Interpretation of bhikkhunī pārājika 5

I don’t agree with this.

I think the issue of ‘what is consent?’ is important here.
If we take consent as not saying ‘no’ it is very different to saying ‘yes’.

Consent is an agreement to do something. If someone doesn’t say ‘no’ it doesn’t mean they are agreeing to do something. Being able to agree to something requires everyone involved feeling free-enough and safe- enough to tune into ourselves, and to communicate openly with others, about who we are, what our capacities are, and what we want and don’t want.

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Ven @Khemarato.bhikkhu also picked me up on this:

You can see my reply above.

Again, this is a quote taken out of context.

The important point is one of self understanding.

I suspect too much is being read into the line you’ve quoted me on, Ven. :pray:t5:

But perhaps that’s what we’re all, after 25 centuries, trying to do here: read a lot into one small, but potentially powerful, rule.

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Once again, thanks everyone for taking an interest. I’ve now updated my original post with the information received, especially Ven. Vimalañāṇī’s excellent translations of the parallels in Chinese. Because the changes are so great, I am reposting it here rather than editing the original above. Further comments are very welcome!

Bhikkhunī pārājika 5

Bhikkhunī pārājika 5 presents us with the seemingly strange case of a bhikkhunī committing a pārājika offence by consenting to the touch of a man, but no offence at all if she herself touches a man. The rule reads as follows:

“If a lustful nun consents to a lustful man making physical contact with her, to touching her, to taking hold of her, to contacting her, or to squeezing her, anywhere below the collar bone but above the knees, she too is expelled and excluded from the community. The training rule on above the knees.” (1)

To get our bearings, let’s start by investigating the Vibhaṅga. The word-interpretation section has no relevant information, but the permutation series does. Here is the first permutation, which is typical of the entire series:

“If both have lust and he/she makes physical contact, below the collar bone but above the knees, body to body, she commits an offense entailing expulsion.” (2)

“Makes physical contact” renders āmasati. No agent is specified, and thus my provisional rendering “he/she”. Going by the wording of the rule, it would seem the agent must be the man. The commentary, however, states that the agent may be either the man or the bhikkhunī:

“Makes physical contact, body with body: the bhikkhunī touches whatever (part of the) body of a man with her body as delimited, or the man touches the body of the bhikkhunī as delimited with whatever (part of) his body. In both cases, there is a pārājika offence for the bhikkhunī.” (“As delimited”, yathāparicchinnena, presumably refers to the fact that the touching must be below the collar bone and above the knees.) (3)

Is there anything in the Canonical text that supports the commentary? As it happens, there is one unusual case in the permutation series that deserves closer attention. The ambiguity in the agent continues for the entire permutation series, except in one case:

“If both have lust and she makes physical contact with a spirit, a ghost, a paṇḍaka, or an animal in human form, below the collar bone but above the knees, body to body, she commits a serious offense.” (4)

Contrary to the formulation of the rule, in this sentence it seems required that the bhikkhunī is the agent. The various beings that are mentioned here are all in the genitive/dative case, which suggests they are not doing the touching, but are being touched. If the agent of āmasati in this case is the bhikkhunī, then it would be natural to conclude that the same must be true for the entire permutation series. The parallels in wording are just too close. This might then be taken as lending support to the commentarial position, which would mean that the agent may be either the man or the bhikkhunī. This would resolve the ambiguity.

Still, there are some immediate problems with the above suggestion. As we have just seen, the above sentence suggests that the bhikkhunī is the only agent. Yet taking the bhikkhunī as the sole agent for the entire permutation series goes too far, because it would fly in the face of the wording of the rule. What we have, in fact, are two different and irreconcilable positions: (i) the position of the rule, which says the man is the agent, and (ii) the position of the one sentence from the Vibhaṅga, which says the bhikkhunī is the agent. Only in the Commentary is this combined to suggest that either the man or the bhikkhunī can be the agent in all cases, including in the rule. Yet it is by no means obvious that the commentary is right about this.

Let’s return to the sentence above that apparently concerns a bhikkhunī touching various kinds of beings. The first problem with understanding this sentence in this way is that it leaves out the case of these being touching the bhikkhunī. This is a rather major problem since the bhikkhunī being touched, not the bhikkhunī touching, is the concern of the main rule. It would mean that there is no statement anywhere about what the offence is if, for instance, a bhikkhunī consents to being touched by a paṇḍaka. In this way, a secondary development would be mentioned, whereas the main concern of the rule would not.

Another problem is that the permutation series would then mention the case of a bhikkhunī touching a number of beings of various kinds, including those belonging to non-human realms, but would not mention the case of a bhikkhunī touching a man. Thus, the most important case, by far, would be left out.

Given these obvious problems, I do not think it is acceptable to read the entire permutation series in light of this one unusual sentence. Instead, I think we need to follow the reading of the rule, which is only concerned with the case of a bhikkhunī consenting to a man touching her. The case of a bhikkhunī touching a man would not be covered.

How, then, might we understand the one sentence in the permutation series? I would suggest this sentence has been corrupted and originally had a structure closer to the one in the main rule. In the main rule the bhikkhunī consents to the touch of a man, the man being expressed in the genitive case, purisapuggalassa. The syntax of the sentence is such that this makes the man the agent. I would suggest the beings in the permutation series that are expressed in the genitive case should be understood in the same way. They are meant to be the actual agents of the sentence. The syntax no longer supports this, and thus my proposal that there has been a corruption of the text at some point in history. Originally the syntax may have been similar to what we find in the main rule.

Once we look at the text in this way, the problems mentioned above disappear. The case of various beings touching the bhikkhunī is then no more than a subsidiary rule under the main one. And the case of a bhikkhunī touching a man would no longer apply.

This suggestion is supported by the parallels to this rule in Chinese translation. Here are the translations of the bhikkhunī pārājika 5, as found in five different Vinayas, all translated from the Chinese by Bhikkhunī Vimalañāṇī:

“If a bhikkhunī, with a defiled mind, allows a man with a defiled mind, having removed her robes, to rub her up and down below the hairline and above the knees and the arms, to pull, push, press, and squeeze her, to lift her up and set her down, that bhikkhunī commits a pārājika, and doesn’t live in community.” (5)

Here we see the use of the word “allows”, which presumably functions in the same way as “consents to” in the Pali version. The Vibhaṅga to this rule then uses the same term throughout. This means that this is all about the man being the agent, not the bhikkhunī.

“If a bhikkhunī with a defiled mind and a man with defiled mind have their bodies touch each other with the thought to feel pleasure, below the eyes and above the knees, even with the slightest touch in this way, that bhikkhunī incurs a pārājika and shouldn’t live in the community.” (6)

Here both the bhikkhunī and the man are agents. This would seem to mean that there is only the full offence if both are involved in the touching.

“If a bhikkhunī in a mind-state altered by abundant desire, lets a man rub and touch her in all kinds of ways below the hairline, above the knees, and above the elbows, that bhikkhunī incurs a pārājika, and doesn’t live in community.” (7)

“Lets (rub and touch)” once again suggests that this has to do only with consent. No agency on the part of the bhikkhunī is mentioned.

“If a bhikkhunī with a defiled mind, feels pleasure from being rubbed and touched below the shoulders and above the knees by a man with a defiled mind, that bhikkhunī is pārājika, and shouldn’t live in community.” (8)

Here the term “feels pleasure” is likely to be equivalent to “consents to”. The Pali word behind “to consent” is sādiyati, which can also be rendered as “to feel pleasure”. This, then, is a third case of only the man being the agent.

“If a bhikkhunī with a defiled mind and a man with a defiled mind have their bodies touch each other below the armpits and above the knees; if they grasp, pull, push, rub upwards and downwards, lift up, set down, hold, and press each other, that bhikkhunī is pārājika, and doesn’t live in community, because she’s ‘one with bodily contact’.” (9)

This a second case of both the bhikkhunī and the man being agents. Yet even here the Vibhaṅga focuses on the man as the agent.

If we include the Pali version, we have four cases where the man is the only agent, and two cases where also the bhikkhunī is an agent. This suggests that only the man being the agent is the earlier reading. Moreover, in the two rules where both are agents, the natural interpretation is that the rule is only broken if both take part in the touching. And so again, if the bhikkhunī is the sole agent, there would be no offence. We have a situation where the man touching is always required for the committing of a pārājika offence, whereas the bhikkhunī touching is never sufficient in itself.

My overall conclusion from this brief comparative study is that there is no pārājika offence for a bhikkhunī who touches a man, whether she is lustful or not, assuming the man does not touch her. I would suggest the Pali should be interpreted accordingly.

(1) Bi Pj 5:1.54.1.1: Yā pana bhikkhunī avassutā avassutassa purisapuggalassa adhakkhakaṁ ubbhajāṇumaṇḍalaṁ āmasanaṁ vā parāmasanaṁ vā gahaṇaṁ vā chupanaṁ vā paṭipīḷanaṁ vā sādiyeyya, ayampi pārājikā hoti asaṁvāsā ubbhajāṇumaṇḍalikā ti.

(2) Bi Pj 5:2.2.1: Ubhatoavassute adhakkhakaṁ ubbhajāṇumaṇḍalaṁ kāyena kāyaṁ āmasati, āpatti pārājikassa.

(3) Sp 2.659: Kāyena kāyaṃ āmasatīti bhikkhunī yathāparicchinnena kāyena purisassa yaṃkiñci kāyaṃ puriso vā yena kenaci kāyena bhikkhuniyā yathāparicchinnaṃ kāyaṃ āmasati, ubhayathāpi bhikkhuniyā pārājikaṃ.

(4) Bi Pj 5:2.2.29.1: Ubhatoavassute yakkhassa vā petassa vā paṇḍakassa vā tiracchānagatamanussaviggahassa vā adhakkhakaṁ ubbhajāṇumaṇḍalaṁ kāyena kāyaṁ āmasati, āpatti thullaccayassa.

(5) Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, fascicle 42 (Part 1 of the seventh recitation chapter): 若比丘尼有漏心,聽漏心男子髮際以下至腕膝以上却衣,順摩、逆摩、牽推、按掐、抱上、抱下,是比丘尼得波羅夷不共住。」

(6) Mūlasarvāstivāda bhikkhunī vinaya, fascicle 5: 「若復苾芻尼自有染心,共染心男子,從目已下、膝已上,作受樂心身相摩觸、若極摩觸。於如是事,此苾芻尼亦得波羅市迦,不應共住。」

(7) Mahīśāsaka Vibhaṅga, pj.5: 「若比丘尼,欲盛變心,受男子種種摩觸:髮際已下,膝已上,肘已後。是比丘尼得波羅夷,不共住。」

(8) Mahāsaṅghika Vibhaṅga, pj.5: 若比丘尼漏心。漏心男子邊肩以下膝以上摩觸受樂者。是比丘尼波羅夷不應共住。

(9) Dharmaguptaka Vibhaṅga, pj.5: 若比丘尼染污心,共染污心男子,從腋已下膝已上身相觸,若捉摩、若牽、若推、若上摩、若下摩、若舉、若下、若捉、若捺,是比丘尼波羅夷,不共住。是身相觸也。」

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Thank you, Ajahn, for inviting me to comment again. :anjal:

I agree with your reasoning and have nothing to add to the issue you raised.

It may be beyond the scope of your present essay, but another question that often comes up in regard to pj 5 is whether the bhikkhuni needs to be naked to fall into the offense, i.e. if the contact needs to be skin-to-skin, or can be through clothes.
I’m sure you’ve noticed that three of the Chinese vinayas, Dg, Sarv, and Mi*, specify that the full offense is only incurred if the clothes are removed. The Pali agrees with this. The other two vinayas are silent on the issue.
(*You may not have seen that Mi says this. The Mi rule references the corresponding bhikkhu rule, ss2, and it’s found there.)

I just wanted to mention this here in case someone comes to this thread with this frequently asked question in mind, since I believe that you haven’t left a note about it in your translation.

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:grinning:

Yes, I did pick that up from the Vinayas in Chinese. This strengthens my pre-existing view that the touching has to be skin-to-skin for there to be the full offence. As you know, the Pali uses the expression “what is connected to the body”, which to my mind must include clothes.

I shall consider adding a note.

And the above little essay will be included in my translation as an appendix. So many thanks once again!

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