other. We think of an organism as being separate and apart from its environment. In actuality, they are not really separate. They are atoms and molecules interacting with each other like they do everywhere else. We think of them as separate because an ever changing set of atoms and molecules appears to take pains to preserve “itself”.

I believe that this is mirrored in the internal six senses. We think of portions of consciousness as “self” and the rest as “that” or “the world”. When we cease to think of the everchanging set of portions as self, we just have the senses. They “collapse” into one another. In fact, they were never really separate. I think oneness is an apt term, but I will leave you to be the judge.

Kuan in the book mentioned above goes into an argument to support this notion of kaya as the six sense bases which I will try to summarize below. My own reasons for considering this initially were that in practice I naturally gravitated to stretching mindfulness to include all sense fields. It also seemed like it would be relevant to the Bahiya Sutta.

Kuan argues that kaya is used to mean consciousness of the six senses in the canon. Here is a representative quote.

As discussed in Chapter 2, in the Chapana Sutta of the Salayatana
Samyutta, kayagata sati functions as a post or pillar that restrains the six senses. In the Kimsuka Sutta of the Salayatana Samyutta (SN IV 194–195)the Buddha makes a simile about a frontier city with six gates. In this simile, as he explains, “the city” represents kaya; “the six gates” represents the six internal sense bases; “the gatekeeper” represents mindfulness. It is very clear that what mindfulness is concerned with is what is going on at the six gates. This is perhaps the import of kayagata sati or kayasati in the Salayatana Samyutta, and kaya in kayagata sati/kayasati probably refers to the same as kaya in the above simile, where the city with six gates implies that kaya has six senses. In his discussion of this simile, Harvey (1995: 116–117) says, “[T]he ‘town’ of the body has ‘six gates’, which thus means that it includes the mind-organ… ‘Body’, then, can include mental processes.”

He makes many arguments and it is hard to do them justice here, but this one seems persuasive to me anyway.

Kaya in SN12.2 = SA 298 means “classes” or “groups”:
Page 162 from The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (67.5 KB)

What do you think about the reply to cdpatton directly above?

To clarify further. In this oneness, would there be a centre? For example, we have a sense that we reside in our bodies and a feeling that we are centred somewhere there. In your view of oneness, would one feel as if one resides in the centre of this oneness?

I ask because this feeling of a centre has been equated to the conceit of I am; meaning that if there is a feeling of a centre of experience then one has not discarded the view I am.

There would be no center.

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Bhante @sujato discusses the meaning of kaya in his book “A Swift Pair of Messengers”. This is where I think I first read it and felt vindicated.

Kuan references the sutta from which the title of Bhante Sujatu book is derived. Bhante includes the same quote

The walls are part of the city (body) and they have six gates(internal sense bases) so the body includes the six sense bases. The gatekeeper(mindfulness) watches the six gates. I think it makes sense that mindfulness of the body encompasses them(the six gates).

Just wanted to jump in here to say that “identity view” is a terrible translation for sakkāyadiṭṭhi

It is so misleading and confusing and muddles up the overcoming of sakkāyadiṭṭhi with the anatta insight.

sakkāyadiṭṭhi is the first fetter, the absolute lowest bar, it very clearly means the (obviously false) belief that “truly I am simply my body”. A belief which is clearly inimicable with spiritual progress and violates the undeclared points.

It is irritating to see revisionist interpretations of it that make it more or less equivilent to the conciet fetter which is obviously a much more subtle thing.

SN22.89 shows how Ven. Khemaka describes the conceit of I am. The key part is in bold. He’s had the insight into anatta because he does not regard the aggregates as self. Nonetheless, he describes himself as still not being free from the conceit of I am.

“Please, Reverend Dāsaka, go to the mendicant Khemaka and say to him: ‘Reverend Khemaka, the seniors say that these five grasping aggregates have been taught by the Buddha, that is: the grasping aggregates of form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness. If, as it seems, Venerable Khemaka does not regard anything among these five grasping aggregates as self or as belonging to self, then he is a perfected one, with defilements ended.’”

“Yes, reverends,” replied Dāsaka. He relayed the message to Khemaka, who replied:

“These five grasping aggregates have been taught by the Buddha, that is: the grasping aggregates of form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness. I do not regard anything among these five grasping aggregates as self or as belonging to self, yet I am not a perfected one, with defilements ended. For when it comes to the five grasping aggregates I’m not rid of the conceit ‘I am’. But I don’t regard anything as ‘I am this’.”

Then Dāsaka went to those seniors and told them what had happened. They said:

“Please, Reverend Dāsaka, go to the mendicant Khemaka and say to him: ‘Reverend Khemaka, the seniors ask, when you say “I am”, what is it that you’re talking about? Is it form or apart from form? Is it feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, or apart from consciousness? When you say “I am”, what is it that you’re talking about?”

“Yes, reverends,” replied Dāsaka. He relayed the message to Khemaka, who replied:

“Enough, Reverend Dāsaka! What’s the point in running back and forth? Bring my staff, I’ll go to see the senior mendicants myself.”

Then Venerable Khemaka, leaning on a staff, went to those senior mendicants and exchanged greetings with them. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side. They said to him:

“Reverend Khemaka, when you say ‘I am’, what is it that you’re talking about? Is it form or apart from form? Is it feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, or apart from consciousness? When you say ‘I am’, what is it that you’re talking about?”

“Reverends, I don’t say ‘I am’ with reference to form, or apart from form. I don’t say ‘I am’ with reference to feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, or apart from consciousness. For when it comes to the five grasping aggregates I’m not rid of the conceit ‘I am’. But I don’t regard anything as ‘I am this’.

It’s like the scent of a blue water lily, or a pink or white lotus. Would it be right to say that the scent belongs to the petals or the stalk or the pistil?”

“No, reverend.”

“Then, reverends, how should it be said?”

“It would be right to say that the scent belongs to the flower.”

“In the same way, reverends, I don’t say ‘I am’ with reference to form, or apart from form. I don’t say ‘I am’ with reference to feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, or apart from consciousness. For when it comes to the five grasping aggregates I’m not rid of the conceit ‘I am’. But I don’t regard anything as ‘I am this’.

Although a noble disciple has given up the five lower fetters, they still have a lingering residue of the conceit ‘I am’, the desire ‘I am’, and the underlying tendency ‘I am’ which has not been eradicated. After some time they meditate observing rise and fall in the five grasping aggregates. ‘Such is form, such is the origin of form, such is the ending of form. Such is feeling … Such is perception … Such are choices … Such is consciousness, such is the origin of consciousness, such is the ending of consciousness.’ As they do so, that lingering residue is eradicated.

Suppose there was a cloth that was dirty and soiled, so the owners give it to a launderer. The launderer kneads it thoroughly with salt, lye, and cow dung, and rinses it in clear water. Although that cloth is clean and bright, it still has a lingering scent of salt, lye, or cow dung that had not been eradicated. The launderer returns it to its owners, who store it in a fragrant casket. And that lingering scent would be eradicated.

In the same way, although a noble disciple has given up the five lower fetters, they still have a lingering residue of the conceit ‘I am’, the desire ‘I am’, and the underlying tendency ‘I am’ which has not been eradicated. After some time they meditate observing rise and fall in the five grasping aggregates. ‘Such is form, such is the origin of form, such is the ending of form. Such is feeling … Such is perception … Such are choices … Such is consciousness, such is the origin of consciousness, such is the ending of consciousness.’ As they do so, that lingering residue is eradicated.”

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