IF or ONLY IF: the logic behind Dependent Arising

[yeshe.tenley]

@Darayavaush

Hey, I’m a philosophy amateur, so thank you for explaining the concept of necessary condition

Hello @Darayavaush, I hope it was helpful. My intent in the post was only focused on clarifying the role of the formal logic. I wish to remain neutral as to the ongoing debate regarding conclusory statements re: Dependent Origination.

I do believe logic can help us understand and think clearly about Buddha dharma. Nonetheless, logic is only a tool. While it can aid in understanding, ultimately it is insufficient to truly know dharma. Still, like any tool, when it is wielded it should be wielded properly

@Darayavaush

It is impossible for ‘vedana exists’ to be true unless ‘avijja exists’ is true

That is a proper logical proposition. Well done! It specifies one possible way of framing DO in logical terms. The truth of this proposition is not self-evident. To know whether it is true requires something else: namely, a sound proof.

Another way of framing DO in logical terms is:

It is impossible for ‘vedana exists’ to be true unless ‘avijja has previously arisen’ is true

And I’m sure there are countless others. Both of the formulations above are valid. The logical framework is agnostic about what goes inside the quotes. Nothing about the definition of necessary condition or the rules of logic can help us determine what is the proper formulation of DO into the logical framework.

This forum is host to a myriad set of such formulations. The way it usually works is people on this forum argue about how the suttas should be translated or framed in logical terms, while simultaneously trying to make pseudo-logical proofs about their preferred formulation, often accompanied by logical errors and fallacies embedded in the discussion.

The result I’ve often seen is people get lost. They can’t see the elements of the discussion clearly. Assumptions are not shared, illogical steps are inserted, appeals to emotion/authority, are swapped in and out, etc.

I hope that helps to explain my previous post. I’m not trying to involve myself in the proper formulation of DO into logical terms, I’m rather trying to make sure that the role of logic - as a tool - is being wielded properly in the hope that it will help dispel confusion. That’s all.

[Sunyo]

Thanks @yeshe.tenley,

My point has also been about the logic, especially of “only if”. I didn’t mean to prove any particular model of Dependent Arising by it.

The idea of necessary conditions is compatible with the multiple-lifetime interpretation of Dependent Arising, though. I hope that is now clear to Darayavaush as well.

[Sunyo]

Hi Charles, Thanks for your comment.

@cdpatton

The most elaborate treatment of the classic 12-step version of DO is probably the one found in the Sarvāstivādin’s Mahāvibhāṣā.

There is no translation in a Western language, is there?

Also interesting for the logic behind D.O. is the following ancient (translated from Chinese) text:

Another principle is this: If something, e.g. contact exists, it exists necessarily on account of the six [sense] bases; but all bases do not cause the contact. If there exists thirst, it necessarily arises on account of feeling, but all the feelings do not cause thirst. The entire causality is sometimes expressed when it is said: contact-conditioned is the feeling. The incomplete causality is also sometimes expressed when it is said: feeling-conditioned is thirst; but ignorance is not stated so. (Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman vol.2, N. Aiyaswami Sastri (tr.), 1978., p33)

@cdpatton

Problems like “why does craving disappear before feeling” to me are indications that the 12 step chain may actually be a fusion of one chain that explains how craving arises from past karma and another that explains how suffering arises from craving and attachments

Yes, I agree. See my footnote nr 25, which I expand on further here.

The link between feeling and craving is perhaps the most obvious. However, this possible development of the chain does not explain all links, where the preceding factor is not always sufficient for the next.

Still, even if the full twelvefold chain is a development (which I think was done by the Buddha himself during his long teaching career), we shouldnt expect the development to suddenly be logically inconsistent. So the link between feeling and craving still tells us how to interpret words like paccaya and imasmim sati (namely, as necessary but not sufficient conditions, just like the above-quoted Tattvasiddhi Sastra explains)

[knotty36]

Pardon me if this has already been covered; I don’t have time to read through the entire thread on this fascinating topic. (Thank you, as always, @sunyo!) Nevertheless, I actually just learned of and read an article which may relate. I post it here for anyone’s perusal…

Watts-NecessitySufficiencyBuddhas-1982.pdf (546.2 KB)

[cdpatton]

@Sunyo

There is no translation in a Western language, is there?

Unfortunately, no, unless there is one hiding in an academic journal I’m not aware of. It’s tough reading to start with, so I’m not surprised, but I wonder if there is an article or thesis somewhere that at least summarizes it … I should poke around and see if I can find any.

@Sunyo

Also interesting for the logic behind D.O. is the following ancient (translated from Chinese) text:

That’s a good reference! Yes, there are several significant commentaries in Chinese. I’ve worked with them some in my spare time. To be honest, the amount of material that “ought” to be translated is overwhelming. I get kind of mind-boggled when I think about it.

Something I think about regarding later developments in Buddhist thought in general is that later generations after the Buddha may have been more constrained when formulating new ideas. They had to work within the confines of existing scripture. The Buddha may have felt that way to some extent after teaching for a long time, but I think he still would have had more creative freedom than the monks charged with maintaining what he taught. When new ideas were introduced, they caused doctrinal controversies and traditions split into new schools of thought. It would have been important to avoid those consequences. There are plenty of examples of “new” teachings being “created” by presenting older material in different ways that combined, divided, or reordered them. The process would cause some inconsistencies sometimes precisely because the older, well-known material couldn’t be altered much. It may have been preferable to have an imperfect formulation that could be rationalized in exegesis than to formulate something new and unprecedented.

So, I agree with you that later developments didn’t have to become inconsistent, but the sociopolitical situation may have caused it to happen when monks wanted to combine more than one teaching into one presentation. I think may have been done for very practical reasons. Two or more smaller teachings could be taught together when they were combined together. I lean toward that explanation when I see a larger teaching that’s very common in later Buddhist literature compared to EBTs. It looks to my like the work of Abhidharmists reformulating scattered teachings into larger “chunks” of teaching material.

But, you know, it’s speculation. History is full of things I wouldn’t expect to have happened.

[Sunyo]

@knotty36

I actually just learned of and read an article which may relate.

Thanks for sharing Knotty! I actually found this earlier, but then forgot to read it… Otherwise, I may have quoted from it in my essay, since it seems Watts’ ideas align largely with mine.

Watts agrees all links are about necessary conditions of the preceding factor for the following. But “no one of the twelve nidānas can be understood as sufficient for the arising of suffering”. He also talks about certain factors being jointly sufficient, but not in isolation.

He also describes how in DN15 the Buddha uses the principle of contraposition to argue birth is a necessary condition for old age and death. Watts does not mention the imasmiṃ sati formula, however.

About paccaya he also says the word indicates “no more than a relation of necessary conditionship. In no case does the presence of a single nidāna alone stand as sufficient for the arising of any other.” However, when it comes to nonenlightened beings (which he calls the “normal process”), Watts argues: “when the presence of avijjā as a causal factor is being presupposed, there is a special sense in which paccaya can be construed as indicating a sufficiency relation.” This is similar to what Ven. @Brahmali argued here.

It’s not exactly clear what Watt means by this. If by this “special sense” he means that paccaya suddenly gets a new meaning depending on whether we talk about the normal person or the enlightened being, I think that would be overburdening the word paccaya. Technically, the word just means a necessary condition or ‘requirement’. But it’s true that if there is feeling and ignorance, we can say they are jointly sufficient for craving. Yet, this is a conclusion we have draw ourselves. The mere phrase vedanāpaccayā taṇhā by itself does not capture this idea, in my view. And neither does therefore the equivalent vedanāya sati taṇhā hoti.

That aside, I think Watts picked a bad example to make his case. He argues: “Vedanā at least cannot be sufficient for suffering under all conditions because we have seen that there are those [i.e. enlightened ones] who have succeeded in ending suffering while still being subject to feelings.” This makes the common mistake of assuming that suffering ends completely at enlightenment. That is not the case, and it is overlooking sutta quotes like these:

I also said that whatever is felt is included in suffering. (SN36.11)

Feeling of the past and future is suffering, let alone that of the present. (SN22.10)

“Is feeling permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.”

“But what is impermanent, is that pleasant or suffering?”

“Suffering, sir.” (SN56.11)

Enlightened ones are liberated from suffering in the sense that they don’t have mental sadness and despair and such; also in the sense that suffering is not taken as “me” so isn’t “their suffering”; and also in the sense that don’t get reborn so will be or get fully liberated from suffering. But whatever feelings there are still impermanent and hence dukkha.

Watts would have made a stronger case if he focused on the link between feeling and craving rather than feeling and suffering.

@cdpatton

Two or more smaller teachings could be taught together when they were combined together

Yeah, could be. Scholars who’ve argued that there two joined sequences differ on whether they were joined already by the Buddha or at a later time. If later, it would still be very early, however, since we do find the 12-fold sequence in various early texts, not only Pali and Chinese but also Sanskrit. Maybe also tibetan, not sure.

I’d have more to say on this but it gets us too far off topic. Thanks for sharing!

[knotty36]

@Sunyo

If by this “special sense” he means that paccaya suddenly gets a new meaning depending on whether we talk about the normal person or the enlightened being, I think that would be overburdening the word paccaya.

Yes, I didn’t read him as saying that paccayā itself gains a quality of sufficiency, but rather that the presence of avijjā is sufficient to lend to the chain as a whole the quality of necessarily maturing in its transmigration, which simultaneously lends sufficiency to all intermediate factors.

BTW, what do you call that? that avijjā is both necessary for the arising of dukkha and necessarily brings about the arising of dukkha.

[Sunyo]

@knotty36

@Sunyo

overburdening the word paccaya.

Yes, I didn’t read him as saying that paccayā itself gains a quality of sufficiency, but rather that the presence of avijjā is sufficient to lend to the chain as a whole the quality of necessarily maturing in its transmigration, which simultaneously lends sufficiency to all intermediate factors.

That’s how I read it, too.

@knotty36

BTW, what do you call that? that avijjā is both necessary for the arising of dukkha and necessarily brings about the arising of dukkha.

Then it would be both a necessary and sufficient condition. It’s a bit confusing in English, with “necessarily” implying sufficiency. But in this case it means not a necessary condition but a necessary result. The result always follows from the cause. Therefore, the cause is sufficient for the result. (As said in the essay, sufficiency and necessity are dual in this way.)

[knotty36]

Really? I originally figured that but then discounted it because, for example, in the proposition x-paccayā y, I understand “sufficiency” to mean that x and x alone is sufficient to lead to the arising of y. This is decidedly different from the effect of avijjā on the arising of dukkha: the latter necessarily arises when the former is present, but much more than just the former is needed; that is to say, avijjā alone is insufficient to cause dukkha to arise.

[Sunyo]

@knotty36

I understand “sufficiency” to mean that x and x alone is sufficient to lead to the arising of y.

What do you mean by “x and x alone”? If you mean that the sole presence of x is sufficient for y, then yes. That’s a sufficient condition.

But if you mean that only x leads to y and nothing else leads to y, then no. This is not what a sufficient condition implies.

It could be the case that x is sufficient for y, but at the same time z is also sufficient for y. That’s precisely one of the problems I have with the translation “if there is this …”

We can say, “if it’s Saturday, it is a weekend” but at the same time also “if it’s Sunday, it is a weekend”. Both Saturday and Sunday are sufficient for it being a weekend.

Likewise, if we say “if there is avijja, there will be sankharas” (i.e. avijja is sufficient for sankharas), then we don’t rule out that there could also be other sufficient conditions for sankharas. But the whole point is that all sankharas (in this context) come from avijja. That’s one reason I prefer to translate “only if there is ignorance, there will be willful actions”.

@knotty36

the latter [dukkha] necessarily arises when the former [avijja] is present

If avijja were a sufficient condition for the arising of suffering, as Watts suggest, indeed. In context of DO, I don’t think it is, however. Because suffering in the sequence of factors comes only after birth, and not all avijja is sufficient to cause birth, as I argued in the essay. It is specifically the avijja around the time of death that would result in birth and the resultant old age and death and other suffering.

@knotty36

avijjā alone is insufficient to cause dukkha to arise.

Yes exactly, in context of rebirth at least.

But if it alone is insufficient, then it is not a sufficient condition. So I actually disagree with Watts on this, which is another reason why I think he picked a bad example to make his case.

[knotty36]

@Sunyo

What do you mean by “x and x alone”? If you mean that the sole presence of x is sufficient for y, then yes. That’s a sufficient condition.

Exactly, exactly, exactly!

@Sunyo

But if you mean that only x leads to y and nothing else leads to y, then no. This is not what a sufficient condition implies.

No, not at all.

@Sunyo

So I actually disagree with Watts on this, which is another reason why I think he picked a bad example to make his case.

Alright, I get. And I agree with you. (This use of non-Buddhist terminology to explain Buddhist metaphysics is new to me—and a bit confusing!) “Sufficient,” it seems was the wrong word for Watts to use. The distinction I was attempting to get at (and I think you misunderstood me) was that avijjā is necessary, but not sufficient; however, in addition, its necessarily resulting in the arising of dukkha places it in a third category as well, wholly apart from necessity and sufficiency: it necessarily results in dukkha, but it alone is insufficient, being only one of several necessary conditions.

(And, yes, there is confusion in English surrounding the word “necessary,” but a condition’s necessity for an outcome does not equate to that condition necessarily resulting in whatever outcome we’re discussing.)

I originally wanted to know if there was a cute little name for that as well, but now I’m just tired.