If jhana is total absorption without physical sensation, why is pain only abandoned in the fourth jhana?

Bhante, my translations for the above:

  • Kāmacchanda: sensual desire
  • Kāmarāga: sensual passion
  • Kāmupapatti: sensual birth
  • Kāmupādāna: sensual clinging

Another:
kāmasukha: sensual happiness

Doesn’t that come under those who go by the Visuddhimagga’s idea of jhana?

1 Like

Hi Venerable, nice to see you here!

These are reasonable translations, but they don’t help us much with the deciding the exact meaning of kāma. We know from AN6.63 that kāma can refer to the personal feeling of desire for things in the sensory realm:

Greedy intention is a person’s sensual pleasure (kāmo, singular)

We also know that kāma and kāmaguṇa are used extensively to refer to the objects of the senses:

There are these five kinds of sensual stimulation (kāmaguṇā = kāmā, both plural)—Sights known by the eye … Sounds known by the ear … Smells known by the nose … Tastes known by the tongue … Touches known by the body that are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing.

You can see here how the rendering “sensual pleasure(s)” obscures the distinction between the different meanings of singular and the plural. If fact, it seems this is precisely why so many translators choose this rendering. It means they can render kāma with a single word. Personally I am not sure if this is such a good idea, precisely because it obscures what is going on. When a single word has two significantly different meanings, I think it is better to vary the translation dependent on the context.

So when it comes to the compounds kāmacchanda, kāmarāga, kāmupapatti, and kāmupādāna, it is necessary, I think, to translate with greater precision as to the two known meanings of kāma, and then see which makes the better sense. Hence my renderings above.

The commentarial literature is huge, spanning millennia and involving a large number of different authors. So far as I know there are no alternative interpretations of jhāna. The reinterpretation suggested here seems to be a modern phenomenon started by the likes of Rod Bucknell. But see Ven. Analyo’s critique of Rod Bucknell in Journal of Buddhist Studies Vol. XIX, 2022.

5 Likes

Hi Venerables both,

I don’t think kāma is an adjective in these compounds, though, if anywhere. Sometimes such compounds seems to be translated as if kāma was an adjective (“sensual”), as in “sensual desire” or “sensual pleasure”, but those are just shorthand translations, employed because expressions like “desire for sense objects” and “pleasure coming from sense objects” are bulky and unsightly. But the latter is what those compounds literally mean. That this is the case is indicated by other places where the “parts” of the compounds are separated and kāma is clearly a noun, like in kāmesu rajjati (“he desires sense objects”, Snp1.9) or kāmesu tibbasārāgā (“with strong desire for sense objects”, MN4). (Just two examples I quickly found for kāmarāga.)

If there is any place where kāma is clearly an adjective I stand corrected. But either way, in vivicceva kāmehi the word kāmehi clearly isn’t an adjective, otherwise it means “fully separated from sensual”, which is meaningless. So here it is surely a noun.

Very commonly mentioned in the suttas is also “heavenly kāmas” (dibbā kāmā) which makes little sense as “heavenly sense desires” (or “heavenly sensuals” or “heavenly sensualities”). What it means is heavenly sights, heavenly sounds, etc. Somewhere in DN it is also mentioned that a father will provide his son with kāmehi, i.e. with sense objects, not sense desires or “the sensuals/sensualities”. There’s more quotes like this where the objective meaning of kāma is very clear. This meaning of kāma as the sensual objects really shouldn’t be under discussion.

But does it apply to the first jhāna formula? I said before that the plural doesn’t necessarily mean that kāmehi refers to these objects, although it is a strong indication. But many texts directly oppose the kāma(guṇa)s to the first jhāna, which indicates that this objective meaning of kāma is what is implied in vivicceva kāmehi.

Of course, we can still argue exactly what that means. Is it being without any sense experiences, is it being withdrawn in a hut, or is it something else? Regardless, as I mentioned to Ceisiwr, I think it leaves no room for the pīti and sukha of the jhanas to be pleasant bodily feelings, because these would be included in the kāma(guṇa)s regardless of how we interpret it. As I quoted before: “The pleasure and happiness that arise from these five kinds of sensual stimulation is called sensual pleasure. [But] there is another pleasure that is finer than that.”

4 Likes

I’d translate the noun form literally as “sensuality".

Isn‘t that forcing an equation here? Clearly, there’s no kāmā in here.

The same commentarial literature also admits that “jhana” (as they understand it) is not necessary for liberation from suffering.

1 Like

It’s true that MN 128 is interesting. The Buddha talks about developing light and forms to access jhanas.

But personally, I don’t recall any other sutta stating that “the development of visions of light and forms enables one to attain jhana”. So far, in all the other suttas I’ve read about jhana, the Buddha doesn’t talk about the development of light and form (when the suttas mention light, they’re referring to higher knowledge - for example, the divine eye - aren’t they?). So I would find it a little strange to consider that MN 128 proves the absolute necessity of the development of light and forms for jhana. It seems strange to me.

And as this article explains (which Venerable Kumara shared in his book), even commentaries like the Visuddhimagga assert that there are meditations allowing access to jhana without relying on light as the object of attention (from memory I think there’s skeleton meditation, worm-infested body meditation, dismemberment meditation, etc.).

However, I admit that this sutta is rather disturbing.

Also, if you want to know more about the Pa-Auk system, I recommend reading “Knowing and Seeing” and “The Only Way for the Realization of Nibbāna” by Pa Auk Sayadaw. They describe in detail the stages of meditation leading to Nibbana, based on the commentaries (and particularly the Visuddhimagga; Pa Auk Sayadaw is a huge fan of the Visuddhimagga and has great respect for it). The explanations are very detailed, fine-tuned and precise.

1 Like

Some contents of the four jhanas are found in the SN/SA Vedana Samyutta, e.g. SN 36.11, 15-18 (= SA 474), SN 36.19-20 (= SA 485); SN 36.29 (= SA 483).

But the four jhanas are certainly not the core teachings of the Buddha for the cessation of dukkha.

The core teachings of the Buddha for the cessation of dukkha are essentially about Right View, according to SN/SA suttas.

So, did the Buddha teach the four jhanas for his core dhamma, although it is part of the noble eightfold path?

If the Buddha did not teach the four jhanas for his core dhamma, then, any interpretations of the four jhanas seem meaningless for the cessation of dukkha!

1 Like

But again, the ambiguity in the term sensuality avoids taking a clear position. If kāma means sensual desire, then the translation need to work with this rendering.

This is how kāma is understood in our best dictionaries. Some of these dictionaries, especially the CPD, are meticulously researched. We should have really good reasons for going against them. I cannot see any such reasons. Again, the fact that all words for “desire” normally occur in the singular means that kāma in the plural must refer to something else.

Sometimes this does seem to be the case, but generally the commentaries are very positive about the contribution of jhāna on the path. In any case, this is a different matter. Even if the commentaries at times misrepresent the importance of jhāna, this does not mean that they also misunderstand the meaning kāma. I believe we should assume that the accumulated wisdom of the commentaries is right unless we have good evidence to the contrary.

1 Like

Just following the title, I though the discussion should be about the following suttas, not sure if my following question is brought up yet, I didn’t read everything, but I am curious how to reconcile deep Jhānas with the following 2 suttas?

sn48.36 defines the 5 faculties:

And what is the faculty of pleasure? Physical enjoyment, physical pleasure, the enjoyable, pleasant feeling that’s born from physical contact. This is called the faculty of pleasure.

And what is the faculty of pain? Physical pain, physical unpleasantness, the painful, unpleasant feeling that’s born from physical contact. This is called the faculty of pain.

And what is the faculty of happiness? Mental enjoyment, mental pleasure, the enjoyable, pleasant feeling that’s born from mind contact. This is called the faculty of happiness.

And what is the faculty of sadness? Mental pain, mental displeasure, the painful, unpleasant feeling that’s born from mind contact. This is called the faculty of sadness.

sn48.40 has faculty of pleasure only cease at 3rd Jhāna. Indicating that 1st and 2nd Jhāna can still feel physical pleasant feelings.

an5.176 somewhat contradicts and agrees with this a bit. Pleasure and happiness connected with the skillful is in the 1st Jhāna, by which it’s natural to interpret pleasure as bodily happiness and happiness and mental happiness.

Yet, faculty of sadness only completely cease in 2nd Jhāna according to SN48.40. One could harmonize this with AN5.176 by assuming that sensual pleasures, skillful and the unskillful doesn’t cover all possibilities. There can be sadness connected with something else which doesn’t cease in first Jhāna yet. Or else, there’s a contradiction between these 3 suttas, whereby at least one must be wrong.

Great to see many prominent monks here, hopefully, there can be some answers to my query.

2 Likes

Well, if we were to cleanse the translation of SN48.36 of all injections and implications, and leave it as bare as possible, then I think (it’s a dictionary translation, so it’s certainly very rough) it should look something like this:

The faculties of sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa, upekkha.

And what, monks, is the faculty of sukha?
Whatever, monks, bodily sukha, a bodily agreeableness, an agreeableness of a feeling of the contact of the body, - this is called the faculty of sukha.

And what, monks, is the faculty of dukkha?
Whatever, monks, bodily dukkha, a bodily disagreeableness, a disagreeableness of a feeling of the contact of the body, - this is called the faculty of dukkha.

And what, monks, is the faculty of somanassa?
Whatever, monks, mental sukha, a mental agreeableness, an agreeableness of a feeling of the contact of the mind, - this is called the faculty of somanassa.

And what, monks, is the faculty of domanassa?
Whatever, monks, mental dukkha, a mental disareeableness, a disagreeableness of a feeling of the contact of the mind, - this is called the faculty of domanassa.

And what, monks, is the faculty of upekkha?
Whatever, monks, neither agreeableness nor disagreeableness of bodily or mental feeling, - this is called the faculty of upekkha.

If this translation is to be accepted, then I think it is not difficult to see that in such a reading the meaning of the passage becomes significantly different: from considering the body and mind as organs, and the qualities as qualities of the perceptions of these organs, to considering simply the immediate experience of sensations, some of which are perceived as bodily and some of which are perceived as mental. In other words, when it is spoken of jhana, it is not the cessation of physical perceptions that is meant, but the cessation of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of bodily and mental experiences.

1 Like

That’s not a problem in Pali. So, why should we make it a problem in English?

Ambiguity of words is common in languages. Context narrows their meaning. E.g, how do we translate kāmesu micchācāra"?

Just as kāma has a range of meanings in Pali, so does “sensuality” in English. I’m sure you’ve seen that yourself.

The same applies for sukha and its most apt English translation “happiness”.

1 Like

Bhante, you’ve misunderstood my saying the above. I mean to imply that the orthodox Theravada commentarial version of jhāna is different from that of the Suttas.

1 Like

Assuming by “deep Jhānas” you mean “absorption jhānas”, it’s not possible.

1 Like

Arrggh, discussions like this just make me want to meditate! :grin: :person_in_lotus_position: But I got feedback even in real life that it’s helpful to people who are confused about the topic, so I’ll stick around here a bit more. And exchanging thoughts on these subjects is also helpful for me, so thanks everybody.

Thanks for those links. :slightly_smiling_face: I will need to look into the venerable Pa Auk’s teachings a bit more one day, although I have to say it is exactly his strong reliance on the Visuddhimagga which has put me off till now. :face_with_open_eyes_and_hand_over_mouth:

As to the article on nimittas, I don’t have any problems with it. I actually agree that in the jhānas there are no lights. In the first jhāna the object is pīti-sukha, not a light or other nimittas. The nimittas are a way into jhanas, but not the jhānas themselves. That is likely one reason that the light nimittas aren’t mentioned super often in the suttas.

Another likely reason the suttas don’t often mention them is that the mind can represent itself in many ways to meditators. Lights are a common way, but they’re not a requisite. Nimittas can also be “sounds” or certain “bodily feelings” or metta or what have you. But these “sounds” aren’t heard by the ear, nor are the “bodily feelings” felt by the body: they’re all just representations (or reflections or “signs”) of the mind. Many people find it hard to describe this territory of meditation. This diversity in hard-to-describe experiences can also explain why the suttas don’t tend to pin themselves down to lights and forms alone. Notice also that the instructions in MN128 are given to three specific bhikkhus, not to the general populace like most other texts on meditation. The three experienced lights and forms, but that doesn’t mean everybody always does.

A third reason is that advanced meditators may be able to skip the stage of nimittas altogether. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Buddha for example was able to go straight into jhāna, skipping any kind of lights or other nimittas.

As to the article questioning whether nimitta in MN128 refers to the lights or idiomatically to the ‘cause’ of samādhi, I agree with Ven. Ānalayo in his comparative study of the sutta: “This sense of nimitta as a mental ‘sign’ or object used for the development of concentration would also fit the present context well, which describes meditative visions and the development of concentration. At a later point of its exposition, the Upakkilesa-sutta [MN128] in fact explicitly uses the term nimitta in order to refer to the vision of light and forms that Anuruddha and his companions had been unable to stabilize, a usage where nimitta clearly stands for a mental sign, for something that is perceived.” That is to say, it certainly doesn’t mean “cause” at that later instance, so Ven. Bodhi’s translation “you should understand the cause for that” is perhaps not literal enough, and it should be “you should penetrate that sign [nimitta]”, meaning basically what you said earlier, “absorb oneself in nimitta”, or “enter that nimitta”. (Edit some days later: I’m now more convinced Bodhi’s translation is more likely to be correct.)

Although MN128 is indeed the most explicit text on the nimittas, I don’t think it is alone in describing these experiences. I see references elsewhere too, though they don’t use the word nimitta: both in the Ānāpānassati and Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas, but particularly in the kasinas and “the eight bases of transcendence/mastery”.

First, in the Ānāpānassati Sutta (MN118) it says: “I’ll breathe in experiencing the mind.” This “experiencing the mind” refers in my experience to the same stage of meditation described in MN128. It’s not called a light or form here, because what you are actually experiencing when you “see” (or “hear” or “feel”) a nimitta is the mind itself. This instruction talks about the same thing as MN128, but more directly, bypassing the perception of light and going straight to what the light represents, which is the mind.

To continue, the subsequent instruction in ānāpānassati is “gladdening the mind”, which is the stabilizing of the lights that MN128 talks about. Put simply, it’s because of lacking gladness that the various hindrances take over. If the mind is truly glad, it won’t become sleepy, restless, distracted, and so forth.

Then the next step of Ānāpānassati is “samadhi-ing” the mind, unifying the mind, i.e. moving towards jhānas. In the next step the mind is “liberated”, which means the hindrances are completely abandoned and the mind enters the jhānas. (These two steps essentially go together.) The jhanas are also called temporary liberations of the mind (e.g. MN122), and this is what “liberating the mind” in Ānāpānassati refers to. It can’t mean liberation in the ultimate sense of ending of craving, because there are still contemplations to be done afterwards.

So the Ānāpānassati Sutta fits MN128 very well, in my view.


In the Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas I also see similar ideas to MN128 under the third factor of “mind”. For example, when MN128 mentions “loss of focus on forms” and “perception of diversity” those are examples of “the scattered mind” of the Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas.


Now, I may be opening another :canned_food: of :worm::worm:, but I also think the kasinas (which are not super common in the suttas but also not exactly rare), in later tradition taken to be physical disks, were originally meant to be mental perceptions we now call nimittas. For example, “the meditation on universal yellow” (AN10.25) would be a yellow light which takes up your whole awareness, the “universality” implying among other things that you don’t perceive the body anymore. (Kasina literally means ‘total’, hence Bhante Sujato’s translation “universal”. Perhaps “pervasive” gives a better sense of the meaning.)

The kasinas are not explained in much detail in the suttas, but in MN77 they precede the jhānas, so it seems they lead up to them, as is commonly assumed. Then they fit the lights and forms of MN128 extremely well, with ttese kasinas and nimittas both leading to samādhi. The various color “kasinas” are then the light nimittas (obhāsanimitta) of MN128, and the elemental kasinas (including space) being the form nimittas (rūpanimitta).

Also very tellingly, MN128 concludes the development of these nimittas with: “I perceive limitless (sañjānāmi appamāṇāni) lights and see limitless forms” and the kasinas are likely said to be “perceived as limitless” (sañjānāti appamāṇaṃ). Same words, same ideas. So the kasinas are what MN128 calls nimittas. A yellow kasina is a yellow nimitta, for example.


Another reference to nimittas seems to be the “eight bases for transcendence” (or “eight bases of mastery/overcoming”), for example at DN16, AN10.29. We again have mentions of “forms” and “perceptions”, and the word “limitless” reappears again here for the higher perceptions. The exact same colors as the “kasinas” are mentioned as well. So it’s quite clearly presenting the same idea as the kasinas, and therefore the same as MN128, which also talks about limitless perceptions of forms and lights (i.e. colors). Accordingly, Bhante Sujato notes on these “eight basis” at DN16: “The ‘visions’ (rūpā) seen externally are the lights or other meditation phenomena that today are usually called nimitta." (I’m not exactly sure why the nimittas are said to be “seen externally”, though. The commentaries seems to say it’s because they are opposed to the “internal” form of the body. :thinking: So then it’s external in the sense of being an external āyatana, a sense object, though it’s a mental one.)

In short, the nimittas are in other places too, not just in MN128, just under different names.

I’m well aware that some of these references are somewhat opaque, and I also still have some questions about them (so what I did say is subject to revision :smiley: ), but I think they make much more sense in light of the deeper jhanas which require nimittas, compared to the bodily jhanas where this sort of stuff is generally just seen as commentarial ideas that can be disregarded. But all these things are also all found in various parallels, so they clearly predate the commentaries by a long time, as is the case with MN128.

May I ask why you find MN128 “disturbing”? I hope I am not disturbing you even more! :speak_no_evil:

2 Likes

Nice to see you here too, Venerable. Those are good questions. We discussed this briefly before. Here are my thoughts.

SN48.40 is problematic for both interpretations of the jhānas, actually, because the “pleasure faculty” (sukha-indriya) is said to be abandoned already in the third jhāna, while sukha is normally said to be abandoned in the fourth. This is awkward no matter how we interpret the jhānas.

If we interpret the sukha of the third jhāna to be experienced “with the body”, then why does SN48.40 say the faculty of sukha (which SN48.36–39 define as bodily) has ceased in the third jhāna? If anything, this then actually confirms that the sukha of the third jhāna is not bodily, because it says there’s no more bodily sukha in the third jhāna. So the sukha of the third jhana must then be mental. :thinking:

But then the sukha of the second jhāna apparently is bodily? How does that make sense? Does the meaning of sukha shift between the jhānas? In the 1st and 2nd it is bodily but in the 3rd it is not? That seems strange. :woozy_face:

In AN5.176 all pleasure (sukha) and pain connected to the kāma are abandoned in the first jhāna already, so this includes bodily pleasure. This apparently contradicts SN48.40 as well.

It’s likewise strange why the faculty of domanassa (“sadness”) is said to be abandoned in the second jhana in SN48.40. This also contradicts AN5.176 which implies all domanassa (of the skillful and unskillful and of the sensual) is already abandoned in the first jhāna.

Now, the answer may be authenticity, as you suggest when you say “at least one must be wrong”.

But if we assume the text is authentic, then I would reply that the bodily sukha is already abandoned in the first jhana, but in SN48.40 it’s linked to the third jhāna exactly to make the point that the sukha that still exists in the third jhāna is NOT bodily. In other words, bodily sukha was already gone at first jhana, but to emphasize that sukha in the third jhana is mental, it’s stated specifically before the third jhana that bodily sukha has ceased there.

Because technically speaking the text actually does not say that bodily sukha still exists in the earlier jhanas (although we may imply that). It just says that it has ceased in the third. That’s being a bit pedantic, but it does seem to me the best way to resolve the issue. And it certainly wouldn’t be the first time that the Buddha is being creative with how he phrased things.

Maybe somebody else has some more satisfying resolution. But for now, I think this text is actually most problematic for the bodily jhana view.

3 Likes

It is not really a problem. My point is just that when we try to discover the meaning of a concept, we need to translate as explicitly as possible so as to see how the rendering works. In other words, this concerns interpretation, not necessarily translation.

The commentaries may occasionally underestimate the importance of jhāna, but this does not automatically mean they misunderstand its character.

Anyway, thanks for engaging! Hopefully we are both learning something. :slightly_smiling_face:

2 Likes

Sunyo. AN 5.176 does not sound related to jhana. It reads as a teaching for householders that does not go beyond rapture. Rapture in the suttas does not always refer to jhana, as in SN 12.23.

Sunyo. The sukha-faculty in the framework of SN 48.40 must include piti-sukha rather than only sukha. Also, more importantly, the meaning of the word ‘indriya’ meaning ‘controlling’ may need to be examined with yonisomanasikara. It looks like run-of-the-mill Abhidhamma & Commentary style scholarship that makes synonyms out of various words is not an appropriate EBT approach to EBT scholarship.

Similarly, as for SN 48.40 in its entirety, not that we may likely agree, but:

  • it is either using the words samudaya & nirodha in a corrupted manner, similar to in the Piltdown Sutta MN 10 & Abhidhamma, where samudaya, jati & uppajjati or nirodha & vaya look treated as synonyms; or
  • it is using samudaya & nirodha in a proper manner (as in SN 22.5 & most places; as explained by the Elder Venerable Payutto) and is referring to something beyond the mere uppajjati of the jhana factors because the terms samudaya (as in SN 22.5) & nirodha are generally used in relation to attachment & other unwholesome states.
  • To add, SN 48.40, unique to the suttas, includes the words sanimittaṁ sanidānaṁ sasaṅkhāraṁ sappaccayaṁ. The words sound similar to the more common words kiṁnidāno kiṁsamudayo kiṁjātiko kiṁpabhavo, which look only used in relation to unwholesome states, unless I am mistaken. In SN 48.40, the use of the words nimitta & saṅkhāra looks particularly interesting and might refer to some type of mental formation or view giving a ‘controlling power’ (‘indriya’) to the respective feelings. The word ‘nimitta’ as ‘sign’ is often used as a controlling power over the mind.
  • To conclude, SN 48.40 may be saying, in the 3rd jhana, the power of feelings to control/dictate (‘indriya’) the mind ceases (nirodha) when rapture (piti) ceases.
  • I recall Ajahn Buddhadasa in his renowned book titled: Anapanasati Unveiling The Secrets of Life For Serious Beginners discussed the matter of piti vs sukha; how sukha is peaceful but piti impacts the mind less peacefully. The Elder Ajahn said:

The important quality of piti for you to be aware of is that it is not peacefu1. There is a kind of excitement or disturbance in the thing, called piti. Only when it becomes sukha is it tranquil. Piti has varying levels but all are characterized as stimulating, as causing the citta to shake. Sukha is the opposite. It calms and soothes the mind. This is how piti and sukha differ.The most important thing to study and observe is the power piti has over the mind. …What influence does piti have on the mind and thoughts? Carefully observe how the mind is when piti has not arisen. Once piti arises, what is the citta like? What is the effect of a lot of piti? How is the mind when there is only a little piti? When piti is heavy, especially rapture, how much more does it stimulate the mind? Study the coarse kinds of piti, medium levels, and the finest types, to see how they differ. Then, see how their influence upon the mind differs. This is the crucial point of this step of practice.

Bhikkhu Buddhadasa - Anapanasati Mindfulness with Breathing

Thus, when it comes to the 4th jhana, the author of the sutta has chosen to use somanassa as the primary subject and ignored the sukha.

It looks very unlikely the author of SN 48.40 would make an error by saying sukha vedana is felt in the 3rd jhana but also say the faculty of sukha has ceased (nirodha) in the 3rd jhana if ‘vedana’ & ‘indriya’ were synonymous. It looks like regarding sukha vedana to be a synonym of sukha indriya and also regarding uppajjati & samudaya to also be synonyms is possibly an error.

If samudaya & uppajjati and nirodha & vaya are regarded to be synonymous, in an Abhidhamma, Commentary or MN 10 manner, SN 48.40 will look problematic. But if the more nuanced Elder Buddhadasa or Payutto approach is taken, the problematicness of SN 48.40 will cease (nirodha). :raised_hands:

1 Like

I’ve read MN128 and I’ve noticed the Buddha say that the reason for the disappearance of his vision of lights and forms is his loss of immersion due to the various corruptions.

If the nimittas were the way into jhana, the jhana would disappear with the loss of the nimitta and not the other way around. :thinking:

2 Likes

I do think they understand the character of jhāna as they understand it. That is why they regard it as optional.

1 Like

Venerable @Sunyo , I thank you with all my heart for your work, I am extremely grateful.

At the time, I was a little perturbed by the Buddha’s explicit insistence on the use of light and form to attain jhana, whereas this technique is not as clearly and explicitly described in other sutta: I found it a little hard to understand where this technique stood in relation to other techniques.

Anyway, you’re not confusing me at all, on the contrary. It’s really wonderful for us that you’ve come to answer our questions, you’re helping a lot of people, and as I’ve already said, this topic will certainly be read a lot in the future, so that even more people will be helped. That goes for all the Venerables - @kumara
, @sabbamitta , @Brahmali , @NgXinZhao, etc. - who post here: you’re all real lights for beings. I couldn’t have hoped you’d be here! All these debates are extremely useful, I assure you. Thanks again!!!

2 Likes

Perhaps we first need to have sufficient (non-jhanic) concentration to make nimitta appear and stabilize nimitta, and once nimitta appears and is stable, nimitta can be used to intensify concentration and thus attain jhana.
This means that if the starting (non-jhanic) concentration is not high enough, nimitta may disappear; and if nimitta has been achieved, but is eventually lost, then this may prevent concentration intensification (no appearance of jhana), or even decrease it.
This is a hypothesis.