If arahants are free from rebirth, but still suffer, why we don't see a widespread account of arahants ending their lives prematurely in the suttas?

And just on why i think that;

for clarity:

saupādisesā ca nibbānadhātu

occurs in

VN: 0

DN: 0

SN: 0

AN: 0

KN: 2 (once in the Itivutakka and once in the Netti)

AB: 0

So the distinction might be said to be rare? in the EBT’s.

nibbānadhātu

occurs in

VN: 1

DN: 6 (all bar one in the parinibbanasutta)

MN: 0

SN:1

AN: 4

KN: 54 (6 times in Udana and Itivutakka and all the rest in late books)

AB: 5 (all in the Kathuvathu, so even the tradition ascribes these to a much later period)

there are some more examples that deal with “a person with something left over” such as at AN9.12 however this is actually an interpretive problem for those who take the nibbana element dotrine to be supported by the EBT’s because it talks about persons “with something left over” being reborn, and implies that only those “with nothing left over” are not reborn. This contradicts the usage given in the “nibbana with something left over” camp.

(I would also say that AN9.12 is pretty palpably late, ending with an “explanation” of why Sariputta has never heard this teaching.)

From the excellent thread:

https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/on-not-self-existence-and-ontological-strategies/

From SN12.51:

‘But what is the source of these choices? 7.11When what exists do choices come to be? When what does not exist do choices not come to be?’ 7.12While making an inquiry they understand: 7.13‘Ignorance is the source of choices. 7.14When ignorance exists, choices come to be. When ignorance does not exist, choices don’t come to be.’

8.1They understand choices, their origin, their cessation, and the fitting practice for their cessation. And they practice in line with that path. 8.2This is called a mendicant who is practicing for the complete ending of suffering, for the cessation of choices.

9.1If an ignorant individual makes a good choice, their consciousness enters a good realm. 9.2If they make a bad choice, their consciousness enters a bad realm. 9.3If they make an imperturbable choice, their consciousness enters an imperturbable realm. 9.4When a mendicant has given up ignorance and given rise to knowledge, they don’t make a good choice, a bad choice, or an imperturbable choice. 9.5Not choosing or intending, they don’t grasp at anything in the world. 9.6Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished.

Now my contention would be, that it is habit or choice in the activity of the body in the movement of breath that ceases with the fourth jhanna. You could say, ignorance with regard to the activity of the body has ceased.

The extension would say that it’s habit or choice in the activity of the mind in feeling and perceiving that ceases in “the cessation of feeling and perceiving”, at that time ignorance with regard to the activity of mind has ceased.

As to abiding in pleasant feelings (MN12, mentioned by josephzizys)—I take MN 59 as my inspiration:

Whatever happiness, whatever joy, Ananda, arises in consequence of these five strands of sense-pleasures, it is called happiness in sense-pleasures.

Whoever, Ananda, should speak thus: ‘This is the highest happiness and joy that creatures experience’—this I cannot allow on [their] part. What is the reason for this? There is, Ananda, another happiness more excellent and exquisite than that happiness. And what, Ananda, is this other happiness more excellent and exquisite than that happiness? Here, Ananda, a [person], aloof from pleasures of the senses, aloof from unskilled states of mind, enters and abides in the first meditation that is accompanied by initial thought and discursive thought, is born of aloofness and is rapturous and joyful. This, Ananda, is the other happiness that is more excellent and exquisite than that happiness.

(MN I 398-399, PTS Vol II p 67)

Of course, that analysis is continued through all the states of concentration. Likewise:

“…What do you think about this, reverend Jain: Is King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, without moving his body, without uttering a word, able to stay experiencing nothing but happiness for seven nights and days?”

“No, your reverence.”

“What do you think about this, reverend Jain: Is King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, without moving his body, without uttering a word, able to stay experiencing nothing but happiness for six nights and days, for five, for four, for three, for two nights and days, for one night and day?”

“No, your reverence.”

“But I, reverend Jain, am able, without moving my body, without uttering a word, to stay experiencing nothing but happiness for one night and day. I, reverend Jain, am able, without moving my body, without uttering a word, to stay experiencing nothing but happiness for two nights and days, for three, four, five, six, for seven nights and days.”

(MN I 14, PTS Vol I p 123-124)

That’s clearer to me than the notion that once having experienced the cessation of feeling and perceiving, one continues in life feeling nothing but pleasant feelings.

The major problem is that the puthujjana is incapable of thinking beyond the attachment to the identity of a “self” or "i ".
To surmount this difficulty he needs to follow the Buddha’s advise and practise ardently the 4 Satipatthanas.