"I declare ONLY suffering and its cessation." — The Buddha, indeed

Essays
82

I put “exist” in quotation marks for a reason. :slight_smile: Either way, in my understanding, views about the existence or nonexistence of rocks are irrelevant to understanding the Dhamma. Seeing the origination of suffering is understanding how craving leads to rebirth, and this has little to nothing to do with whether rocks really exist or not, regardless of how we interpret “exist”.

The bigger problem is that we thing we exist in some sense, as some sort of self (and likewise see a self in other beings). The (imagined) existence of rocks is not so relevant.

I understand “not conceiving” to mean not seeing a self in those things. That is the standard use of ‘conceiving’ in the Canon in contexts such as this. It doesn’t matter if you think the “seen” in some sense exists or not (or if you don’t have an opinion either way), as long as you don’t take it to be a self or owned by a self, and don’t take it to be permanent or happiness.

I am not much taken by Venerable Ñāṇananda’s phenomenological approach in general. I think he gets a lot of things wrong in his readings of the suttas, predominantly regarding Dependent Origination and particularly nāmarūpa. The Buddha was talking about some much more profound concepts. Whether you think rocks exists or you think they do not, you suffer much the same. Anyway, that takes us off topic.

:pray:

OK, but then you misunderstood my point, Bhante. In that case just substitute my earlier “chairs and rocks” with wavelengths, photons, mass, energy, and so forth, or with whatever external “stuff” may give rise to sensory input.

You can’t prove that nothing whatsoever exist outside of the observer, that is what I was saying. Also, that is a very unnatural assumption, as I explained. If there is nothing but our perception, who/what is the Buddha, what does “the word of another” even constitute? Did I make up the Dhamma “myself”? Does it all exist in my mind? Am I talking to “myself” right now in some self-constructed Matrix? It all makes much more sense if there is external “stuff”, whether it be chairs and rocks or just energy. (But again, my point being that all this doesn’t matter to the Buddha, as that’s not what he was on about. This sort of conjecture is like the leaves he left untouched in he canopy overhead.)

Also, you take the Buddha’s definition of “the world” to refer to the external world in some sense, even if misconceived or just existing in the mind. But, we sort of glossed over this earlier, ‘the world’ is defined as the six senses through which you perceive the world. That is, as the six sense “organs”, not (or at least not just) as the perceptions we have through them:

Whatever in the world through which you perceive the world and conceive the world is called the world in the training of the Noble One. And through what in the world do you perceive the world and conceive the world? Through the eye in the world you perceive the world and conceive the world. Through the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind in the world you perceive the world and conceive the world. (SN35.116)

So the “world” is not just our perceptoins, but that with which we perceive the world. It’s the six senses as “organs” of cognition. And these six senses arise when a being is born. They don’t arise moment by moment, like our perceptions of the world. So “the world” to the Buddha is the being.

That’s because it’s our personal existence that matters, not the existence (or nonexistence) of the external world. This, again, is the entire point behind the Buddha’s redefinition of “the world”, to bring us back from speculation about externals to what is actually important to end suffering.

This is also indirectly indicated in SN12.44:

If we base our reading of the discourse solely on the description of origination of “the world”, we might conclude the world originates when sense impressions and consciousness arise. This would give credence to interpretations where ‘the world’ is interpreted to be some deluded concepts or experiences of the external world. However, the last paragraphs which describe the disappearance of the world also include the arising of sense impressions and consciousness. So the difference between the world’s origination and its disappearance is not found in the first half (the bold part) of the paragraphs. It is only found in the second half, which describes the arising and ceasing of rebirth and existence as a result of craving. By ‘the world’ the Buddha therefore did not just mean subjective experiences, but also (if not primarily) the being who has the experiences. This “world” originates when the being is born and disappears when its existence completely ends.

When the Rohitassa sutta speaks about the origin and cessation of “the world”, it also means the being. The Buddha says, “I declare ‘the world’, its origin, its cessation, and the practice that makes its cease, with reference to this fathom-long body along with its mind and perception.” The origin of this fathim-long body with mind is rebirth, and its cessation is the end of personal existence. As another indication of what he’s on about, the practice that makes it cease, the eightfold path, surely refers to the being, not to the external world. To Rohitassa, the path to the end of the world exists in the external world. To the Buddha, that “world” doesn’t matter.

When the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta mentions the origination and cessation of the world, this is what it is on about as well: rebirth and its ending. Because the middle view between annihilationism and eternalism is not arrived at through understanding how “the world” would be a construct of the mind. It is by understanding how rebirth happens without a self, which is a completely different matter.

Of course, when the six senses cease, all perceptions of the external world cease alongside. So that is another reason for the Buddha’s redefinition of ‘the world’. But I don’t think it is a phenomenological or metaphysical matter in a much deeper sense than this.

Just to be clear, I’m not defending materialism or dualism, nor realism. I’m just saying that views about the makeup of the external world are not relevant for understanding the dhamma. For one, because you can never definitely proof either way whether things exist outside of us or not, or if they do, in what form or shape. All the science about wavelengths you mention is indirect knowledge, knowledge arrived at through measurements rather than direct observation, knowledge, also, which the Buddha and other arahants 25 centuries back (or even further back) wouldn’t even have had.

And therefore, to bring it back to the topic, when the Buddha declares only suffering and its cessation, it refers to the being and its experiences, not to things that may exist when not experienced—whether we call it chairs and rocks, or photons and energy, or whatever quarks and stuff there may be.

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83

Namo Buddhaya!

In regards to this i want to say

If we think about this a lot more, it is not that we don’t see the world as it is.

Rather the correct expression is that ‘we do not see the world as we think about the world; and we do not think about the world as we see it’.

We should think about thinking as we do about seeing.

This explains why we can’t see the full electromagnetic spectrum; why our understanding of physics & whatnot will never explain everything; and why the cessation of the sense bases is beyond conjecture and it is paradoxical when we explain it.

Thinking & seeing are to be thought of as two mirroring reflections & models of one another. Rather than two reflections of something existing beyond the nervous system.

Even more thinking models itself too in how we think about thinking where what is thought about is not what one thinks about it, and so thinking by labeling has conquered all six sense fields.

Nāmaṃ sabbaṃ anvabhavi,
nāmā bhiyyo na vijjati,
nāmassa ekadhammassa,
sabbeva vasamanvagū.

“Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name.”

Therefore it is not like we are mirroring inside of the nervous system what is outside of the nervous system. Rather we are dealing with the nervous system mirroring itself.

Therefore it is not so that our knowledge about the world is limited by our senses. Rather our senses are exactly what constitutes a world.

Whatever in the world through which you perceive the world and conceive the world is called the world in the training of the Noble One
SuttaCentral

Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception & intellect, that I declare that there is the world, the origination of the world, the cessation of the world, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the world."
ceive the world and conceive the world is called the world in the training of the Noble One.

"Insofar as it disintegrates, monk, it is called the ‘world.’ Now what disintegrates? The eye disintegrates. Forms disintegrate. Consciousness at the eye disintegrates. Contact at the eye disintegrates. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the eye — experienced as pleasure, pain or neither-pleasure-nor-pain — that too disintegrates.

"The ear disintegrates. Sounds disintegrate…

"The nose disintegrates. Aromas disintegrate…

"The tongue disintegrates. Tastes disintegrate…

"The body disintegrates. Tactile sensations disintegrate…

"The intellect disintegrates. Ideas disintegrate. Consciousness at the intellect consciousness disintegrates. Contact at the intellect disintegrates. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the intellect — experienced as pleasure, pain or neither-pleasure-nor-pain — that too disintegrates.

“Insofar as it disintegrates, it is called the ‘world.’” Loka Sutta: The World

Mendicants, I say it’s not possible to know or see or reach the end of the world by traveling. But I also say there’s no making an end of suffering without reaching the end of the world.”

I hope people can understand and i wonder how this formulation is received. It has been difficult for me to figure out a good way to explain but i think this method is the correct way.

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84

Hello Venerable. Thank you for that extended explanation. It was very helpful to my mind. The only problem I have with it is this last part, “the being and its experiences.” Equating suffering and its cessation with the being and its experiences is problematic; wasn’t that the whole point of the sutta (SN 22.86) in question?

If we put aside rocks and chairs and focus only on the being and its experiences, then SN 22.86 says the being can’t be found under analysis. If the being can’t be found and that being is suffering, then it follows that its cessation can’t be found either. If neither the being nor its cessation can be found under analysis, then is it appropriate to say that the being or suffering truly end?

:pray:

85

My point is that the external world is ultimately unknowable and therefore irrelevant. Wavelength, mass, etc., are themselves just descriptions. What the world ultimately might consist of is a complete mystery. Even thinking of it as “out there” might be a mistake. This means the world for all practical purposes is just the six senses, and thus, I think, the Buddha’s statement.

Then there is the problem that the above view may not, in the end, be any different from dualism. Whatever is outside will have to be either material or somehow mental. I am not sure if there is any third alternative. If dualism is unacceptable - which it seems to be to most philosophers - then we are left with some sort of idealism. I am personally interested to see if idealism can be made compatible with early Buddhism. I used to think this could not be, but I 've recently become more openminded.

Idealism does not deny the existence of other beings, that is, other minds. Such a denial would be solipsism, which I think we can discard as unacceptable.

The senses are not inherently physical. They are just different portals to the world.

I am sure you know that I agree with this. Yet I cannot see any reason why this cannot be fitted into an idealist framework. The being that has the experience does not have to be material.

I agree. I’ve made the point above that the reason I am interested in this is to have a counterargument against materialists. Metaphysics matters because people get trapped by ideas. It is useful to be able to show that there are other possibilities, apart from materialism, that cater for core Buddhist ideas such as rebirth. By postulating something external that is not mind, it seems to me that you fall back on dualism. Yet we both seem to agree that this is not an tenable view. Thus my interest in idealism.

I don’t really expect you to respond! :slightly_smiling_face:

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86

This looks, to my eye, like a non-sequitor. I agree with the first two sentences, but the leap to the third is quite big.

Well one third alternative is that everything is just physical, consciousness is just an emergent physical property of brains, and the “hard problem of consciousness” is just an illusion or the result of a failure of intuition. See here and here for example. So three alternatives could roughly be summarized as hard materialism (just material things exist, conciousness is an illusion), hard idealism (just mental things exist), and dualism (both exist).

87

Bhante,

Regarding such a larger mentality. There can only be one. You must obviously consider such a larger mentality as being unstated in any sort of exposition on dependent origination(paccaya akara desana)?

Additionally, do you consider Jhana as some sort of ekattata with this larger mentality?

88

Sadhu Banthe.

I find this very interesting …

Could “Not-Self” originally have been an attempt at a critical argument against Vedic monism, whithout ascertaining dualism, at a time when epistemology was certainly unavailable?

Could an idealist “underpinning” reconcile some of the philosophical contradictions within Buddhism?

Please keep us posted.

89

According to Western science, in order for consciousness to exist the organism needs a centralized nervous system and some type of sensory capacity. In terms of categorization, not all “aware” organisms are conscious. So, we have to be aware of the definition of consciousness that informs our approach to thinking about what consciousness is defined as in the suttas.

From what I understand, to talk about consciousness in English means to talk about what we would say is self-consciousness. We are conscious of having experiences that we ourselves are involved in. We don’t just “have” experiences, we are conscious of them. Saying something as simple as, you startled me, indicates consciousness. I didn’t like that, indicates consciousness.

90

I should have said experience through the six senses.

Personally, I don’t see this as an alternative. It contradicts core tenets of the Dhamma. And it seems to me that philosophers and scientists are increasingly moving away from it.

I would say there can and must be many. And it comes squarely within dependent origination. All minds are dependently arisen.

Yes, I think so. Buddhism critiques the Vedic idea that everything ultimately is a single, eternal, and non-changing mind. According to Buddhism, all minds are individuated and ever-changing. So if idealism is compatible with Buddhism, it would have to be different from the Vedic kind.

My understanding is that philosophers speak of two kinds of consciousness: phenomenal consciousness and meta consciousness. Self-consciousness is included within meta consciousness, whereas phenomenal consciousness is just basic awareness. Both of these kinds of consciousness are included in the Buddhist idea of viññāṇa.

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91

That still looks like quite a leap to me. :slightly_smiling_face:

Yeah, I also don’t agree it is necessarily a good one, but I think it is worth making explicit.

92

“My understanding is that philosophers speak of two kinds of consciousness: phenomenal consciousness and meta consciousness. Self-consciousness is included within meta consciousness, whereas phenomenal consciousness is just basic awareness.”

I think we call meta consciousness cognition. We have a large third layer of our brain to help us with that. Realistically, MRIs that register greater cognitive activity during such things as “lucid dreaming,” confirm what we already know about cognition. It takes work. Even sorting out our dreams, aspirations and projections in real time takes work. I always thought that’s why we meditate.

94

Sorry Bhante for the barrage of questions. And also I appreciate being open with your views.

I guess when it comes to vinnana you are thinking along the lines of nested dolls?

I guess the larger mentality sits above(so to speak) both phenomenal consciousness and meta consciousness?

Does vinnana in ‘sankhara paccaya vinnanam’ include the above larger mentality?

Atleast the monist type idealism (if that is the right term) can account for how two people can interact with the same pebble so to speak. How does that work in this new type of idealism?

What happens in Jhana, do you view this as some kinds of consciousness ceasing?

95

Not really. Just individuality.

Most beings have both phenomenal consciousness and meta consciousness. Meta consciousness is reflexive. You think back on your experience and build a sense of self out of it, that is, papañca happens. A being in a jhāna state, however, will only have phenomenal consciousness. In other words, they experience, but are unable to reflect on that experience. Only after they emerge from jhāna does the meta consciousness reassert itself. It is only then - provided you have wrong view - that you take the jhāna experience as a self.

Yes.

Well, from an idealist point of view a person’s body is the external appearance of their mind. We can interact body to body - like shaking hands - even though our minds are separate. It is the same with the larger consciousness. If the external world is a third person perspective - an image, if you like - of a larger consciousness, then we interact with it by interacting with the “physical” world. Or at least this is one way of interacting with it.

So far as I can tell, the idea that the physical world is an image of a larger consciousness fits with the suttas. The brahmas are often said to “rule” one or more world systems, that is, solar systems. This could, perhaps, be understood as the solar system being the third person appearance of such a brahma. I admit it’s all very speculative. But at the very least it seems to me that a certain kind of idealism may well be compatible with early Buddhism.

Also, I don’t think “monist idealism” is the right term. All idealism is monist in the sense that reality only consists of one substance, that is, mind. Perhaps one could use terms such as “unitary monism” and “pluralistic monism”. Don’t know!

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96

:pray:
But that’s what I meant as well! :smile: But my view is, you also can’t ever definitely conclude that the world does not exist in some sense, exactly because it’s unknowable. And therefore, there can reasonably be “stuff” that isn’t experienced and therefore isn’t suffering. When the Buddha says declares there’s only suffering, he’s not referring to that “stuff”. That’s all we initially disagreed upon, it seems.

Thanks for the clarification in terminology. I think my general argument still applies, though. It makes little sense to say the mind is all there is, nor does this seem to be the view of the suttas, such as MN28 I referenced earlier, where the sense objects are implied to “exist” independent of consciousness.

So I still say the Buddha’s teachings on the world are not meant to be a form of idealism. Nor are they realism or a middle way between the two. Rather, it is a pragmatic redefinition of “the world” to take us away from this kind of philosophy about externals to our own existence. To me, this is not an insignificant difference in interpretation, because it has practical consequences. So let me just say one final thing on this.

If we take these teachings on the “world” to be metaphysics—for example, if we take them to be about the insubstantiality of matter—I think we are doing the exact thing the Buddha was trying to prevent. We are still focusing on the makeup of the physical world, while he wanted us to focus on our own existence. And if we take these teachings to be pure phenomenology—for example, if we take them to say that the world and things within it are just mental concepts—we are still looking for the origin of suffering in the wrong place, not looking at the “world” the Buddha indented us to look at, which is our own personal existence. We’re still making assumptions about the physical world, namely, that it is not the way we perceive it. Science tells us it isn’t, but as long as we don’t take it to be happiness, permanent, or a self, whatever exactly constitutes the physical world, or even whether it exists or not, is not a concern of the Buddha. As Venerable Bodhi annotates the discourse with Rohitassa: “[In] the Buddha’s teaching […] the objective world is of interest only to the extent that it serves as the necessary external condition for experience.”

The commentary also seems to interpret the statements on the world as referring to the being. It says that Rohitassa asked about the end of the world with reference to the universe, but the Buddha answered with reference to the five aggregates, which in the commentarial understanding constitute the being. It paraphrases the Buddha to say: “I do not declare these four truths with reference to [external] things like grass and wood but just with reference to this body made of the four elements.” Elsewhere it says, “The origination and disappearance of the world […] means the rebirth (nibbatti) and [final] breaking up of the aggregates.”

In other words, the redefinition of ‘the world’ is not meant to explain what the external world exactly is or how we perceive it wrongly. It is primarily meant to shift our focus to what is important for understanding and overcoming suffering, which is the “world” of our own existence.

Of course, when our personal existence ceases, from our inner perspective the external world, in a certain sense, also comes to an end. That is probably another reason the Buddha defines the world the way he does. But I think it’d be overburdening this definition to conclude from it that the world only exists in the mind.

97

One of the aggregates is the body. You say it, along with all the other aggregates, utterly cease with the paranibbana of a Realized One. Yet you say this body is not the same “stuff” that might or might not exist and is never experienced and the Teacher wasn’t concerned with like rocks and tables? But how do you define this body as different from rocks and tables and stuff? Which atom if you removed it would no longer be body? Or do you think the body aggregate means more than just the physical body? Is it the part of the All that can be experienced as form that would include rocks and tables and stuff?

I take it you believe the 5 aggregates are real from your responses on the other thanissaro nibbana thread and that when these 5 aggregates utterly cease you call it annihilation2. But what do you think is annihilated when the form aggregate utterly ceases? Is it the physical body? Is it all the matter and energy that we experience as form?

You say the real aggregates utterly cease and it is these aggregates that are suffering. How do you precisely define and distinguish the form aggregate from rocks and stuff?

Struggling to understand your view.

:pray:

98

If the body is just a reflection of the mind, then how does conservation of energy/matter come into play? Is that just conservation of the mind? When my hand shakes your hand does my mind produce my hand and your mind produce your hand and my mind is really shaking your mind? If not which mind is responsible for which hand and the rest of the matter/energy in the universe? Like the moon. Which mind is responsible for the moon? Or how about the atoms that are in physical contact with your body (such as the air) but are not part of your body: whose mind is responsible for those? :pray:

99

I first have to clarify a few assumptions you made. The aggregate of rupa is complicated. Though often referring to the body, isn’t just the body. It refers primarily to how certain things, including the body, are experienced. Also, annihilation2 was someone else’s terminology, not mine. I call it cessation.

But even if we take rupa to refer to the body, when it ceases, it just means the body dies and no other body takes its place in a next life. We could say it ceases for that individual. It doesn’t mean the body ceases to exist in all ways. SN12.51 speaks to this. It says that after the death of an enlightened being “only bodily remains will be left”. (Which is another indication, by the way, that the suttas don’t teach idealism, because something physical is assumed to exist even if “all that is experienced cools off”.)

100

How about the rupa that is not the body? How does that aggregate cease? Presumably it doesn’t die, right? So in what sense does it cease?

Also, the body ceases in that same way for non realized ones as well, right? Regular peoples bodies die too. When you say the rupa aggregate utterly ceases for a Realized One do you mean it ceases in a way different than for a regular person or no?

How about the mind aggregates? Do they really utterly cease and are annihilated in an instant or are they like the body and decay and decompose but the “stuff” that makes them up is transformed and recycled like the matter/energy that is the body aggregate?

You’ve said you are explicitly making an ontological statement when you say suffering ceases and you define suffering as the 5 aggregates. Given this is an ontological statement I am trying to understand the objective ontology of precisely what ceases and how.

:pray:

101

Thanks Bhante for taking the time. I will get back to you once this thread slows down.

102

Bhante,

Presumably when you say solar system, right down to the tiniest detail including experimental tinkering at the LHC and so forth?

Presumably five sensory experience also comes under phenomenal consciousness?

Since you used the word ‘reflect’ , I presume you place ‘sati’, ‘panna’ so forth as part of meta consciousness?

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